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T H E
Peculiar Doctrines of Revelation,

R E L A T I N G T O

PECULIAR SACRIFICES, REDEMPTION BY CHRIST, FAITH IN HIM,
THE TREATMENT OF DIFFERENT MORAL CHARACTERS BY
THE DEITY UNDER THE SEVERAL DISPENSATIONS OF REVEALED
RELIGION, &c.

Exhibited as they are taught in HOLY SCRIPTURE;

And the R A T I O N A L E of them ILLUSTRATED,
IN TWO ESSAYS, viz.

ESSAY I. On the Rectitude of Divine Moral Government in the Treatment of
RATIONAL CREATURES.

ESSAY II. On the Rectitude of Divine Moral Government in the Treatment of DIFFER-
ENT MORAL CHARACTERS under the several Dispensations of Revealed Religion,
viz. The ADAMICAL, PATRIARCHAL, HEBREW, and CHRISTIAN.

TO WHICH ARE SUBJOINED

T W O D I S S E R T A T I O N S, viz.

DISSERT. I. On the Office of JESUS CHRIST, as MEDIATOR and SURETY of the
new Covenant.

DISSERT. II. On the PERSON of JESUS CHRIST.

In TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

By JAMES RICHIE, M. D.
Author of *The Criticism upon modern Notions of Sacrifices.* /

Abfit, ut, qui totum orbem terrarum aequitate moderatur, is aequitate non utatur.
Genesis xviii. 25.

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THE
Peculiar Doctrines of Revelation



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RELIGION, &c.

Explained as they are taught in Holy Scriptures;
And the RATIONALE of them ILLUSTRATED,

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RATIONAL CREATURES.


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DISSERT. II. On the Person of Jesus Christ.

IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. I.

By JAMES RICHIE, M.D.
Author of 'The Christian upon modern Notions of Sacrifice.'
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THE

P R E F A C E.

THE following performance I promised, some years ago, to offer to the public for their encouragement, in the Preface to my Criticism upon modern Notions of Sacrifices. And in consequence of that promise, and their encouragement, it is now published.

The existence of this work has been more owing to accident, and to such a series of unexpected ideas and thoughts as very often offer themselves to the human mind when it is deeply engaged in any particular subject, than to design.—Private satisfaction was all that was, at first, intended, without any thoughts of being an Author.

Having no clear, distinct, and satisfactory idea of the death of Jesus Christ as a sacrifice for sins, and not being able to find any help from any thing that had been written on that subject, I seemed to myself to be without resource, and in the hopeless state of a blind person who has no prospect of ever beholding the light. But hearing that the learned and ingenious Mr. Balguy, whose merit and great abilities had, at that time, become very conspicuous, and were justly celebrated by all sensible and intelligent men, was publishing a Tract upon Redemption, I exulted in the hope of having the mist, which hung over my bewildered mind,

mind, soon dispelled by such an elegant and able pen. Full of this flattering expectation, I procured that celebrated piece: But, upon the perusal of it, found myself utterly disappointed. For though that Reverend Gentleman sets out with observing, that there is an essential difference between the moral character of a penitent sinner and that of an innocent or perfectly righteous creature; and that this essential difference of moral character is a proper basis, or reason, for an essential difference of treatment; yet, in the sequel of his performance, instead of assigning a different treatment to those two different moral characters, or of making the sacrifice of Christ the instrument or mean by which a difference is made and constituted between their treatment, as he should have done, had he acted consistently with his first principles; he, on the contrary, assigns the very same treatment to both characters, and makes the sacrifice of Christ the mean, by which this sameness of treatment is brought to a consistency with divine rectitude; that is, the mean whereby that, which is absolutely, and in itself, inconsistent with divine rectitude, is brought to a consistency with it; which is a contradiction to common sense, as well as to those principles with which the Author had set out. Withal, his idea of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ being arbitrary, and very different from that idea of it which is conveyed to us in scripture, (which makes it to consist in his death, and not in the perfect obedience of his whole life) and being applied to such a bad use, I could not think it wise or rational to acquiesce in it.—Wherefore, being thus disappointed in my expectations from this performance, I was resolved to try whether that light, which I wanted, and could not obtain from the systems and writings of men, might not be procured by private industry, and a careful and diligent study of the Holy Scriptures. And, in the prosecution of this resolution, I proposed to examine very carefully (1) What idea was affixed to placular sacrifice in the Levitical Law, which is the most ancient, and the only authentic writing in which we have any account of the nature and end of that mode of worship. And, (2) Whether that idea of placular sacrifice could, or could not, be properly applied to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, which, in the writings of the New Testament, is said to be, what the legal placular sacrifices were, a sacrifice and atonement for sins.

In

In examining the first point, I found, that piacular sacrifice was not a thing of a ceremonial nature, and merely symbolical or typical in its use; but that it was a necessary implement or instrument of divine moral government in the treatment of penitent sinners, as being the mean whereby a due difference was made and preserved between their treatment and that of perfectly righteous creatures, when they were discharged from the grievous punishment of the impenitent.—But perceiving that this idea of piacular sacrifice could not be duly exhibited and illustrated, without a clear explanation of the particular treatment which those of the penitent character had from the Deity, under the Hebrew Theocracy; and observing also, that the treatment, which persons of that moral character had, under that dispensation of religion, was of a relative nature, and could not be clearly explained without comparing it with the treatment of those other moral characters to which it had a relation; I found myself under a necessity either to desist from pursuing the inquiry any further, or to take a view of the treatment which every different moral character had from the Deity under the law of Moses, and to account for the rationale of it. And this was what gave birth to the third part of the second Essay, which was executed before any other part of the complex work.

Having thus finished the first part of my design, and got a clear and distinct view of the idea which is affixed to piacular sacrifice in the Levitical law; I proceeded to the execution of the second part of it, viz. To examine, whether that idea of piacular sacrifice, was, or was not, applicable to that sacrifice which Jesus Christ offered of himself for sins; and, of course, whether that sacrifice be a piacular sacrifice in a true and proper sense, or only in a figurative one.—But I had gone but a little way in this scrutiny, before I perceived, that redemption from that death, which had been introduced by the lapse of our first parents, was one of those effects which are attributed, in the writings of the New Testament, to the death of Christ as a sacrifice for sins; that, therefore, no clear and satisfactory account could be given either of the effects of the death of Christ as a sacrifice for sins, or of the nature of the efficacy by which it produceth those effects; without first setting the state

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of mankind, with regard to life and death, in a just and proper light; and that this last could not be done to any purpose, but by exhibiting the treatment which persons of different moral characters had from the Deity under both the Adamical and Patriarchal dispensations of religion, and accounting for the rationale of it. The prospect which this unexpected discovery of the necessity I would be under to go through so much tedious and hard work, before I could proceed one step further, presented to my view, was very discouraging, and gave such a shock to my spirits, already fatigued, and even exhausted by hard study, that here I gave over the prosecution of the inquiry, even with a resolution never to resume it.

However, the subject having got such a thorough possession of my mind; that it would be always intruding itself into my thoughts, that resolution was dropt in a little time; and an uncommon ardour to pursue the inquiry, even through all those difficulties which had unexpectedly offered themselves to my view, returned.—Upon resuming the subject, I found, that the exhibiting, under every particular dispensation of revealed religion, the treatment which different moral characters had from the Deity, and the accounting for the rationale of it, would occasion a frequent repetition of the same things, and make the work very tedious. And, therefore, to remedy this inconveniency as far as I could, I proposed to exhibit, in one general view, the treatment proper to different moral characters under divine moral government, together with an illustration of the rationale of it, and an answer to any objections which might seem to lie against it; that I might have this performance to refer to, instead of repeating the same things and reasonings. And that I might not miss my way, and deviate from scripture-doctrine, in the execution of this piece, I proposed to make the treatment, which different moral characters had from the Deity under the Hebrew Theocracy, (with which I was now well acquainted) the basis and plan of it; as thinking that the treatment, which different moral characters had from the Deity under the other dispensations of revealed religion, might be of the same general nature with it; in which thought, I afterwards found, I was not deceived.—The execution of the last mentioned proposal, in the manner

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ner mentioned, gave birth to the first Essay of this work; which, tho' it may appear to some as a detached and unrelated piece, or an hypothesis of my own framing, is a general theory of the treatment which different moral characters had from the Deity under the Hebrew Theocracy, and, indeed, under every other dispensation of revealed religion, together with the rationale, and a defence, of it; and so has the most close connection with the other parts of the complex work.

Having thus got rid of one great incumbrance, I proceeded to the execution of the first and second parts of the second Essay; wherein I have set the treatment of different moral characters, under the Adamic and Patriarchal dispensations of religion, and the rationale of that treatment, and the state of mankind with regard to life and death, in as full and clear a light as the obscurity, in which these subjects are necessarily involved by the shortness of the history which we have of them, would permit.

The way being thus prepared for it, I now proceeded to the execution of the second part of my first and original design, viz. To examine whether the idea, which is affixed to piacular sacrifices in the Levitical law, is, or is not, applicable to the sacrifice which Christ offered of himself for sins; and, of course, whether that sacrifice is a piacular one in a true and proper sense, or only in a figurative one. And as this could not be done, without exhibiting the treatment which penitent sinners have from the Deity under the Christian Theocracy; nor this last, without comparing their treatment with that of other moral characters under the same dispensation of religion; I found it would be necessary, to take a particular view of the treatment which every different moral character has from the Deity under the Christian Theocracy, and to account for the rationale of it. And this is what is done in the fourth and last part of the second Essay.

From these beginnings, and by these steps, has this work arrived at the state in which it is now presented to the public.—And, in, order to render what I have said on the subject of the last part of the second Essay as full and complete as I could make it, I have subjoined two Dissertations to it; the first, concerning the office of Jesus Christ, as mediator and surety of the new covenant; and the second, concern-

ing his person : which Dissertations may, I hope, cast some light upon two very dark and perplexed subjects, and give satisfaction to the minds of those who cannot swallow down the absurdities of human systems, and are concerned to have a scriptural and rational faith.

I have given the foregoing account of the rise, progress, and intention of this work, in order to give the reader a clear view of the connection and dependence of its several parts.—And from it, it will be easy to see, whether the method, which has been followed in the execution of it, is a natural and just one, and the best that could have been used for the discovery of truth; and whether, upon the supposition, that the main points, proposed to be examined, were to be set in a clear and just light, the performance could have been brought within a narrower compass than it is.

As it now stands, it exhibits a just view of all the peculiar doctrines of revelation, relating to peculiar sacrifices, redemption by Jesus Christ, and the treatment which different moral characters have, or have had, from the Deity under the several dispensations of revealed religion, and that as they are delivered and taught in Holy Scripture; and illustrates the rationale of those doctrines, or their congruity to the rectitude of divine moral government.

I have been very careful to exhibit those doctrines as they are delivered in Holy Scripture, and in the true and genuine sense of the language of it. As all proper regard has been shewn to the peculiar idoms of the original languages; so all pains have been taken to find out the true signification of the words of them, and to admit it in all cases. And when any word occurred, that was of an uncertain or equivocal signification, I have always made the context, and, common sense, determine the sense which it bore in those passages which I had to consider.—By a strict adherence to those rules, I have been, sometimes, carried out of the common and ordinary tracts of thinking, and, not seldom, been obliged to correct my own former sentiments and opinions: But for those excursions from beaten paths, I hope for a easy and ready excuse from all reasonable men; especially, as they have been made, not from any preconceived prejudice against the private opinions of any particular doctor, or against the current popular opinions of the age (of whose company I would have been glad.

glad, could I have had it upon any reasonable and honourable terms) nor out of complisance to the conceits and fancies of my own imagination; but from a sacred reverence for a better and higher guide, viz. Scripture truth. Wherefore, if any new discoveries have been made, I would have them called OLD LIGHT, as, indeed, all true and genuine Scripture truth is, at what time soever, or by whomsoever, it is discovered. And I would here enter a caveat against their being called NEW LIGHT, till such time as it has been fairly and clearly proved, that they are not true and genuine Scripture doctrines. And I the rather enter this caveat, not only because it has its foundation in protestant principles and good sense, but because many have, of late years, got the mean and artful knack of giving the nick-name of NEW LIGHT to every discovery of OLD SCRIPTURE TRUTH, which has any tendency to rob them of their favourite-system, and to give a fatal overthrow to such unscriptural doctrines as are not so old, by far, as popery itself; yea many of them, not the age of their own great great grand-fathers. And the foregoing caveat I enter, against all offenders of this sort, under this certification, that, for the future, they will be reckoned, what they really are, viz. Stiff in modern errors, and enemies to old Scripture-light and truth. But to return from this needful digression.

The reasonings, by which the rationale of the Scripture-doctrines, aforesaid (for scripture-doctrines I take them to be) is established, are all grounded on common sense, and the nature of things; and, as far as I know, have no defect in them.

No precarious, unsupported, or disputable hypothesis is assumed or adopted in any part of this work. Scripture-truth is the foundation of the whole fabrick, as far as I know: nor is any thing admitted for Scripture-truth, that is a contradiction to reason, or shocking to common sense; or that is not either proved to be such by the plain declarations of Scripture it self, or deducible from its uncontested doctrines by natural and just consequence, and the rules of sober criticism.

The reader, I think, will find a perfect harmony and consistency between all the parts of the general scheme, and each part of it well supported. He will not meet with any thing that is taken upon trust; or admitted, but after the most mature examination. And he will find, that

that the same ideas are always affixed to the same words, and invariably adhered to, through the whole performance.

The idea of piacular sacrifice, which is exhibited in this work, is no whim or conceit of mine, nor a groundless hypothesis borrowed from others: but it is proved to be that very idea which is affixed to piacular sacrifice in the writings of Moses, which contain the most ancient, and, indeed, the only authentic, and, therefore, the best account of the nature, design, and use of piacular sacrifices. And this idea of piacular sacrifice is preserved, unvaried, through all those dispensations of revealed religion that were posterior to the lapse of the first parents of mankind: And, in the last of them, in particular, (viz. The Christian Theocracy) it is applied to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, because it was a sacrifice for sins, and, therefore, of the piacular kind.

It may, however, occasion surprize to many, when they come to find this idea of piacular sacrifice applied to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, as, indeed, it did to my self, when I first perceived that it was to be so applied. But their surprize will greatly subside, when they have considered, that it is really applicable to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ; and that his sacrifice, so understood, has a natural and genuine efficacy for producing all the effects which are assigned to it, and that in a perfect consistency with the rectitude of divine moral government; which cannot be affirmed of the sacrifice of Christ, if it be understood in any other sense. And it will, I think, quite cease, when they have considered further, that this idea of piacular sacrifice, if it be not applied to the sacrifice of Christ, must either be denied to be the true and right idea of piacular sacrifice, or the sacrifice of Christ must be denied to be a true and proper piacular sacrifice. And the first they will, I think, find very hard to prove; and the second to be inconsistent with plain Scripture-doctrine. To all this let me add, that, when this idea of a piacular sacrifice has been rejected as a false one, and condemned as being unapplicable to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, the treatment, which penitent sinners are represented to have from the Deity under the Christian Theocracy, and to have had from him under the preceding dispensations of revealed religion, will be found to be inconsistent with the rectitude of divine moral government; and the general systems of revelation to be left as naked, and incapable of any defence, as that of Deism it self.

But

But tho' much may be said for the truth and consistency of the general scheme (which, I believe, is scriptural, and will endure the severest scrutinies of reason, without receiving any hurt from them) yet I dare not take upon me to say, that every thing, advanced in this performance, is undoubted stirring truth. I have taken all possible pains to make it such; and know no other, but that it is such. Nevertheless, being a weak, fallible man, 'tis very possible I may have been mistaken in some things. And, indeed, considering the large extent of the subject, the multiplicity of its parts, and the great confusion and obscurity in which I found the most part of them, 'tis much if I have not. However, these mistakes will not be found to affect or destroy any part of the general scheme: And the thinking and wise part of mankind, who know that proper allowances must be made for the foible of fallibility, will readily excuse them, especially, in a first Essay on a subject so large and difficult. And that the reader may not be led into error by any mistake of mine, I would advise him, to peruse this performance with due caution, and to examine every thing for himself. And if he discovers any defects, imperfections, mistakes, misrepresentations of Scripture-doctrine, or wrong and inconclusive reasonings, in any part of it, the communication of his remarks, made, with a christian temper, upon the basis of common sense, will be gratefully accepted and duly regarded by one who doth not set up for a dictator, and aims at no higher station than that of a scholar and sincere inquirer after truth. And, for his encouragement, I here promise to retract, in a public manner, whatever, he may convince me, is inconsistent with truth; and to give him further satisfaction, if I find his remarks to be grounded on mistake, and wide of truth: For I am so little in love with error, that I sincerely desire to be delivered even from involuntary mistakes; and, I thank God, there is no worldly interest of mine that I could wish to be served by falsehood and the ruin of truth.— If such persons as are bigoted to unscriptural systems and lucrative popularity, or disposed to enter audaciously into subjects for which they have no talents, and would put off noise, chicanery, and raillery for argument and good reasoning, shall presume to give me any trouble with their clamour and nonsense, they will miss their aim; for, whether they belong to the great or the little vulgar, I will take no notice of them.

As this work was, at first, begun, and, afterwards, prosecuted, with a sole view to private satisfaction; it is now made public with a more extensive one, to public good. And I am not without some hope, that it may be of use, to give satisfaction to such minds as are open to truth, but as much in the dark as my own once was; to rescue the peculiar doctrines of revelation out of the hands of QUACKS (who are every where dispensing them with abundance of zeal, noise and absurdity) where they have remained too long; to enable rational and sensible divines to preach those doctrines, upon the foot of common sense, and with confidence and a good conscience, to the most polite and judicious assemblies, and in a way that has a direct and natural tendency to promote the general practice of piety and virtue; to promote the knowledge of the excellence, perfection, and usefulness of revelation; and to detect the weakness, defects, and absurdity of Deism, as it stands at present; and to bring it into disgrace with the rational and sensible part of mankind, as an imperfect and indefensible system. And if it shall be found to subserve these excellent purposes in any measure, I shall have my end. —I conclude with regret, that the bulk and price of this work could not be brought within a less compass. But as it is not owing to choice, but inability, that this is not done, the public must, and, I hope, readily will, excuse the length and bulk of it.



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 cuity, I shall,

Divine Moral Government

IN THE
 TREATMENT OF RATIONAL CREATURES.

TO those who believe a providence nothing can be more interesting, than to know what treatment men have to expect from the Deity in consequence of their behaviour. And to those who believe revelation nothing can be more desirable, or of higher importance, than to have some rational assurance, that the treatment, which persons of different moral characters are therein represented to receive from the Deity, is such as may be depended on. But, without a previous knowledge of the rectitude of divine moral government in the treatment of rational creatures, 'tis impossible to attain to any solid satisfaction about either of these points: For, if this is wanting, we have no certain *criterion*, whereby to form any judgment about them. 'Tis the design of this *Essay* to supply
 B those,

those, who have any concern for satisfaction about these interesting subjects, with a clear and full view of the only rule whereby they can make a true and just judgment about them, by a free inquiry into the rectitude of divine moral government in the treatment of rational creatures. In the prosecution of this design, I shall ground my reasonings solely upon the attributes of Deity, human nature, the nature and end of moral government, such unquestionable facts as are vouched by experience, observation, and common sense; without paying any regard to popular opinions, or human systems. And that I may proceed in it with due perspicuity, I shall,

First. Premise some observations concerning the nature, end, and rectitude of divine moral government, considered as exercised over rational creatures in general.

Secondly. Inquire into the rectitude of divine government in the treatment of the human species *in particular*. And

Thirdly. Answer such objections as may possibly be made to what shall be said under the first two heads.



CHAP. I.

Containing some observations concerning the nature, end, and rectitude of divine moral government, considered as exercised over rational creatures in general.

§ 1. **D**IVINE moral government consists in the Deity's setting such laws or rules, to the behaviour and actions of rational creatures, as are calculated to promote the end which he proposes to subserve by the administration of it; and in enforcing obedience to those laws, by a proper application of rewards and punishments. This definition, I presume, will be allowed to exhibit a true and just idea of divine moral government.

§ 2. All Theists, who believe the existence of a Deity, and that he is an intelligent being, are agreed, that there is a supreme view, an



an ultimate end, which he aims at, and prosecutes in all his works, whether of creation, or of providence and government. And, indeed, this is what must be confessed to be true, by all those who have any right and worthy notion of the Deity, as an intelligent being. For if his attribute of intelligence be real and infinite, he must needs aim at some ultimate end, in every action and work of his: If he did not, he would act blindly and unintelligently, at random, and without any aim; *that is*, inconsistently with his own attribute of intelligence; which it is impossible for an all-perfect mind to do.

§ 3. But tho' Theists unanimously agree, that the Deity proposes and prosecutes some ultimate end, in all his actions and works; yet, in determining what that ultimate end is, they go into different sentiments. Some of them are of opinion, that the *constitution and production of order* is that ultimate end: And others think, that it is not the *constitution and production of order*, but the *communication of good or happiness*.---But that neither of these is the supreme view and ultimate end of the Deity in his actions and works, seems to be very evident, because he neither would, nor could, aim at either, as an end, unless the prosecution of it was more congruous to his nature, and more pleasing to him, than the prosecution of the contrary would be. If *order and confusion*, the *happiness and misery* of his creatures, were alike indifferent to the Deity, he could not propose any of them, as an end, to be prosecuted by any action of his. Or, supposing them to be all equally pleasing to him; there would not, in this case, be any reason to determine him to choose one of them before another; but he must choose them all equally, one as well as another, as ends to be pursued by him. And, therefore, that he prefers the *production of order and happiness* to the *production of disorder and misery*, must be solely owing to this, that the production of the former gives him *pleasure*, whereas the production of the latter would give him *disgust*; consequently, pleasure must be his ultimate end, both in the *production of order*, and in the *communication of good*.—Besides, if the *communication of good* be prosecuted by the Deity, as an end, without any view or regard to the pleasure thence arising, the communication of it would be no goodness, nor any proof of goodness, in him: For no being is, or can be accounted good, merely for the doing of beneficent actions, provided

vided that he neither seeks, nor takes, any pleasure in the performance of them, and in the good which others receive from the performance of them. In like manner, if the *production or establishment of order* be prosecuted by the Deity, as an end, without any view or regard to the pleasure thence arising, the production and establishment of it would be no instance, or proof, of any excellence of nature in him, whether intellectual or moral, because it did not proceed from any affection to order nor was gratifying to such affection. In fine, as neither *order*, nor the *communication of good*, nor any thing else, can be a motive, or end, to any rational mind, in the performance of any action, but only so far as they affect and please it, or are expected to excite pleasure or delight; 'tis reasonable to think, and necessary to conclude, that *pleasure or delight*, and this alone, is the supreme view and ultimate end that is pursued by the Deity, and by all other rational beings, in all their actions and works.

§ 4. These arguments seem to me to prove, demonstratively, that *pleasure or delight*, is the supreme view, and ultimate end of the Deity in all his actions and works; and that the *establishment of order*, and the *communication of happiness*, if they are ends to him, (as they doubtless are) are only such ends as are of a secondary, mediate, and relative nature, as being wholly subservient and subordinate to the ultimate end, just now mentioned. And this seems to be perfectly agreeable to the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, which represents the gratification of *will*, or *inclination*, as being motive and end to the Deity in all his works of creation and providence (a).

§ 5. Now since pleasure or delight, is the supreme view and ultimate end of the Deity in all his works; and since all those actions of his, which are productive of satisfaction and pleasure to him, must be right actions, as being calculated to answer his supreme view and ultimate end in the performance of them; it would be an easy matter, to determine in all cases, with certainty, concerning the rectitude of the actions and works of the Deity, provided we had a true and perfect knowledge of the temper and disposition

(a) Gen. I. 31. Psal. CIV. 31. CXXV. 6. Isai. XLVI. 10. Rev. IV. 11. &c.

disposition of the divine mind. If, for instance, we had such an intuitive knowledge of the temper and disposition of Deity, as we have of the dispositions, affections, and aversions of our own minds, it would not only be possible, but very easy, to determine, even *a priori*, what actions and works would, and what actions and works would not, be congruous to his nature, and pleasing to him: For knowing his real temper and disposition, there would be no greater difficulty in pronouncing, before hand, concerning what was, and what was not, suitable to it, than after the action or work was done.—But such an immediate, intuitive knowledge of the temper and disposition of Deity, we have not, nor, indeed, any capacity for the attainment of it. So far from this, that we have no knowledge at all of the existence, much less of the attributes, temper and dispositions of God, but what we learn, *a posteriori*, from his works of creation and providence, and from those discoveries which he has been pleased to make of himself by revelation. And this defect of intuitive knowledge, is what renders it absolutely impossible for us to determine, *a priori*, concerning what is pleasing, or displeasing, to the Deity; or to pronounce any thing, in this way, about the rectitude of his actions or works.

§ 6. But tho' we can determine nothing, *a priori*, concerning what actions and works are, and what actions and works are not pleasing to the Deity; yet, in all cases of importance, we can determine about this point, *a posteriori*, with certainty; at least, with the highest degree of probability. For, from the knowledge which we have of actions and works which have been really done by the Deity, we may conclude, that those actions and works which have been done by him, are congruous to his nature, and such as give him *pleasure*; and that actions and works of a contrary nature would give him *disgust*. This way of reasoning is strong and conclusive; for, since pleasure, as has been demonstrated, is the supreme view and ultimate end of the Deity in all his actions and works; and since he cannot be disappointed in his aim, thro' a defect either of power or wisdom; it follows, that whenever he acts or works, he must reach and obtain his end, which is pleasure, or delight: Consequently, that all the actions which he doth, and all the works which

which he performs, must be such as are congruous to his nature, and give him pleasure: I say, all the actions and works which he doth; for, here, those actions and works which he doth, and those which he doth not, are carefully to be distinguished, since the former, for the reasons mentioned, must give him pleasure, whereas the latter may have a contrary effect, and give him disgust.

§ 7. In the whole system of the world, as far as it falls under our observation, there are plain marks of dependent and derived existence: For, there is no one part of it that is either self-existent, or such as could have given being to it self; or even such as can be reasonably thought to be the true, adequate cause of those beings in the production of which it is a *medium*, or instrument. And if so, we may fairly conclude, that the whole system of mundane things, and all the parts of it, are the real productions of the Deity: And, consequently, that this system of created things was, in its first and original state, such as answered his supreme view and ultimate end in the formation of it, by giving him delight or pleasure. Not only so, but, admitting that the temper and disposition of the Deity are unchangeable, and that what is pleasing to him at any one time, is pleasing to him at all times, it will follow, likewise, that the system of the universe, as far, and so long as, it remains in or is reduced to, the state in which it was at first formed; and the creatures which are in it, continue to answer the ends and uses, unto which they are fitted and destined, as parts of it; this system must ever be pleasing to the Deity, and subservient to his supreme view and ultimate end in the creation of it, as yielding delight and pleasure to him. And, therefore, since the Deity, considered as an intelligent and wise being, must be supposed to be concerned, intent, and active, to obtain and secure his supreme view and ultimate end in the formation of the system of the universe, it follows, that the conservation and support of this system, and of all its parts, in their natural right, and original state, (by upholding all its parts in their existence; preserving due order, harmony, and subordination among them; restraining them from being hurtful and destructive to one another; reducing those of them, which become thus noxious and

and injurious to others, to their proper state of subordination and usefulness in the system ; and by keeping them all up to such operation and action as is consistent with, and contributive to the conservation and well-being of that *whole* of which they are *parts* ;) I say, it follows, that the conservation and support of the system of created things in its right and natural state, in the ways, and by the means, mentioned, must be the object of the constant care of the Deity. Wherefore, since the conservation and well-being of the whole system of created things, in the state just now mentioned, must be the object of the constant care of the Deity; *the happiness of the creation* in general, must be the sole, immediate end of his providence over the whole world, and of that universal government which he exerciseth over all the parts of it, as being subservient and naturally subordinate to that which is his supreme view and ultimate end in all his works.

§ 8. The moral government of the Deity is only a part of that universal government which he exerciseth over the whole system of created things; that part of it, in particular, which he exerciseth over the several species of rational creatures. Wherefore, since the conservation and well-being of the whole system of the universe is the sole immediate end of that government which the deity exerciseth over all the parts of it; the conservation and well-being (or the happiness) of the several species of rational creatures, must be the sole immediate end of that part of this universal government which the Deity exerciseth over them; *that is*, of his moral government. This will be farther confirmed, by observing, that whatever be supposed to have been the supreme view and ultimate end of the Deity in the creation of the several species of rational creatures; the conservation or preservation of them, in such a state of safety and happiness as has been mentioned is indispensably necessary to promote and secure that ultimate end. For, it is self-evident, that as far as any species of rational creatures is ruined and destroyed; as far as order, harmony, and due subordination among the individuals of any species, is disconcerted; as far as any individual, or part, of a species are permitted to act for the hurt and ruin of their kind; and finally, as far

far as proper care is not taken to cause the individuals of every species to act such a part as is consistent with, and conducive to the good of the community; so far, in proportion, must the creator's supreme view, in the production of the several species of rational creatures, be disappointed and frustrated. And, therefore, it must be the immediate end of divine moral government to prevent this, by promoting such order, harmony, and mutual behaviour, among the individuals of each species, as may contribute to the safety and happiness of the community; and by restraining and discouraging such disorderly and injurious behaviour as may be productive of contrary effects.—To what has been said let me add, That the only *Criterion*, supplied by reason, or the light of nature, whereby we can form any judgment about what a reasonable creature is, or is not, required to do by the Deity; or about those *laws* or *rules* which he has, or has not, set to the actions of reasonable creatures, is taken from the tendencies of actions to the good or hurt of the species, or community. Whatever actions have a real tendency to promote the good of the species, we esteem the performance of them to be required by the Deity, merely because they have this tendency. And whatever actions have a contrary tendency, we esteem the performance of them to be prohibited by the Deity, only because they have a hurtful and destructive tendency. After this manner have all wise and thinking men, in all ages and places, formed a judgment about those *laws* by which the Deity governs moral agents: So that all the notion of that part of the law of nature, which has the direction and regulation of the manners and actions of reasonable creatures for its object, that any wise man has, or ever has had, is briefly this, That it is a requisition of the performance of all such actions as have a real tendency to promote the public good, and a prohibition of all actions which have a contrary tendency.—And indeed, the light of nature supplies us with no *criterion*, whereby to judge what actions are, and what actions are not, required from rational creatures by the Deity, but only this single one, which is taken from the tendency of actions to the benefit, or hurt of society. And this, without all doubt, is the reason, whereby wise men, in all ages and places, have

have been induced to consider the tendencies of actions to the good and hurt of society, as being the sole characters or marks of their being required or forbidden by the Deity. If the judgment, therefore, of the wisest of men, in all ages, be to be regarded and relied on, *public happiness*, or the *good of the community*, is the sole immediate end of the Deity in the exercise of his moral government over rational creatures.—To conclude; The evidence, now proposed, is, I think, abundantly sufficient to satisfy any fair and unprejudiced mind, that *the public welfare*, or *the happiness of the community*, is the sole immediate end of that moral government which the Deity exercises over every species of rational creatures; And that here, as well as in all civil governments, *Salus populi est suprema lex*. And if this be the sole immediate end of divine moral government, then it follows, that if any moral government, or any part or branch of moral government, which pretends to have the Deity for its author, be found, to have a tendency to promote the misery and ruin of rational creatures in general, or of any particular species of them, we may safely conclude, that that *frame*, or *part*, of moral government, is neither instituted nor exercised by the Deity, whatever be said or alledged to the contrary.

§ 9. The sum of all that has been said, is, That *pleasure* is the ultimate end which the Deity aims at in all his actions and works; That *the communication of good* to his creatures, *that is*, of happiness, and capacities for the enjoyment of it, is the thing which gives him delight or pleasure; and, therefore, that, both in the creation, and in the moral government, of rational creatures, he aims at their happiness as an end which is subordinate and subservient to his supreme view, and ultimate end, in all his actions and works; or, in other words, because their happiness gives him *pleasure*.—And what possibly can give us a more aimable and endearing view of the Deity, than the conceiving of him as thus engaged in creating and governing numberless myriads of rational creatures, with no other view than to make them happy; and as communicating happiness, and capacities for the enjoyment of happiness, to them, for no other reason, but because their happiness gives him pleasure and delight!—If, under
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the pretence of making the *goodness* of the Deity a more generous and disinterested principle of action, than I have here represented it, any person shall essay to explain it, without making *pleasure, delight, or private happiness*, the motive to the exercise of it, I shall only presume to caution him to take care, that he do not destroy the very idea of *goodness* by the attempt.

§ 10. Having fixed and settled the end of divine moral government, both ultimate and immediate; I now proceed, to make some observations on the rectitude of it.

§ 11. The rectitude of divine moral government consists in the *fitness* of the laws and sanctions of it to promote the ends of it, *that is*, the pleasure of the Deity *ultimately*, and the happiness of the several species of rational creatures *immediately*; this last being the source of pleasure and delight to the Deity: So that we can make no judgment or estimate of the rectitude, either of the laws, or sanctions, of divine moral government, but only from their tendency to promote the ends mentioned. The truth of this position is so plain and obvious, that it requires very little proof. For since the happiness of the rational creation, or of the several species of reasonable creatures, is the sole immediate end of divine moral government; and since the laws and sanctions of this government, are nothing but the means by which this end is promoted and secured; it follows, that the rectitude of these laws and sanctions must arise from, and, indeed, consist in, their *aptitude* or *fitness* to promote the *good* of the rational creation in general, and of the several species of reasonable creatures in particular. If, therefore, it shall be found, that all the laws, which the Deity is pleased to enjoin, for regulating the manners and actions of his reasonable creatures; and all the sanctions, by which obedience to these laws is enforced, have a true and just *aptitude*, or *tendency*, to promote their happiness as one great community, and the happiness of the several species into which they are divided; it must of necessity be acknowledged, that all these laws and sanctions are *good, just, and right*; and what they ought to be, in reference to the end which is to be subserved by them; and that nothing is wanting to their perfection and rectitude.

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On the other hand, if it shall be found, that the laws and sanctions which are supposed to belong to divine moral government, or any of them, have an aptitude or tendency to promote the misery or ruin of all rational creatures in general, or of any particular species of them; Or that, upon the whole, they have no tendency at all to promote their happiness; it is necessary to conclude, that these laws and sanctions are utterly void of rectitude, as having either no tendency at all to promote that which is the sole immediate end of divine moral government, or a contrary tendency; yea, and that the government itself, as far as it comprehends laws and sanctions which are either useless, or of bad tendencies, is no divine government, or government exercised by the Deity.

§ 12. As to the laws, which take place under divine moral government, they may be of two kinds; viz. 1st. moral 2^{dly}. ceremonial or ritual.

§ 13. Moral laws are those which enjoin the performance of such actions as have a natural tendency to promote public happiness, or the good of society; and forbid the performance of such actions as have a contrary natural tendency.—Concerning the rectitude of this sort of laws, there can be no doubt or dispute, since they have a natural tendency to hinder the misery, and promote the happiness of society, which is the immediate end and intention of divine moral government.

§ 14. Ceremonial or ritual laws are such as enjoin, or forbid, the performance of actions which, in themselves, have no natural tendency to promote either the good, or the hurt of society; but which, in certain circumstances, are useful and necessary; as either serving to bring such important *facts* frequently in view, as may be motives to rational creatures, to be steady in their gratitude and obedience to the Deity; or, as having a tendency to preserve upon their minds, a deep, affecting, and abiding sense of the *being, unity, and supreme universal dominion* of the Deity, by multiplying the branches and parts of their duty towards him, and keeping them more frequently employed in performing acts of worship and obedience, than otherwise they would be. In the divine government of

such a frail species as mankind are, who are apt to be very thoughtless about the *being, unity, and supreme dominion* of the Deity, and to suffer such important and striking *facts* to slip out of their minds, as might, if frequently remembered, be the means of rendering them steady in their gratitude, subjection, and obedience to him; in the divine government, I say, of such a thoughtless and forgetful race of creatures, the injunction of some ceremonial or ritual laws may, perhaps, be always expedient and useful, and, consequently, wise and right. And accordingly, it is notorious, that some laws of this sort, fewer or more, have been enjoined by the Deity, under every dispensation of revealed religion, even not excepting that which obtained while the first parents of mankind retained their innocence. But when idolatry, at any time, has a wide spread, and becomes fashionable; and the temptations to the practice of it are frequent and strong; and a people are not only verging towards it in their inclinations and affections; but have their sense of the *being, unity, and supreme dominion* of the Deity, greatly impaired by gross, stupid imaginations, and low sophistical reasonings; then it is, that the injunction of ceremonial or ritual laws, and even of a great number of them, becomes not only expedient and useful, but, in a manner, necessary, in order to prevent the entire subversion of divine moral government, and to preserve the very existence of it. And, indeed, in such a state of things as this, the injunction of a great number of ceremonial laws, and the rigorous execution of punishments, of sufficient weight, upon the transgressors of them, must have a very natural and strong tendency to prevent an entire dissolution of divine government; even such a tendency as nothing else could have, unless it were a frequent repetition of miracle after miracle; which could not answer the end mentioned as efficaciously as the other: For if they were of the beneficial kind, the frequency of them would soon destroy their striking influence upon the minds of men: And if they were of the destructive sort, instead of reforming, they would only destroy the subjects.—As this way of accounting for the rectitude of ceremonial or ritual laws, is so plain and easy in it self, that it must afford to every thinking mind a clear and satisfactory reason

reason for the institution and injunction of them under divine moral government; so, perhaps, it may, on that account, merit a preference to that way of accounting for the rectitude of them, which, tho' it silences all objections, yet, by taking an advantage from our ignorance, and resolving the rectitude of these laws into such secret and hidden reasons as are unknown to us, and as unknown to those who thus solve the difficulty as to others, it leaves the mind in an inextricable *labyrinth* of darkness, uncertainty, and perplexity.

§ 15. But leaving these short hints, concerning the rectitude of the laws of the Deity, to be considered by others; I proceed to that which is the main subject of this *Essay*, viz. To inquire after the rectitude of divine moral government in the application of the sanctions by which its laws are enforced.

§ 16. The sanctions, by which the laws of the Deity are enforced, are of two kinds, viz. REWARD and PUNISHMENT. Reward, either promised to, or conferred on, the obedient, as a motive and encouragement to obedience; and punishment, either threatened against, or inflicted on, the disobedient, as a check and discouragement to transgression.

§ 17. Divine reward, properly speaking, is some *natural good*, different from that which is the natural consequence of the action or actions required, which is either promised by the Deity to the obedient, or conferred by him on such, because they have been obedient: Or, in other words, It is *natural good* conferred by the Deity, in consequence of antecedent promise, on the obedient, on account of good behaviour, or obedience to his laws.—On the other hand, Divine punishment, strictly speaking, is some *natural evil*, different from that which is the natural consequence of the action or actions prohibited, which is either threatened by the Deity against the disobedient, or inflicted by him on such, because they have been disobedient: Or, in other words, It is *natural evil* inflicted by the Deity, according to antecedent warning and threatening, on the disobedient, on account of their ill behaviour, or disobedience to his laws.

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§ 18. According to these ideas of reward and punishment, reward doth not consist barely in the enjoyment of natural good, but in the enjoyment of such natural good only as is promised and conferred, on account of, and for, obedience performed. And punishment doth not consist in the mere suffering of natural evil; but in suffering such natural evil only as is threatened and inflicted, on account of, and for, transgression.

§ 19. Moreover, according to the ideas of reward and punishment, aforesaid, reward and punishment are not the natural good and bad consequences of obedient and disobedient actions; but they depend solely and wholly upon the will and appointment of the law-giver; who, after the actions have been done, and the natural consequences of them have all taken place, has power to confer or withhold promised reward, and to inflict or forgive threatened punishment, as he thinks fit; whereas the natural consequences of actions must take place, and cannot be prevented by the will of any being whatsoever. This way of conceiving of divine rewards and punishments must, I think, appear to be right and reasonable to every thinking and considerate person: For, if divine rewards and punishments were nothing but the natural, unavoidable consequences of the actions of rational creatures, the Deity could neither defer reward, nor forgive, or even delay, punishment, how much soever he was disposed and inclined to do it.—Besides, such rewards and punishments as these could have no influence at all, upon such persons as knew that they were the only ones they had to expect from the Deity, and, at the same time, preferred the pleasures and emoluments arising from acts of disobedience to those which are the result of acts of obedience; a thing which often happens among frail and thoughtless men: consequently, in all cases of this nature, such sanctions as these would be without force, and quite useless.—When these things are duly considered, it must, I presume, be allowed, that divine reward and punishment consist in such natural good and evil as are entirely different from the natural good and bad consequences of these actions to which they are annexed: If so, the common way of thinking, according to which, the good
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and ill natural consequences of actions are reputed to be the natural rewards and punishments of them, to say no worse of it, must be a very improper and loose way of thinking.—The natural consequences, indeed, of virtuous and vicious actions are motives, *sui generis*, to the practice of virtue, and determents from that of vice: But if, for this reason, we shall conceive of them as being rewards and punishments; yet we must allow, that they are such rewards and punishments as must of necessity take place, as soon as the actions, of which they are the natural and unavoidable consequences, have been done. 'Tis most certain, that rewards and punishments of this kind, are such, that the former cannot be with-held or deferred for one moment; nor the latter be forgiven, or even delayed for ever so small a space of time: And how far things of such an unstopable nature, can be reasonably deemed to be rewards and punishments appointed by the Deity, that all-wise and all-merciful being, who usually defers, for a long time, both the enjoyment of reward, and the infliction of punishment; and always forgives the latter upon the sinners repentance, I leave to the consideration and judgment of others. As for myself; I am fully satisfied, that divine rewards and punishments consist in such things, and such things only, as the Deity can either with-hold, or impart, even after the natural consequences of these actions, which are the grounds of them, have taken place.

§ 20. The rectitude of divine rewards and punishments, or rather, of divine government in the use of them, consists, as I have hinted already, in such an application or distribution of them as is duly calculated to promote the happiness of rational creatures in general, and of each species of them in particular. This is very evident; for since the good or happiness of the public is, as I have shewn, the sole immediate end of divine moral government; the laws of this government must, for this very reason, be all calculated for answering that end: And, for the very same reason, the sanctions, which are annexed to these laws, must be all intended to promote and secure the same end, by enforcing obedience to them. Wherefore, it being the sole and whole intention of divine rewards.

rewards and punishments, to enforce obedience to the laws of the Deity, *immediately*, and, by effecting that, to promote the good of the several species of rational creatures *ultimately*; it follows, that the rectitude of these rewards and punishments must consist in such an application or distribution of them as is best fitted to answer the ends mentioned: For when they are applied in such manner, and in such proportions, as have a natural tendency, and due fitness, to answer these purposes, the distribution of them must answer the whole intention of their institution; and, consequently, must be wise and right.

§ 21. If the Deity did make use of rewards and punishments, to restrain rational creatures, or any species, or part, of them, from acting for their own good and true happiness; or to enforce obedience to such laws, as have a tendency to promote their misery and ruin; such a proceeding would be wrong, and utterly inconsistent with rectitude. It would be repugnant to his own end and intention both in the creation and government of these his creatures: repugnant to his end in creating them, whatever this was, unless it should be absurdly supposed, that he made them on purpose to ruin and destroy them; which is a supposition, that is as inconsistent with the present state of the world, as it is with the wisdom and goodness of the Deity: repugnant, likewise, to his end in governing them, which is their happiness, and not their misery and ruin. Such a measure as this, would, likewise, be utterly inconsistent with the attributes of Deity. For the Deity to hold out reward to the view of reasonable creatures as a *good* that will make them happy, with no other real intention, but to excite such desires in their minds, as may push them on to act for their own hurt and ruin; or, to set punishment before them as an *evil* which will make them miserable, in order to deter them from the performance of such actions as are conducive to their real and true happiness: This, surely, would be, for him to practice the most mean and detestable cunning, in order to cheat them into ruin and misery, and to make them their own executioners. It would be, to deter them from the pursuit of true happiness, by the dread of misery; and to push them
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them on in the pursuit of real misery, by the hope and prospect of happiness: a mean, mischievous *trick*, inconsistent with the lowest degree of sincerity; which a God of infinite truth, goodness, wisdom, and power, can have no motive to practise, and never can practise, in a consistency with these his attributes; yea, which no being will ever attempt to practise, unless it be an impotent, mean-spirited tyrant, who wants to crush those by cunning and deceit, whom he cannot ruin by power and open violence.—Again, should the Deity endeavour to enforce obedience to laws which are hurtful and destructive to mankind, or any other species of rational creatures, by such an use and application of rewards and punishments as has been mentioned, the very attempt would be unnatural and foolish. It would be unnatural; for since rational minds are so formed, that the *desire of happiness*, either positive or negative, is the sole spring, or motive, by which they are excited and made to act; the annexing of rewards to actions which are naturally productive of misery, in order to enforce the performance of them; and the connecting of punishment with actions which are naturally productive of happiness, in order to deter creatures from the performance of them; would be most unnatural ways of dealing with, and influencing minds which are so formed; since the *natural desire of happiness* and *dread of misery*, planted in them, must stand in direct opposition to the influence of rewards and punishments so applied, or rather misapplied; and in such a fixed and firm opposition to it, as cannot be conquered by any thing, but force and violence.—This attempt would be as foolish, as it would be unnatural: For the wise and thinking part of any species of rational creatures would never be influenced to perform and forbear actions, by rewards and punishments so unnaturally applied, and having no tendency, but to befool them out of their happiness, and to inspire them with the madness of making themselves miserable. The ignorant, mistaken, thoughtless, and inconsiderate part of rational creatures, who had no just sense of the true natural consequences of the actions to which they were pushed on, or from which they were deterred, by such an application of rewards and punishments, being utterly insensible

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of their danger, would, doubtless, be easily caught in the snare, that was, in this case, laid for them: But the knowing, the thinking, and the wise, who had just and clear apprehensions of the true natural consequences of these actions, and of the injurious design of such an application of rewards and punishments, would be sufficiently animated, by the *natural desire of happiness*, and *dread of misery*, planted within them, to oppose and resist the influence of rewards and punishments so insidiously applied; nor could they ever yield to that influence, so long as their *desire of happiness*, and *dread of misery*, were not overcome and extinguished by over-bearing force and violence; in which event, their actions would no longer be the actions of intelligent minds, acting rationally.—To sum up all, in a few words, that has been said under this head: Such an application of rewards and punishments, as I have been here considering, would be obstructive to the Creator's end, both in the creation and government of rational creatures; inconsistent with the attributes of Deity; and a most unnatural expedient for influencing, or causing, rational minds to perform and forbear actions; yea, such an expedient, as could have no real effect at all upon the wise and thinking part of any species of them. And, therefore, such an application of rewards and punishments, under divine government, would be utterly wrong, and inconsistent with rectitude.

§ 22. But, indeed, since the happiness of the several species of rational creatures, is the sole immediate end of divine moral government; and since all the laws and sanctions, under this government, must be subservient to this end; 'tis impossible, that such an application, or rather, misapplication, of rewards and punishments, as I have been considering, should ever have any place under divine moral government.—Wherefore, setting aside the consideration of this misapplication or abuse of rewards and punishments, which is inconsistent with the end and rectitude of divine government; I now proceed, to consider that application of them, which is consistent with rectitude, and in which the rectitude of divine moral government, in relation to rewards and punishments, consists.

§ 23. It

§ 23. It has been just now proved, that the making use of rewards and punishments, as motives to restrain rational creatures from the performance of such actions as are productive of true happiness, and to push them on to the doing of such actions as have a tendency to hurt and ruin them, is inconsistent with the rectitude of divine moral government. From this, it seems, at first sight, to follow, That the rectitude of divine moral government, in making use of rewards and punishments, must lie in such an application of them as has a tendency to promote the contrary purposes; *that is*, to induce rational creatures to perform such actions as are productive of true happiness, and to deter them from doing such actions as will hurt and ruin them: So that the rectitude of divine government, in relation to rewards and punishments, must consist in using them as motives to action, not in opposition, but in aid, to the influence to these motives to act, and forbear acting, which arise from the consideration of the good and bad natural consequences of the actions themselves; *that is*, as motives to induce rational creatures to do these actions which have good natural consequences, and to forbear such as are naturally productive of ill consequences.—The truth of this notion or conception of the rectitude of divine government, in the administration of rewards and punishments, seems, as I have said, to be confirmed by the proof, which I have produced, of the falsehood of the contrary doctrine. And yet, the falsehood of the contrary doctrine will not be found to be a good and sufficient proof, or any proof at all, of the truth of it, but only upon the two following *suppositions*, viz. That rewards and punishments are natural and fit means for answering the purposes mentioned; and, That, in the administration and exercise of divine moral government, there is reason and occasion for making use of them as such.—The truth, therefore, of both these *suppositions* I shall first prove, and then deduce the consequences which naturally follow from them.

§ 24. That rewards and punishments are natural and fit means for inducing rational creatures to perform actions which have good consequences, and to forbear actions which are productive of ill consequences, I thus prove.—*Desire of good, either positive, as the*

enjoyment of happiness, or *negative*, as indolence from pain, is the sole motive by which the mind is, from time to time, made, or determined, to act, and to forbear acting. Whatsoever, therefore, serves to excite this desire of positive or negative good, must have a natural aptitude, to set the mind on action, or to make it forbear action. This desire, which is the universal motive and cause of action and inaction, is only excited, as experience teaches us, by the apprehension or perception either of some attainable, positive good, or of some avoidable evil or misery. Wherefore, because the promise of reward supplies the mind with a prospect of attainable happiness; and the threatening of punishment produces in it an apprehension of avoidable evil, or misery; the former has a natural aptitude to excite that desire of positive good; and the latter, to produce that desire of escape from perceived, avoidable evil, which are the sole motives by which the mind is, from time to time, determined to act, and forbear acting. And as the prospect of reward and punishment has this natural aptitude to determine the mind to action and inaction, so when the influence of them chimes in with, and comes in aid to, the influence of these motives to action and inaction, which arise from the consideration of the good and bad natural consequences of actions, they must have a very powerful influence upon sober and considerate minds, both as giving an additional force to the influence of these other motives, and as drawing the mind, not in a contrary, but in the self-same direction, in which it is impelled by their force.—To what has been said, let me add, that when reward and punishment are conjoined, in order to enforce the performance of an action which is productive of good consequences; *that is*, when reward is annexed to the performance of such an action, and punishment, both to the omission of it, and to the performance of the contrary action; they must, by this their combined force, act more powerfully upon the mind, and excite it to the performance of the action by a much stronger *stimulus*, than either of them, singly and separately applied to it, could do. And the same may be affirmed of the influence of reward and punishment, when they are properly joined together, in order

order to enforce the forbearance of actions of bad consequences: For, there is nothing more evident, than that the mind, when the joint force of any number of motives is applied to it, in order to draw it in some certain direction, must be more powerfully impelled and moved, than it could be, by the single and separate force of any one of them. And for this reason, this way of moving and determining the mind to perform and forbear actions, by the combined influence of reward and punishment, being more strong and forcible than any other, it may very properly be pursued where the case requires it, and motives of less weight will not answer.—Upon the whole, it is absolutely evident, as I think, that rewards and punishments, applied in aid to these motives which arise from the consideration of the natural consequences of actions, are very natural and proper means, for inducing rational creatures to perform and forbear actions, when these other motives stand in need of such aids.

§ 25. Again; That, in the exercise or administration of divine moral government, there reason and occasion for making use of rewards and punishments, for the purposes before-mentioned, is very clear and evident: For, not to insist on the felt and visible inefficacy of other motives upon the greater part of human minds; I shall only take notice, That the use and influence of rewards and punishments are necessary to the exercise, support, and the very existence, of any government which is instituted with a view to regulate the manners and actions of rational creatures, whether it be divine or human. If, under any government of this kind, the *subjects* were left without any motive to obedience, or check to disobedience, but such as arose from their own sense and apprehension of the good and bad consequences of their actions; every one of them would, in fact, be both law and law-giver to himself, and do that only which was good and right in his own eyes, without paying any the least regard to the will of any superior: consequently, the authority of the law-giver would be entirely destroyed, and the government itself utterly dissolved. The laws would not have any proper force, as laws; and the exercise of the government would be absolutely impracticable.

§ 26. Now

§ 26. Now the consequences, which are deducible from what has been proved in the two last *paragraphs*, are the following, viz. That because rewards and punishments have a natural aptitude to excite rational minds to act, and to forbear acting, even where the prospect of the natural consequences of the actions themselves do not move them; therefore, the application of rewards and punishments for the purposes mentioned, not in opposition, but in aid, to the other, must be a wise and right measure, such as may be followed by any legislator, whether God or man:—That because reward and punishment conjoined, in the manner before-mentioned, have a more powerful influence to excite rational minds to action and inaction, than either of them, separate and single, has; therefore, the combining them together in that manner, in order to enforce obedience to such laws as are calculated for the public good, must be a wise and right action in any legislator who has power to do it; consequently, in the Deity, whose power to reward the obedient is as extensive, as his power to punish the disobedient; which cannot be said of any other legislator:—And, *finally*, That because no legislative power can be supported or exist, nor any moral government be exercised, but only so far as rewards and punishments are made use of, to enforce obedience, and restrain disobedience to the laws; therefore, the establishment and application of rewards and punishments for the ends mentioned, must be a measure, not only fit and useful, but indispensably necessary, under moral government.—Thus it appears in general, That the establishment of rewards and punishments, in order to give additional force to these motives to action and inaction, which arise from the prospect of the good and bad consequences of actions, is both congruous to the nature of rational minds, and indispensably necessary to the exercise, yea, and to the very existence, of divine moral government; and, therefore, is not only consistent with the rectitude, but essential to the very being, of divine government; consequently, a measure, very proper to be taken by the Deity.

§ 27. But the main thing, which I have to note here, is, that rewards and punishments, when they are thus appointed and established,

lished, not in opposition, but in aid, to these motives to action and inaction which arise from the consideration of the good and bad consequences of actions, are directly subservient to the intention of the Deity in the exercise of his moral government, *viz.* the happiness of the several species of his rational creatures. This is almost self-evident. For since the happiness and misery of rational creatures depend on the consequences of their actions; and since the motives, which arise from the prospect of the good and bad consequences of actions, tend to excite the mind to perform such actions as are productive of good consequences, or happiness to it self, and its kind; and to deter it from doing such actions as are productive of ill consequences, or misery to itself, and others; 'tis plain, that whatever serves to encrease the *momenta*, or force of these motives which arise from the consideration of the good and bad consequences of actions, serves, at the same time, to prevent the misery, and promote the happiness of rational creatures; and, consequently, to accomplish that which is the immediate end of the moral government of the Deity. Wherefore, since such an use and application of rewards and punishments as serves to encrease the force of the motives mentioned, has a manifest and direct tendency to promote the happiness of the several species of rational creatures, which is the immediate end and intention of divine moral government; that particular use and application of them, is both consistent with, and essential to, the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine government.

§ 28. Having brought the subject of this *inquiry* to this issue, it only remains, that I exhibit and explain that application of rewards and punishments, or these peculiar ways of dispensing them in different cases, and proportions, which have a real tendency to promote the happiness of the several species of rational creatures (which is the immediate end and intention of divine moral government) by increasing the force of these motives to action and inaction, which arise from the prospect of the good and ill consequences of actions. And when we have once got clear and just ideas of the peculiar ways, mentioned, of dispensing rewards and punishments,
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we shall have a full view of the rectitude of divine moral government in the administration of them, and, consequently, in the treatment of rational creatures.

§ 29. I have already proved, that actions of good consequences, are the only actions which are required to be done, by the laws of the Deity; and that actions of bad consequences, are the only actions which are forbidden by these laws. Hence it follows, that that administration of rewards and punishments (whatever it is) which is calculated to enforce obedience to the laws of the Deity, is calculated, at the same time, to promote the performance of actions of good consequences, and to hinder the practice of actions of bad consequences; and, consequently, to enforce these motives to action and inaction, which naturally arise from the prospect of the consequences of actions. I shall, therefore, do all that is needful, to satisfy the present *inquiry*, and to set the rectitude of divine government in dispensing rewards and punishments in a true and clear light, if I shew, what administration of rewards and punishments is, and what administration of them is not, calculated, or fitted, to promote the happiness of rational creatures, by enforcing obedience to the laws of the Deity. And this is what I shall now endeavour to do. And

§ 30. 1st. In order to promote the happiness of rational creatures, by a right and proper enforcement of obedience to the laws of the Deity by the sanctions of rewards and punishments, it is necessary, that reward be annexed to acts of obedience, and acts of obedience only; and that punishment be annexed to acts of disobedience, and these only. If reward be thus annexed to acts of obedience only, the hope and prospect of it will be a steady and powerful motive to obedience, and to nothing but obedience. If, on the other hand, punishment be annexed to acts of disobedience only, the dread and terror of it will be a constant and uniform discouragement to disobedience, and to disobedience only. By the force of the one sanction, the subjects will be drawn and constrained to yield obedience to the laws of the Deity; and, by the fear and dread of the other, they will be deterred from the transgression of them: By the influence

fluence of both, therefore, thus dispensed, obedience to the divine laws will be enforced; and, of course, the good of the community (which is the sole immediate end of divine government) will be promoted. But if this rule should be reversed, and reward be annexed to acts of disobedience, and punishment to acts of obedience, the force of both sanctions would be applied to discourage obedience, and to promote disobedience; consequently, to defeat and frustrate the end and intention of divine moral government. Such an administration of rewards and punishments would be a manifest misapplication and abuse of them, as tending not to the support, but the utter subversion, of government, and, of course, to the hurt and misery of the *subjects*. Between such a dispensation of sanctions, and the end of divine moral government, there would be no congruity, but an utter repugnancy; for which reason, it would be inconsistent with the rectitude of divine government, and entirely wrong.

§ 31. 2^{dly}. To the rectitude of divine moral government, in the administration of rewards to the unoffending righteous, it is requisite, that the reward, bestowed on every individual, should be duly proportioned to the degree and measure of his obedience to the laws. And the degree and measure of his obedience ought to be estimated, not so much from the bare number of the acts of it, as from the greater or lesser good thence arising to the *public*; the difficulties and discouragements attending the performance of it; the ability of the agent, and the opportunities of doing good, which are afforded him.

§ 32. 'Tis not unnatural to suppose, that amongst those *subjects*, who have not been guilty of any transgression of the divine law, there may be some whose obedience has been more careful, accurate, and complete, than that of others. The reward, therefore, of the former ought, in all cases, to be greater than that which is assigned to the latter, and that in proportion to the superiour degrees and measures of their obedience. To bestow the very same reward upon those whose obedience to the laws has, and upon those whose obedience to them has not, been careful, punctual, and accurate,

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would be, to leave the *subjects* in general, without any proper encouragement, (in the way of reward) to aim at the highest measure and degrees of obedience: For, in this case, they would have no more to expect from a greater than from a lesser measure of obedience. And since it is impossible, that as great a quantity of happiness to society, should be produced by a lesser measure of obedience to such laws as are calculated for the public good, as by a greater; this defect of encouragement to aim at the highest measure and degrees of obedience, must, of necessity, tend to defeat, in a good measure, the end of divine moral government. This way, therefore, of distributing rewards would be wrong, as being, in a high degree, repugnant to the end of divine government.

§ 33. But if we shall suppose, that a lesser degree of reward is assigned to a greater than to a lesser measure of obedience; the consequences to society, or the public, would be still worse. For such a constitution would have a direct tendency to discourage the higher degrees and measures of obedience, and to encourage the lower only. If the same reward was promised both to the lower and the higher degrees of obedience, there would, as we have seen, be no motive, no inducement at all, to aspire after the higher: But if a greater reward was promised to the lower than to the higher degrees of obedience, this would be a powerful inducement to rational creatures, to aim at the lower degrees only, as being the more interesting of the two; and to decline all endeavours after the higher degrees, as being not only less conducive, but, in some measure, prejudicial, to private happiness, or self-interest. If, therefore, rewards were to be dispensed according to this rule, the distribution of them would, in an exceeding high degree, obstruct the end of divine moral government, or, the happiness of every species of rational creatures; and, therefore, would be wrong, and utterly inconsistent with the rectitude of divine government.

§ 34. As to particular acts of obedience; they have different degrees of worth; and the estimate of their different degrees of worth is to be taken from the greater or lesser degrees of good which the public receives from them, the disposition and intention of

of the agent in performing them, and the difficulty attending the performance of them. The only right rule, therefore, whereby to treat particular acts of obedience, under divine government; (which has the good of the public for its end and object) is the very same with that which ought to be observed in treating different degrees and measures of obedience, *viz.* An act of obedience of greater worth, ought, in all cases, to have a greater reward annexed to it, than any act of obedience of lesser worth; and *vice versa*. By the observance of this rule, in the treatment of particular acts of obedience, the end of divine government will be promoted in the best and most effectual manner. But if different rules be followed; if equal reward be annexed to all particular acts of obedience; or, if a greater reward be annexed to acts of obedience of lesser worth, than to acts of obedience of greater worth, the ill consequences to society will be the very same as when different degrees and measures of obedience are treated after the same manner; (concerning which I have said enough already) for which reason, the observance of these rules would be inconsistent with the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine government. Thus much then concerning the rectitude of divine government in the treatment of the unoffending righteous.

§ 35. *3dly.* To the rectitude of divine moral government, in dispensing punishment to impenitent offenders, it is requisite, that punishment be distributed, in just and righteous proportions, according to the different degrees and measures of disobedience, which are found among them. And the rule of proportion, to be observed in this affair, is this, *viz.* That, in all cases, a heavier degree of punishment be annexed to a higher degree or measure of disobedience, than to any lower degree or measure of disobedience; and *vice versa*.

§ 36. Here the nature, number, and aggravations of the *crimes* committed, are to be duly regarded, and the punishments, annexed to them, are to be exactly proportioned to the respective heinousness of each. An act of disobedience, which has a great tendency to promote the unhappiness of the public, ought to have a greater punish-

ment annexed to it, than any other act of disobedience from which society receives less hurt. A greater number of offences ought to subject the offender to a more heavy punishment, than any lesser number of offences, which have not an equal, or greater, tendency to hurt the public. And, in like manner, an act of disobedience which is done knowingly, deliberately, or from a calm and settled contempt of authority, ought to be more severely punished, than the self-same act of disobedience, when it proceeds from inadvertency, or great inward disturbances; whether occasioned by temptations from external objects, or by violent appetites and passions within; and that, because an act of disobedience, when it proceeds from the former principles, is aimed at the subversion of the government itself, and, of course, at the destruction and utter ruin of the *subjects*; whereas it has no such tendency when it proceeds from the latter, which imply no contempt of authority, or obstinacy in offending; and are nothing but the *foibles* of human nature. In fine, under divine moral government, which has the good of the several species of rational creatures for its sole immediate end, punishments ought to be dispensed, in all cases, with a view to the promoting of this end; and, consequently, ought to be duly proportioned to the various degrees, aggravations, and measures, of the disobedience of the impenitent. And the degrees and measures of their offences ought not, under such a government, to be estimated either from the abstract natures of them, or the bare numbers of them, but from the greater or lesser hurt thence arising to society, and the intention and disposition with which they are done. When punishments are thus adapted, in lenity and severity, to the lesser and greater tendencies, found in the dispositions and actions of impenitent offenders, to promote the unhappiness of the public, then are they exactly calculated for the good of society. Under such an administration as this, punishments bring no more suffering upon any individual than what is absolutely necessary to promote and secure the happiness of his kind, his *own* included; the heaviest evils are made to fall only upon those, whose crimes have done the greatest hurt to society; and, *finally*, no offender suffers any other or heavier punishment,

punishment, but what bears a reasonable and righteous proportion to the real hurt and injury which the public sustains, through his personal acts of disobedience. And, therefore, such a proportionate distribution of punishment, is, in all respects, subservient and conducive to public happiness; and, consequently, just and right, and perfectly conformable to the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine government.

§ 37. But if we suppose this rule of proportion, in the distribution of rewards and punishments, to be inverted; and the heavier punishments to fall upon those whose crimes have a lesser tendency, and the lighter upon those whose offences have a greater tendency, to promote the hurt of society; 'tis plain, that such a distribution of punishments would not be calculated for the good of the public; and, for that reason, would be inconsistent with the rectitude of divine moral government.—Under such a constitution as this, punishments of the mildest kind only, would be made use of, to deter rational creatures from crimes of the most pernicious and destructive tendency: and the weight and terror of the heaviest punishments would only be applied, to restrain them from such offences as have but a small tendency to disturb the order and happiness of society. They who were most injurious to the public, would suffer little; and they who did little hurt to it, would suffer much.—This unequal and disproportionate treatment would not only create murmuring and discontent among the *subjects*: but have a very bad influence on their moral behaviour, and the state of society. It would render the perpetration of the most horrid and pernicious crimes easy and cheap, and the commission of smaller faults unreasonably and excessively dear: lay lesser faults under the highest discouragements, while those of an atrocious and enormous nature would, in a manner, be tolerated, by the small and disproportionate discouragement that was given to them. And what can we suppose would be the result and effect of such a constitution? Why, this, and this only; lesser offences would be carefully avoided, and the greater would be committed with little fear or concern. And the
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consequences of this behaviour, would be the misery and ruin of society, and the defeat of the end of divine moral government. But to proceed.

§ 38. *4thly*. As to penitent offenders; the rectitude of divine moral government requires in general, that their treatment should be better than that of impenitent offenders; but worse than that of the unoffending righteous. For if it were not better than the treatment of impenitent offenders, they, who have offended, would not have any motive, or encouragement, to repent, and amend their behaviour: and if it were as good as the treatment of the unoffending righteous, too much encouragement would be given to transgress the laws. And, therefore, were penitent offenders treated either way, their treatment would have a direct tendency to diminish the happiness of their species; and, therefore, would be inconsistent with the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government, which has the production of public happiness for its immediate end and object. But as I shall have occasion, in the following *chapter*, to enquire largely into the particulars of the treatment of penitent offenders, under divine moral government, I shall not here enter upon them.

§ 39. *5thly*. The last thing which I have to observe here, is, That the rectitude of divine moral government, in the administration of rewards and punishments, includes in it, the dispensing, from time to time, to every rational creature, that particular treatment, whether *præmial*, or *poenal*, or *mixed*, which is suitable to his behaviour, or moral character, at the time when he receives it; *that is*, the giving the treatment, which is proper in the case of the unoffending righteous, under such a government, to every unoffending righteous person; and the treatment which is proper in the case of impenitent offenders, to every impenitent offender; and the treatment that is proper in the case of penitent sinners, to every penitent sinner; and these continued as long as they preserve the respective moral characters mentioned, but no longer; and, consequently, the *varying* of the treatment of every person, from time to time, just as he changes his moral character, and assumes a new one,

one, in such manner, that he may ever have that particular kind of treatment which is suitable to his manner of behaviour at the time when he receives it.^(b) Any person will readily perceive, that this way of dispensing rewards and punishments must be included in the rectitude of divine moral government, who considers that the happiness of the several species of rational creatures is the immediate end of divine moral government, and then reflects upon the consequences which must follow, and the hurt which every species of rational creatures must sustain, if the unoffending righteous, or impenitent offenders, or penitent sinners, were to receive any other treatment than what is proper and suitable to their manner of behaviour, or respective moral characters, at the time when they receive it.—But, because I shall have this to explain and illustrate, when I come to consider the rectitude of divine government in the treatment of the human species, I shall say no more about it, in this place: but proceed to



C H A P. II.

Concerning the rectitude of divine moral government in the treatment of the human species.

§ 1. **H**AVING, in the foregoing *Chapter*, considered the nature, end, and rectitude, of divine moral government, as exercised over all rational creatures in general; I now propose to take a view of the rectitude of that government, as exercised over the human species in particular.

Among the individuals of this species of rational creatures, there are only found three general moral characters, or kinds of behaviour, which are essentially different, viz. that of

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(b) See *Ezek.* Chap. III. Ver. 20. and *Chap.* XVIII. 20—28. and *Chap.* XXXIII. Ver. 12—19. Where the *dictates of reason* here mentioned, are confirmed by the express declarations of the Deity.

1st. The righteous, or obedient, who have not yet offended. Of this character were the first parents of mankind, before they had transgressed the divine law; and of the same is every individual of the species, when first put into a state of trial, and before he has committed any actual sin.

2^{dly}. The impenitent, who have transgressed the divine law, and persist in the transgression of it, without repentance and amendment of life.

3^{dly}. The penitent, who have transgressed the law, but have repented of their sins, and returned to the practice of their duty.

§ 2. Besides these three moral characters, some mention a fourth, which they call simple innocence; and they describe it, as consisting in the having done no action in obedience or disobedience to the divine law. This character belongs only to those who are newly put into a state of trial, and denotes a total absence or negation of all moral character; and, therefore, is such a character as is no proper ground either of reward or punishment. For which reason, I have no concern with it in this place.

§ 3. The three moral characters mentioned, are essentially different, as containing repugnant and contradictory ideas. Thus the idea of undefective obedience, and that of disobedience, whether repented of or not, are the reverse of each other; and so repugnant, that the one can have no existence where the other takes place; nor is it possible that they should ever be consistent parts of one and the same moral character. The ideas likewise of penitence and impenitence are inconsistent ideas. No person can, at the same time, be both penitent and impenitent. To repent of past offences and cease from the commission of them; and to approve of past offences and persist in the repetition of them, are ways of behaviour which are as opposite and repugnant as bitter and sweet, light and darkness. In like manner, the ideas of penitence and undefective obedience are so inconsistent and contradictory, that it is naturally impossible, that they should be constituent parts of one and the same moral character. A person who has not transgressed the divine law in any instance, cannot repent of, or reform, any thing that has been

been wrong or blame-worthy in his behaviour; for this plain reason, because he has not offended in any thing, and, of course, has nothing to repent of, and amend. Nor, on the other hand, is it in the power of a penitent offender to attain to, or recover, the character of a righteous person who has not offended, for a reason which is equally obvious, *viz.* because he has offended, and because the offensive actions which he has done, can never be undone, or cease to have been done. It appears, therefore, with the evidence of a demonstration, that these three moral characters are not only different, but naturally inconsistent and repugnant.

§ 4. As these three moral characters are essentially different, so the effects, which they have upon the state of society, are equally different.—Undefective obedience has a natural and direct tendency to promote public good. As far as such obedience is performed, so far, in proportion, is society made happy: and when the performance of it becomes entire and universal, the happiness of the human species must be as complete as it is possible for mutual good behaviour to make it.—On the contrary, disobedience, unrepented of, and persisted in, has a natural and direct tendency to promote the disorder and misery of the human species. If such disobedience has an universal spread, the entire ruin of society is the natural and unavoidable consequence; and as far as it gains ground, (let the degree and extent of it be what they will) the public must suffer in proportion. The happiness of the human species can never be fully established, and effectually secured, till every remaining degree of disobedience, unrepented of, and persisted in, is entirely removed from among them. The effect, therefore, of this moral, or rather immoral character upon the state of society, is, the direct reverse of that of the foregoing moral character. The natural effect of that was the happiness, but the natural effect of this is the misery, of the human species. The former, therefore, is the best, and the latter the worst, of all moral characters.—Again, as to the character of the penitent offender, it consists in *offence, penitence*, and consequent *amendment of life*. It is, therefore, of a middle nature between that of the unfinning righteous, and that of the impenitent offender,

offender, being worse than the former, and better than the latter : and its effects upon the state of society are accordingly. The penitent sinner has, by his past offences, been injurious to society : and as those his offences, and the hurt which society has received by them, can never be annihilated, the effects of this part of his moral character upon the state of society, are, and ever will be, worse than those of the behaviour of the righteous who have not offended, and whose actions have all been conducive to the public good.—But though there is one part of the moral character of the penitent sinner which has an ill effect on the state of society, and is, on that account, worse than the moral character of the unoffending righteous ; yet the other part of this moral character has a much better effect upon the state of the public than that of impenitent and incorrigible offenders. The penitent sinner has ceased to be disobedient, and is become obedient. His penitence for what is past, has put a stop to his progress in a course of disobedience : and, by that obedience, which is the natural consequence and effect of sincere penitence, he now acts for the public good : whereas the impenitent sinner, by persisting in a course of disobedience, still continues to promote the hurt and misery of the public. It is, therefore, manifest, that the moral character or behaviour of penitent offenders has a much better effect upon the state of society, than the moral character of impenitent offenders, though it has not so good an effect upon it as that of the unoffending righteous.

§ 5. Wherefore, since undefective obedience to the laws of the Deity has a natural and necessary tendency to promote the happiness of the human species ; and disobedience, unrepented of, and persisted in, a contrary tendency ; and since, withal, penitence for offences committed, accompanied with amendment of life, has not so good an effect upon the state of the public as the former, but a much better than the latter ; it is easy to see, how the rectitude of divine moral government (which has the happiness of the human species for its immediate end and object) must stand, in the treatment of each of those three moral characters, or in the distribution of rewards and punishments to the persons to whom they belong.—
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But that I may set this whole affair in a proper light, I shall consider the rectitude of divine moral government in reference, 1st. To the peculiar treatment of each of these three moral characters: and, 2^{dly}. To the continuance and variation of that treatment.



SECTION I.

Concerning the rectitude of divine moral government, in the treatment of the righteous who have not offended.

§. I. **C**ONCERNING the moral treatment, which is proper and suitable to the moral character of the unoffending righteous under divine moral government, I have said so much about it in the foregoing *Chapter*, that I have nothing to add to it.—In the general, persons of this excellent character ought to have better treatment from the Deity, than any offenders, whether penitent or impenitent, have from him.—In particular, they ought not to be punished, but rewarded; and rewarded according to the respective measures and degrees of their obedience.—To punish persons of this character in any degree, would be, so far to discourage obedience to the laws of the Deity, and to obstruct the accomplishment of the immediate end of his moral government, which is the good or happiness of the human species.—To leave them unrewarded, would be, to deprive obedience to those laws of all proper encouragement, which would infallibly turn out to the great disadvantage of mankind.—And to reward them within the respective degrees and measures of their obedience, and not up to the full extent of it, would be, to leave obedience to the laws destitute of such effectual support and encouragement as might be given to it; which would have a natural tendency to diminish the happiness of the human species by lessening that obedience to the divine laws on which it depends.—Tis evident, therefore, that the treating persons of this

this excellent and unblemished character in any of the ways mentioned, would diminish, impair, and greatly obstruct the happiness of the human species; and, consequently, would be wrong under divine moral government, which has the happiness of this species for its immediate end and object: consequently, the treating them in a different and contrary manner must be right, yea, rectitude itself, in the administration of such a government.—But I proceed to



SECTION II.

Concerning the rectitude of divine moral government in the treatment of impenitent offenders.

§ 1. **T**HE treatment proper to impenitent offenders, under divine moral government, is punishment, punishment only, and punishment duly proportioned to the degrees and measures of their disobedience, either threatened or inflicted.—To bestow reward, or any degree of reward, upon persons of this character, or even to give them any ground to hope for it, would be, to encourage disobedience to the divine laws, and to promote the misery of the species, and, consequently, to defeat the true and proper end of divine moral government.—To leave such persons unpunished, and without any dread of punishment, would be, to remove all check and discouragement to disobedience, and to disarm the law of its whole force and authority; which would tend to, and, at last, end in, the utter ruin of society, and the total subversion of government itself.—And, *finally*, to threaten or inflict punishment within, or not up to, the measure and extent of their disobedience, would, likewise, have a very ill effect upon the state of society: for, through such a defective and disproportionate distribution of punishments, disobedience would be left without such an efficacious check as might be given to it, and as is really needful
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in order to restrain it. And the check to disobedience being thus weakened, and not vigorously applied, transgressions of the law must more abound, than what they would under a more powerful and efficacious restraint. And the more these abound, the more, in proportion, must society suffer, and the end of divine government be obstructed.—If, therefore, under divine moral government, impenitent offenders should be dealt within any of the ways now mentioned, their treatment would be wrong, as having a natural tendency to defeat the very end of such government. Wherefore, to punish them, and to punish them up to the extent and measure of their disobedience, is not only consistent with rectitude, but rectitude itself, as being the most natural and powerful means for checking disobedience, and promoting obedience to the divine laws; and, of course, for preventing the misery, and securing the happiness of the human species, which is the immediate end of that moral government which the Deity exerciseth over them.

§ 2. The happiness of the human species being the sole immediate end of that moral government which the Deity exerciseth over them; and it being naturally impossible, that happiness should ever be raised to a proper measure and fulness of perfection, while impenitent sinners are permitted to live in the same society with the righteous and the penitent; it follows, that the end and rectitude of divine moral government render it necessary that all impenitent sinners should, sometime or other, be separated from the better part of mankind.—So long as the obedient and disobedient are permitted to live in one society together, the happiness of mankind must be often disturbed, impaired, and even interrupted, by the evil consequences of the vicious temper and actions of the latter. Were they, therefore, to live always together in one society, the happiness of the human species must ever remain imperfect and incomplete: consequently, the end of divine moral government (which has their happiness for its immediate object) could never be fully accomplished. And for this very reason, the permitting them to remain forever in one and the same society, would be a wrong measure in the administration of divine moral government.

§ 3. Moreover,

§ 3. Moreover, it would, I think, have a very ill effect upon the state of mankind, if the incorrigibly and finally disobedient, after they have been separated from the better part of the species, were not to suffer punishment proportionable to the respective measures of their obstinate and unrepented disobedience, and such as may make a discernable and permanent difference between their treatment and that of all other persons whose behaviour has been better than theirs.—'Tis true, that the consequences of such a separation would, in themselves, be a very grievous evil to the finally and incorrigibly impenitent, whether it were so ordered, that each of them should live in a solitary state, or that they should all live together in one society.—In the first case, the thoughts of being condemned to a forlorn, solitary state, would cause constant grief and uneasiness to creatures who, however vicious could not divest themselves of a love and desire of society.—In the latter, the vicious temper and behaviour of the members of the society would be a constant source of inexpressible sufferings. The temper and actions of each individual would render his own mind uneasy, and be a plague to all who were within the sphere of their influence; whilst he himself would suffer as much from their vicious tempers and actions, as they did from his. So that all the members of this wretched society, would be the instruments of great and permanent sufferings to one another.—When these things are considered, some may be apt to think, that the bare prospect of being condemned to the one or the other of the two states mentioned, would, of itself, be as sufficient and efficacious to bring to repentance and amendment of life all the disobedient who are capable of being touched and worked upon by any sort of motive, as if it were accompanied with the dread and terror of superadded punishment. But, in truth, it would not. For since the joint *momentum* of two motives, impelling the mind in the same direction, must be greater than the *momentum* of either of the two, single and separate; and since the terror of a greater evil must have a greater and more efficacious influence upon a sensible mind, than the fear of a lesser evil; 'tis natural and necessary to conclude, that many offenders, who would not
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be deterred from a course of vice by the bare prospect of being condemned, at some distant, uncertain point of time, either to a forlorn state of solitude, or to suffer the ill effects of their own, and other people's wickedness, would yet be reclaimed by the super-added terror of such a punishment as was proportioned to the respective measures of disobedience unrepented of, and persisted in. If this be allowed; and it be likewise allowed, that the obstinacy of many of the disobedient part of mankind is such as requires so great a force as this to overcome it; (neither of which can be denied) it will follow, that the awarding such a punishment in the case of persevering disobedience and final impenitence, must, in the administration of divine government, be a fit and right measure.—By this expedient, greater terror must be struck upon the minds of the disobedient, than could be produced without it, or by any other method: consequently, the number of the disobedient must be diminished; the quantity of disobedience lessened, and that of obedience increased; much misery to the human species prevented, and the happiness of it promoted and enlarged; and, of course, the end of divine moral government must be more fully answered and accomplished, than it could be by any other means which are less efficacious. Hence it is manifest, that the awarding of such a punishment to the finally disobedient, is not only consistent with the rectitude of divine government, but a constituent and essential part of the rectitude of it: For, without it, the happiness of the human species, which is the immediate end and object of that government, could not be so effectually and extensively promoted, as with it.

§ 4. From what has been now said, it seems to be very clear, that there will, at last, be a day of judgment, a time for punishment, when the wise and righteous rector of the universe will *separate the tares from the wheat, and purge out of his kingdom every thing that offendeth, and worketh iniquity*; when the finally and incorrigibly disobedient will be severed from the company and society of the obedient and penitent, and receive punishment, in just and righteous proportions, according to the respective measures of their disobedience and obstinacy.—This separation will, in process of time,

time, become necessary to answer the full end and intention of divine moral government in the complete happiness of the human species.—The fear and dread of this future punishment is equally fit and necessary, in the present state of mankind, as being the best and most efficacious means for restraining disobedience and promoting obedience to the divine laws and thereby securing the happiness of mankind. All this, as we have seen, is not only consistent with, but included in the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government.—Wherefore, since this separation and punishment, of the finally impenitent are not executed in this present world, it follows, that there must be a future state of life, in which they will be executed.

§ 5. Thus the light of nature informs us of a judgment to come, and of a future state of punishments, *when it shall be ill with the finally impenitent.*—The proof, indeed, of this future state of righteous retribution, doth not arise, as is generally thought, from there being something that is wrong, and requires amendment, in those sufferings which often befall the righteous; and in that prosperity which many of the wicked are permitted to enjoy, under the present administration of providence. For since this promiscuous dispensation of good and evil is, in fact, an appointment or constitution of the Deity, it must be consistent with rectitude, and even a branch of it, whether we can, or cannot, comprehend the reason of it. But the proof of this future state of retribution arises, as I think, from the two following considerations. 1st. From this, that the happiness of the human species, (which is the immediate end of divine moral government) how much soever it may be promoted, in the present state of things, by keeping the righteous and the wicked together in one society, yet it can never become perfect and complete, while they remain in this state of union: Yea, and that the time will come, when the circumstances of this species will be so far changed, that the happiness of it will, upon the whole, be no longer promoted, but actually diminished and obstructed by such a conjunction of the virtuous and vicious in the same society: for which reasons, a separation of the one from the other must,

must, at last, be made, or the end of divine moral government can never be fully accomplished in the complete happiness of our species.—*2dly*. The proof of this future state of retribution arises from this, that the dread of future punishment, duly proportioned to the different degrees and measures of disobedience, obstinately persisted in, and finally unrepented of, is a much more efficacious expedient, than any other thing, without it, would be, to deter men from disobedience, and from obstinacy and perseverance in it; and, consequently, to promote and produce a larger quantity of happiness, than otherwise would be produced; and, of course, to promote the end of divine moral government in a more effectual and ample manner, than it could be, without the assistance and intervention of such an efficacious motive.—From *first* to *last*, therefore, it follows, that the rectitude of divine moral government (which consists in prosecuting and securing its own end by the most fit and efficacious means) requires, that this punishment should, at present, be awarded against the finally disobedient and impenitent, and, at last, inflicted on them.

§ 6. By the same way of reasoning, *mutatis mutandis*, may be proved a future state of happiness, wherein all the righteous shall receive a final reward, in just and righteous proportions, according to the respective measures of their obedience. But the making out of this proof, I shall leave to the ingenious *reader*; and return to the prosecution of the point under consideration.

§ 7. Although the rectitude of divine moral government requires, that the dreadful punishment, aforesaid, should be presently denounced, and, at last, inflicted upon the incorrigibly disobedient and impenitent; yet it doth not require, that this punishment should be immediately, or even speedily, executed upon any offender.—It is the punishment which is proper only in the case of incorrigible disobedience and final impenitence; and to the constitution of this character, *time* and *trial* are requisite; and, therefore, it cannot, in the nature of the thing, be inflicted immediately or speedily.—Moreover, a speedy execution of this punishment would be utterly inconsistent with the end and intention of divine moral government,

government, (which is the happiness of the human species) and, therefore, repugnant to rectitude. For, 1st. Offenders themselves are a part of the human species; and their happiness, as far as it can be promoted, is a part of the general happiness of this species of rational creatures. But can it be supposed, that the general happiness of the human species, of which the happiness of offenders is a very considerable part, would be as much promoted by the immediate and speedy execution of the punishment mentioned, as by gentler methods, such as, time to consider and ruminate upon their folly and danger, the dread of future punishment, mild correctives, and powerful motives and encouragements to repentance and reformation? By these and the like gentle methods, many persons of this bad character might be reclaimed, and brought back to their duty; in which event, the happiness of the human species would be more promoted and enlarged by the delay, than it possibly could be, by the speedy infliction of the dreadful punishment, aforesaid. If so; the first way of proceeding is right, and the latter would be wrong, under divine moral government, which has the happiness of our species for its immediate end and object.—2^{dly}. If, in the government of such a frail species of rational creatures as men are, (who, through the force of early mismanagement and prejudices, the imbecillity and imperfection of their faculties, and the influence of external temptations, have all offended, and are daily offending less or more) *judgment was speedily executed upon every evil work*, more misery than happiness would, upon the whole, be produced by such a constitution. Under such an administration of government, men would be deprived of those opportunities and means, and, of course, of the very possibility, of attaining to such a degree of happiness as they might, and would, arrive at, under a more benign and sparing one. Misery, dreadful and inevitable, as far as I can see, would be painted upon the prospect, and become the actual portion, of every individual, and, consequently, of the whole species. Wherefore, if the happiness of our frail species be the end of that moral government which the Deity exerciseth over it, a speedy execution of the punishment, mentioned, can be no part of it. And that it is no part of it, is very evident, from what we happily

happily feel in our own particular cases, and from what we see and observe in the cases of others. Patience, forbearance, gentle correctives, and all the engaging and persuasive arts of love, are the first methods which the Deity pursues, and long pursues, in his dealings with the offending part of our frail race. Dreadful punishment is, indeed, denounced and threatened, but it is long deferred. All this is plain and obvious fact, confirmed by experience and daily observation. And it is all right, and entirely suitable to the end and rectitude of divine moral government, as being, upon the whole, productive of a larger quantity of happiness to the human species, than a contrary way of dealing with them would be.

§. 8. 'Tis true, that, under such a constitution of government as this (where offences, productive of calamities and sufferings, are committed, and not fully and effectually restrained by the speedy execution of such punishment as is sufficient to answer that purpose) the happiness of mankind must be greatly disturbed, impaired, and obstructed, and remain in a very defective and imperfect state. And so, in fact, we find, it doth. But from this mixture of happiness and misery, which obtains in the present infantile, weak, and forming state of human nature, no objection of any weight can be raised against the rectitude of that constitution of government which permits and appoints it; because it is productive of much less misery, and of greater happiness, to mankind, in their present imperfect and unformed state, than any other supposable constitution of government would be. In the present state of imperfection and imbecillity, where human minds are only in a growing and forming condition, and have arrived at no fixed character; where the improvements are slow and gradual; where many mistakes, and much misconduct, are, in a manner, natural and unavoidable; and where the human mind is advancing and rising, by degrees, from an infant-state, towards maturity and perfection; I say, in such a state of imbecillity and imperfection, the sparing of transgressors in order to give them time to consider, repent, and reform; the administering proper and gentle correctives,

and the supplying them with powerful motives and proper encouragements to bring them to repentance and amendment of life; and the permitting others to suffer, for a while, those evils which are the consequences of their sins; the following, I say, those measures, in dealing with transgressors, is a way of treating them, which, upon the whole, is productive of less misery and more happiness of offenders in particular, and to the whole species in general, than could be produced by a different constitution of government, under which every impenitent offender was immediately to suffer the punishment which is to be the portion of the finally impenitent.—The *phænomena*, therefore, of the sufferings of the righteous, and of the prosperity of the wicked, which appear, and actually take place, in the present administration of providence, and which have puzzled and perplexed many wise and learned heads, as well as many weak minds, are only such occurrences as have a natural and direct tendency to promote the happiness of the human species, in their present infirm and imperfect state; and, of course, the end and intention of divine moral government.—This answers all objections, and solves all difficulties, which do, or can, arise from what we commonly call the inequalities of providence in the treatment of the righteous and the wicked. And it is a solution, as I think, which must give greater satisfaction to a thinking and inquisitive mind, than the common and ordinary ones which have been offered, which rather serve to confound and silence the objector, than to remove his objections; and to puzzle and perplex the mind, rather than to give it the clear and full satisfaction which it wants; and which, indeed, give ground for the raising new objections, much stronger than those which they are brought to remove, either by supposing that the state of the righteous and the wicked in this world is different from that which it is both seen and felt to be; or, by representing the Deity himself as an unwise and blundering being, who has the faults and irregularities of his present government to mend, and must mend them, before any account can be given of the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of it. *Absit blasphemia dictu!*

§ 9. After

§ 9. After all; When the several generations of men, which infinite wisdom sees it fit to produce, have been raised up; and men's faculties have arrived at their proper strength and maturity, and their moral characters are formed and fixed, and all offenders, whom time, and patience, and rational means could have any proper influence upon, have been brought to repentance and amendment of life; and all the happiness, that could arise to the human species, from the reformation of persons of this character has been obtained; and there remain no impenitent persons, but who are obstinately and incorrigibly such; when all these things, I say, are brought about in providence, then must a separation of the finally impenitent from the society of the righteous take place; then must the punishment, the dreadful punishment, hitherto threatened against persons of that bad character, now fall upon them with its whole weight.—The suffering such persons to live any longer in the same society with the righteous, the deferring their punishment any farther, would yield no advantage, produce no new accessions of happiness, to the human species: on the contrary, such a measure could answer no end, but to produce disorder and misery among them, and to obstruct the accomplishment of the end and intention of divine moral government in their complete happiness. And, therefore, their longer escape from this punishment, would be utterly inconsistent with the goodness, wisdom, and rectitude of divine moral government. But to proceed,

§ 10. Although the rectitude of divine moral government, renders it fit and right, that the execution of that punishment, which is to be the portion of the finally impenitent, should be delayed, till men have had time for the improvement or abuse of their faculties, and for the trial of their behaviour; yet the same rectitude of government makes it equally reasonable and fit, that, even in the present imperfect, and forming state of minds and manners, such punishments, and such degrees of punishment, should be inflicted upon impenitent sinners, as may serve to secure the order, peace, and safety of society, and be proper and useful motives for the bringing of themselves to amendment of life. If, in this life, no
punishments

punishments were awarded, and executed upon impenitent offenders, this world would be made a scene of horrid calamities and miseries by their injurious actions, the pernicious influence of their bad examples, and the encouragement that would be given to vice and disobedience by their impunity. Upon this supposition, no person could enjoy peace, or be safe. The very end of divine moral government would be both counteracted and defeated, and the government itself subverted and dissolved. And therefore, it would be utterly inconsistent with the rectitude of divine government, which hath the happiness of the human species for its end and object, to permit such a state of things to take place.

§ 11. To constitute the rectitude of divine moral government in the treatment of the impenitent, in this present life; it is requisite, not only that particular punishments should be inflicted on them for the particular crimes they commit, but that those punishments be of sufficient weight to deter them, and others, from offending in the like manner for the future: for unless they be calculated for answering this purpose, the end of divine government cannot be subserved and promoted by them. And that punishments may have this weight and influence, it is requisite, that they should, in all cases, be such as render offenders losers by their crimes. For if, after punishment has been afflicted, the offender is still a gainer by his crime, the infliction of that punishment will not be sufficient to deter him, or others, from committing the like crime in time coming. So far will it be from producing any such effect as this, that the clear gain got by the crime, after the loss, sustained by the punishment, has been deducted, will remain a motive and inducement to repeat the crime. Such slight and superficial punishments, therefore, must be utterly inconsistent with the rectitude of divine moral government, not only as being not conducive, but as being really obstructive, to the accomplishment of the end thereof.

§ 12. Moreover, the rectitude of divine moral government requires, that the punishments, which are inflicted on impenitent offenders in this life, should be duly proportioned to the greater and lesser heinousness of their respective crimes, or, which is the same

same thing, to the greater or lesser tendency which those crimes have to promote the hurt and misery of society. Thus, in all cases, a crime which, all things considered, has a greater tendency to promote the disorder and misery of society, ought to be punished with greater severity, than any other crime which is less injurious to the public; and *vice versa*. Accordingly, an act of disobedience which proceeds from mere inadvertency, or from some internal foible in human nature, such as, violent appetite or passion, ought not to be punished with the same severity, as when it proceeds from actual ill intention, or from a cool deliberate contempt of authority. For though the bad consequences of the action to society, are the same in both cases; yet, in the former, the disposition and temper of the agent are not so dangerous and injurious to the public, as they are in the latter.—This equitable adjustment of the degrees of punishment to the degrees of crime or offence, is essential to the rectitude of divine moral government. For, if all offences were punished with equal severity, much unnecessary misery would be produced. And besides, the commission of the highest offences would be rendered as cheap and easy as the commission of the smallest. Both ways, therefore, would the end of the divine government (*i. e.* the happiness of the human species) be obstructed.—On the other hand, if the smaller punishments should be annexed to the greater crimes, and the greater punishments to the lesser offences, 'tis plain, that the greater check, or discouragement, would be given, not to the greater, but only to the lesser crimes; consequently, men would be furnished with motives to prefer the commission of the greater crimes to the commission of the lesser; which would be very hurtful and ruinous to society, and, of course, utterly inconsistent with the end and rectitude of divine moral government.—Upon the whole, therefore, it appears, that the infliction of punishments on impenitent offenders, in this world, for the particular crimes they commit, in such weight, measure, and proportion, as may be sufficient to secure the order, safety, and well-being of the human species, is essential to the goodness, wisdom, and rectitude of divine moral government.

§ 13. Concerning the actual administration of the poenal treatment mentioned, it may be observed, that civil government is the common and ordinary engine by which the Deity exerciseth his moral government over mankind in this world. The supreme civil magistrate in every country, as far as he discharges his duty in a right manner, and promotes the good of the public, by equal and just laws, and an impartial administration of justice, is the *minister of God for good* to the society. To him, therefore, hath the Deity committed the temporal punishments of such crimes as are injurious to society; with this reservation however, that he still retains, in his own hands, the power of punishing, when, and in what manner he sees fit, these flagrant crimes in single persons, and these enormous and wide-spread corruptions in society, which the civil magistrate, through depraved inclination, doth not, or, through want of knowledge, or power, cannot punish; and, withal, of punishing the civil magistrate himself when he grossly abuseth his power, by exerting it not for the good, but for the hurt and ruin of society.—Of the actual exercise of this power by the Deity, as lord paramount, and king supreme, in the punishment of particular daring sinners, of the authors and abettors of dark and destructive conspiracies, of flagitious and monstrous tyrants, and even of wicked nations and communities of men when they have filled up the *measure of their iniquity*, the history of mankind affords many striking and unquestionable instances. And when the Deity thus pours out his dreadful judgments, in the cases mentioned, he acts in perfect conformity to rectitude, and prosecutes the end of his moral government (*i. e.* the happiness of the human species) not only by fit and proper means, but by the only fit and proper means which the circumstances of the cases admit of.—The punishments inflicted are so many great deliverances; so many signal rescues from misery and ruin to mankind; such *salvations of the Lord*, as none but he could, at least, would give them. And though, perhaps, the number of those who are, sometimes, involved in such dreadful *calamities*, and destroyed, be much greater than the number of the saved; yet, by their ruin, the human species is really saved, and its happiness

happiness consulted and promoted, and, consequently, the end of divine moral government answered and secured. Their destruction, therefore, is so far from being the ground of any objection to the rectitude of divine moral government, that it is a proof and demonstration of it.

§ 14. But though the Deity has been generally pleased, to commit the government of the human species, as far as it has the external order, safety, and well-being of society for its end and object, to the care of the civil magistrate in every country and nation: yet, in some cases, where the circumstances of mankind were such as did require his own immediate care and superintendency, he has been pleased to exercise the whole of this government himself, without the intervention of any earthly magistrate. This he seems to me to have done, for some time, after man's creation, and, likewise, after *Noah's* flood. And, it is certain, that he did exercise government, in this manner, over the children and nation of *Israel*; for the government under which they lived, was a true and proper *Theocracy*.—In those instances, therefore, of civil government, which have been exercised solely and wholly by the Deity himself, we may expect to find the before-mentioned rules exactly observed in the treatment of impenitent offenders, as well as the strictest dictates of rectitude followed in the treatment of other moral characters.—But I go on to



SECTION III.

Concerning the rectitude of divine moral government in the treatment of penitent offenders.

§ 1. **C**HRISTIAN divines and deists are agreed in putting penitent offenders upon the same footing of divine favour with the perfectly righteous: with this difference however, that the latter maintain, that this high degree of favour is conferred on
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the penitent by the Deity, without the mediation of any person; and is, in itself, congruous to their moral character, and to the benignity and mercy of his own nature, and, of course, consistent with the rectitude of his moral government: Whereas the former seem to be generally agreed, that this degree of favour is conferred on them through the hands and mediation of a redeemer.—But though christian divines are agreed in this general point, yet, in their sentiments about the reason or ground of the conveyance, they differ widely from one another. Some of them think, that the moral character of penitent sinners, as penitent, and that of the Deity, as a benign and merciful being, is the sole reason or ground of the conveyance of this high degree of favour; and their sentiments about this point are the very same with those of the deists, except in the single circumstance, that this favour is conveyed to penitent sinners by the hands of a second person, or mediator. But the much greater part of christian divines are of a different opinion; for they think, that as the Deity is just as well as merciful, and cannot exercise his mercy but in a consistency with rectitude; and that as the behaviour of penitent sinners has been offensive, and much worse than that of the unoffending righteous; the Deity cannot, consistently either with his own attributes, or with the character of penitent sinners, confer upon them the high degrees of favour, mentioned, without the intervention of some expedient, whereby the impropriety and inconsistency of such a measure may be removed. And in order to get over this difficulty, they have taken two different ways. The greater number of them say, that this high degree of favour, conferred on penitent sinners, is not the natural result of their penitence and reformation, but is bought and procured for them, either by the vicarious obedience, or vicarious sufferings, of *Jesus*, the mediator, or by both. But others, thinking that this notion of vicarious obedience and sufferings is inconsistent both with reason and revelation, take a different way, by including the high degree of favour, to which penitent sinners are received by the Deity, in that reward which was due to the eminent piety and perfect obedience of the redeemer; for, according

according to them, penitent sinners obtain this high favour, not as any reward that is due to them, but as a thing that was included in that reward that was due to their redeemer. It doth not belong to the design of this *Essay*, to examine those different opinions of christian divines. I only mention them here, to shew, that christian divines, how much soever they differ from one another, or from the deists, in their sentiments about the manner, and the reason or ground, of the conveyance of the favour, yet they all agree with the deists in placing penitent sinners upon the same footing of divine favour with the unoffending righteous, by assigning the very same treatment to both under divine moral government.—Now the point which I am concerned to examine here, is, whether this doctrine, which is universally taught by deists and christian divines, about the divine treatment of penitent offenders, be true or false, consistent or inconsistent with the rectitude of divine moral government.—The discussion of this point is the more necessary, in regard that a clear and satisfactory account of it will serve, at once, to remove the prejudice of honest, rational deists against divine revelation; and to quiet some of those fierce contentions and uncharitable disputes among christians, which have arisen from their different sentiments about the ground and reason of the divine treatment of persons of this moral character, by removing the very foundation of them.—With a view, therefore, to both those ends, I shall examine this point with all the caution, precision, and accuracy which are suitable to its great importance, and with such candor and fairness, that neither christian nor deist shall have any just reason to accuse me of partiality.

§ 2. For this purpose, I shall, first of all, briefly repeat the *heads* of what I have before said concerning the moral character of penitent offenders, and then draw the conclusion which naturally and necessarily arises from them.—It has been observed already, that the ideas of *offence*, *penitence* strictly so called, and *amendment of life* or renewed obedience, are included in the moral character of a penitent offender; and that those three ideas follow one another, in this moral character, in the same order in which they are here

mentioned.—It has been shewn, likewise, that this moral character, as comprehending the idea of offence, or disobedience, is essentially different from that of the unoffending righteous, and has a bad influence upon the state of society, and, of course, is a much worse character than that of the unoffending righteous.—Withal, it has been shewn, likewise, that this moral character, as including the ideas of penitence and amendment of life, is essentially different from that of impenitent offenders, and much better, as having a real tendency to promote the good of society.—Now the *conclusion*, which naturally and necessarily follows from those premises, is this, that the treatment of penitent sinners, under divine moral government, ought to be of a middle nature between that of the unoffending righteous and that of impenitent offenders; not so good as the treatment of the former, but better than that of the latter.—The truth both of the premises, and of the conclusion here drawn from them, is so clear, that it must, I think, gain the assent of every fair and honest mind. No person, surely, can deny it, unless it be such a shameless wrangler as Mr. Chubb, who has the effrontery to affirm, in contradiction to common sense, and obvious truth, *that the moral character of a penitent sinner, (who has both acted, and been injurious to society, by his actions) is the same with, at least, as good as, if not better, than, that of a mere innocent, who has done no action, good or evil, beneficial or hurtful to society.*^(c)—But as this assertion is nothing but an assertion without any proof, and a bold insult upon reason and common sense; and as the self-contradiction, which it implies, must, at first sight, appear to every body; it needs no confutation of mine.—This much in general. I now proceed to particulars. And,

§. 3. I. There is one part of the moral character of penitent offenders which is faulty and vicious; *viz.* that part of their behaviour which preceded their penitence and amendment, and is, indeed, the sole ground and object of this change of mind and life: For if there was nothing faulty and offensive in their character and behaviour, there

(c) Inquiry concerning Redemption, page 63, 64, 65.

there would be nothing that they could repent of, or amend. And concerning this vicious and culpable part of their character, I observe

§ 4. *First.* That under divine moral government, penitent sinners are the natural and proper objects of penal treatment on account of this faulty part of their moral character.—If they were to escape all punishment, and to receive reward in proportion to the measure of that obedience which is subsequent to their penitence, their treatment would be suitable to one part of their moral character, but not to the whole of it; which, therefore, would be wrong treatment, as being incongruous to their case and character.—Again, if penitent sinners were dealt with in the manner mentioned, the Deity would act as if disobedience, repented of, and blameless, undefective obedience, were things of the same worth, and equally conducive to the good of society; which certainly would be, to contradict truth, and counteract rectitude.—Yea, if penitent sinners were thus dealt with, they would be better treated than the unoffending righteous: For all that the latter are supposed, or can, in reason, be supposed, to receive from the Deity, is only reward justly proportioned to the respective measures of their obedience; whereas the former, upon the supposition mentioned, receive from him not only reward in the very same proportion, but the additional favour of an entire discharge from all that punishment which they had incurred by their preceding disobedience. This, certainly, would be very unequal, disproportionate, and partial, and, therefore wrong treatment.—But this is not all; for, if penitent sinners were to be discharged from all punishment, the consequences of such treatment would be fatal to society, and, of course, inconsistent with the end and rectitude of divine moral government. Upon the supposition, that penitent sinners, upon their repentance, were to obtain an entire discharge from all punishment, and to be restored to the same state and degree of favour as if they had not offended at all; what would there be to restrain any person, furnished with such a hope of impunity and favour, from disobedience to the laws of the Deity? In this case, the relief, obtainable by repentance, would

would extinguish all fear of danger, and the very hope of impunity would prove a temptation and inducement to frail men to transgress the divine law, as often as they found themselves disposed and inclined to do it.—And can any person think, that such a constitution as this, such ample provision made for the entire exemption of penitent offenders from all punishment, would be as effectual to enforce obedience to the divine laws, and to promote the happiness of the human species, which depends on obedience to those laws, as a contrary constitution would be, under which all offenders were to be punished for their respective crimes, and penitent sinners themselves were not to be put upon the same foot of favour with the unoffending righteous, or, to obtain a discharge from punishment any farther than is consistent with the preservation of a just and proper difference between their treatment and that of all other persons whose behaviour has been either better or worse than theirs? This cannot, in reason, be supposed. For, under such a constitution as the first, unequal treatment would be a constant ground of discontent and murmuring: And, besides, repentance being made a salve for all disobedience, and an efficacious antidote against all danger, the fear and terror of punishment would hereby be extinguished; and this check to transgression being removed, the consequences would be, disobedience to the divine law without restraint, and misery to mankind without remedy.—But under such a constitution as the latter, equal and proportionate treatment would silence all murmuring and discontent. And the hope of impunity being taken away from every transgressor, whether penitent or impenitent; and no other hope being left to any of them, but that of suffering the punishment which the rectitude of divine government renders fit and proper in their case; all proper discouragement would be, hereby, given to every act and instance of disobedience, and proper motives supplied to excite all to a sincere, persevering, and universal obedience: And, both ways, would obedience to the laws of the Deity, on which the happiness of mankind depends, and, of course, the end of divine moral government, be in the most effectual manner promoted. The first way mentioned, therefore, of treating penitent

tent sinners, as having a direct tendency to promote the misery of the human species, and to obstruct and frustrate the end of divine moral government, must be wrong, and utterly inconsistent with rectitude: and the latter way of treating them, as having a contrary tendency, must be perfectly wise, good, and right.

§ 5. These appear to me, to be the genuine dictates of right reason, and conformable to the doctrine of holy scripture, which exhibits the Deity as an impartial and just judge, *who renders to every man according to his deeds, whether they have been good or evil.*—A contrary doctrine, indeed, is, and has been, taught; and almost universally received, without examination. But I would here propose it as a *query*, which deserves the serious consideration of all those who are lovers of truth, goodness, order, and peace; Whether or not has not this same doctrine, which is so repugnant to reason and revelation, been, in fact, the genuine source, prime foundation, and main support, not only of all that enthusiasm, and that great corruption of manners, which have prevailed, and still do prevail, among people of all ranks and principles, whether christians or deists; but, likewise, of all those gross corruptions in doctrine, and whimsical fooleries in worship and practice, which have crept into the christian church, and still subsist in it; and which, alas! have been not only the subject matter, but the very fuel, of the most hot and fierce contentions, and the cause of hatred, variance, and the most shocking cruelties and persecutions? These scenes are some of them so ridiculous, others of them so shocking to humanity, and all of them so destructive of the christian temper, and so great a reproach to human nature, that they are very disagreeable to me. For which reason, I rather choose to draw a veil over them, than to disclose them in a full light. *Pudet hæc opprobria nobis!*

§ 6. *Secondly*; I observe, that though penitent sinners, under divine moral government, ought not to be exempted from all punishment; yet the punishment to which they are subjected, ought not to be that heavy punishment to which impenitent offenders are obnoxious, and to which they themselves were liable, while they remained impenitent.—If that heavy punishment still continued to be

be the portion of penitent sinners, their treatment would not be different from that of impenitent offenders, though there case is more favourable, and their behaviour much better than theirs. To punish the penitent, after this severe manner, would be to act as if penitence and impenitence, obstinacy in a course of disobedience, and reformation from it, were of the same worth, and equally conducive to the happiness of mankind: And, therefore, such a way of proceeding would be a contradiction to truth, and a counteraction to rectitude.—Again, if penitent sinners were obnoxious to the punishment of impenitent offenders, this would detract from, and even destroy, the force of that motive to repentance which must arise from the prospect of milder and better treatment; and, consequently, would obstruct the happiness of the human species, and the accomplishment of the end of divine moral government; and for that reason, would be wrong, and repugnant to rectitude.—Whence it is evident, that a penitent sinner ought to be discharged from that grievous punishment to which he was obnoxious while he remained in a state of impenitency: Nevertheless, being still obnoxious, as has been shewn, to pœnal treatment, when this grievous punishment is remitted, a milder one, suitable to his case and character, and such as is consistent with the encouragement that is due to it, ought, in reason to be substituted in its place: by which means, a proper difference will be made between his treatment and the treatment both of the unoffending righteous, and of impenitent offenders.

§ 7. From what has been just now said, it appears, that there is, in the nature of things, a plain and evident reason for the Deity's granting to penitent sinners the remission of that punishment to which they were liable, while they remained in a state of impenitency. The remission, therefore, of that punishment is right action, and the non-remission of it would be wrong action, under divine moral government.—Thus far then concerning the faulty part of the moral character of penitent offenders, and the treatment which is proper to it, under divine government.—I now proceed

§ 8. II.

§ 8. II. To consider the good and commendable part of their moral character, and the treatment which is proper to it, under this government.

§ 9. The ideas of *penitence* and *renewed obedience*, as well as that of *offence*, are comprehended in the moral character of a penitent offender.—Though this person has been disobedient to the laws of the Deity, yet he has repented of that disobedience, and become again obedient; and his present actions are such as are conducive to the good of society.—Now, because the happiness of the human species is the immediate end and object of divine moral government; whatsoever has a real and natural tendency to promote this end, ought, in reason, to be encouraged under it. For this reason,

§ 10. 1st. A penitent sinner ought to be rewarded for his penitence and renewed obedience, because they have a direct and natural tendency to promote the end mentioned.—If, under divine moral government, penitence, and the obedience subsequent to it, were neither rewarded, nor encouraged with the prospect of reward; this, among a race of frail creatures, where there is no one person to be found *that doth good, and sinneth not*, would cast a general damp upon the minds of men, and produce such despair of relief, as would, in itself, be productive of the greatest misery; and, at the same time, be an invincible obstacle to the accomplishment of the end of divine moral government, provided that be the good and happiness of the human species; and, therefore, it would be an unwise and wrong measure.—For, if all, in general, are offenders; and if offenders, whatever way they behave, have nothing but punishment to expect; what motive or encouragement would there be, upon these suppositions, that could be thought sufficient to bring any sinner to repentance, and amendment of life? For say, that penitent sinners were encouraged to hope for a mitigation of punishment; yet if punishment was all, and the only thing, they had to expect, their prospect would be very discouraging, and the motive to repentance exceeding feeble. Yea, supposing that offenders should be actually brought to repentance by the bare prospect of a mitigation of punishment, (as, no doubt, the wiser part of them would, since it is natural to choose the least of two evils) yet
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the penitent would still be left in a most uncomfortable state, under the dread of pœnal treatment, and without any prospect of favour or reward.—Such a constitution as this would, by no means, promote the happiness of the human species, in such a general and extensive manner, as a contrary one would, under which penitent sinners were allowed to hope for reward. And, therefore, the suffering such a constitution, to take place under divine government, (which has the happiness of our species for its immediate end and object) would be utterly inconsistent with the wisdom and rectitude of such a government.

§ 11. *2dly.* As it would be utterly inconsistent with the rectitude of divine moral government, to exclude penitent sinners from the hope and enjoyment of reward; so, it would be equally inconsistent with it, to exclude them from such degrees of reward as are duly proportioned to the respective measures of their obedience to the divine laws.—If all penitent offenders were furnished with the hope of equal reward, and were not permitted to look for different degrees of favour, according to the different measures of their obedience; this would be a great discouragement to diligence and industry, and to all endeavours after an eminency in piety and obedience. It would make them sit down contented with such a low measure of obedience as would amount to no more but the forbearance of offence, or bare innocency. There would be no proper encouragement to make men aspire after high and eminent degrees of piety and goodness. The measures of obedience aimed at, would be low; and the happiness of the human species short and defective in proportion. In one word, equal reward, in the case of penitent offenders, would have the same ill effect upon the state of society, that it would have upon it, in the case of the unoffending righteous.—But, on the other hand, if penitent sinners are allowed to hope for different degrees of reward, suitable to the different measures of their obedience, such a prospect must have a natural and strong tendency to excite them to diligence and activity in their endeavours after the highest attainments; and to kindle in their minds a noble zeal, emulation, and ambition, to outstrip and excel each other in the accuracy and perfection of obedience to the divine laws.

laws. Wherefore, since this last mentioned way of treating penitent sinners is calculated to produce the highest measures of obedience and happiness, it must be perfectly suitable to the wisdom and rectitude of divine government, which has the happiness of the human species for its immediate end and object: And a contrary way of treating them, because it is not calculated to produce the effects mentioned, must be repugnant to the wisdom and rectitude of such a government.—But since the thing, which I here contend for, is universally acknowledged, I have no occasion to enlarge upon it.

§ 12. The substance of what has been hitherto said, concerning the treatment of penitent sinners, is briefly this, *viz.* That the rectitude of divine government requires, that they should be treated, by the Deity better than impenitent offenders, but not so well as the unoffending righteous: and that, in order to constitute this difference of treatment, mild punishment, and reward suitable to the different measures of their obedience, should be conjoined in their treatment.—If so, then it will follow, That the punishment, to which penitent sinners are subjected under divine moral government, ought to be of such a nature, and inflicted in such a manner, that it may be no hinderance to the enjoyment of such reward as is duly proportioned to the measure and quantity of obedience performed by each of them respectively: And, on the other hand, That the reward, bestowed on them, ought not to be of such a nature, or conveyed in such a manner, as may disqualify them for the suffering of the punishment which is proper in their case. For since the rectitude of divine government requires, that punishment and reward should be conjoined in their treatment; it must require, likewise, that the suffering of the punishment, and the enjoyment of the reward, should be compatible and consistent.

§ 13. The ideas of *reward* and *punishment* are, indeed, repugnant ideas; and this may, perhaps, create some difficulty in conceiving of their conjunction in the treatment of one and the same person. But this difficulty may possibly arise from our having been accustomed to a different way of thinking; at least,

from the imbecillity of our understanding; and not from any intrinsic impossibility in the nature of the things themselves.—The ideas of virtue and vice, obedience and disobedience, are as repugnant and incompatible, as the ideas of reward and punishment are; and yet this doth not hinder them from being parts of the moral character, or behaviour, of one and the same person; nor create any difficulty to us in conceiving them to be such. If, therefore, there be no difficulty, or absurdity, in conceiving virtue and vice to be essential and constituent parts of the moral character of one and the same person; there must, certainly, be as little difficulty, or absurdity, in conceiving reward and punishment to be constituent parts of the moral treatment of those to whom such a mixed moral character belongs; especially, considering, that to conceive otherwise, would be to conceive, that the Deity doth not treat persons of this mixed character according to the truth and right of their case; but either puts them upon the same footing of favour with the unoffending righteous, or sinks them down to the same level with the impenitent by punishment: which would be to conceive of him as doing that which is a contradiction to truth, and a counteraction to rectitude, as has been before demonstrated.

§ 14. That an infinitely wise God can, without being puzzled with any difficulty, adapt reward and punishment to the particular case of penitent *sinners*; and so order matters, that the enjoyment of the first, and the suffering of the latter, shall be perfectly consistent, is what, I think, cannot well be denied.—There is one thing, of which, I think, I am pretty sure; and that is, That the several schemes, which exclude this mixed treatment of penitent sinners, have brought their respective authors into such *dilemmas* as they have not yet been able, nor ever will be able, to extricate themselves from.

§ 15. After all, it must be confessed, that there is nothing that would more contribute to the quiet and satisfaction of the human mind, than satisfactory instruction concerning the way in which, and the particular means by which, the Deity punishes and rewards penitent sinners, and makes the seemingly repugnant parts of their
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moral treatment consistent and harmonious.—But here the light of nature leaves us in the dark; anxious and impatient for extraordinary instruction from the original fountain of truth and light, about this hidden, but interesting affair.—And, indeed, as revelation doth, so it is this alone which can, give us light and full satisfaction concerning it.—This, I think, is what all honest and fair-minded deists ought to lay to heart. A due attention to it may possibly prove an useful and happy mean, to make them sensible of the folly and vanity of boasting of the all-sufficiency of nature's light, of relying solely and wholly on the strength of their own natural faculties for safe guidance and comfortable support in the road of duty and happiness, and of superciliously contemning and rejecting the assistance of divine revelation, as an useless thing.—But I go on to,

SECTION IV.

Concerning the rectitude of divine moral government, with regard to the continuance and variation of moral treatment.

§ 1. **T**HE only thing which remains of this *subject* to be considered, is, the rectitude of divine moral government, with regard to the continuance and variation of the moral treatment of moral characters. And this is what I now propose to enquire into, in this *section*. And

§ 2. I. As to the demands of rectitude, with regard to the continuance, or duration, of the moral treatment of moral characters, I have but one observation to make, and that is, That it is essential to the rectitude of divine moral government, that the treatment, proper to any moral character, should remain unvaried, as long as the character itself remains unchanged; or, which is the same thing, should not be discontinued, till such time as the moral character,
to

to which it belongs, has been first discontinued: that is to say, that an unoffending righteous person, as long as he maintains his integrity, and doth not transgress, should have the treatment which is proper to that excellent character, and not be, at any time, treated as an offender, either penitent or impenitent; that an impenitent offender, while he remains impenitent, should have the particular treatment which is proper to that bad character, and should not, at any time, or, on any account, be treated either as an unoffending righteous person, or as a penitent sinner; and, in like manner, that a penitent offender, as long as he continues penitent, and perseveres in his obedience to the divine law, should have that sort of treatment only which is proper to his moral character as a penitent, and should not, at any time, or on any account, be treated either as a faultless, righteous person, or as an impenitent offender.—The truth of this observation, as far as it relates to the divine treatment of the unoffending righteous, and of the impenitent, is generally allowed. And if it be allowed to hold good in the divine treatment of these two characters, it must, I think, be allowed to hold good, likewise, in the divine treatment of penitent sinners; there being, under divine moral government, the same reason, that penitent sinners, while they remain such, should always have the treatment which is proper to their moral character, as that the righteous and the impenitent, while they continue such, should always have the treatment which is proper to their respective characters.—If the treatment, which is proper to any of these three moral characters, was, at any time, discontinued, while the character itself remains unchanged; this way of proceeding would, at that time, be utterly incongruous to the moral character of the person so treated, and destructive of the difference which ought to be preserved between the treatment of persons whose moral characters are essentially different.—Moreover, the treatment, here supposed to be given, being improper and unnatural, as being neither adapted to the moral character of the person who receives it, nor calculated to promote the end of divine moral government, but having a contrary tendency, it would be productive of very bad consequences. It
would

would have a direct tendency to discourage obedience, and to encourage disobedience, to the divine laws; and, consequently, would be incompatible with the wisdom and rectitude of divine moral government, which has the happiness of mankind for its immediate end and object. All this will be abundantly evident to any person, who either reflects, with due care, on the natural and genuine tendency of such supposed treatment, or attentively reads over what I have said, in the three foregoing *sections*, concerning the consequences of it. It is, therefore, necessary to conclude, that the continuance of the treatment, which is proper to any moral character, as long as the character itself remains unchanged, is essential to the rectitude of divine moral government.

§ 3. II. Concerning the variation of moral treatment, under divine moral government, there is one observation which I have to make, illustrate, and prove; and that is, That it is essential to the rectitude of divine moral government, that the treatment of every individual person should be changed, when, and as often as, he changes his moral character.

§ 4. The moral character of the same individual may undergo many changes. The same person whose obedience has been hitherto undefective, may transgress, and become an offender: And when he has become an offender, he may, for some time, remain impenitent; and, afterwards, he may repent and reform: And when he has repented and reformed, he may again transgress, and remain impenitent: And, after this, he may repent and reform again. Thus the same individual person may first, forfeit the character of a blameless, righteous creature, and, after that, may go on, shifting and varying his moral character from time to time: exchanging that of an impenitent offender for that of a penitent sinner, and that of a penitent sinner again, for that of an impenitent offender, and so on: Inasmuch that the very same person may pass through all the three moral characters mentioned, and make many real transitions from one character to a different one.—However, it may be observed, That though the transitions from the moral character of an impenitent offender to that of a penitent sinner, and, back again, from that

that of a penitent sinner to that of an impenitent offender, are things which not only may, but frequently do, happen; yet, when the character of a blameless, righteous person, has been once forfeited, it is lost forever, and cannot be recovered afterwards. All the changes of moral character, however, which have been mentioned, excepting the last, are such as have happened, and are daily happening; and, therefore, are facts which are vouched by experience and observation.

§ 5. When the moral character of any person undergoes any of the changes mentioned, 'tis fit, that his treatment should be varied accordingly.—Thus when a person, whose obedience has been hitherto without defect, transgresseth the law; he ought no longer to be treated as a righteous person who has not offended, but as an offender. This faulty person ought not now to have nothing painted upon his prospect but reward, and reward proportionable to the measure of his obedience: But, if he remains impenitent, he ought to be punished up to the full measure and heinousness of his offence.—But if this same person repents of what he has done amiss, and reforms from it; upon this change of character, the heavy punishment, which he has incurred, ought to be remitted, and a milder one substituted in its place; and, at the same time, encouragement ought to be given to him to hope for reward, proportionable to the measure of his future obedience.—Again, if this same person doth, afterwards, relapse into transgression and impenitence, he ought again to be treated as an impenitent offender. And if, after this, he becomes penitent, and returns to his duty, he ought again to be treated as a penitent offender: with this difference, however, that he ought now to be subjected to some proper penalty, whereby a due difference may be made between his treatment and that of other penitent sinners who have not relapsed into the like disobedience. And this mild penalty ought to be repeated, when he becomes penitent for any future relapse into disobedience: For, by the repetition of such a mild penalty, in every re-admission to the favourable treatment of the penitent, a just and exact proportion will, from time to time, be constituted, not only between his own behaviour and

and particular treatment, but, likewise, between his particular treatment and that of all other penitent sinners, whether their relapses into acts of disobedience have been fewer, or more numerous than his; provided always, that he and they be treated after the same manner.—And the preservation of this just proportion, by the means mentioned, between the particular behaviour and the particular treatment of every penitent sinner, and between the treatment of one penitent sinner and that of another, is the more necessary and essential to the rectitude of divine moral government, because, as it serves to remove the hope of impunity for every act of disobedience, committed after repentance, it must have a natural and direct tendency to render penitent sinners steady in a course of obedience, and to deter them from any future relapse into sin; and, consequently, to promote the happiness of mankind, which is the natural result of obedience to the divine laws, and, indeed, the immediate end of divine moral government: Whereas a contrary constitution would produce the contrary effects; and, for that reason, would be inconsistent with the goodness, wisdom, and rectitude of divine government.

§ 6. This penal treatment, which (in the re-admission of penitent sinners to the favourable treatment of the penitent, after any relapse into sin) is essential to the rectitude of divine moral government, may be executed, either by the repetition of the self-same mild punishment, to which penitent sinners are subjected at the time of their first repentance; or by any other mean, appointed by the Deity, whereby such a degree of uneasiness, or pain, may be produced as will answer the ends, before-mentioned.—Thus much I judged proper to be said, in this place, concerning the treatment of penitent sinners in particular, under divine moral government upon their re-admission to the favourable treatment of the penitent, after such relapses into sin and disobedience as are posterior to their first repentance; because I had no opportunity before to consider it, or say any thing about it.—To return,

§ 7. The proof of the general proposition, *viz.* That the rectitude of divine government requires, that the moral treatment of the

individuals of the human species should, upon any change of moral character, be varied in the manner explained, may be made out in the following manner.—If the Deity was, in no case, to vary the moral treatment of any individual, then it would follow, that all men, the righteous and the finner, the penitent and the impenitent, would have the self-same treatment from him, viz. that of unoffending, righteous persons. For, because innocency, in the order both of nature and time, is prior to transgression, penitence, and impenitency, all men must be treated, at first, as innocent and righteous persons: And, therefore, if no change was ever to be made in their moral treatment, they must for ever, and under all changes of moral character, be treated as innocent and righteous persons. And this uniform, equal treatment of all Persons, under all changes of moral character, whether from better to worse, or from worse to better, would be a perpetual ground of murmuring and discontent; and, consequently, inconsistent with the end and rectitude of divine moral government.—Or, if we should suppose the Deity, on some occasions, to vary the moral treatment of individuals, but capriciously, and at random, and not according to the changes which are made in their moral characters; so that a blameless, righteous person, or an impenitent offender, or a penitent finner, while they remain such, should be treated, at one time, as an innocent and righteous creature; at another time, as an impenitent offender; and at a third time, as a penitent finner; 'tis plain, that, in this way of proceeding, every moral character would often receive from the Deity such a treatment as was quite incongruous to it.—Not to multiply words; upon both the suppositions mentioned, the difference between the treatment of moral characters which are essentially different, would be utterly destroyed; and there would be no motive (in the way of reward or punishment) to one sort of behaviour any more than to another; and besides, this way of treating men, not according to that which is, but according to that which is not, their true and real moral character, would, in all cases (as has been demonstrated in the foregoing *sections*) have a direct, natural tendency, to discourage obedience, and to promote disobedience,

SEC. IV. *and variation of the treatment of moral characters.* 67

disobedience, to the laws of the Deity; and, consequently, to obstruct the happiness, and promote the misery, of the human species: And, on all these accounts, it would be inconsistent with the goodness, wisdom, and rectitude of divine moral government. Hence it is demonstratively evident, that it is essential to the rectitude of divine moral government, that the treatment of every individual person should be varied, according as he changes his moral character, whether it be from worse to better, or from better to worse.

§ 8. Thus I have finished all that I intended, in this inquiry into the rectitude of divine government in the moral treatment of mankind. And the amount of all that I have advanced upon this *subject*, is briefly this, That the rectitude of that moral government, which the Deity exercises over the human species, consists in rendering, at all times, and in all cases, to every individual person *according to his works*, or, *that which he hath done, whether it be good or bad.*



C H A P. III.

Exhibiting the chief objections which may be made to the foregoing doctrine, with the answers to them.

§ 1. **T**HE substance of what has been taught, in the preceding *Chapter*, concerning the rectitude of divine moral government, in the treatment of the several individuals of the human species, is this; That the unoffending righteous (if there be any such) should be rewarded, and rewarded in proportion to the different degrees and measures of their obedience to the laws of the Deity: That impenitent sinners should have no reward given to them, nor any promise of reward made to them; but be threatened with punishment, and be, if they continue impenitent, actually

punished up to the respective degrees and measures of their disobedience: That penitent sinners should not be treated in either of the two ways mentioned, but after a different manner; that a mild punishment should be substituted in place of that grievous one to which they had been obnoxious in their impenitent state; and that they should be encouraged to hope for reward suitable to the respective measures of their future obedience: And, *finally*, That the same treatment should be continued to every person, as long as the moral character, which is the ground of it, remains unchanged; but that a different treatment should be given as soon as that moral character is discontinued, a treatment suitable to the moral character which is assumed in its place.—These ways of dealing with mankind are perfectly congruous to their respective moral characters, and calculated to preserve a proper difference between the divine treatment of such moral characters as are essentially different; and they have such a direct natural tendency to promote obedience to the laws of the Deity, and the happiness of mankind, as no other allotment of rewards and punishments, or rules observed in the distribution of them, have, or can have. And, for these reasons, they must not only be right ways, but the only proper and right ways, of dealing with them, under divine moral government.

§ 2. The truth of every branch of this doctrine has, I think, been demonstratively proved in the foregoing *Chapter*. However, since there are some parts of it which differ from those notions which are generally received by men of learning and genius, as well as by the vulgar, I cannot be so sanguine as to think, that no objections will be made to it. Yea, I myself can foresee some objections, that will probably be made to it, even by candid and honest minds; and, perhaps, with no small degree of confidence in the weight and strength of them.—And, therefore, that these objections may not lie as a dead weight upon the doctrine which I have been inculcating, I shall here propose and discuss the chief of them.

OBJECT-

OBJECTION I.

It may be objected, that such a distribution and frequent use of punishments, as I have supposed to be essential to the rectitude of divine moral government, would tend to keep the minds of men in a slavish state, under perpetual fear and terror.

ANSWER.

§ 3. This objection, or argument, if it proves any thing at all, proves too much: For whatever can be objected against *religious fear*, stands good against the *fear of human laws*: for the religious principle holds out the self-same motive to action. Wherefore, if the argument, contained in this objection, doth not prove, that punishments ought not to be made use of by earthly magistrates to promote the end of civil government, it can be of no force to prove, that they ought not to be made use of by the Deity to promote the end of his moral government.

§ 4. But to come to the direct answer to this objection. Fear of punishment, considered in its true light, is not a slavish principle. To be in a fright indeed, to live under a perpetual apprehension of terror (in which the objection supposes religious fear to consist) is far from being an aimable state. But such a fear as this belongs only to the *guilty*, or to the *superstitious* who have wrong notions of Deity and Religion. But to the rest of mankind, the fear of divine punishment, considered as a motive to action, only implies a lively and habitual belief, that they shall suffer if they disobey the laws of the Deity. And, therefore, how frequently soever punishment be inflicted, and to how many transgressions soever it be annexed, under divine moral government; yet the fear of it cannot be a just ground of inward disturbance, or slavish terror, to any person, till such time as he has transgressed the law. And then, indeed, the rectitude of government renders it necessary, that he should feel both the weight and the terror of such punishment as is proportionable.

able to the nature and heinousness of his crime, provided that the execution of that punishment is not prevented by seasonable repentance. To conclude; the annexing of equitable punishments, to all such actions as have a real natural tendency to promote the hurt of society; and the infliction of them, in all cases, in the way that is best calculated to prevent the misery and secure the happiness of mankind (which is all that is supposed to be done under divine moral government) are real and true grounds of joy to all the *subjects* in general; and cannot be the occasion of grief or terror to any, but only to such as are enemies to mankind, and want to render their own state, and that of other people, slavish and miserable.

OBJECTION II.

It may, perhaps, be said, That such an administration of rewards and punishments, as I have supposed to be essential to the rectitude of divine moral government, would have such an over-bearing and irresistible influence upon the human mind, as would quite destroy the freedom of its actions.

ANSWER.

§ 5. This objection, like the former, strikes at the root of all government, both divine and human. The direct answer to it, is, That the rewards and punishments which are annexed to actions by the divine law, because they have no other kind of influence upon the mind than that of motives to action, can neither diminish nor destroy any part of that real freedom which men have in the performance of their actions.—This is evident. For, since man is incapable of performing any moral action, but only as he is determined to the performance of it by some motive or other; and since the influence of all those motives, by which he is actually determined to act, is over-bearing and irresistible; it follows, that the freedom, which he really has in the performance of moral actions, cannot be destroyed, or, in the least, impaired, by the influence of any motive, even

even though it be irresistible. For if his freedom were destroyed by the over-bearing and irresistible influence of those motives, by which he is impelled to act, he could have no freedom at all, in the performance of any moral action, because every action of this kind is the real effect of such an over-bearing influence. Men, therefore, must either have no freedom at all in the performance of moral actions, or their freedom in the performance of them must not be subject to be diminished, much less to be destroyed, by the irresistibility of the influence of those motives by which they are determined to do them: consequently, supposing the influence of rewards and punishments upon the human mind to be ever so great, even irresistible; yet, because it is only such influence as all determining motives whatsoever have upon the mind, it can neither impair, nor destroy, that liberty, whatever it be, which men really have in the performance of moral actions.

§ 6. But to go to the bottom of this affair. The motive, which, from time to time, actually determines the mind to the next action, is the desire of the greatest *apparent good*, which is considered as being attainable. But now the greatest *apparent good*, being frequently a very different thing from the greatest *real good*, is often mistaken for the latter by the mind. And, through this mistake, the desire of the *greatest apparent good* very often determines the mind to act, whilst the desire of the *greatest real good* has no determining influence at all upon it. But as soon as the mind, in any case, becomes sensible of this mistake, the desire of the greatest *real good* becomes immediately the motive by which it is determined to action; and the desire of that, which, before, had been the greatest *apparent good*, ceases to have any farther influence as a motive to action.— A misapprehension of the greatest *real good* may be occasioned, in any case, by inadvertency, wrong reasoning, and other causes of mistake. And till such time as the mind has corrected such misapprehension, neither rewards nor punishments, divine or human, can determine the mind to the pursuit of the greatest *real good*, and the performance of the subservient actions, as experience teacheth us. But such misapprehensions or mistakes as these the mind has power, and

and is at liberty, to rectify by consideration and due examination. This power, this liberty, the mind has. But whether it doth, or doth not, rectify these mistakes, it is, in all cases, necessitated to act by the desire of the greatest *apparent good*, whether it be the greatest *real good* or not. The freedom, therefore, which the human mind really enjoys, is no more effected by the sanctions of rewards and punishments which are annexed to laws, than it is by other objects of *desire* and *aversion*; it is not impaired or destroyed by the one, any more than it is by the other.—If it apprehends the reward, which is promised to obedience, to be the *greatest good*, and the punishment, which is denounced against disobedience, to be the greatest evil, it must, of necessity act accordingly. If it is of a different opinion, it will not be, in the least, moved or determined to act, by any influence which the prospect of reward or punishment has upon it. And, even in this case, it has power and freedom to consider and examine, when, and as far as, it thinks fit, whether its apprehensions about the good and evil of these objects, be right or wrong. And greater liberty than this it hath not in any case whatsoever, where rewards and punishments are entirely out of the question.

OBJECTION III.

It may be objected further, That obedience to the divine laws extorted by the force and influence of rewards and punishments would be mercenary and worthless.

ANSWER.

§ 7. This is another of those fine arguments which strike at the root and being of all government, whether divine or human: For if all obedience, performed under the influence of rewards and punishments, be mercenary and worthless; and if no worthless and mercenary obedience is to be required, encouraged, or regarded (as the objection suggests) then it will follow, That all government, both
divine

divine and human, ought to be discontinued and set aside. But I would advise every person, before he ventures to draw, or admit, this conclusion, to examine the *premises* well, and to consider seriously with himself, whether order can be preserved among mankind, or the good of society be promoted and secured in any tolerable manner, without government; and whether government of any kind, can be established and supported, or even exercised, without the intervention and assistance of rewards and punishments.

§ 8. But to come closer to the point. I would ask the objector, why he thinks, that obedience to the laws of God, performed under the influence of rewards and punishments, is worthless? Is it because such obedience would answer no good end, nor be productive of any good effect? This, I presume, will scarce be urged, since obedience to the laws of the Deity, from what motive soever it proceeds, must promote the happiness of the human species, which is the immediate end of divine government, and than which, I know of no effect that is of greater, or even equal importance and excellence.—If, therefore, we may be allowed to make an estimate of the worth of any cause from the excellence and importance of its effects, obedience to the laws of the Deity, even when it is produced by the prospect of rewards and punishments, must be a thing of inestimable value.

§ 9. But, perhaps, it may be urged here, That the natural liberty of the agent would be much impaired, if not quite destroyed, by the forcible influence of rewards and punishments; and, therefore, obedience, performed under such an influence, whatever worth it may have in respect of its effects, yet it can have little, if any, in respect of the agent; or, in other words, such acts of obedience, or rather, the agent by whom they are performed, would be virtuous either in a very low degree, or in no degree at all.—But, surely, this is what cannot be urged, since it is demonstrable, and actually has been demonstrated, that the influence of rewards and punishments upon the human mind is neither inconsistent with, nor destructive of, its natural liberty.—But let us take a view of this objection on all sides, and

and in all lights, and see whether there is, or is not, any weight in it. In order to this, we may take notice,

§ 10. *First.* That rewards and punishments are so far from having any certain, uniform influence upon human minds in all cases; that, in many cases, they make no impressions at all upon them: in all which cases, it must be allowed, that the liberty of the mind is neither impaired, nor destroyed, nor in any manner, affected, by the influence of them.

§ 11. *Secondly.* The human mind, in other cases, is actually determined to the performance and forbearance of actions by the prospect of rewards and punishments: And, in all these cases, the influence, which reward and punishment have upon it, is over-bearing and irresistible. But then, this influence is neither other, nor greater, than the influence of any other motive by which the mind is actually determined to action. Besides, the irresistibility of the influence of rewards and punishments, in the cases mentioned, depends on antecedent thought, consideration and judgment; and, therefore, instead of destroying or impairing the natural liberty of the mind, it plainly supposes the antecedent exercise of it in thinking, considering and judging, these being absolutely necessary towards the rendering it irresistible. The influence, therefore, arising from the prospect of rewards and punishments neither doth, nor can, destroy, or, in any degree, impair the natural liberty of the human mind.

§ 12. *Thirdly.* In all governments, divine and human, there are certain punishments annexed, by the laws, to some heinous crimes, by the infliction of which, *life*, and, consequently *liberty*, are destroyed; and the end of government makes it necessary, that these capital punishments should be sometimes inflicted.—But then it ought to be observed, that it is not by the threatening of these capital punishments, before the crimes, to which they are annexed, are committed, but only by the actual execution of them, that offenders are deprived of their natural liberty to act, and to forbear acting, according to their own thought and judgment. For, that their natural liberty is neither destroyed nor impaired by the antecedent

cedent threatening of these punishments, is very evident, because some are, and others are not, restrained from offending by the dread of them: and besides, it is very remarkable, that the self-same person, at one time, is, and at another time is not, deterred from transgression by it.—Hence it is manifest, that all men are left at liberty, to be influenced, or not influenced, by the dread of these punishments, according to their own apprehensions of the greater or lesser weight of them. That obedience, therefore, which is the effect of the dread of capital punishment it self, is the obedience of persons who are at liberty to act, and not to act, as they think fit.—By the actual execution, indeed, of capital punishments, offenders are deprived of their natural liberty, and of their whole capacity for action. But then, the intention of the threatening, and the intention of the execution, of these punishments, are very different. The intention of the former is to excite men to future obedience to the law, and to prevent transgression; but the intention of the latter is to disable offenders for transgressing the law for the future, by depriving them of their life and liberty. The latter is inconsistent with liberty, but the former is perfectly consistent with it, as I have shewn already; and this is sufficient for my present purpose.—And for others; experience shews us, that they are at liberty either to profit, or not to profit, by the execution of such capital punishments, as they think fit. These *examples of terror* do not, in the least, hinder them to think and consider, and to act according to their own thought and judgment; which is all the liberty, and the only liberty, which any intelligent agent has, or can have. And, therefore, the worth of that obedience, which is promoted by the influence of such *examples of terror* is neither destroyed or impaired, through any loss or diminution of natural liberty. But,

§ 13. *Fourthly.* As the objection mentions, that obedience, extorted by the force and influence of rewards and punishments, is mercenary; perhaps it may be, on this account, that such obedience is pronounced worthless.—But this way of proving the worthlessness of such acts of obedience from the mercenariness of them, is, most certainly, a wrong way of reasoning, unless it be allowed,

that all other moral actions, the most generous and disinterested not excepted, are, likewise, worthless actions, since experience teacheth us, that these, as well as the other, are performed with a view to *self-interest*, or *private happiness*.—The truth is, the feeling of *immediate*, or the prospect of *future* happiness, is the sole motive by which men can be induced or determined to the performance of any moral action, whether virtuous or religious; so that self-interest, call it mercenariness, or what you please, is the sole hinge upon which all moral actions, virtuous or religious, turn. And, therefore, if any one of these actions be deemed worthless, merely on this account, they must all, in the lump, be condemned as such.—Without attempting any thing of my own in proof of what I have here advanced, I shall present my reader with an abstract of what the celebrated Author of the *Essays on the Characteristics*, has said upon it.—“Selfishness and disinterestedness, says this Author, have been used in a very loose and indeterminate manner. In one sense, a motive is called disinterested, when it consists in a pure benevolent affection, or a regard to the *moral sense*. In another, no motive is disinterested; for even in acting according to these impulses of *benevolence* and *conscience*, we gratify an inclination, and act upon the principle, or immediate feeling of private happiness. Thus when we say, *we love virtue for virtue's sake*, 'tis only implied, that we find immediate happiness from the love and practice of virtue, without regard to external or future consequences. Setting aside all ambiguous and metaphorical expressions,—it seems evident, that a motive, from its very nature, must be something that *affects our self*. Now what can possibly *affect our self*, but either the *feeling* or *prospect* of pleasure or pain, of happiness or misery?—But to come to the direct proof; 'tis evident, even to a demonstration, that no *affection* can, in the strict sense, be more or less selfish or disinterested than another; because, whatever be its *object*, the *affection* it self is no other, than a mode either of *pleasure* or of *pain*, and is, therefore, equally to be referred to the *mind*, or *feeling* of the patient, whatever be its external occasion.” (d)

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(d) Essay II. on the *Characteristics*, Sect. VI.

This reasoning seems to be demonstrative. And, therefore, without adding any thing to it, I shall only draw the following conclusion from it, and leave it to the consideration of the candid and ingenious reader, viz. Since self-interest or private happiness, is the motive by which the human mind is impelled and determined to the performance of every virtuous action, as the foregoing reasoning sheweth; and since virtuous actions do not lose their worth or virtue because they are performed under the influence of this selfish or mercenary principle; it follows, that acts of obedience to the divine law, performed under the influence of the same motive, or with a view to *private happiness* (*that is*, in order to avoid punishment or obtain reward) cannot be accounted worthless, because they are mercenary.

OBJECTION IV.

In the answers to the last two objections, two things have been affirmed, 1st. That the human mind is frequently determined to action by such motives as arise from the consideration of the natural consequences of actions: And, 2^{dly}. That all those motives, by which the mind is actually determined to action, have an overbearing and irresistible influence upon it. It may, therefore, perhaps be queried here, What possible occasion can there be for the additional weight of rewards and punishments? Are not the motives, which arise from the consideration of the natural consequences of actions, abundantly sufficient, without any others, for the purpose of determining the mind to action in all cases? Or can it be imagined, that that which is over-bearing and irresistible, is not of force enough to determine the mind to act and to forbear acting?

ANSWER.

§ 14. The objection, which is couched in these queries, appears to be ingenious enough, but it has no weight in it.—In the general, if any motive, by which a human mind is actually determined to perform

perform an action, had, at all times, the same determining, irresistible influence upon that mind, and upon all other minds; that motive, without the additional weight of any other motive, would, at all times, and in all cases, be sufficient to determine that mind, and all other minds, to perform that action: and, consequently, this objection would be good and unanswerable. But the supposition, on which the truth of this consequence depends, has no foundation in truth and nature. For it is found to be true, by daily experience, that a motive, by which a man has been over-powered, and irresistibly determined to action, at one time, has no power over him, nor makes any impression upon him, at another time: And, in like manner, that a motive, by which one person is irresistibly impelled to act, is not always found to have the like influence upon another person, or upon all persons.—These are stubborn facts, which are attested by daily and universal experience and observation.—Hence it appears, that a motive, which has, at one time, been sufficient to determine a man to act, may require an additional force to make it have the like influence upon him, at another time; and that a motive, by which one person is irresistibly determined to act, must, in many cases, have its *momentum* increased, before it can have the like determining influence upon the minds of other people. And, therefore, from the irresistibility of determining motives, we cannot conclude, that any of these motives, which has had an irresistible influence upon some mind, at some time, will have the like determining influence upon other minds, or even upon the same mind, for the future. In general, therefore, it is evident, that motives, whose force upon some persons has, at some times, been really irresistible, may yet require the super-added *momentum* of other motives to render their force over other people, and even over the same persons, at other times, irresistible: consequently, the objection, under consideration, has no weight, as depending wholly upon a false supposition.

§ 15. As to the particular motives to action, which arise from the consideration of the natural consequences of action; I acknowledge, that those motives have had, and still have, a powerful and irresistible

irresistible influence over some minds; and have produced some eminent examples of illustrious virtue in the *Heathen*, as well as in the *Christian* world. But then, it ought to be noted, that those motives derive their whole force over the mind, from consideration, clear reasoning, and right judgment, in minds which are uncorrupted, or not much corrupted, by wrong education and habits of vice, nor under any great perturbations from immoderate appetites and passions. And these, indeed, are characters which, comparatively speaking, belong to a very small part of mankind:—Over persons who are ignorant and inconsiderate, or who reason and judge in a wrong manner; or whose minds have received a wrong bent from inveterate prejudices, and settled habits of vice; or who are under great inward perturbations from the impulses of impetuous appetites and passions, (and such are the bulk of mankind) the motives, I am speaking of, are found to have little power, or rather no power at all. Yea, even over men who are possessors of several of the good qualities mentioned, but are deficient in others of them, they are found to have little or no influence. To this purpose, it may be observed, that many men, who have an excellent genius and good understanding, whose reasonings are very accurate, and their sentiments noble and just, are not influenced to the practice of virtue by their perceptions of the natural consequences of actions, because the temper and bent of their mind is vicious. In like manner, it may be observed, that even a good man, who is uncorrupted by prejudice or vice, when he is careless and off his guard, and doth not consider, reason, and judge in a right manner, feels nothing at all of the determining influence of the motives, aforesaid, upon his mind. These are facts which are confirmed by experience and observation, and by all the *History* which we have of the moral state of mankind, past or present. And it clearly appears from them, that though those motives to action, which arise from the good and ill natural consequences of actions, have had, and still have, an over-bearing and irresistible influence over some minds; yet they neither have, nor ever had, the like influence universally over all minds, or even over any one mind, at all times. The bulk of mankind have felt little,

little, or nothing of the determining influence of those motives; and even over the few who have felt it, it has not been steady and uniform, but frequently interrupted through inadvertency, mistake, wrong reasoning, and erroneous sentiments, and not seldom defeated, and set aside entirely, by gradually acquired habits of vice.—Such motives as these, whose influences are so narrow and unsteady, 'tis plain, would have no considerable effect upon the reformation and virtue of the bulk of mankind, unless their impelling force was increased, and men were roused to a proper attention to them, by the additional force of other motives, whose influence may be more readily, strongly, and universally felt by all men.—And what motives can possibly answer all these ends better, than those which arise from the prospect of rewards and punishments, properly administered? Motives of this last kind, are more striking and awakening than the other, and better calculated to operate upon the minds of all men, whether knowing or ignorant, virtuous or vicious; not only as they greatly increase the good and bad consequences of actions, and, by that mean, add to the force of those motives which arise from the consideration of them; but, especially, because no greater degree of consideration and reasoning is requisite to the perception of the weight and force of them, than what the most ignorant are capable of, and the most vicious, however averse, must, on some occasions, exercise.—Accordingly, in the exercise of *civil governments*, it has been found to be true in fact, that they who could not be restrained from such actions as are hurtful to society, nor be made to perform such actions as are conducive to the public good, by the bare consideration of the natural consequences of the actions themselves; have yet been induced to refrain from the one, and to perform the other, by a proper use and application of rewards and punishments. And as rewards and punishments are so useful and needful in those civil governments which are exercised by earthly princes and magistrates, they must be equally needful and useful in the administration of divine moral government; there being the very same reason for the use of them in both.

OBJECTION

OBJECTION V.

It may, perhaps, be urged, That the dealing with every person at last, according to his *prevailing character*, would answer the end of divine, moral government, and all the demands of rectitude, without such a nice adjusting of rewards and punishments to the acts and degrees of his obedience and disobedience, and to the changes which happen in his moral character, as I have been contending for in the foregoing *Chapter*.

ANSWER.

§ 16. Before I attempt any answer to this objection, it will be proper to settle the idea of what may be called, a *prevailing character*, and to clear it from all ambiguity. A person's *prevailing character* may denote one of two things; either 1st. That which is his real, predominant character for the time present. Or, 2^{dly}. That character which, upon the whole, has been more predominant than any other, through some given period of time, as having been either, at times, raised to an higher degree of perfection, or preserved through a longer space of time, than any other character, during the period of time, aforesaid.—The first, for brevity's sake, I shall call, *the prevailing character for the time present*; and the second, *the prevailing character, upon the whole, for a given period of time*.

§ 17. As to the *prevailing character for the time present*; I grant, That it is sufficient to constitute the rectitude of divine moral government, that every person be, from time to time, treated by the Deity, according to this character; and, consequently, that the treatment of each individual be varied as he changes his moral character, in such manner, that a constant conformity or agreement may be preserved between his treatment, and that which is his real moral character at the time when he receives it. This is what I not only allow, but contend for.

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§ 18.

§ 18. But this *prevailing character for the time present*, is not, I think, the prevailing character which is intended in the objection: For if it were the character therein intended, it could not be supposed, that the end of divine government, and all the demands of rectitude, may be answered, without any nice adjusting of rewards and punishments to particular acts of obedience and disobedience, and to all the changes which happen to be made in moral characters.—The prevailing character, therefore, which is intended in the objection, must be *the prevailing character, upon the whole, for a given period of time*: Consequently, the question, which we have to consider here, is, Whether the Deity's dealing, at last, with each individual person, according to that character which, through some given period of time, has been more predominant and prevailing in his behaviour than any other character, would, or would not, be conducive to the end, and consistent with the rectitude, of divine moral government?—And to this question we may, as far as I can see, venture to answer in the negative. For,

§ 19. *1st*. If no reward was given to the obedient, nor any punishment executed upon the disobedient, for some given period of time; 'tis plain, that no cognizance at all would be taken of men's actions thro' that whole period: consequently, there would be no exercise of government; or, in other words, the government would, all that while, be actually dissolved.—Hence it is manifest, that the deferring of reward and punishment for the present, and the dealing with men at last, according to that which has been their most prevailing and predominant character thro' a given period of time, instead of being conducive to the end, or consistent with the rectitude, of divine moral government, would really obstruct the exercise of it, and be inconsistent with its very being, during that whole period of time.

§ 20. *2^{dly}*. If, after the expiration of the supposed period of time, men, who, during the continuance of it, had often changed their moral character, were to receive reward, or punishment, according to that character which, upon the whole, had been more predominant and prevailing in their behaviour than any other; then
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it will follow, That the persons, whose measure of obedience to the laws of the Deity, through that period of time, has, upon the whole, ever so little exceeded and out weighed the measure of their disobedience to these laws; and who have done nearly as much hurt as good to society; will, nevertheless escape all punishment, and be rewarded for a poor, pitiful surplus of obedience; yea be rewarded for it, even tho' they were caught before the tribunal of the Deity in an act of high treason, or of the most atrocious wickedness, which they did not repent of.—In like manner, upon the supposition, aforesaid, it will follow, on the other hand, That the persons, whose measure of disobedience has, upon the whole, ever so little exceeded the measure of their obedience, and who have nearly done as much good as hurt to society, will not only receive no reward, but be punished for a very small and inconsiderable surplus of disobedience; and punished for it, even tho' they be ever so penitent for it. Hopeful methods, truly, for promoting the end, and securing the rectitude, of divine moral government! If these are the ways in which the Deity is to treat mankind, any, even the smallest, excess of obedience beyond disobedience, through a certain given period of time, excuses a person from all punishment, and ascertains a reward to him, even though he should happen to be an impenitent sinner, at the time he receives it; and any, the least, excess of disobedience beyond obedience, excludes a man from all reward, and subjects him to punishment, without remedy, even though he be penitent for it. But,

§ 21. During the period of time, aforesaid, in which punishment and reward are supposed to be deferred by the Deity, 'tis plain, that persons of different moral characters, and the same persons, under all changes of moral character, would all receive the very same moral treatment from the Deity, or rather, no moral treatment at all. And what the dreadful consequences of such an universal defect of proper moral treatment, under divine government, would be, I have already demonstrated in the foregoing Chapter; viz. the *distress* and *misery* of the human species in general;

ral; and, consequently, the obstruction of the end of divine moral government, not in one or two particular cases, but universally, in all supposable cases whatsoever.

§ 22. To conclude, if any person will reflect, and seriously consider the miserable state to which a nation would be reduced under *civil government*, if the execution of the sanctions of the law was deferred for the space of twenty or thirty years; and every subject was, in the mean time, informed by the *prince*, that, at the expiration of that period of years, he should escape all punishment, and receive reward, if it did then appear, that his disobedience to the laws, during the continuance of it, had, in any degree, been exceeded or over ballanced by his obedience to them: But that he should be excluded from all reward, and punished, if the contrary should appear: I say, If any person will duly reflect upon the miserable state to which a nation, in the circumstances mentioned, would presently be reduced; he will readily conceive of the great *distress* and *misery* to which mankind, in the like circumstances, would be reduced, under divine moral government.

§ 23. When all that has been said, in answer to this objection, has been duly weighed, we may venture, I think, to conclude, that the Deity's dealing, at last, with every man, according to that which has been his *prevailing character*, through some given period of time (for instance, through the course of his natural life in this world) would tend to promote, not the happiness, but the misery, of mankind; and, consequently would be inconsistent with the end and rectitude of his moral government.

OBJECTION VI.

It may be objected further, That the exercise of *divine mercy*, in the treatment of penitent offenders, would be greatly limited, if not wholly excluded, by such an administration of rewards and punishments, as has been contended for in their case.

ANSWER

ANSWER.

§ 24. *Mercy* is that particular species of goodness which has beings, who are in misery and distress, for its objects: and it consists in commiserating or pitying such beings under their sufferings, and in giving them help and relief either *in part*, or *in whole*; so that the affection of *pity*, and every degree of relief which is given to the miserable, are comprehended in the idea of *mercy*; and, indeed, are all that is comprehended in it.—Again, the miserable are either such as have brought misery upon themselves by their own crimes, or such as have been rendered miserable by other causes: and the objection, here proposed, relates to the divine mercy in the treatment of a part only of the former, viz. of penitent offenders, who have rendered themselves obnoxious to punishment by disobedience to the laws of the Deity.

§ 25. Now the treatment of penitent sinners, under divine moral government, which I have been contending for, as consistent with, and essential to, the rectitude of that government, is briefly as followeth, viz. That they be entirely discharged from the grievous punishment to which they were obnoxious in their former impenitent state, and favoured with reward suitable to the respective measures of their future obedience: But that this discharge from punishment, and grant of reward, should be attended with the suffering of such a mild punishment as may be sufficient to preserve a proper difference between their treatment and that of the unoffending righteous.—This appears to me, and, I think, must appear, at first view, to every thinking and unprejudiced mind, to be very merciful treatment. If such favour shewn, such relief, even happiness, granted by the Deity, to those who have made themselves miserable by disobedience to him, be not mercy and great mercy, I know not what the word, *MERCY*, means. A contrary treatment, I am sure, would not deserve the epithet of *merciful*.—But it is objected, that such a treatment of penitent sinners would greatly limit, if not wholly

wholly exclude the exercise of divine mercy. In support of this objection, the following questions may, perhaps, be put; Can that be mercy which is not free? Can those acts of relief, which proceed not from the impulse of the affections of *pity* and *goodness*, but from other motives, be accounted acts of mercy? Are not penitent sinners supposed, in this *scheme*, to be treated according to the same general rule which is observed in the treatment of the unoffending righteous, and even in that of impenitent offenders? Is the treatment, which they are supposed to receive, conceived to be any other, than what is proper to their moral character, and the end and rectitude of divine moral government require, and even oblige, the Deity to give them? And are they not supposed to receive this treatment from him, for no other reason, but because the end and rectitude of his moral government require and oblige him to give it? Can then that, which the rectitude and end of divine government make *a just debt*, and oblige the Deity to discharge, be accounted the effect of free mercy, and of pure disinterested goodness?

§ 26. I have here given the objection all the force I can. Some, perhaps, may think it a very formidable one, and sufficient to overturn all that I have said concerning the rectitude of divine moral government in the treatment of penitent sinners. But really, unless it be a jingle of words about an absurd and chimerical idea of *mercy*, or *goodness*, it has nothing at all in it.—I allow, that, under divine government, penitent sinners are, and must be, treated according to the same general rule which is observed in the treatment of other moral characters, or, in other words, according to their own proper moral character or behaviour; and that the end and rectitude of divine government require that they should be thus treated. But, pray, what can be inferred from this? Doth it give any ground for such a conclusion as this, that the treatment of penitent sinners under divine government, is not merciful treatment? By no means. On the contrary, the only conclusion that can, with any shadow of reason, be drawn from it, is this, That their treatment is as merciful as the end and rectitude of divine government either require, or permit it to be: Or, in other words, That as
much

much mercy is shewed them as is either conducive to, or consistent with, the happiness of their own species, their own included.—Ay! But doth not the rectitude of divine government require, that penitent sinners should have this treatment, and even oblige the Deity to give it to them? And is not this demand of rectitude, and obligation on the Deity, by which he is moved and determined to give them this treatment, inconsistent with *free mercy*, and *disinterested goodness*?—What ideas, truly, some people may frame to themselves of *free mercy*, and *disinterested goodness*, is what I cannot tell. The ideas of them, which are here suggested, appear to me, to be mere *entia rationis*, or rather monstrous chimeras which never had, never can have, any being. *Mercy* and *goodness*, free and disinterested, in the sense of being exercised without any motive or inducement, besides the bare impulse of the affections themselves, and, consequently, without the guidance and direction of an understanding mind, if they could be thus exercised by an intelligent mind, yet they would be no instances of moral virtue or excellence, but would lose their very nature, and be no mercy or goodness at all.—As to the mercy of the Deity, in particular, it is a branch of moral perfection; and, for that reason, it must be always exercised upon proper motives, and under the direction of unerring wisdom; and, consequently, cannot be *free* and *disinterested* in the sense suggested by the objection.

§ 27. *Mercy* and *goodness* themselves have certain boundaries, beyond which they cannot be carried, without losing their very existence. Were the impulses of the blind affections of goodness and mercy, goodness and mercy set loose from the guidance of reason, and undirected to any end, the spring and motives upon which the actions of the Deity turn, in the administration of his moral government, what, pray, must the consequence be? Why, this, and this only, that persons of all moral characters, the saint and the sinner, the penitent and the impenitent, would have the very same treatment, and the same favour, hope, and encouragement, from the Deity; and the natural and necessary result of such equal and undistinguishing treatment, would be, the unhappiness, misery, and ruin of the whole human

human species, and the entire defeat of the end and intention of divine moral government, as has been proved in the foregoing *Chapter*. Would, then, such an exercise of what some are pleased to call, *free mercy*, and *disinterested goodness*, that is, of blind mercy and goodness, be the exercise of any goodness and mercy at all? Or rather, would it not be the exercise of the greatest tyranny or cruelty that could possibly be practised? Would not every single act of this boasted *free mercy* and *disinterested goodness*, on behalf of the penitent and impenitent, beyond what is suitable to their respective characters, and consistent with the public good, be a real act of cruelty to the whole community, and even, eventually, to those for whose sake it was done? Most certainly it would. Wherefore since *mercy* uncondemned by reason, directed to no end, but practised according to the impulse of blind affection, is really no mercy at all, but tyranny and cruelty, the Deity, when he extends favour to penitent sinners, as far as the end of his moral government either requires or permits, exercises mercy as pure, free, and disinterested, as it is possible for mercy to be: not only so, but he stretches mercy to the utmost latitude of its real extent, and displays it in as ample manner, and high degree, as it is possible for it to be displayed in their case: for the extending it in the least any farther than this, would destroy its nature and convert it into tyranny and cruelty, as has been shewn just now.—The exercise of divine mercy, therefore, instead of being wholly excluded, or even, in any degree, limited, by such an administration of rewards and punishments, as I have been contending for in the treatment of penitent sinners, is really comprehended in that treatment, and secured by it, in its whole latitude and extent.

§ 28. Perhaps it may be here asked, Would not the mercy shewn to penitent offenders, be much greater than what I have supposed it to be, if they were entirely discharged from all punishment; not only from that grievous one to which they had been obnoxious in their impenitent state, but, likewise, from the gentle and mild one, which is supposed to be fit and proper even in their penitent state?—To this question I answer, That it would be greater mercy,

provided such a release from all punishment was consistent with the general happiness of the human species, or, which is the same thing, with the end of divine moral government. But it has been proved, yea, demonstrated, that it would not be consistent with the happiness of mankind; and, for that reason, the grant of it would be an act of cruelty, and not of mercy.—The impenitent are given up to punishment by all men. But why? Only because the sparing them, and shewing them any degree of favour, would not be mercy, but cruelty to society in general, and, as such, inconsistent with the end and rectitude of divine moral government. Very well! And ought not then penitent sinners, for the same reason, to be subjected to such a mild punishment as has been insisted on in their case, since their release from it would not be mercy, but cruelty, to the species or community?—Upon the whole, it appears, That the exercise of divine mercy is so far from being excluded, or, in any degree, limited, by that administration of rewards and punishments, which I have contended for in the case of penitent sinners, that it is stretched to the utmost latitude of its real extent by it.

OBJECTION VII.

It may be further objected, That such an administration of rewards and punishments, as I have supposed to be essential to the rectitude of divine moral government, is inconsistent with real *facts* and *appearances*, and with what we see and observe in the present, actual administration of providence.

ANSWER.

§ 29. I am now afraid, that the objector hath set both himself and me fast, whilst he thus puts me upon reconciling my sentiments with facts, of the truth and real circumstances of which neither he nor I are competent judges.—But I shall endeavour to give him what satisfaction I can, in this dark and intricate affair.

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§ 30. Those

§ 30. Those civil governments, which are exercised over kind by the *princes* and *magistrates* of the earth, are one of the principal engines by which the Deity exerciseth his moral government over the human species. But, it must be confessed, that such an administration of rewards and punishments as I have proved to be essential to the rectitude of divine moral government, neither doth, nor can, take place under these civil governments, but in part only. The defective power, and imperfect knowledge of earthly princes and magistrates, are invincible obstacles to its taking place in its whole extent under their governments. The civil magistrate, in every country, has, in most cases, power to punish the disobedient in proportion to their crimes; but he has not equal power to reward all the obedient in proportion to the respective measures of their obedience. He can, in many cases, distinguish clearly between truth and falsehood, right and wrong; but, in some dark and intricate ones, he cannot. He can perceive the difference between one external action and another; but he cannot distinguish between one heart and another, nor discover the difference between a true and a counterfeit penitence; and, therefore, can shew very little regard, if any at all, to that difference in his administration of government. Withal, he frequently meets with such great and insuperable obstacles in the administration of justice from the opposing power and passions either of the *great*, or of the *many*, that he cannot do that which, in other circumstances, would be right, without involving himself, or the public, or both, perhaps, in ruin.—For these reasons, such an administration of rewards and punishments as I have proved to be essential to the rectitude of divine moral government, cannot take place, under the governments of earthly princes and magistrates, but in part only.

§ 31. But, besides these natural and unavoidable imperfections of mind, there are certain vices, to which, one or more of them, many of the princes and magistrates of this world are very subject; and, in consequence of which, the little which they are really capable of doing towards such an administration of rewards and punishments as has been mentioned, is really neglected, and their
very

very government rendered the cause and instrument of great and inexpressible misery to mankind: Such as, The neglect of improving their minds in that knowledge, and in those virtues, which are necessary to qualify them for the exercise of government; Sloth and indolence; Cowardice and timidity; The hearkening to evil counsellors; The acting precipitately without due deliberation and enquiry; Partial affection to some, and private resentment against others; Inhumanity and cruelty of temper; An inordinate love of sensual pleasures; And a lust after *despotism*, or arbitrary power, by which they are naturally led to sacrifice, in a wanton manner, the lives, liberty, and properties, both of their own subjects, and of other princes and nations, to their pride and ambition, or, to what they abusively call their GLORY.—Through these and the like vices in earthly princes, their administration of government is frequently made to subserve purposes which are directly opposite to, and subversive of, the end and intention of divine moral government.

§ 32. When, therefore, the natural incapacity of earthly princes for such an administration of rewards and punishments as has been proved to be essential to the rectitude of divine government, and the natural effects of those vices which are incident to many persons of this high rank, have been duly weighed and considered; it needs not be any matter of wonder or surprize to us, if we are not able to discover much, under their governments, of such an administration of rewards and punishments; and if we meet with many things which are apparently inconsistent with it.—But, pray, what is the conclusion which ought, in reason, to be drawn from these *phænomena*? Is it this, That the same defects, botches, and irregularities, which are found in the governments of earthly princes, must, likewise, be found in the government of the Deity? This conclusion, I think, will not be thought to follow from these *phænomena*, but the contrary; because the Deity is perfectly exempted both from that imperfection of nature, and from those vices, which are the true sources, and sole causes, of all the defects and irregularities mentioned.—The princes of this world are, all of them, weak in

power and understanding; and many of them are corrupted by vice: But what is all this to the Deity? Is not he perfectly exempted from all imperfection of nature, and depravity of will? Can it then be supposed, that his moral government should be limited, obstructed, or rendered, in any degree, imperfect, by a defect either of power or understanding; or that it should be abused, and perverted to wrong purposes, by a vicious turn of mind? This ought not, cannot, be supposed.—What then can there be, in any case, to hinder him from exercising his government by such a proper and just administration of reward and punishment as may best answer and accomplish the end of it? Can the defects and abuses of civil governments, exercised by men, be any obstacle, in the prosecution of this affair, to him who has power and understanding abundantly sufficient to enable him to remedy all the unavoidable defects of such governments, and, likewise, to correct the follies, and punish the vices, of those to whom they are committed, as well as those of their subjects?

§ 33. If, indeed, civil governments were the only instrument, or engine, which the Deity has to employ in the administration of his moral government, it would follow, that where these failed, or became disordered, there the Deity would be under a necessity to stop working, and would miss his end. But this supposition is utterly false; and, therefore, the consequence mentioned, is naught.—The Deity, besides human, civil governments, has many means and instruments, by which he exerciseth and administreth his moral government; and by which he not only supplies all the defects, but often mends and corrects the faults of the former. Endless myriads of invisible intelligences, together with all the powers of nature; health and disease; wealth and poverty; life and death; the virtues and vices, the weaknesses and follies, the understandings, passions, consciences, and all the power, not only of single persons, but of the largest communities of men; all these are at his command, and prepared to obey his nod, whether in the conveyance of reward, or in the execution of punishment. By these instruments the Deity can work at any time, and fulfil all his pleasure, maugre all opposition.

position.—'Tis generally allowed, I think, that the Deity has made use of these, and the like instruments, upon many occasions. Why then may it not be rationally supposed, that he makes use of them on every proper occasion; *that is*, whensoever the end and rectitude of his moral government makes the use of them needful in the conveyance of reward, or in the execution of punishment? This supposition, I am sure, is very rational, since the Deity must have the same reason for making use of them on all such occasions, as on any one of them.

§ 34. But it may be still queried; Is it real fact, that, in the present administration of divine providence, all the righteous have reward, suitable to the respective measures of their obedience, conferred on them; and that all the impenitent have punishment, suitable to the respective measures of their disobedience, inflicted on them; and that penitent sinners are all subjected to gentle punishment on account of the offensive part of their moral character, and enjoy such reward as is duly proportioned to the respective measures of their obedience; which are the things insisted on? Is it not rather manifest, from that promiscuous dispensation of good and evil, which, according to all appearances, actually takes place at present, that the moral characters, mentioned, are not uniformly and constantly, if at all, treated in the respective ways specified?

§ 35. To this Query, I shall, in the first place, make this general Answer, *viz.* That, because the happiness of the human species is the immediate end and object of that moral government which the Deity exerciseth over them; and because the respective ways, specified, of treating the three moral characters mentioned, are the only ways of treating them which have any natural tendency or fitness to promote and secure that end of divine government, and, therefore, the only right ways of treating them; we are sufficiently warranted by the attributes of Deity, (his infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, which render it impossible that he should be disappointed of his end, or take any wrong measure, or neglect any right one, in the prosecution of it) to conclude, that each of these three moral characters is actually treated by the Deity, even in this present.

present world, in the very way which is specified in this query.—This argumentation, whatever objections may be made to it, appears to me to be conclusive, demonstratively so.—But to proceed to a more particular answer.

§ 36. The force of the objection, couched in this query, may be abated in some degree, by considering, that there is no character of perfect piety, or virtue, to be found amongst our frail species. And for this reason, no person has any reason to be surprized, if he finds none among the *adult* (with whom only I am here concerned) exempted from sufferings, even penal sufferings.—But to come to that in which the great strength of this objection lies.

§ 37. 'Tis alledged, that a promiscuous dispensation of good and evil actually takes place in the present administration of providence. This is urged; and, indeed, it is generally allowed to be real and true fact. But it is what I have not as yet found to be supported by any good proof, either from reason or observation. And 'till some proof of this kind is produced, which, I think, never will, I must take the liberty to deny this fact; And shall here shew the reasons why I cannot assent to it.

§. 38. I acknowledge, that every person has his share of natural good and evil, or of pleasure and pain; that different persons have their shares of them in very different and unequal proportions; and that some of the best of men have a lesser share of natural good, and a greater of natural evil, than others have, whose characters are much worse, perhaps, very bad; and *vice versa*. All this appears to me to be plain and visible fact; and I acknowledge it as such. But notwithstanding these concessions, I cannot allow, that it is either plain and visible fact, or any fact at all, that natural good and evil, considered either simply as such, or as reward and punishment, are, in the present administration of providence, dispensed promiscuously, and at random, without any regard to the happiness of the human species, or to the behaviour or moral characters of men: I say, they are not dispensed promiscuously, and at random, either simply, as natural good and evil, or as reward and punishment; for since all enjoyment

enjoyment is not reward, nor all suffering punishment, it is necessary, to distinguish between natural good and evil, considered simply as such, and considered as reward and punishment. And what I here affirm, is, that it is not plain and evident fact, that natural good and evil, considered in either of these two views, are, in the present administration of providence, dispensed promiscuously, and at random, without any regard to the moral characters of men, or to the good either of individuals, or of the species.—Such a fact as this, if it was evident and real, would altogether exclude a providence from having any concern in human affairs; at least, if it did not, it would present us with the horrid view of such a blind, undistinguishing, and monstrous providence, as would carry in it the highest reflection on the Deity himself, and be a most discouraging and dreadful consideration to men. But, thank God, This fact is not plain and evident: So far from this, that there is not any one certain trace, or probable evidence, of its existence, to be met with any where, no not even in the present state of our world, confused and disorderly as it appears in the eyes of many. The external *phænomena* in the administration of providence, which seem to have a contrary aspect, and which many are apt to consider as real instances of a promiscuous dispensation of good and evil, and of a most disorderly state of things, do not amount to any real or good proof of the truth of this fact; and, which deserves a particular remark, if they really did amount to a good proof of it, we are incapable of judging whether they do so, or not; and, therefore, cannot determine, with any certainty, concerning the truth, or the falsehood, of the fact. For,

§ 39. 1st. The moral characters which men assume, and in which they appear to us, may be more or less perfect than what we take them to be; or, perhaps, since there is no moral character but what may be, and often is, counterfeited, they may be the very reverse of what we judge them to be. How then should it be possible for us to determine, whether the treatment, which any particular person has from the Deity, be suitable, or not suitable, to

to his true and genuine moral character, when we really cannot tell what his true and genuine moral character is?

§ 40 *2dly*. Natural good and evil are, sometimes, dispensed by the Deity, as reward and punishment; and, at other times, they are dispensed with other views, and for different ends. But it is impossible for us to discover, from external appearances, the precise and particular views with which they are dispensed in particular cases. How then should it be possible for us to determine, from outward appearances, whether the treatment, which any particular person receives from the Deity, be suitable, or not suitable, to his real moral character, since we cannot discover, when natural good is dispensed as a reward, and natural evil as a punishment; and when they are not.

§ 41 *3dly*. In certain *series's* of circumstances and events and in some particular tempers of mind, natural evil, seasonably and properly applied, may eventually, and, upon the whole, prove the mean of real and great happiness, both to single persons, and to bodies politic; whereas the absence of that evil, and a flow of outward ease and prosperity, would be productive of a contrary effect. And, on the other hand, a long run of external tranquillity and prosperity very often terminates in the misery and ruin both of states and single persons, when the contrary would produce a different effect.—In such cases, therefore, as the former, natural evil may, very properly, be dispensed as a reward; And, in the latter, natural good may, with great propriety, be granted as a punishment.—But, surely, it is naturally impossible to discover, from mere outward appearances, when natural good and evil are, in any case, dispensed with a view to the ends, just now mentioned, and when they are not. How then should it be possible for us to determine, from mere external appearances, whether the treatment, which any particular person, or nation, receives from the Deity at any particular time, be suitable, or not suitable, to their true and genuine moral characters; since there are many cases and circumstances, wherein we cannot determine what is for their good, and what is for their hurt; Or, indeed, what ought to be accounted either reward, or punishment?

§ 42. To

§ 42. To conclude; such is our ignorance of the real and true moral characters of men; of the end and intention of providence in dispensing natural good and evil in particular cases, whether our own, or those of other people; and of the real effects which either the suffering of natural evil, or the enjoyment of natural good, may produce in certain circumstances; that it is simply impossible for any mere man, upon any view that he can take of those external phenomena which appear in the present administration of providence, to determine with any certainty, or even with any degree of probability, whether such a regular and uniform administration of rewards and punishments, as has been proved to be essential to the rectitude of divine moral government, doth, or doth not, take place in the present exercise of that government over mankind.—Concerning the end and intention, the use and consequences, and the true reasons of those external *phænomena*, in particular cases, we can make no right judgment; And, therefore, can draw no solid conclusions from them, which may be depended on. All may be order and regularity, or all may be disorder and confusion, for any thing that can be determined to the contrary, on either side, from mere external appearances.

§ 43. Wherefore, since no objection, or argument, of any weight, arises from this quarter, (*viz.* from the *external phænomena*, which appear in the present administration of providence) to invalidate the strength of the before-mentioned argument, which I have taken from the end of divine moral government, and the attributes of Deity, to prove, that such a regular and uniform administration of rewards and punishments as has been described, and contended for, in the foregoing *Chapter* of this *Essay*, actually takes place in the present exercise of divine government over mankind; that argument remains in its full strength. This, I think, may give full satisfaction, and convince every fair and candid mind, that whatever the disorders are, which are produced in the world by the irregular passions and vicious actions of men; yet there are none which proceed from any defect, or irregularity, either in the plan, or in the administration, of divine moral government.



THE CONCLUSION.


§ 1. **I** Have now finished what I intended to do in this *Essay*.— And the amount of all that I have said, and endeavoured to prove, is briefly this, That the rectitude of divine moral government, in the treatment of persons of different moral characters, consists in the following particulars, *viz.*—In distributing to all the unoffending righteous such reward as is proportionable to the respective measure of the obedience of each of them; and to all impenitent offenders, such punishment as is proportionable to the respective measures of their disobedience:—In subjecting all penitent sinners (not to the punishment of the impenitent, but) to gentle and mild punishment, on account of the offensive part of their character, and bestowing, at the same time, reward on them, proportionable to the respective measures of their future virtue and obedience:—In keeping persons of each of these three moral characters, as long as they retain them, under that particular treatment which is adapted to their respective characters:—And, *finally*, In changing their treatment, when, and as often as, they change their moral characters.

§ 2. And if the rectitude of divine moral government, in treating persons of different moral characters, consists in the observation of the *few rules* mentioned, then, by comparing the treatment which persons of different moral characters have, under any supposed dispensation of revealed religion, with these rules, we may discover, whether their treatment is, or is not, consistent with the rectitude of divine moral government.

§ 3. If, therefore, upon a careful perusal and examination of the Holy Scriptures, it shall be found (as, I hope, it may) that the treatment, which persons of all moral characters have had from the Deity, under the several dispensations of revealed religion, which
have

have been instituted in the different ages of the world, has been exactly agreeable to the rules, mentioned; this will be a sufficient evidence of the perfect agreement of that treatment with all the natural notions which we either have, or can have, of the rectitude of divine moral government; and a presumptive evidence of the divine original of the Holy Scriptures.—Withal, this discovery, when made, will be the means not only of reviving and restoring some important, ancient truths, concerning the divine treatment of penitent offenders, which have, for ages, been smothered and buried under the weight and rubbish of several elaborate systems of human structure; but of reducing the *Deists*, who have already greatly decorated their system, with the spoils of revelation, to the necessity of either borrowing a little more of the same foreign drapery, or of relinquishing their system, as being, in its present state, indefensible; unless they shall rather choose (which is no uncommon thing with many of them) to display their great and immoveable attachment to *Deism*, by an utter contempt and neglect of discovered absurdity.

The End of this E S S A Y.



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with many of them) to display their great and immovable attach-
ment to Deism, by an utter contempt and neglect of discovered
abridgments.

The End of the First Part.

A N
E S S A Y
ON THE RECTITUDE OF
DIVINE MORAL GOVERNMENT
In the TREATMENT of
DIFFERENT MORAL CHARACTERS

Under the several dispensations of *Revealed Religion*, viz..

- I. The ADAMICAL.
 - II. The PATRIARCHAL.
 - III. The HEBREW or JEWISH.
 - IV. The CHRISTIAN.
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SEVERAL DISPENSATIONS OF REVEALED RELIGION.

AS there is nothing that can be of greater concern or advantage to mankind, than the having a true and right idea of the particular treatment (premiat or penal) which the rectitude of divine moral government renders fit and proper to be given to the several individuals of their own species, according to their different moral characters: So there is nothing that

that can have a stronger tendency to establish and confirm the faith, or to give true and solid satisfaction to the mind, of a rational believer of revelation, than a clear perception of the rectitude of the moral treatment which men, of different moral characters, have, and have had, from the Deity, under the several dispensations of revealed religion.—The first of these two points, I have endeavoured to set in a clear light, in the *former Essay*. The latter I propose for the subject of the present *inquiry*.

The dispensations of revealed religion are four in number, *viz.* That which obtained in man's state of *Innocency*, *The Patriarchal*, *The Mosaic*, and *The Christian*. I shall, therefore, divide this *Essay* into four distinct *Parts*, in which I shall exhibit the moral treatment which men had from the Deity, according to their respective moral characters, under each of these dispensations of religion; and shew, that it was, in all its parts, and in every respect, perfectly consistent with the rectitude of divine moral government.



P A R T I.

Concerning the rectitude of divine moral government, in the treatment of Man, in his state of Innocency.

§ 1. **T**HE first dispensation of revealed religion, instituted by the Deity, was that under which the first parents of the human race lived before their *Lapse*.—The time of the duration of it, is uncertain. Some time it must have continued; but probably not long, since it doth not appear, that any children were begotten, or born, before the expiration of it; and since it is natural to think, that our first parents would be more obnoxious to deception, and to be overcome by temptation, before they had acquired a stock of experience, and a considerable degree of knowledge and understanding, than afterwards.

§ 2. Under

§ 2. Under this dispensation of religion, the moral character of mankind was uniform: and it was that of *Innocency* and *undefective obedience*. No sin was committed: and, therefore, there was no sinner, either penitent or impenitent. Neither of those moral characters had as yet any existence. For which reason, we have no account of any particular moral treatment which either of the two had from the Deity, under this dispensation of religion.

§ 3. As the human mind was originally formed with a natural capacity for an endless progression in acquisitions of knowledge, moral virtue, and happiness; so, that our first parents might have time and opportunity for arriving, by gradual improvements, at the highest perfection and happiness their nature was capable of, and have proper encouragement to persevere in the pursuit of them, from a perceived possibility of attaining to the possession of them, an immortal life was promised to them; but upon the express condition of perfect and undefective obedience. And the forbearing to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, was appointed to be the test of their obedience; at least, the eating of it was one of those things which were prohibited. This is evident from Gen. II. 16, 17. *And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the Garden thou mayest freely eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: For in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die, or, dying thou shalt die.*—If Adam did not eat of this tree, he was to live, and be immortal: But if he did eat of it, he was to die, or to become a mortal man. For that this, and nothing more, is the import of the expression, (מֵת מָוֹת *moriendo morieris*) *dying thou shalt die*, is evident from the execution of this sentence upon Adam and Eve, who were not put death, but only condemned to a mortal state and its attendant evils. See Gen. III. 17, 17,—19.—Wherefore, because the life, which our first parents had received from the Deity, was to remain immortal as long as their obedience was undefective, but to become mortal upon the first transgression; tis manifest, that *continued immortality*, and the *loss of it*, were constituted by the Deity, to be the means whereby, under his government, a difference was

to be made between the moral treatment which they were to receive from him while they remained innocent, and that which they were to receive from him when they became sinners or transgressors.

§ 4. This gift of amissible immortality was granted to the first parents of our race, in connection with that of a terrestrial Paradise, which they were to hold of God, together with the other, upon the same condition of persevering, in undefective obedience; and in which they were to enjoy a happiness, which would be always growing and encreasing in proportion to the measures of their obedience, and to the advances which they made in intellectual and moral improvements.

§ 5. The treatment, therefore, which our first parents had from the Deity in their state of innocency, was perfectly suitable to their unfulfilled moral character, and the rectitude of divine moral government. All was goodness, favour, and reward, without any mixture of displeasure or punishment: such treatment as supplied them with proper time, the best means, and all due encouragement for improving their understandings, perfecting their virtue, and acquiring happiness in proportion to those advances which they made in intellectual and moral accomplishments: such, therefore, as was perfectly suitable to the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government. (e) —Immortality, in connection with such a paradisaical state, was as proper a motive to obedience as could possibly be set before innocent creatures in their circumstances, and the best reward of it. Nothing could operate more powerfully upon an uncorrupted mind, or be productive of greater happiness.—And though our first parents were threatened with the loss of both, upon the first act of disobedience which they should commit; yet this threatening, as it was not to be executed till such time as they had disobeyed, and would never have been executed if they had not disobeyed, had no tendency to disturb or impair the happiness of their paradisaical state; and was only intended to preserve it, by being

(e) See the foregoing Essay, Ch. I. § 28—32. and Ch. II. Sec. I.

being a guard to their innocency and virtue in their frail and fallible state, and an additional motive to obedience, by a failure in which only, it was possible for them to forfeit their happy state. *(f)*

§ 6. What has been said may, I think, be thought sufficient to set the moral treatment which man had from the Deity in his state of innocency, and the congruity of that treatment to the goodness, wisdom,

(f) See the foregoing Essay, Chap. I. § 24.

The immortality of the Deity and that of created intelligences are of a different nature. The former is the result of an intrinsic necessity of existence, which renders both a beginning and cessation of existence absolutely impossible: The latter is a free donation of the Creator, and the continuance of it depends every moment upon his will and good pleasure. The immortality, likewise, of different species of created intelligences may, perhaps, be of a different nature. In some, it may imply the continued, endless existence of a spiritual, thinking substance. In others, it may denote the continued, endless existence of a vital union between *spirit* and an *organized system* of matter. This last is the immortality which is proper to man: For though a human soul should exist in a separate state, after the vital union betwixt it and the body is dissolved, (the possibility of which, I think, cannot be denied) yet the man, whose soul did so exist, could not, on that account, be said to be immortal; for, instead of being immortal, he is actually in a state of death. However, in general, the term *immortality* denotes either such an endless duration of existence as excludes annihilation; or an endless continuance of a vital union between essential and constituent parts.

Now, to intelligent, created minds, naturally capable of an endless progression in acquisitions of intellectual and moral perfection, immortality, as thus explained, and distinguished from the immortality of the Deity, was necessary, in order to their arriving at that perfection and happiness of which their natural frame rendered them capable, and for the arriving at which the wise author of that frame, who makes nothing in vain, must have originally intended it. Accordingly, we find, that these dictates of reason are confirmed by revelation; from which we learn, that immortality, together with such a state as furnished means and encouragements for constant improvements in intellectual and moral perfection, and for endless advances in happiness in proportion to these improvements, was originally conferred upon all created intelligences by their all-bountiful Creator. And, indeed, these were the greatest blessings they were capable of, or that the Deity could confer upon them.—Immortality, with such a state of Paradisaical happiness, the first parents of our race had bestowed upon them. And as those blessings were to be continued to them as long as their obedience to the Deity remained undefective, and were to be withdrawn upon the first act of disobedience, 'tis plain, that they were intended by the Deity to be the badges of *innocency* and *undefective obedience*, or, in other words, the means whereby, under his government, a difference was to be made and preserved betwixt their treatment as *innocent* and *unoffending* creatures, and the treatment of *sinners* or *transgressors*.

wisdom, and rectitude of divine moral government, in a proper light. And, therefore, without enlarging any further upon this subject, I proceed to,

The End of the First Part.

PART



PART. II.

Concerning the rectitude of divine moral government in the treatment of mankind under the Patriarchal dispensation of Religion.

§ 1. **B**Y the *Patriarchal* dispensation of religion, is commonly understood, that under which the Patriarchs of the *Hebrew* nation lived. This dispensation of religion was of a large extent, and of a long duration: For it was that under which all mankind were placed by the Deity upon the lapse of their first parents, and under which they all remained till the time in which the Law of Moses was given to the *Hebrew* nation; being a period, according to the best and most authenticated calculations of about 2513 years.

§ 2. Upon the lapse of *Adam* and *Eve*, a change of moral character ensued. That of innocency and undefective righteousness was irrecoverably lost: And that of offence, together with a possibility of penitence and impenitence, succeeded in its place.—Wherefore, the moral character of the human species being thus changed from better to worse, the rectitude of divine moral government required that there should be a correspondent change of moral treatment.^(g) Accordingly, the first parents of our race were immediately driven out of *Paradise* into the common world, and condemned to a *mortal state*, and the evils incident to it, *Gen.* III. 16—24. Thus they were deprived of all those marks of favour which were proper to innocency and undefective righteousness, and subjected to mortality, hard labour, pain, and death, the marks and punishments of offence. And, by this change of moral treatment, the rectitude of divine moral government was preserved inviolate, and a suitable difference

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(g) See the foregoing Essay, Chap. II. Sec. IV.

was made between the now moral treatment of the guilty race, and that of innocent and unoffending creatures.

§ 3. The whole posterity of *Adam* and *Eve* were involved in the same *catastrophe* with them. For it is certain and undeniable fact, that all men are mortal. And, that they were brought into this mortal state, by the first sin of their first parents, is a declaration of Holy Scripture, which is several times, and, on different occasions, repeated. *By man came death*, 1 Cor. xv. 21.—*In Adam all die*, v. 22. *As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, even so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned*, or become mortal, Rom. v. 12. (h) *Through the offence of one, the many be dead*, v. 15. *By the offence of one (or by one offence) judgment came upon all men to condemnation*, v. 18. *By one man's disobedience many were made sinners, or sufferers*, v. 19.

§ 4. Now, though it is very easy to apprehend the *rationale* of the penal treatment which *Adam* and *Eve*, who were sinners, had from the Deity, on this occasion; yet it appears to me, to be a greater difficulty than is commonly imagined, to give a rational account of the conduct of the Deity (if, indeed, it was an action of his) in including their unborn and innocent posterity in the same *catastrophe* with them.

§ 5. To solve this difficulty several ways have been taken, which don't appear to me to be very satisfactory.

§ 6. There are some who tell us, “ That *Adam* was the *federal Head*, or *representative*, of his posterity in a covenant, supposed to have been made between him and the Deity: And that, being their federal Head, what he did, is to be considered as done by them, and as imputable to them: In which view of things, they must have been *guilty of his sin*; and, of course, justly obnoxious to his punishment.”—But this is saying what the scriptures no where affirm; and, which is still worse, it is saying what is shocking to reason and common sense, as being inconsistent with the

(h) See Mr. Locke, Dr. Taylor, and Dr. Whitby in locum; and the first and last of these three upon v. 19.

the attributes of Deity, and with the rectitude of his moral government, yea, and what is, in itself, impossible.—Obedience is a personal thing; and the obedience of one person cannot, in truth, either be, or be reputed to be, the obedience or actions of another person. Had *Adam*, therefore, engaged to obey the law of God for, and in the stead of, his posterity, he would have undertaken a thing which was, in itself, impossible.—In like manner, disobedience is a personal, and, therefore, untransferrable thing: For it is, in the nature of the thing, impossible, that a disobedient action, performed by one person, should, in truth, be, or, in reason, be reputed to be, the disobedient action of any person, but of him who has performed it: Or, in other words, that one person should be guilty of the sin of another person, or of a sin which he has not himself committed, and to the commission of which he has not been accessory by example, advice, encouragement, assistance, or in any other way.—Withal, punishment itself is a personal thing, and of such a nature as cannot agree to any moral character but that of a sinner or offender; and, therefore, it cannot, in the nature of the thing, be inflicted on any but the personally guilty. 'Tis very possible, that the innocent may, and it is certain fact, that they sometimes do, suffer for, and through the faults of the guilty: But it is, in the nature of the thing, impossible, that they should be punished for their faults, because punishment is not bare suffering, but suffering for a faultiness of moral character, from which the innocent are altogether clear. Yea, in all cases, where the innocent and unoffending are, by any being, put to pain, and made to suffer, for the faults of other persons, their sufferings carry in them the idea of oppression, and not of punishment, of which the idea of *justice* is a necessary and essential part. These observations make it very evident, That no covenant could have been made between God and *Adam*, in which the latter engaged to obey the divine Law for, and instead of, his posterity; and according to the tenor of which, his obedience, or disobedience, was to be imputed to them as their obedience and disobedience, and they were either to be rewarded for his obedience or punished for his sin. All this

is inconsistent with the very ideas of obedience, disobedience, reward, and punishment; and, therefore, shocking to reason and common sense.—Again, Had the the Deity entered into a covenant with *Adam*, wherein it was stipulated and agreed, that the happiness of all his unborn posterity should depend upon the undefective obedience of such a frail and fallible creature as he was; and their punishment and misery, on the very first failure in his obedience; what must have become of the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude, or of the very being, of God's moral government? Had *Adam*, as the *representative* and *federal Head* of his posterity, actually performed undefective obedience to the divine Law, the consequence, in this case, would have been, the discharge of his posterity from all obligation to personal obedience: And so the affair must have ended in a total dissolution of government, and the misery of the whole human species; and would, of course, have been repugnant to the end, rectitude, and very being, of divine moral government.—Had *Adam*, on the contrary, failed in the performance of undefective obedience; and had the Deity, on that account, punished all his unborn, innocent posterity, as being guilty of his sin; this way of proceeding would have been oppression, not punishment; the deed of an arbitrary, cruel, and unjust tyrant, and not of a good and righteous governour. After such a tyrannical and oppressive act as this, who could tell, what they had to expect from obedience, or to fear from disobedience, to the Deity? Or what notion at all could men have formed of his moral attributes, or of the rectitude and equity of his government? Such a way of proceeding would, without doubt, have had a natural and direct tendency to produce anarchy, murmuring, and misery; and, of course, would have frustrated the end, and destroyed the rectitude, together with the very being and exercise, of divine moral government.—From all which, it is manifest, that the subjecting of the unborn and innocent posterity of *Adam* to mortality and death, for their guilt of his sin, considered as an *act* and *appointment* of the Deity, cannot be rationally accounted for, upon the *Hypothesis* which I have been considering.

§ 7. There

§ 7. There are others who think, "That the Deity intended the subjection of mankind to a state of mortality, to be a punishment to their first parents for their sin: In which view, it can be considered, with regard to their posterity, as a misfortune only."—In defence of this opinion, two things are commonly urged. (1) It is said, That nothing could have been a heavier punishment to *Adam*, or have given him a more lively and striking sense of the demerit and bad consequences of his sin and disobedience, than the reflecting upon the mortality of his whole posterity as the effect of his own folly and faulty behaviour. (2) It is said, That immortality was a *free gift*, a donation of mere pleasure, which the Deity was under no obligation to confer on any creature whatsoever; and, therefore, a *gift*, which he might either give or with-hold, continue or with-draw, as he pleased, without doing an injury to any creature. Wherefore, because immortality is a free gift, which no creature can claim as a matter of right, no injury could be done by the Deity to *Adam's* posterity, when this gift was with-drawn from them. Now all this is very true: But it comes not up to the point; nor doth it remove the difficulties with which the *Hypothesis*, under consideration, is embarrassed. For though immortality be a free gift, which no creature can claim as a matter of right; yet when the Creator had made it the badge of *innocency*, and *undefective obedience*, the very mean by which the treatment of the unoffending righteous was, under his government, to be preserved different from that of offenders; how could he, in any consistency with the goodness, wisdom, or rectitude of his own moral government, withdraw it from the innocent and unoffending posterity of *Adam*, without providing or appointing some other thing to supply its place, and answer its end?—Again, since human minds are endowed with a natural capacity, for an endless progression in intellectual and moral improvements, and are designedly furnished with this capacity by the Deity; how could the Creator strip *Adam's* innocent and unoffending posterity (without any *fault* or *forfeiture* on their part) of immortality, without acting inconsistently with his own design in the constitution of their frame, and depriving them of time for arriving

arriving at that perfection and happiness, for the attainment of which that very frame was originally fitted and intended by himself? In vain, surely, was this capacity bestowed upon them, if they were thus, without any reason, arising from the perversion or abuse of it, to be curtailed in the enjoyment of it, and deprived of time for reaping the benefit which would arise from an endless exercise of it.—Finally, although nothing could have been a heavier affliction, or a greater punishment to our first parents, than to have seen all their posterity reduced, through their fault, to a mortal state, and subjected to pain, sufferings, and death; yet it would have been extremely improper, to appoint this to be the punishment, or any part of the punishment, of the offence of our first progenitors: For, upon the supposition, that the posterity of the first pair were all innocent, and that there was a prospect, or possibility, that they all, or any of them, would be obedient for some time, when they came to act; the Deity could not condemn them to mortality and death, without counteracting the original design of their very frame, and the rectitude of his own moral government, as I have, just now, shewn.

§ 8. Thus, I think, it appears, that no rational account can be given of the mortality of *Adam's* posterity, in either of the two ways mentioned; *that is*, by considering their mortality as intended and appointed by the Deity, to be a punishment either to them for their guilt of his sin, or to him for his own act of disobedience. Nor do I think, that any rational account can be given of its introduction, but by considering their mortality as a natural and necessary effect of the mortality of their first progenitors.—By thus conceiving of it, I think, a rational account, clogged with no absurdity, may be given of the origin and introduction of the mortality of the human species. For, in this view, the mortality of *Adam's* posterity appears to be nothing but the necessary effect of a natural cause; it being impossible, according to the natural course of things, that mortal parents should produce any other than a mortal race. The mortality of *Adam's* posterity, placed in this light, appears to be a *misfortune* to them, but nothing more than a *misfortune*; an evil arising

arising not from any fault, or sin, in themselves, or from the agency or any positive appointment of the Deity, but solely and wholly from that mortal state into which their first progenitors brought themselves by voluntary disobedience to the Deity.

§ 9. But though the origin and cause of the mortality of *Adam's* posterity may thus be rationally accounted for; yet there is a difficulty behind, which has been scarce adverted to by the writers on this subject, and yet seems not to be of easy solution: and that is, To account for the conduct of the Deity, and the rectitude of his moral government, under this, and all the succeeding dispensations of religion, in making no proper provision for the moral treatment of *Adam's* innocent posterity, whose obedience, it may be supposed, would, at least, for some time, be blameless and undefective; either by restoring immortality to them, with the happiness originally annexed to it, or by appointing some other thing in place of those, whereby a proper difference might be made between the treatment of the unoffending righteous and that of offenders.⁽ⁱ⁾ For if the posterity of *Adam* are born innocent, and there be a possibility, that the obedience of all or any of them may, for any time, prove un-

defective

(i) For the treatment proper to the unoffending righteous, under divine moral government, the reader may consult the foregoing *Essay*, Chap. I. § 28—32. and Chap. II. Sec. I. and Sec. IV. § 2.

The *Patriarchal*, *Mosaic*, and *Christian* dispensations of religion are so far from either making any provision for the treatment of the moral character of undefective righteousness, or giving any ground to think, that there was any reason or necessity for making such provision; that, on the contrary, all the three suppose *sincere* (not undefective) obedience to be the *neplus ultra* of human endeavours and efforts, or the highest possible pitch of righteousness which is attainable by men. Accordingly, no proper moral treatment is, under any of those dispensations, provided by the Deity, for any moral character but the last mentioned, and that of impenitent sinners. Indeed, under the *Christian* dispensation of religion, immortality is both brought to light, and placed within the reach of men: But then immortality is there exhibited to view, not as a reward which is to be given, in this world, for undefective obedience; but as a free gift which, in the world to come, is to be conferred on those whose obedience (though imperfect) shall be found to have been *sincere*; and to be conferred on them, through the intervention of the propitiatory sacrifice of *Jesus Christ*, that is, in such a manner as will preserve a proper difference between their treatment, and that of creatures whose obedience has been undefective and blameless.

defective and blameless; how can the rectitude of divine moral government be secured, if no proper provision be made by the Deity for the treatment of those whose obedience may prove, at least, for some time, to be undefective and blameless?

§ 10. This appears to me, to be a considerable difficulty. However, the case of children, who die in infancy, is not affected by it: For dying before they have arrived at any capacity for moral action, and before they have acquired any moral character, there can be no reason at all for providing, in this world, a moral treatment of any sort for them.—The difficulty, therefore, relates only to the case of the adult, who, having arrived at a capacity for moral action, may be supposed either to yield an undefective obedience to the divine law, or to fail in the performance of it. And it is such a difficulty, as cannot be cleared up, by supposing all mankind to be guilty of the sin of their first parents, because that *Hypothesis* is absurd and self-contradictory, as I have shewn before; for which reason, no use can be made of it, nor any thing built upon it.

§ 11. How then is this difficulty to be cleared up, and got over? No way, as far as I can see, unless something did happen, upon the lapse of our first parents, which occasioned such a difficulty, to their posterity, in the performance of commanded duty, as, all things considered, rendered the performance of perfect and undefective obedience impracticable. If something of this nature did then happen, and the Deity could not, after that, expect blameless and undefective obedience from any of the human race; it will be an easy matter, to account for the conduct of the Deity, and the rectitude of his moral government, under the succeeding dispensations of religion, in making no proper provision for the moral treatment of persons whose obedience might be perfect and blameless: For since no undefective obedience could be expected from any person, there could be no reason for making any provision for the treatment of those who were to perform it.—Whether, therefore, we have, or have not, reason to think, that mankind did, at the time mentioned, become subject to such a *moral inability* for yielding a perfect

fect and undefective obedience to the will and law of the Deity, is what now remains to be considered.

§ 12. There is, in the present moral state of mankind, a real *Phænomenon*, which seems to me, to be the effect of a moral inability to yield a perfect and undefective obedience to the moral laws of the Deity; and that is, *an universal degeneracy and corruption of manners*, arising from a strength of appetite and passion very difficult to be controlled and subdued by reason and rational motives; and an inclination towards that which is evil, in many cases, stronger than the inclination of the mind to that which is good, by which the vicious part of the species are led and governed, and the best of men are much embarrassed, and even, sometimes, overcome.—This internal disorder of the human frame is sensibly felt by every individual; and its influence and effects upon life and practice are, every where, so visible and glaring, that they can escape the observation of no thinking person.—And we have reason to think, that this *foible* in human minds, and the effects of it upon life and behaviour, have been epidemic evils among mankind, ever since the lapse of *Adam*. For, since that time, all moral writings, and all histories in which we have any account of the moral temper and actions of men, both sacred and prophane, are full of them. It was, many ages ago, the observation of a *Heathen Poet*, who was well acquainted with the tempers and manners of mankind, *That there is no man, who is born without a bias or inclination towards vice.* (k) And King Solomon, who lived many ages before that *Poet*, takes notice of the universality of the effect of this inclination towards vice in men; for he affirms, that *there is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not*, Ecc. VII. 20.

§ 13. Now to what cause can we rationally ascribe this internal disorder of the human frame, which is, and has been, the source of such an universal depravation of manners among mankind? To the agency of God? No; we cannot ascribe it to this, because, being

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(k) ——— *Vitiis nemo sine nascitur, optimus ille*
Qui minimis urgetur ——— HOR.

ing a natural *stimulus* or incitement to the commission of sin; the purity and goodness of his nature, and the rectitude of his moral government, could not permit him to be the cause or Author of it. To what cause then can we ascribe this internal disorder of the human frame? Without all doubt, to the agency of man himself. But how?

§ 14. This last is a question of difficult solution.—Perhaps this internal disorder in the human frame, and the thence arising general depravation of manners, may proceed not from one, but from several concurring causes; such as the following.

§ 15. 'Tis evident, from observation, that the structure of the human frame, at the time of a man's birth, is very imperfect, and, as it were, but half-formed. Some parts of this frame are then formed; but others are wanting, which, afterwards, unfold themselves, one after another, at different periods of life. Now, in this gradual formation of the human frame, there are several appetites of sense, and passions for sensible objects, which get the start of reason, and are long in being and exercise before that faculty hath unfolded itself. And it is certain, that, during this period of life, those appetites and passions may, by immoderate exercise, and the misconduct of mothers, nurses, and other persons who are placed about little children, be raised to an undue strength. And may not the undue strength, which those appetites and passions thus acquire in infancy and childhood, be the cause of that general corruption of manners, which has been observed among mankind, ever since men began to be born into the world?—Without all doubt, it is one cause of it. And, for some time, I thought that it might be the sole and entire cause of it. But I now begin to dislike that opinion; because appetites and passions are not found to be raised, to any undue degree of strength, by moderate and regular exercise; because many parents and nurses, bad as the world is, are pretty sparing in gratifying the appetites, and indulging the passions, of little children; because there are some children, whose appetites and passions have been kept under pretty exact discipline and government in their infancy and childhood, who nevertheless
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turn out as bad as any, and *vice versa*; because, generally speaking, it is not so much by the undue strength, which appetites and passions acquire in infancy and childhood, before the faculty of reason unfolds itself, as by the undue strength, which the appetites and passions of childhood and infancy acquire afterwards, and by the violence of other appetites and passions, which arise in the human frame after the faculty of reason has been formed, that men are corrupted and made vicious; and, *finally*, because the violence of those appetites and passions, which have been formed in the first and early season of life, is commonly corrected and reduced, and most part of the appetites and passions themselves extinguished, by the counteraction and violence of those other appetites and passions which, at different periods of life, arise, afterwards, in the human frame.—These are facts which are confirmed by experience and observation; and such, as make it evident, that though the universal degeneracy of mankind may, in part, and in some measure, proceed from the undue strength, which several appetites and passions may have acquired in infancy and childhood, before the faculty of reason has come in play; yet the undue strength, then usually acquired by those appetites and passions, cannot be the sole, entire, and adequate cause of the effect mentioned; but there must be some other cause, of a more extensive and powerful influence, necessary to the production of it.

§ 16. Another thing, which has been a very considerable cause of that universal degeneracy and corruption of manners, which, at present, and in past ages, has been observable among mankind, is the influence of evil example. The efficacy of evil example in corrupting the minds and manners of men, is so obvious and apparent, that it escapes the observation of no body; and it is so great, that some men, of great penetration and judgment, have taken it to be the sole and intire cause of the moral corruption of our species. But, I think, they are mistaken in this point. My reasons are the following, *viz.*—The influence which evil example has, in corrupting the minds and manners of men, cannot be accounted for, but upon the supposition of an antecedent *inclination* or *bias* in human minds

minds towards vice. Good examples are not observed to have near so great an influence to preserve men from vice, or to reform them from it, as evil examples are known to have in corrupting them. The best examples, even when joined with a pious and virtuous education have not been found of sufficient efficacy to preserve any one individual entirely free from *wilful sin*. Yea, many persons, (of whom *Cain*, the first-born man, who cannot well be supposed to have been much corrupted by evil example, was one) who have lived from infancy up to manhood, under the advantages mentioned, have shewn themselves to be as viciously disposed as any other persons whatsoever.—These are matters of fact which cannot be denied.—But how they should ever have happened, is more than I can comprehend, unless there be some previous disorder, some antecedent bias, in the human frame, by which men are more disposed to be influenced by evil, than by good example.—If, to avoid the force of this reasoning, it be said, that men live in the midst of a wicked and corrupt world, where evil examples are much more numerous than good examples are: And this is the reason, why they are more apt to be corrupted by the former, than benefited by the latter.—To this objection I answer, that it is of no force; because some of those who have good examples more frequently and constantly placed before them, than evil examples, are nevertheless as greatly and as quickly, corrupted by evil example as others in different circumstances; and, likewise, because evil examples, let their number be ever so great, could have no more influence in corrupting men, than good examples, even though fewer in number, would have to preserve them virtuous, unless there was some previous bias towards vice in the human frame, to second and assist their influence: For, setting aside this bias, examples of all kinds would have an equal influence upon human minds. And good examples, as they have all rational motives upon their side, to give weight to their influence, would, most certainly, have, in all cases, a more powerful influence to preserve men virtuous, than evil examples, destitute of all those helps and advantages, and even attended with the alarming prospect of danger and misery, could possibly have to corrupt them, provided there was no secret bias towards

towards vice in the human frame, to favour and promote the influence of the latter.—Add to all this, that the best of men, in whom the habits of piety and virtue are so strong, as to produce an habitual aversion to vice, and to secure them, in a good measure, against all danger from the influence of evil example, do yet, on many occasions, feel within themselves, such an inclination and bias of mind towards that which is evil, as they are never able to conquer fully; which yet could not be, if the internal disorder in their frame did not derive itself from another and higher source than that of the influence of evil example.—These observations may fully satisfy us, I think, that the influence of evil example is neither the sole nor the first cause of the universal degeneracy and moral depravation of the human species; and that they, who would have a right idea of the true origin and first rise of it, must trace it up to some prior and higher cause. Which brings me to observe, in the next place,

§ 17. That it is very natural to think, that that internal disorder in the human frame, which is, and has been, the first source of a general depravation of manners among mankind, may have proceeded from some damage, which that frame received from the lapse of our *first parents*, and from the change which their bodies, at that time, underwent. According to the declarations of *Revelation*, it was about the time of *Adam's* lapse, that this disorder in the human frame began to operate, and shew itself; and, therefore, it is not unlikely, that it might have its first rise from the cause now mentioned.—But, in order to exhibit my thoughts about this affair, I shall lay the following particulars before the reader.

§ 18. The goodness of the Creator, and the perfection which appears in all his other works, give us reason to think, that the human frame, in its first and original state, was a most perfect and exquisite piece of workmanship; and, particularly, that the *tone* of its natural appetites and passions was, with the utmost nicety and exactness, so adjusted to the strength of its understanding and reasoning faculty; as to render the subjection of the former to the control and government of the latter natural and easy.—Now if this original

tone

tone of the natural appetites and passions of the human frame be, by any cause, altered in any degree, so as to become either weaker or stronger, 'tis plain, that the natural and easy subjection of those appetites and passions to the control and government of the faculty of reason, must be destroyed: Or, in other words, that there will be, in the human frame an *inclination* or *bias* towards vice, incapable of being ever extirpated totally by human endeavours and efforts of reason, till such time as the internal disorder, from which it proceeds, is removed: such an inclination towards evil, as will render the performance of duty, and the practice of virtue, difficult; and by which men, when they are thoughtless, and off their guard, or indisposed to give a due attention to moral motives and the dictates of reason, will be overcome, and pushed on to acts of sin and vice.—Whatsoever, therefore, is capable of making such an alteration in the *tone* and strength of the appetites and passions of all men, as will produce this *bias* or inclination towards evil, whereby it becomes a difficult province to *reason*, to keep those appetites and passions in subjection to its government, may be the cause of that universal depravation of manners, which has been observed, in all places and ages, among mankind, ever since the lapse of *Adam*.

§ 19. 'Tis evident from *experience*, that our appetites and passions are raised, and much strengthened, by vicious thoughts and imaginations. The same effect is produced not only by an intemperate and irregular way of living, but by a very small dose of the substance, juice, or fruit of certain plants and trees. If so; might not the appetites and passions of our *first parents*, have been raised to an undue degree of strength, by those vicious thoughts and imaginations which had been excited by the temptation of the *serpent*, and the deleterious juice of the forbidden fruit? And, the original adjustment of the *tone* of their appetites and passions to the strength of their understanding faculty, which was very nice and delicate, being thus disconcerted, might it not so have happened, that their appetites and passions, thus braced up to an unnatural degree of strength, would never, afterwards, recover their right and natural *tone*, but always remain too strong for being governed with ease, and

and without difficulty, by *reason*.—In these suppositions there is nothing, I think, but what is natural and rational.—But leaving these conjectures,

§ 20. I observe, That the temperature of the human body has a great influence upon the state and strength of the appetites and passions. Any change in the former constantly produces a correspondent change in the latter; insomuch that the temperature of the body is, at no time, changed by any cause, but presently there ensues a sensible and remarkable alteration in the temper of the mind, either by a depression or exaltation of the appetites and passions.—Now the bodies of our *first parents*, in passing from an *immortal* to a *mortal state*, must have undergone a very considerable change. The original texture of the *blood*, and of all the other animal juices, which depend on it, and the tone of all the animal fibres, must have been greatly altered at this time: consequently, according to the laws of *union*, a correspondent change must have been produced in the tone and strength of the appetites and passions, by their being either raised above, or depressed below, the original, right standard; and, of course, rendered either too strong, or too feeble and unwieldy, for being easily, and without difficulty, guided and governed, in their exercise and motions, by moral motives, and the dictates of right reason.—And would not the first parents of our race, in consequence of this wrong tone of their appetites and passions, feel within themselves an inclination or bias towards that which is evil, and become subject to moral depravation or corruption?

§ 21. Again, the very nature of the state, into which our *first parents* were brought by their lapse, might, after their appetites and passions were unduly raised or depressed, by the cause mentioned, serve to corrupt them still further. For as the possession of an immortal life, the desire of preserving it, and the fear of losing it, are strong motives and a great support to virtuous practice; so the being deprived of such a life, without having any clear prospect of recovering it again, would tend to weaken the virtue of fallen man, and to superinduce upon his mind a carnal and worldly temper, by
strength—

strengthening his appetites and passions for earthly and worldly enjoyments, the only blessings he had now any clear and certain prospect of enjoying.—Withal, as our first parents were now driven out of paradise into a wild, uncultivated world, where the necessities of life were not to be had, but by much thought, and hard labour; this would have a natural tendency, especially after their species was considerably multiplied, to render them immoderately anxious about earthly things; fond of acquiring and enlarging property; covetous, selfish, and unbenevolent; fraudulent, unjust, and oppressive; proud of being rich, and unreasonably dejected under poverty. In fine, it would have a tendency to introduce such an inundation of vice of every kind, as we behold at present, actually overflowing the whole earth. But to go on,

§ 22. Upon the supposition, that the first parents of mankind received a wrong bias, or a propension to vice, by the causes mentioned, 'tis very easy to see, that the same wrong bias, or propension to evil, must have descended, as a wretched inheritance, to all their posterity, unless the conveyance was hindered by some special and extraordinary interposition. For being mortal, they would all be obnoxious to that wrong bias, or propension to vice, which is essential to a mortal state, and inseparable from it; and would be liable to be still more and more corrupted by the ill conduct of those who were placed about them in their infancy and childhood, and by the immoderate desires of those blessings, and the excessive fears of those evils, which are proper to a mortal state; especially, as those blessings could not be procured, nor those evils averted, but by great watchfulness, painful industry, and hard labour. Withal, universal, moral degeneracy, once introduced, would produce a great number of evil examples; which (by reason of an antecedent propension in men to evil) would serve to corrupt them further, and to encrease the spread and quantity of moral degeneracy.

§ 23. The account, which I have now given, of the origin of a *moral inability* in men to yield an undefective and perfect obedience to the moral laws of the Deity, as proceeding from an internal propension to vice in the human frame, which was produced by the transition

transition of the bodies of our first parents from an immortal to a mortal state, and from the circumstances in which they, and their mortal race, were placed, after their expulsion out of paradise; this account, I say, of the origin of a moral inability in men, to yield a perfect obedience to the moral laws of the Deity, is, in itself, consistent, rational, and highly probable. Nor do I know of any one just objection, that can be made against it: which things cannot, I think, be affirmed of any other account which has been given of the origin of moral evil. For,

§ 24. 1st. In the view wherein I have placed the origin of this moral inability in men, and of the internal disorder of the human frame from which it arises, neither of the two appears to be the effect of the agency of the Deity; but they are both exhibited as being the natural and necessary result of that mortal state, and of that life in the common world, to which the first parents of our race reduced themselves by voluntary disobedience. Nor is either of them represented, as having in it any degree or tincture of sin or punishment, but only as a bare misfortune.—Moreover, the inability, which I contend for, is not a physical, but a moral impotency only: an inability arising, not from a defect of natural power to perform any particular act of obedience, but only from a difficulty in the performance of it; such a difficulty as, all things considered, renders it impossible for any man, to perform such an obedience to the moral laws of the Deity, as is, in all respects, perfect and undefective.—In a word, such inability, as leaves man, frail and weak as he is, in the possession of full power to perform a sincere (though not a perfect) obedience to the laws of the Deity: Such an inability, therefore, as doth not render man incapable of moral government; nor hinder the Deity to suit men's duty to their state of imbecillity; and the treatment of every individual, to his own personal behaviour; nor suppose him to be under any necessity, to punish any person for a failure in that which he had not power to do, or to treat him in any other way than according to his failure, or not failure, in that which he has a real ability to perform, viz.

sincere obedience.—These things shew us, that the account, which I have given of a moral inability in men to yield a perfect and undefective obedience to the moral laws of the Deity, carries nothing in it that is unreasonable, absurd, or shocking; nothing that reflects dishonour upon the Deity, or is inconsistent with the rectitude of his moral government, or that can be accounted unjust, injurious, or oppressive, in his dealings with men.

§ 25. Moral evil, likewise, in the account which I have given of the origin of it, is ascribed to a cause which, in all respects, is adequate to the effect, being such an one as every living, mortal man must be affected by; and, therefore, sufficient to account for the universality of that moral degeneracy which has been visible among the adult part of the human *species*, in all places and ages, ever since the lapse of our first parents; which cannot be affirmed of any other cause which has been assigned for it.

§ 26. And, lastly, By the account which has been given of the origin of the moral corruption of mankind, the first rise of it will be fixed to the time of the lapse of our first parents; which (if this was the true date of it) will account for the conduct of the Deity, under the succeeding dispensations of religion, in making no provision for the moral treatment of any person, or persons, whose obedience might be blameless and perfect: For as no moral character of this kind was to be expected, there could be no reason for providing a proper moral treatment for it.—In this way, I say, the conduct of the Deity, in this affair, may be rationally accounted for: And in no other way, I think, can any satisfactory account be given of it. And this seems to me, to be a pretty strong evidence of its being the true and right way of accounting for it.—I only add, that I sincerely wish, that those writers, who endeavour to account for the moral depravation of mankind by the sole influence of evil example, or by the causality of any other partial and inadequate cause, would duly consider, how the conduct of the Deity, in the omission aforesaid, can, upon their schemes, be rationally explained, or satisfactorily accounted for. But I proceed,

§ 27. There being, as has been shewn, no ground, after the lapse of Adam, to expect any perfect virtue, or obedience, among the *adult* part of his posterity, but good reason to think, that they would all offend when they had arrived at a capacity for moral action; it was perfectly agreeable to the wisdom and rectitude of divine moral government, to provide no moral treatment for any but such as were offenders, under any of the following dispensations of religion.—And accordingly, we find, that all were treated by the Deity as offenders. They were stripped of immortality and of the happiness originally annexed to it, and remained in the common world in a state of mortality: by which means, a proper difference was made and preserved between their moral treatment and that of perfectly righteous creatures whose obedience was undefective; such a difference as was calculated to promote the end, and perfectly suitable to the rectitude, of divine moral government.⁽¹⁾—Thus far, therefore, was the treatment, which mankind had from the Deity under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, exactly conformable to the rectitude of his moral government.

§ 28. But though the *adult* part of mankind were all offenders, and the rectitude of divine moral government did require, that they should be treated as such; yet, because the propension to evil, in consequence of which they became offenders, was, in its first rise, their *misfortune* only, and not their *fault*; and because this propension to evil did not render the performance of their duty absolutely impossible, but only difficult; and because they were still in a capacity to yield a *sincere* (though not a *perfect*) obedience to the laws of the Deity, and to mend their moral state greatly, provided they were put into a condition, and had proper encouragement, to do it; the innate goodness of the nature of God, and the equity and rectitude of his government, did require, that this offending race should be put into a new state of trial, wherein all proper encouragement should be given to *sincere obedience*, and every person be treated according as he did, or did not, fail in the performance of it;

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and

(1) See the foregoing Essay, Ch. I. § 28.

and wherein they should have opportunity, and a proper season, to mend their moral state, and to arrive at what degrees of moral perfection and happiness, the frailty of their nature still left them capable of reaching to. Accordingly, upon the lapse of our first parents, mankind were immediately put into such a new state of trial as has been mentioned, and encouraged to hope for pardon upon *repentance*, and reward, according to the measures of their obedience.

§ 29. This new form of government, adapted to the frail state of our offending race, as it was expressive of great goodness in the Deity, and suitable to the equity and rectitude of his moral government; so, among creatures capable of being excited to, and deterred from action, by *hope* and *fear*, or *moral motives*, but still at liberty to follow a *wrong bias* of mind, without regarding the moral motives, to action, or considering, in a due manner, the good and evil consequences of actions, it would, without doubt, be productive of new moral characters. The thinking and considerate part of mankind would be prevailed with to repent of their sins, and regulate their manners according to divine prescription: And the rest, either through inconsideration, or wilful obstinacy, would continue to abuse the goodness of God, and remain in a state of impenitency.—The two moral characters, therefore, of *penitent* and *impenitent*, would now begin to exist; characters which had no place under the former dispensation of religion. And these two characters being naturally and essentially different, the rectitude of divine moral government would require, that a treatment, suitable to each of them, should be provided, and that the means of such treatment should be fixed and established. (m)

§ 30. The next thing, therefore, which we have to consider, is, the particular moral treatment which both penitent and impenitent sinners had from the Deity, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion; and whether the treatment, which each of those moral characters had from him, was, or was not, suitable and congruous to

(m) See the foregoing Essay, Ch. II. § 3—5. and the II. III. and IV. Sections of the same Chapter.

to the rectitude of divine moral government.—For this end, it will be proper to make the following observations.

§ 31. 1st. The moral state in the common world, to which mankind were reduced by the lapse of their first parents, was such, as furnished out a great variety of temporal blessings and evils, and left men in a capacity for the enjoyment of the one, and the suffering of the other.

§ 32. 2^{dly}. We find that all the punishments, threatened or executed by the Deity, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, were formed out of the temporal evils just now mentioned: (n) And, in like manner, that all the rewards, which he promised, or conferred, under that dispensation, were such as were formed out of the temporal blessings, aforesaid. (o) Wherefore,

§ 33. 3^{dly}.

(n) See Gen. IV. 10—12.—VI. 3, 7, 12, 13.—VII. 1—23.—IX. 6, 25—27.—XI. 1—9.—XII. 17.—XV. 14. (compared with Exod. Ch. I—XIV.)—XVIII. 20, 21. (compared with Ch. XIX. 1—25.)—XX. 3, 7, 17, 18.—XXXI. 4—9.—XXVIII. 7, 10.—XLII. 21, 22.—XLIV. 16. Exod. XVII. 14. &c.

(o) See Gen. VII. 1. VIII. 21, 22.—IX. 1—3; 8—17; 26, 27.—XII. 1—3, 7.—XIII. 14—16.—XV. 1—5; 15—21.—XVI. 7—12.—XVII. 1—16; 18—21.—XVIII. 1—19.—XIX. 12—22.—XXI. 13.—XXII. 15—18.—XXIV. 7, 26, 27, 50, 51. compared together.—XXVI. 1—5; 12—14; 24.—XXVIII. 13—15.—XXXI. 9—12.—XXXV. 10—12. XLVI. 2—4. &c.

Enoch, indeed, as a reward for his eminent piety and sincere obedience, was, without tasting death, translated from a mortal to an immortal life, Gen. V. 24. Heb. XI. 5. But then, this whole life here on earth, like that of other men, was mortal. And his translation was not the consequence of any provision that was made for that end by the dispensation of religion under which he lived, or of any promise contained in it, but an uncommon and extraordinary thing: And, therefore, it is no just objection against what I have said concerning the nature of those rewards which obtained under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion.

And as to the promises that were made to *Abraham*, that he should be a father of many nations, and that in him, and in his seed, all the families of the earth should be blessed, Gen. XII. 3.—XXII. 18. and that other promise, which was, afterwards, made to *Judah*, That the scepter should not depart from him, nor a law-giver from between his feet, until *Shiloh* came, Gen. XLIX. 10. It is manifest, that the blessings contained in those promises, as far as they could be enjoyed by *Abraham*, or *Judah*, or their posterity exclusive of the rest of mankind, were plainly of a temporal and worldly nature. These promises, indeed, gave them, and all mankind, ground to hope for blessings of a spiritual and eternal nature: But then those blessings belonged to another dispensation of religion, under which

§ 33. 3dly. Since all the punishments which the Deity did threaten, or inflict, and all the rewards which he did promise, or bestow, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, were formed out of the fund of materials just now mentioned; 'tis manifest, that the administration of the executorial part of divine moral government, under this dispensation of religion, did consist in dispensing *temporal blessings* to the obedient, in the way of reward; and *temporal evils* to the disobedient, in the way of punishment.

§ 34. 4thly. This fund of materials for reward and punishment was such, as, under proper management, might furnish out a proper moral treatment for every individual of the human species, whether *penitent* or *impenitent*; such as would be suitable to his moral character, particular case, and the rectitude of divine moral government. For,

(1.) The evils, proper to a mortal state, being many, and of different weight; and being each of them capable of diminution and increase, and of being dispensed either singly, or in many different combinations with others; 'tis easy to see, that punishments of all degrees and magnitudes may be formed out of them, either by choosing those which are of a greater, or those which are of a lesser weight; or by enlarging or diminishing the weight of the same evil; or by dispensing them singly, or in a thousand different combinations with others; even *punishments* of such different degrees and magnitudes, as would not only suit the general character of impenitent offenders, and make a proper difference between the treatment of it, and that of all other moral characters; but be congruous to all the different measures and degrees of disobedience found among persons of this class and character: consequently, such, as would be exactly conformable to the rectitude of divine moral

which neither *Abraham*, nor *Judah*, nor their *posterity* exclusive of the rest of mankind, lived. And the promises of them, in those early ages, were only preparatory to the introduction of the *Christian Theocracy*, which was to be set up, in the *last days*, under the *Messiah*, and was to continue forever. They were *promises of good things to come*, but no constituent parts either of the *Patriarchal* or *Mosaic* dispensations of religion: for the blessings contained in them were distant, and such as were enjoyed under neither.

moral government, and constitute such a moral treatment as is exhibited in the foregoing *Essay*, Ch. I. § 33—35. and Ch. II. § 1, 10—12.

(2.) In like manner, the blessings proper to a mortal state being many, and of different moment; and the most part of them being capable of being enlarged or diminished, so as to yield various degrees of satisfaction; and of being dispensed singly, or in different combinations with others; 'tis manifest, that rewards of all dimensions may be formed out of them, either by choosing those which are of greater, or those which are of lesser worth; or by enlarging or diminishing them in quantity and degree; or by dispensing them singly, or sorting them into a thousand different combinations with others; even rewards of such different degrees and magnitudes as would exactly correspond to all the different measures of sincere obedience which are to be found amongst the penitent part of mankind, and constitute such a moral treatment for every individual of this class, as would be suitable to his moral character, and particular behaviour, and be duly different both from that of the *impenitent*, and from that of every other *penitent sinner* whose behaviour had been either better or worse than his: Consequently, such, as would be perfectly congruous to the rectitude of divine moral government, and the *same* with that which I have described in the foregoing *Essay*, Ch. I. § 36. and Ch. II. Sec. III. § 9—11.

(3.) The two methods of moral treatment now mentioned, *that is*, the distribution of punishments, consisting of *temporal evils*, to the impenitent; and the dispensing of rewards of *temporal blessings* to the penitent; I say, these two methods of moral treatment are capable of being either continued, or of being exchanged, the one for the other, according as the penitent and impenitent retain, or change, their respective moral characters. And, if they were thus continued and exchanged, a constant conformity would be kept up between the moral character of every individual and his treatment, at the time of his receiving it, such as would be exactly conformable to the rectitude of divine moral government, as I have shewn at large in the foregoing *Essay*, Ch. II. Sec. IV.

§ 35. Thus

§ 35. Thus we see, that the *evils* and *blessings*, which attend a mortal state, are a fund, out of which may be formed *punishments* of all dimensions, suitable to every possible degree of disobedience; and *rewards* of all magnitudes, suitable to every possible measure of obedience.—And, as this was the stock of materials from whence, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, the Deity took all those evils with which he punished the impenitent, and all those blessings with which he rewarded the penitent and obedient; there can be no doubt, but that, in the administration of those sanctions, he would class those *evils* and *blessings* into such arrangements, and distribute them in such quantities and proportions, as would correspond to the moral character, and particular case, of every individual, whether penitent or impenitent; and be suitable to the goodness, wisdom, and rectitude of his own divine moral government. And for such work, the Deity was perfectly qualified, by his all-perfect intelligence, wisdom, and power.

§ 36. We cannot, indeed, conceive, that such an administration of temporal rewards and punishments would have been practicable, but upon the supposition that the Deity did exercise a *particular providence*, at all times; and an *extraordinary one*, on some occasions. But this is no objection of weight against it; because the exercise of a particular providence is consonant to the dictates of right reason, visible in all parts of the universe, as far as they fall under our observation, and taught and exemplified in many places of holy scripture; and in no places with greater perspicuity, than in some of those which give us an account of the state of mankind and the world, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion: And of the exercise of an extraordinary providence, on some occasions, the scriptures furnish us with many instances and examples under all dispensations of religion; and with as striking ones under the *Patriarchal* as any other.

§ 37. And as to the *objection*, against such an administration of temporal rewards and punishments as I have been exhibiting, which may be taken from *contrary appearances* in the course of providence; I have taken notice of it, and given a full answer to it, in the foregoing

going *Essay*, Ch. III. § 29—42. And thither I must refer the reader.

§ 38. Upon a review then of the representation, which we have had, of the treatment which mankind had from the Deity under the *Patriarchal* dispensation of religion, we may make a pause, and admire the goodness and wisdom of the Deity in this whole affair: His goodness, in putting mankind, upon the lapse of *Adam*, into a new state of trial; and making *sincere obedience* (now that they were disabled for the performance of *perfect, undefective obedience*) the condition of their acceptance with him: His wisdom, in ordering *mortality* to be the punishment of the first sin of the *first parents* of our race; a punishment which, when inflicted, would be the natural means of bringing all their posterity into a *mortal state*; a state which would still leave room for discipline, and for a new and fair trial, upon reasonable and practicable terms; and would, at the same time, furnish out a sufficient fund of *temporal evils* and *blessings* for an equitable treatment of all and each of them, according to the nature, degrees, and variations of the different moral characters which should be found among them: A train of *temporal evils*, which might be converted into punishments of all sizes and magnitudes, suitable to every act, degree, and quantity of disobedience, which might be found among them; and a fund of *blessings*, capable of being sorted into rewards of all dimensions, suitable to every act, degree, and quantity of obedience; which punishments and rewards might, likewise, be continued, or exchanged with one another, just as men retained or varied their respective moral characters. Certainly, when we reflect upon a state of mortality, as being thus intended to make way for a new and fair trial of men upon reasonable and practicable terms, and as furnishing out materials for reward and punishment to each of them, according to his particular behaviour, whether good or bad; we cannot but think it the properest state in which our *species* could have been placed by the Deity, after the lapse of our *first parents*.

§ 39. To sum up all, it appears, I think, from what we have hitherto seen, that the treatment which impenitent sinners had from
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the Deity under this dispensation of religion; and the treatment, likewise, which penitent sinners had under it, as far as it was of a premial nature, and regarded the virtuous and commendable part of their moral character, were perfectly congruous to the rectitude of divine moral government, and such as had a natural and direct tendency to promote the immediate end of it, *viz.* the happiness of the human species. (*p*)

§ 40 There is one thing further which yet remains to be done, in order to illustrate and vindicate the rectitude of divine moral government, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, in the treatment of moral characters; And that is, to exhibit the *penal treatment* which penitent sinners had from the Deity under this dispensation, and to shew the consistency of that treatment with the rectitude of divine moral government.—In order to introduce my self to this subject, I shall remind the *reader* of the observations which I have made in the foregoing *Essay*, concerning the *penal treatment* of penitent sinners under divine moral government.—These observations are,

1st. That, under divine moral government, penitent sinners ought to be better treated than impenitent offenders, because their behaviour is much better: consequently, the grievous punishment, to which they had been obnoxious while they remained impenitent, ought to be forgiven. For unless they were discharged from this punishment, there would be no proper motive or encouragement to repentance, and to such obedient practice as has a tendency to promote and secure the happiness of the human species: consequently, their treatment would be inconsistent with the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government. (*q*)

2^{dly}. That when the heavy punishment, to which the penitent sinner had been obnoxious in his former impenitent state, is thus remitted, a milder punishment (such as may be no hinderance to the

(*p*) See the foregoing *Essay*, Ch. I. § 33—37. and Ch. II. Sec. II. and Sec. III. 8—12. and Sec. IV. of the same Chapter.

(*q*) See the foregoing *Essay*, Ch. I. § 36. and Ch. II. § 3—5. and Sec. III. §. 6, 7. of the same Chapter.

the enjoyment of a reward suitable to the degree and measure of his future sincere obedience) ought to be substituted in its place, and inflicted upon him. For unless this was done, there would be no danger in persisting in a course of disobedience and impenitency as long as *health* continued, and *death* was at some distance; because there would be a possibility of warding off all punishment by a *late repentance*; which encouragement to delay *repentance* and persevere in a course of sin and impenitency, would be absolutely repugnant to the happiness of the human species; consequently, to the end and rectitude of divine moral government. (r)

3dly. That when any sinner, who has repented of his sins, hath relapsed into any act of disobedience, and becomes penitent for it, the mild punishment mentioned, ought to be repeated. For unless this was done, a proper difference would not be preserved between the treatment of one penitent sinner, and that of another penitent sinner, suitable to their different behaviour; but all penitent sinners would have the very same treatment; which would minister just ground for murmuring and discontent: Nor would there be any proper motive to steadiness and perseverance in a course of obedience: On the contrary, when any penitent sinner did offend, he would have ground to think, that renewed repentance would be a *screen* from all danger, and restore him to the same good state from which he had fallen: all which would have a tendency to corrupt the morals, and promote the unhappiness of the human species; and, of course, be inconsistent with the goodness, wisdom, rectitude, and end of divine moral government. (s)

Lastly. That the penal treatment, to which penitent sinners are subjected, on account of the faulty part of their moral character, ought to be continued as long as their said moral character remains unchanged; this being indispensably necessary to preserve and keep up a proper difference between their treatment and the treatment of all other persons whose moral characters are essentially different;

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and,

(r) *Ibidem*, Chap. II. Sec. IV. § 3—7.

(s) See the foregoing Essay, Ch. II. Sec. IV. § 5—7.

and, consequently, to secure the end and rectitude of divine moral government.^(t)

§ 41. The truth of the foregoing *observations* has been largely illustrated in the foregoing *Essay*.—Now, if it be queried, What ground have we to think, or, Where have we any account, or even hint, in the history which *Moses* gives us of the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, that penitent sinners were treated by the Deity in the penal manner just now described? To this query I answer,

1st. That the history, which *Moses* gives us of the *patriarchal* state of the world, especially before the *flood of Noah*, is very curt. And, for that reason, may well be supposed to give us no account of some things, and but an imperfect one of others. The most perfect accounts of things it gives us before the deluge, are those of the creation of the world; of the primitive state and fall of man, and of the state to which he was reduced by his lapse; of the genealogy of the *Patriarchs* in the line of *Cain*, and of the *Arts* discovered by some of them, of the genealogy of the *Patriarchs* in the line of *Seth*, together with an account of their respective births and deaths; of the great corruption and wickedness of mankind in the days of *Noah*; and of the destruction of the whole species by a *Flood*, excepting *Noah* and his family, who were spared, and, by divine direction, saved in an *Ark*, for the re-peopling of the new world. Wherefore, in an history so curt in itself, and chiefly confined to other matters, 'tis no wonder, that we should have little or no account, or a very imperfect one, of the divine treatment of moral characters, and, particularly, of the divine treatment of penitent sinners: especially, when we consider, that this history was written at a time, when a particular and full record of this affair could have been of little use to those for whose benefit it was written; *that is*, at a time, when that people were well acquainted with it, and needed no information about it; and when a new dispensation of religion was to be set up, and a written record of its institution, containing a particular explanation of this very affair, was

(t) *Ibidem*, Chap. II. Sec. IV. § 2.

was to be made public.—In such a conjuncture as this, I say, a full and particular account of the divine treatment of moral characters, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, could have been of little use to the *Hebrew* nation; and, therefore, it is not to be wondered at, if the history which *Moses* gives us of the divine treatment of penitent offenders, under this dispensation of religion, be very lame and imperfect. And yet,

2dly. In this History, curt as it is, we have an account of a certain *mode of worship*, which seems to have been universally practised under this dispensation of religion, from the beginning to the end of it; and which, if it was of divine appointment, and instituted with a penal view, and practised upon the same occasions as it was, afterwards, under the law of *Moses* (as I think it was) furnishes us with those very ideas of the penal treatment of penitent sinners under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, which are exhibited in the foregoing *observations*; and that is, *The oblation of piacular sacrifices*.—But this affair will require much explanation and illustration, to which I proceed. And,

§. 42. I. Although the instances, which we have in the history of *Moses*, of the oblation of piacular sacrifices under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, are few, a thing which, for the reasons before-mentioned, was to be expected; yet, in that history, we have several instances of that mode of worship, and those so circumstanced, as to render it highly probable, that it was practised by mankind from the lapse of *Adam*, all along down to the time in which the law of *Moses* was given to the *Hebrew* nation.

We find *Cain* and *Abel*, the eldest son of the first man, offering, each of them, a piacular oblation: For we are told, that *Cain brought of the fruit of the ground; and Abel of the firstlings of his flock, an offering unto the Lord*, Gen. IV. 3, 4.—These are the first oblations of the piacular kind, of which we have any mention in history.

(u) And

(u) And the two *Brothers*, who offered them, are not represented by *Moses* as the inventors of this new mode of worship, or as consulting and agreeing together about it as a new thing, or as directed at the time, to the practice of it by any immediate revelation; but they are exhibited as only practising a common and familiar mode of worship, with which they had formerly been well acquainted. This renders it highly probable, that this mode of worship had been in use before this time; and that the two *Brothers* had been instructed in it by their parents, and learned it from their example.

§ 43. From

(u) That the sacrifice, which *Abel* offered, was of the piacular kind is evident from the comparison which the writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* makes betwixt the effect of it and that of the sacrifice of *Jesus Christ*, which, without doubt, was of the piacular kind. *Ye are come—to the blood of sprinkling, that speaketh better things, Παρά του (scil. πονηροῦ αἵματος ἡ) Ἀβελ, than the sprinkling of the blood of Abel, or of the blood of that sacrifice which he offered, Heb. XII. 22, 24.* Unless those two sacrifices had been of the same kind, and productive of similar effects, such a comparison could not have been made; nor the effect of the one pronounced to have been better, or much greater, than the effect of the other. Causes of a different nature produce effects of a dissimilar kind: and between effects of a dissimilar kind, no such comparison can be made, as is here made betwixt the effect of *Christ's* sacrifice and that of *Abel's* sacrifice.

And as to *Cain's* oblation, I can see no reason to doubt of its being of the same kind with *Abel's*, but rather perceive reason to think that it was. Both those oblations have the same denomination of *Minchah* given to them by the sacred *Historian*; and were offered by two *Brothers* at one and the same time; which things render it probable, that they were offered with one view, and for the same end: Which probability is greatly strengthened by another consideration, viz. That we have no mention made, in sacred History of any sacrifices or oblations, that were offered under the *Patriarchal* dispensation of religion, but what were of the Piacular kind.

It has, indeed, been alledged, that what *Moses* says to *Pharaoh*, Ex. X. 25. and what is said of *Jethro*, Chap. XVIII. 12. shew that there were other sacrifices, besides those of the Piacular kind, in use, before the expiration of these dispensation of religion. In the first of those two places, *Moses* says to *Pharaoh*, *Thou must also give us sacrifices and burnt-offerings, that we may sacrifice unto the Lord:* And, in the latter, it is said, *Jethro took a burnt-offering and sacrifices for God.* In both passages, sacrifices are seemingly distinguished from burnt-offerings; whence it is concluded, that other sacrifices, besides burnt-offerings, were then in use.—But, I think, there is no weight in this objection: For, (1) Sacrifices cannot be distinguished from burnt-offerings, because burnt-offerings were one species of sacrifice. (2) The force of the objection depends on this supposition, viz. That the *Hebrew particle* *ו* has, in those passages, the same signification which the conjunction,

§ 43. From the days of *Cain* and *Abel*, down to the time of *Noah's flood*, *Moses* makes no mention of any piacular sacrifice that was offered by any person. However, we have reason to think, that this mode of worship was practised throughout that whole period of time: For the first thing we find *Noah*, the *Father* and *Head* of the new world, engaged in, after his exit out of the *Ark*, is, the erecting of an *Altar* unto the Lord, and the offering upon it

Burnt-

conjunction, *AND*, has in our language, or the conjunction, *ET*, has in the *Latin* language. But upon this supposition nothing can be built; because that *Hebrew* particle is of such various signification, that arguments, grounded on any particular signification of it, can be of no weight, unless where they are supported by the general sense, coherence, and scope of the passage. But what I would especially observe, is, That the *Hebrew* particle is often used to denote no more but a connection between equipollent Terms. Thus it is said of *Cain*, *A fugitive*, (*וָנָד* *vanad*), *EVEN* a vagabond shalt thou be, *Gen. IV. 12.* In like manner, *v. 23.* *I have slain a man to my hurt*, (*וַיַּעֲלֶה* *vajeled*) *EVEN* a young man to my wounding. And in the same sense is this *Hebrew* particle used *Gen. VI. 6.* *And it repented the Lord, that he had made man upon earth*, (*וַיִּתְעַצֵּב* *vajithgnatzebh*) *EVEN* it grieved him to the heart. And *Gen. XI. 1.*—*The whole earth was of one language*, (*וְדַבְּרִים אֶחָדִים* *udebarim achadim*) *EVEN* of one speech. And *Gen. XIII. 13.*—*The men of Sodom were wicked*, (*וְהָעָם רָשָׁעִים* *vehattaim*) *EVEN* sinners before the Lord exceedingly, &c. &c. —Now if we understand the *Hebrew* particle *ו* as bearing this sense in the passages under consideration, (and I know no reason why we should not so understand it) those passages will contain no intimation, that other sacrifices, besides burnt-offerings, were either then, or before that time, in use: For they will run thus, *Thou must also give us sacrifices*, (*וַיִּשְׁלַח* *vaynoloth*) *EVEN* burnt-offerings. *Jethro* took a burnt-offering, (*וַיִּזְבַּח* *uzebachim*) *EVEN* sacrifices &c. (or animals fit for being killed, *ma'latilia*. Vide *Buxtorf. Lexicon Hebraicum et Chaldaicum in nomen זָבַח* *zebach*.)

And though the oblation which *Cain* offered was a *Minchah* of the fruit of the ground; yet it will not hence follow, that his oblation was of the *Eucharistical*, and not of the piacular kind: For it is well known, that, under the *Law of Moses*, there were *Minchahs* of the fruits of the earth, which were offered as piacular oblations. Thus a *Minchah* of fine Flour, Oil, and Frankincense, was the usual appendage of burnt-offerings, which were sacrifices of the piacular kind. See *Numb. XV. 1—12.* and the *XXVIII* and *XXIX* Chapters of the same Book.—In like manner, a *Minchah* of the tenth part of an *Ephah* of fine Flour was ordered to be offered, by a poor person, as a *sin-offering*, to make atonement for his sin, *Lev. V. 11—13.*—And if *Minchahs* of the fruits of the ground were thus offered to God, as piacular oblations, under the *Law of Moses*; I see no reason why they might not have been offered to him, as such, under the preceeding dispensation of religion; but rather conceive that there is reason for thinking that they might; especially considering, that no mention is made of any oblation or sacrifice, that was offered under the *Patriarchal* dispensation of religion, but what was of the piacular kind.

Burnt-offerings of every clean beast, and of every clean fowl, Gen. VIII. 20. And this mode of worship *Noah* is represented as performing, not as an invention of his own, but as an usual and common mode of worship, to which he had, before-hand, been accustomed, and which had been in practice among men in former times. Withal, his offering of *burnt-offerings of every clean beast and of every clean fowl*, shews us, that he had been, before-hand, acquainted with the distinction between *clean* and *unclean* animals, and with the manner of offering the first, and not the latter, to God as burnt-offerings: consequently, that the distinction between *clean* and *unclean* animals, and the oblation of those, which were *clean* to God as burnt-offerings, had obtained among mankind in that period of time which was before the *Flood*. (w)

The *inferences*, therefore, which may be fairly drawn from the piacular oblations which were offered by *Adam's* two *eldest sons*, and by *Noah* the *head* of the new world, and from the manner of the conduct of the offerers of them, make it highly probable, that oblations and sacrifices of the piacular kind were offered to God about, or soon after, the time of the lapse of *Adam*, and all along down to the time of the *deluge*. And, that we have not a larger account, and more instances of it, in *Moses's* History of this period of time, seems to me, to be owing to the reasons before-mentioned.

§ 44. *MOSES*, after he has given us the just now mentioned *specimen* of this mode of worship, as introduced into the new world by the *Father* and *Head* of it, being in haste to reach the history of the *Origin* and *Fathers* of the *Hebrew* nation, gives us no more instances of it, till he comes down to the days of *Abraham*, who was born about 352 years after the *deluge*. And even in the history which he gives us of the life of this *Patriarch*, and of his son *Isaac*, and of his grand-son *Jacob*, he doth not make mention of any particular sacrifice that was offered all that while, excepting one offered by *Abraham*, when, instead of his son *Isaac*, he offered, as a burnt-offering,

(w) That the distinction between *clean* and *unclean* animals was familiarly known before the *Flood*, is evident from Gen. VII. 2. 8.

offering, the *Ram* which was caught in a neighbouring thicket, *Gen. xxii. 13.*—But though *Moses*, in his history of the lives of those *Fathers*, is very sparing in giving us instances of piacular sacrifices, offered by them; yet he gives abundant reason for thinking, that the oblation of sacrifice was a mode of worship stately and commonly practised by all the three. For he frequently tells us, that they *builded altars, where they pitched their tents*; which cannot be supposed to have been built for any other purpose, but that of offering sacrifices upon them; and, sometimes, he tells us, that they did *offer sacrifices upon those Altars*, but does not say, of what kind.—To this purpose he tells us, That *Abraham pitched his tent to the east of Bethel, and there he builded an Altar, and called upon the name of the Lord*, *Gen. xii. 8.* In like manner, he mentions, That *Isaac built an Altar at Beersheba, and called upon the name of the Lord, and pitched his tent there*, *Gen. xxvi. 25.* He tells us also, That *Jacob, in his return from Padan-Aram, offered sacrifice upon mount Gilead*, *Gen. xxxi. 54.* That he *pitched his tent before Shalem, and built an Altar there*, upon a parcel of ground which he bought, *Gen. xxxiii. 18—20.* That he *built another Altar at Bethel*, *Gen. xxxv. 7.* And that, before he set out in his journey to *Egypt*, he *offered sacrifices at Beersheba unto the God of his father Isaac*, *Gen. xlv. 1.* Which sacrifices he probably offered upon the Altar which his father *Isaac* had built there. These instances of Altars built, and sacrifices offered, by those *Patriarchs*, shew us, that the oblation of sacrifice was a common and familiar mode of worship in their days. And as we have no particular account of any *species* of sacrifice which was offered by them, or in the ages before them, but that of *burnt-offerings* only, 'tis very probable, that all the sacrifices which were offered by those *Patriarchs*, were of this kind. And, *lastly*, As those *Patriarchs* are not represented as being the inventors of sacrifice, but only as observing and practising a common and usual mode of worship, 'tis highly probable, that this mode of worship had been practised in the ages foregoing; as indeed, we find it was.

§ 45. The next mention which we have of this mode of worship among the *Hebrew* nation, is, about 200 years after *Jacob* went down to *Egypt* with his family, and a little before the exit of his posterity from that country. For *Moses* and *Aaron*, in their address to the King of *Egypt* for liberty to the *Israelites* to depart out of his dominions, express themselves thus, *Let us go, we pray thee, three days journey into the desert, and sacrifice to the Lord our God, lest he fall upon us with the Pestilence, or with the Sword*, *Exod. v. 3.* And again, *Thou must give us also sacrifices, even burnt-offerings; (x) that we may sacrifice unto the Lord our God*, *Chap. x, 25.*—In these two passages, *Moses* and *Aaron* speak of sacrificing, not as a new and uncommon thing, but as an usual mode of worship with which *Pharaoh* was as well acquainted as themselves; consequently, as a thing that was not a late or new invention. In the first passage no particular species of sacrifice is mentioned: In the latter, *burnt-offerings* are the only species which is taken notice of.

§ 46. Under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, the oblation of piacular sacrifices was a mode of worship that was practised by pious men of other nations, as well as by those of the *Hebrew* nation. Thus *Job*, the pious *Arabian*, when his Children had, at any time, feasted together in a cheerful manner, offered a *burnt-offering according to the number of them all*, (or, for each of them, as fearing) that they might have sinned, and cursed God in their hearts, *Job i. 5.* (y) And his three mistaken friends were directed,

(x) See the foregoing marginal note (u)

(y) The worship of the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Stars*, was the first species of *Idolatry* that was set on foot among men. And this species of *Idolatry* is the only one which *Job* mentions as practised in his days, *Job xxxi. 26, 27.* It is, therefore, probable, that *Job* lived about the time of the first rise of *Idolatry*, or not long after it; which, I think, was in the days of *Terah* the father of *Abraham*. (See *Josb. xxiv. 14, 15.*) And the great age to which *Job* lived, (*Job xlii. 16.*) is a further confirmation of this, it being suitable to the common and ordinary length of human life in the days of *Terah* or *Abraham*, but at no other time. And if this was the age in which *Job* lived, he is rightly placed here under the *Patriarchal* dispensation of religion. And the *burnt-offerings*, which he and his friends offered, are a proper *Specimen* of that species of piacular sacrifice, which was then in use.

to take *seven Bullocks and seven Rams*, and to offer them for a burnt-offering, to make atonement for the sin of which they had been guilty; and which they, accordingly, did, *Job xlii. 7, 8.* And, in like manner, *Jethro*, the Priest, or Prince, of *Midian*, when he came to pay his respects to *Moses* his son-in-law, in the wilderness, Took with him a burnt-offering, even sacrifices for God, *Exod. xviii. 12. (z)*

§ 47. *Lastly.* The *Heathen* nations, who did not receive their religious rites from the *Hebrews*, did offer piacular sacrifices of the burnt-offering kind in the worship of their *Idol-Gods*, both before, and after, the promulgation of the law of *Moses*.—Thus, before that law was given, it was customary for the Idolatrous nations of *Canaan*, to cause their children to pass through the fire to *Molech*, *Lev. xviii. 21, 24, 27.* And, in the same period of time, we find, that the same mode of worship was practised by the *Moabites*, and the *Midianites*, in the worship of their Gods, *Numb. xxiii. 1—6; 14, 15, 17.*—And after the *Law of Moses* was given, we find, that the same mode of worship was used by the *Moabites*, *2 Kings iii. 26, 27.* and by the *Syrians*, *2 Kings v. 17.* and probably by many other nations; for burnt-offerings were used in the worship of *Baal*, *2 Kings x. 23—25. Jerem. xix. 5. &c.* And *Baal* seems to have been an *Idol-God* who, under different names, was worshipped by many nations. (a)

§ 48. Now, from the foregoing samples of piacular sacrifices, of the burnt-offering kind, which we have in the history of *Moses*, and from the inferences fairly deducible from the way and manner in which the conduct of the offerers of them is related; 'tis manifest, I think, that the oblation of this species of sacrifice was a mode of worship which was practised under the *patriarchal* dispensation

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(z) See the foregoing marginal note (u)

(a) Dr. Winder makes it very probable, that *Baal*, *Bel*, *Molech*, *Milcom*, *Adramelech*, and *Chemoth*, were all names, in deification, for the *Sun*; and shews, that the worship of this *Idol* began early, continued long, and was of great extent, being practised in *Assyria*, *Babylon*, *Canaan*, *Phenicia*, as far north as *Tyre*, and by the Colonies which went from *Tyre*. See his *Critical History of Knowledge*, Vol. I. p. 195—202.

of religion, from the beginning to the end of it; and had its rise before the eldest sons of the *first man* did practise it.

§ 49. II. The next thing which we have to consider, is, the *origin* of this mode of worship; and whether it was an invention of men, or an institution of men, or an institution of the Deity.

§ 50. In *Moses's* history of the *patriarchal* state of the world, we have no express account of the *origin* of this mode of worship: But this is not to be wondered at, when we consider, that probably the people, for whose use he wrote his history, had no need of any information about it; or if they had, they might infer, what might give them reasonable satisfaction, from the several instances which he had given them of this mode of worship, and the way and manner in which he had related them; and from the accurate account which he was going to give them of the continuance of it, by divine appointment, under another dispensation of religion. However, since *Moses* gives us no express account of the *origin* of this mode of worship, we can determine nothing about it, but upon the foot of *probability*. And, certainly, the greater probability, upon which side soever it be found, ought to determine our judgment in this, and in all other cases of the like nature.

§ 51. From the silence of the history of *Moses*, 'tis certain, that nothing can be concluded either way about the *origin* of this mode of worship: For since that history doth not inform us, that it had its first rise either from divine institution, or human invention; it leaves us at perfect liberty, to impute its *origin* to either cause, as we may find reason to do the one or the other, from what probability may arise from other considerations.

§ 52. Now, when the argument from the silence of the history of *Moses* is set aside, the following considerations, I think, will make it much more probable, that this mode of worship had its first rise from divine institution, than from human invention.
First,

§ 53. According to *Moses's* account, it was by *Cain* and *Abel*, the eldest sons of *Adam*, that this mode of worship was first practised. Wherefore, if it was a human contrivance, it must have been

been invented either by them, or by their father *Adam*; for besides those, there was no man then in being. But it is utterly improbable that it was invented by any of the three.—When *Cain* and *Abel* brought their oblations unto the Lord, they are not represented by the historian, as inventing or practising a new mode of worship: so far from this, that God, instead of reprehending them for a superstitious practice of their own invention, *accepts* of the oblation of the one, because he was a good man; and *rejects* the oblation of the other, because he was a wicked person: for we are told, that the Lord said unto *Cain*, *Why art thou wroth? And why is thy countenance fallen? If thou doest well, shalt not thou be accepted? And if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door*, Gen. iv. 6, 7.—Had this mode of worship been an invention of the two Brothers, 'tis natural to think, that the Deity would have rejected both their oblations, and reprimanded them, with a becoming severity, for their superstitious worship. But *Moses* tells us, that he acted a very different part, and just such a part as might have been expected, if this mode of worship had been instituted by himself. He reprehends neither of the two, either for superstitious worship, or for being the Authors of it; but *accepts* of the oblation of the one, because he was a good and pious man; and *rejects* the oblation of the other, because he was an ungodly and wicked person. The behaviour, therefore, of the Deity, on this occasion, renders it highly probable, that the mode of worship practised, was not the invention of these two Brothers, or of any other man, but an institution of his own.

And, indeed, when we consider the state of mankind, and the world, at this time; and the way and manner in which *uninstituted worship* has been introduced in all ages; it is utterly improbable, that either *Cain* and *Abel*, or *Adam* their father, were the inventors of this mode of worship.—It is known and certain fact, that all modes of worship, of human invention, have been brought into practice by such refinements of reason and imagination as have been grounded upon modes of worship antecedently in use. But, in the case before us, there was no mode of worship.

worship; antecedently in use, which could be a foundation for any refinements of reason and imagination, whereby *Adam* or his *Sons* could be induced to think, that the oblation of sacrifice would be acceptable to the Deity, or a proper mode of worship: consequently, neither *Adam*, nor his *Sons*, could have any inducement or motive either to invent, or to set up, this mode of worship.—Withal, these refinements of reason and imagination, which have given rise to all superstitious modes of worship, require talents, leisure, and time, which neither *Adam*, nor his *Sons*, can, in reason, be supposed to have had in the then infantile state of their faculties, and uncultivated state of the earth. The study of *agriculture*, and of those *arts* by which proper instruments for the culture of the earth, and utensils for the conveniencies of life, might be procured; the cultivation of the earth under unspeakable disadvantages, and other necessary occupations, would furnish out constant work for their heads and hands, and leave them little time or leisure to think about other things. Accordingly, we find in fact, that mankind, for many ages after this, had neither talents, nor time, for the invention of superstitious modes of worship; at least, none that they made use of that way: For, from the lapse of *Adam*, down to the time of *Noah's Flood*, and much lower, the sins, of which men were guilty, were, the neglect of instituted worship, and immoralities in life: But we do not find, that they were, in any respect, superstitious, or concerned in the invention or practice of uninstituted worship.

These things, put together, make it highly probable, that neither *Cain* and *Abel*, nor their father *Adam*, were the Authors and Inventors of the mode of worship under consideration. And what heightens this probability still further, is, that if we should, contrary to all reason, suppose the persons mentioned, to have invented and set up any mode of uninstituted worship; yet it is utterly improbable, that it would have been the oblation of *animal sacrifices*, or of the *fruits of the earth*; a mode of worship, from which they could not think that the Deity would receive any benefit
or

or pleasure; and which would have been very detrimental to themselves, families, and posterity, in the then barren state of the uncultivated earth.

§ 54. *2dly.* As far as we have any extant history of the religious state of mankind, both before, and for many ages after, the promulgation of the *Law of Moses*, it appears, that the oblation of piacular sacrifices was a mode of worship that was practised by all nations. And from the *universality* of the practice of it, a good argument may, I think, be taken, to prove that it had its origin from divine institution, and not from human invention.

This mode of worship could not have been invented and set on foot by the *Hebrew* nation upon their exit out of *Egypt*; for it was practised by people of other nations at, and before, that time; yea, practised many ages before either they or their Ancestors had a being. And had it really been invented, and set on foot by the *Hebrew* nation, at the time mentioned; yet it could not have had such an early and universal spread, as, we find, it had. The obscure and depressed state, in which that people remained for ages after that time, and the enmity which subsisted between them and the neighbouring *states*, were effectual obstacles to the spread and reception of any mode of worship invented by them.

And as this mode of worship, which was universally received and practised by all nations, who retained any notions of religion, either *right* or *wrong*, could not have been an invention of the *Hebrew* nation; so it could not have been set on foot by the concurrent consent and agreement of mankind, at any time after they were considerably multiplied, and widely dispersed over the face of the earth: For it is as probable, that a number of *types*, by being shaken together, would fall into such order and arrangement as would produce a *well-composed History*, or a *rational discourse* upon some subject; as that such a great multitude of people, living in distant places of the earth, and of different tastes, sentiments, tempers, and interests, should *all* or even a *majority* of them, agree in the use of one and the same precise mode of worship, if the choice of it was left to their decision. We have never, since the world began

began, had one instance of such a general consent of mankind to any other mode of worship of human invention. And had men of all nations, and in such distant places and ages, given their unanimous consent to this one, it would have been truly wonderful, and next to, if not altogether, miraculous.

But so far is it from being probable, that men of all nations, or of many nations, would, at any given time, have agreed to set this mode of worship on foot; that it is utterly improbable, that any single person, in any age whatsoever, would have introduced the practice of it. The reasons are very plain and obvious, *viz.* because there was no imaginable motive or reason, whereby any person could be led to do it; and because no person could do it, without diserving his own worldly interest, and that of his family and posterity.—No man could think, that the Deity could take any pleasure in the waste and destruction of his creatures; no appetite or passion could be gratified, nor any one dictate of right reason complied with, by the invention and practice of this mode of worship: And it is certain, that the person who did invent and introduce it, whoever he was, would have done a thing that was very prejudicial to his own worldly interest, and to that of his family and posterity. There was, therefore, no reason, no motive, to induce any person to invent and set up this mode of worship; but there was a very powerful one to restrain every person from attempting it.—Wherefore, since no man is ever known to act, without some incitement or motive; much less, to act, without any motive, and contrary to all reason, for his own hurt, and that of his family and posterity; it is utterly incredible, that the mode of worship under consideration, was the invention of any man.—Perhaps it may be thought, that a wrong-headed person might have arisen in some age or other, who, without any reason or motive, and even in contradiction to the temporal interest of himself, family, and posterity, might have invented this mode of worship, and set it up.—To this I answer, that it is very possible, that such a thing as this might have happened: But then, it cannot, I think, be thought, that this wrong-headed person would have had many followers.

followers. And, therefore, supposing this mode of worship to have been invented and set up by some fanciful and whimsical person; the universality of the spread and practice of it will still remain to be accounted for: which it will be very difficult, yea impossible, to do upon this bottom.

These considerations render it highly improbable, and utterly incredible, that this mode of worship was ever invented or set up by men, either when they were but few in number, or considerably multiplied. But to proceed,

§ 55. 3dly. Under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, this mode of worship was practised, in different countries and ages, by men who were eminent for piety and virtue; by *Abel*, *Noah*, *Job* the *Arabian*, *Abraham*, *Isaac*, *Jacob*, and *Jethro* the Priest or Prince of *Midian*; which, I think, makes it very probable, that it was not a human invention, but a divine institution. For it is very natural to think, that men of eminent piety and virtue, living in distant countries and ages, would observe and practise a mode of worship which had been instituted by the Deity: but it is utterly improbable, that men of their pious and virtuous temper, would have all fallen in with the practice of a mode of worship of human invention; yea the practice of the same individual superstition.— And as to the *possibility* of the preservation of the *tradition*, concerning this mode of worship; and of the conveyance of it, from the first parents of the human species, down among the several branches of their family and posterity, for about the space of 2300 years; there can be no doubt made about it; when we consider the great age to which men lived through the most part of that period of time, the reduction which was made, by the *deluge*, of all mankind to the narrow compass of one family, And that the *tradition*, conveyed, was concerning a mode of worship which was all along in common use. (b)

§ 56. 4thly. It deserves remark, likewise, that the oblation of some of those sacrifices, which were offered under the *patriarchal* dispensation

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(b) See Dr. Winder's Critical History of Knowledge, Vol. I. p. 61—69, and p. 92—98. and p. 155—158.

dispensation of religion, was directed and ordered by God himself; E. G. The *burnt-offering* which *Abraham* offered, Gen. xxii. and the *burnt-offerings* which were offered by *Job's* three friends, *Job* xlii.—And it is equally manifest, that the *divine acceptance* of others of those sacrifices is expressly mentioned. Thus it is said, *God had a respect to Abel and his offering*, Gen. iv. 4.—and *smelled a sweet savour* (a token and expression of acceptance) when *Noah* offered his *burnt-offering*, Gen. viii. 21. *Job's* care, likewise, to offer *burnt-offerings* for his children, is mentioned as an eminent effect of piety, and with particular marks of approbation, *Job* Ch. i. And the honourable mention which is made of those sacrifices which were offered by other pious men, in this period of time, leaves no room to doubt of their having been, likewise, graciously accepted by God.—These things shew us, again, that it is much more probable, that the sacrifices which were offered in this period of time, had their origin and first rise from divine institution than from human invention. For, that it is more natural to think, that God would *order*, and *accept of*, the performance of a mode of worship which had been instituted by himself, than that he would give any countenance of this kind to a mode of worship which had been invented, and set on foot, by men, is a thing which will bear no dispute.

§ 57. Upon the whole, it appears to be utterly improbable and incredible, that the sacrifices, which were offered under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, owed their origin to human invention. If they did; no account can be given either of the *first rise*, or of the *universal spread* of this mode of worship, but what is shocking to reason and common sense: Nor is it, in any degree, probable, that such a superstitious mode of worship would have been practised, in places and ages so distant, by men of the most eminent piety; Or, that the Deity would have *ordered*, or *accepted of*, the performance of it in any case, or upon any occasion whatsoever.

§ 58. But

§ 58. But the supposition, That the oblation of sacrifices was instituted by the Deity about the time of, or soon after, the lapse of *Adam*, dissipates all difficulties, and gives a satisfactory account of all facts and appearances. *Divine institution* would be a good reason to *Adam* and his *Children*, to begin this mode of worship, and to their *posterity*, to continue it from generation to generation, and more especially to those of them who were eminent for piety and goodness. It is very natural, likewise, to think, that God would, on some occasions, *order* and *direct* the performance of a mode of worship of his own institution; and that he would *accept* of it on all occasions, when performed with a right disposition of mind, and so as to promote the end intended to be subserved by the institution of it. Withal, it is rational to conceive, that a mode of worship, begun upon the foot of divine institution, by the first man, or men, in being, and practised by them and their more immediate descendents for a considerable time, would be conveyed down to their more remote posterity, and be practised by them, even after they had greatly corrupted themselves, and, perhaps, had utterly lost the knowledge of the *true origin* of it, and all *tradition* about it. Accordingly, it is very natural to think, that, at the time, when *Idolatry* began to be introduced, men would still retain a *mode of worship* to which they had been accustomed, and transfer it to the worship of their Idol-Deities; as we find, in fact, they did.—Thus we see, how the oblation of sacrifice might, upon the foot of *divine institution*, become an universal mode of worship among mankind, and be at last practised, as it really was, not only by all good and pious men in the worship of the *one true God*, but by all the *Heathen* nations also, in the worship of their *false* and *fictitious* Gods.

§ 59. III. The next thing which we have to consider, is, the *nature* and *design* of those piacular sacrifices, which were offered under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion.

§ 60. The sacrifices, which were offered under this dispensation of religion, were all of the *burnt-offering* kind, and, of course, piacular. And as all piacular sacrifices were intended for the benefit

and relief of penitent sinners, and were offered for sin, *that is*, either for particular sins actually committed, or for faultiness of moral behaviour; so it is natural to think, that the oblation of *burnt-offerings* was, under this dispensation of religion, instituted with a penal view; and that these *burnt-offerings* were the *mulcts* or *finer*s which were exacted from, and levied upon, penitent sinners, for the particular sins which they had committed, and on account of the culpable part of their moral character or behaviour.

§ 61. This notion of the penal nature and design of piacular sacrifices is neither a singular nor a new one. It has been espoused by some *moderns* of good judgment. (c) And it is mentioned by *Abarbanel*, who speaking of sacrifices, saith, "It pleased God to mulct (or punish) them, by a diminution of their goods, that their minds might be affected with a sense of their loss, in such a manner, as would, for the future, make them extremely careful not to offend in any thing." (d) And, if I mistake not, this is the very idea of piacular sacrifice which is exhibited in the *Levitical law*, and other places of the *Old Testament*. But of this I shall have occasion to say more in its proper place. And as to those piacular sacrifices of the *burnt-offering* kind which were in use

(c) "After all the disputes about the origin and intent of *sacrifices*, as well before, as under the Law of Moses, (when they are taken in the strict sense, and distinguished from all other offerings that accompanied either prayers or thanks for particular blessings) I am forced to refer them to divine appointment; and think we may conceive of them to have been fixed — by way of positive mulct and forfeiture, to render every breach of duty burthensome and expensive to the sinner. (Vide *Morality of religion*, p. 35. *Abarbanel. exord. Com. in Lev. p. 313. Le Clerc. in Levit. p. 12.*) Dr. *Laws Considerations* (Edit. Cambridge, 1745.) p. 56. Note (d)

Again, "The case, I apprehend, will not be much different, as to the life of an animal creature; for if this creature be considered as man's property, why may not the oblation of it be assigned by way of composition, mulct, or commutation, for such faults as he is sensible of, and be accepted by the offended governour of the world, in lieu of a more condign punishment? By virtue of such assignment doing away his guilt, and being a sufficient encouragement to him to hope for a full restoration to the divine favour, without any further import." *Ibid. p. 64. Note (c)*

(d) *Deus voluit illos diminutione bonorum multari, qua multa animi atque mentes eorum commoverentur, sic ut deinceps studiosissime curarent, ne quid per errorem delinquerent. Abarbanel. Exord. Com. in Levit. p. 313.*

use under the patriarchal dispensation of religion, this is the most natural and probable idea, perhaps, the only natural and probable one, that we can form of the nature and design of them. For, § 62. 1st. 'Tis utterly improbable, that the intention of the institution of this mode of worship, under the patriarchal dispensation of religion, was ceremonial or ritual. For at the time, when it must have been first instituted, that is, immediately, or soon, after the lapse of Adam, the circumstances of mankind and of the world were such, as made it utterly improper and incongruous, to impose upon them any thing of a merely ritual or ceremonial nature in the worship of the Deity; especially, such a burthenome and expensive rite as was that of the oblation of burnt-offerings, whether of the animal kind or of the fruits of the earth. At that time, man was turned out of Paradise into a wild and uncultivated world, which he had to subdue, and where he could not procure the necessities of life, but by hard labour, and the sweat of his brows: And the difficulty of procuring these was rendered very great, by his being destitute of proper tools and instruments for agriculture, and his utter ignorance of the Arts by which they were to be obtained. In such circumstances, therefore, as these, it is utterly improbable, that a good and merciful God would oblige man to spend his time, of which he had none to spare from other necessary affairs, in useless ceremonial worship. And much more improbable still is it, that he would oblige him to the performance of such burthenome and expensive ceremonial rites, as would considerably diminish those very acquisitions which he had made for his subsistence by hard labour. From the circumstances, therefore, of mankind and the world, at the time when burnt-offerings were first instituted, it appears to be altogether improbable, that those sacrifices were instituted, with any ceremonial view: If so; there is reason to think, that they were instituted to subserve some wise and rational purpose of the Deity in the moral government of mankind; and were intend-

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ed to be engines or instruments of government, and as such, to subserve an important and necessary end. (e)

§ 63. *2dly.* It is natural to think, that piacular sacrifices were instituted and enjoined with the same view, and for the same end, under both the *Patriarchal* and *Mosaic* dispensations of religion. But under the *Mosaic* dispensation of religion, 'tis manifest from the writings of *Moses*, and other parts of the *Old Testament*, that piacular sacrifices were instituted with a penal design, and exacted from penitent sinners as mulcts for sin and faultiness of moral character: And, therefore, it is natural to think, that piacular sacrifices were instituted and enjoined with the same penal intention under the *Patriarchal* dispensation of religion.—This argument, I am sensible, cannot be thought to be of any force, till it be proved, that, under the *Law of Moses* piacular sacrifices were instituted for the penal purposes aforesaid. But, because it will be an argument of great force when this has been proved, (which I propose to do in its proper place) I judged it would neither be improper, nor foreign to my purpose, to mention it here.

§ 64. *3dly.* There were, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, offenders of the penitent character: And the end and rectitude of divine moral government would not have been secured, unless persons of this moral character, when discharged from the grievous punishment of the impenitent, had been subjected to a more mild penal treatment, to be continued as long as their moral character remained unchanged, and to be repeated *ex abundanti*, as often as any of them, after a relapse into sin and disobedience, became penitent for the sin committed. Without this, a due difference would not have been preserved between the divine treatment

(e) If *animal food* was not (as some think) in use before *Noah's Flood*, the force of this argument will be abated in part, but not destroyed. However, I think, that the Author of the *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices* (published at London, Ann. 1748.) has clearly proved, that animal food was then in use; at least, there is nothing said in the Scriptures, that gives any ground to think, that it was not. If so; this argument remains in its full force.—But for fuller satisfaction about this controverted point, I refer the reader to what the Author of the *Essay*, aforesaid, advances from p. 165. to p. 178.

ment of moral characters essentially different; nor, indeed, between the divine treatment of one penitent sinner and that of another penitent sinner: At the same time, the *motives* for bringing the impenitent to repentance, and restraining the penitent from relapsing into sin, would have been greatly weakened, if not quite enervated, as I have shewn else where (*f*)—But now, if the piacular sacrifices, offered under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, were not instituted with a penal design, and exacted from penitent sinners as *mulets* for sin and faultiness of moral character; there was nothing, under that dispensation of religion, to secure the end and rectitude of divine moral government, by such a penal treatment of penitent sinners as has been mentioned. And this, certainly, must incline any sober and thinking person to conclude, that those piacular sacrifices were instituted with a penal view, and where no other than the *mulets* which, by divine appointment, were levied upon penitent sinners for their offences.

§ 65. 4thly. The piacular sacrifices, which were offered under the *Patriarchal* dispensation of religion, being all of the *burnt-offering* kind, were wholly consumed, and, reduced to ashes, by *fire*: And this circumstance, in the oblation of them, renders it highly probable, that those sacrifices were instituted with a penal design. For upon the supposition, that they were instituted with this view, there was a plain and evident reason, why they should have been wholly consumed by *fire*, viz. to ascertain the *loss* and *damage* of the offerers. But, upon the supposition of the truth of any of the other notions of the nature and design of this species of sacrifice, which have been offered to the world, the circumstance mentioned, is either absurd, or wholly unaccountable: E. G. If (with the Author of the *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*) we suppose, that piacular sacrifices were intended to be the *dapes*, or *epulae*, of which God and the offerers were to *eat* together, 'tis plain, that the total consumption of those sacrifices by *fire* would have been inconsistent with the very end and design of the institution of them: Or, if we suppose, with Dr. Taylor, that piacular sacrifices were symbols of penitent disposition

(f) See the foregoing Essay, Ch. II. Sec. III. § 3—7. and Sec. IV of the same Chapter.

disposition and prayer; 'tis evident, that no reason at all can be given of the total consumption of *burnt-offerings* by fire, but what is whimsical and imaginary: or, if we fall in with the common, popular opinion, and conceive, that it was the intention of piacular sacrifice, that the *life* of an *animal* should be given in lieu of the *life* of the offender; 'tis plain, that the taking away of the *life* of the sacrificial animal answered the whole intention of the sacrifice; and, therefore, there was no reason at all why the sacrifice should be wholly consumed by fire. Wherefore, since the total consumption of the sacrifices, which were offered under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, by fire, can be satisfactorily accounted for upon the supposition, that the end and design of them were penal, and upon no other supposition or scheme; this renders it highly probable, that those sacrifices were instituted with a penal view, and were really of a penal nature. (g) — But, from arguments which prove a probability of the thing, I proceed to demonstration.

§ 66. 5thly. The oblation of *burnt-offerings*, being a burthensome and expensive rite, such as could not be performed by the offerers without loss and damage; and being, withal, by divine appointment, imposed on penitent sinners, on account either of sin committed, or of a faultiness of moral character; this, without any other consideration, presents us with the idea of divine punishment, and

(g) Some, perhaps, may be apt to consider the total consumption of *burnt-offerings* by fire, as a mere rite, or ceremony, of which no reason need to be given, and upon which no argument or reasoning can be grounded. But if such persons will be pleased to consider the particular precautions which were taken, under the *Mosaic Law*, (when piacular sacrifices of another *species* were instituted, of which a part was assigned towards the maintainance of the priests) that no persons whatsoever, whether priests or others, should have any share of those sacrifices, which they offered for their own proper sins, to eat or for their own private use; they may, perhaps find reason to change their opinion, and to consider the measures which were taken, under both that and this dispensation of religion, to keep the offerers of piacular sacrifices from having any the smallest benefit from them, or any share of them to eat, as a thing of some importance. The particular pains which were taken, under both dispensations of religion, to prevent this, shew that the thing was not casual and accidental, but done with design; and, consequently, to promote some end of importance, whatever this was.

and with no other idea but that.—Divine punishment, properly speaking is some *natural evil* executed, or appointed to be executed, by the Deity, upon offenders, for sin or disobedience. And the more we reflect upon piacular sacrifices as being a loss and damage to the offerers, and a loss and damage which they were appointed by the Deity to suffer for their sin and disobedience, the more forcibly and unavoidably will the idea of *divine punishment* obtrude itself upon our minds. And whatever other notion we may choose to entertain about the nature and design of piacular sacrifices; yet, as often as we view them in the light now mentioned, *that is*, as a loss and damage appointed by the Deity to be suffered for sin by penitent offenders, we shall not be able to hinder the idea of *divine punishment* from arising in our minds, or to restrain ourselves from concluding, that those sacrifices were of a penal nature, and instituted with a penal design.—This argument is one of those which is grounded upon the nature of things, and is, I think, demonstrative in the affair under consideration.

To conclude; From the *first four* of the foregoing arguments, it appears to be highly probable, and from the *last* of them, to be demonstratively evident, that the piacular sacrifices, offered under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, were instituted with a penal design, and levied upon penitent sinners as *mulets* for sins committed, and for faultiness of moral character.

§ 67. IV. 'Tis probable, that, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, piacular sacrifices were offered on the same occasions as they were, afterwards, under the *law of Moses*; and that it was the intention and appointment of the Deity, that they should be offered on these occasions; *that is*, that every offender should, upon his *first repentance*, offer a *burnt-offering* for his sin; and repeat the same, afterwards, as often as he relapsed into any sin, and became penitent for it; and withal, that offenders, of the penitent character, should, at certain stated times, offer *burnt-offerings*, even tho' they had not committed any particular sin, or sins.—Upon the occasions, now mentioned, were piacular sacrifices appointed to be offered by penitent sinners, under the *Law of Moses*, and, in fact, we find, that *burnt-offerings* were offered on all these occasions, under the

the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion. Thus *Job's* three friends offered a *burnt-offering* for one particular sin of which they had been guilty; *Job* xlii. 8, 9. And *Job* himself, as often as his children did feast together, offered a *burnt-offering* for each of them, as fearing that they might have sinned, and cursed God in their heart, *Job* i. 5. And then, of *burnt-offerings*, offered from time to time, when no particular sin, or sins, had been committed, 'tis very probable, that all the other *burnt-offerings*, of the oblation of which we have any mention under this dispensation of religion, were instances; since we have no account of any particular sin, or sins for which they were offered.—Wherefore, since we have, in scripture, these instances of the several occasions on which *burnt-offerings* were offered under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion; 'tis hence probable, that these sacrifices were offered, and ordered to be offered, on all the like occasions, during the whole continuance of this dispensation of religion. And this probability is much strengthened by this consideration, *viz.* That piacular sacrifices were offered on these very occasions under the *Law of Moses*, which did not differ in substance, but only in circumstances, from the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion: For this Law was nothing but the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, so amended, improved, and enlarged, as to be rendered a better fence against idolatry, and more accommodated to the temper and disposition of the *Hebrew* nation, and to that particular policy under which they were placed by God. Whence it is evident, I think, that the end, design, and use of piacular sacrifices, under both dispensations of religion, must have been the same: consequently, that these sacrifices were offered, on the same occasions, under both.

§ 68. I now come to sum up the *Heads*, which I have been proving; and to draw the *inferences*, which they afford, concerning the penal treatment which penitent sinners had from the Deity, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion.

§ 69. It has been proved, that piacular sacrifices, of the *burnt-offering* kind, were in use, upon the foot of *divine institution*, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, from the beginning to the end of it; and were *mulets* imposed on penitent sinners by the Deity for

for sin committed, and faultiness of moral character; and were offered on the same occasions on which piacular sacrifices were, afterwards, offered under the *law of Moses*. Now, if the truth of all this be admitted, (and, indeed, I cannot see, that any part of it can in reason, be denied) then it will follow, That penitent sinners were, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, treated by the Deity in the way and manner described in the 40th *paragraph* of this *Essay*, and in *Chap. II. Sect. III.* of the foregoing *Essay*. For,

(1) Penitent sinners, having, upon their first repentance, a *sacrificial mulct* accepted for their sins, in lieu of a heavier and more condign punishment, would be treated in a more mild and favourable way than impenitent offenders. And the payment of this *mulct* would, at the same time, make a proper difference between their treatment and that of the unoffending righteous.

(2) By the payment of a *sacrificial mulct* for every sin they, afterwards, committed and repented of, a due difference would be made, and always preserved between the divine treatment of one penitent sinner and that of another penitent sinner. And, in all cases, a greater offender (provided he made *restitution*, and a proper compensation for damages) would sustain more loss than any lesser sinner, and *vice versa*.

(3) By having this penal treatment continued (by being obliged, by divine injunction, to offer *burnt-offerings* at stated times, even when no particular sin was committed) a constant difference would be kept up between their treatment and that of the unoffending righteous on the one hand, and the more grievous treatment of the impenitent on the other hand.

And, by such an administration of penal treatment to the penitent, as has been now mentioned, 'tis plain, that all grounds of complaint, on account of partial and unequal treatment, would be removed; and that the most fit and proper *motives* would, in the conduct of providence, be supplied, for deterring the unoffending righteous from disobedience to the Deity, for bringing the impenitent to repentance and reformation, and for restraining the penitent from relapsing into the practice of sin: consequently, that the most

wise and proper measures would be taken to secure the end and rectitude of divine moral government.—And, supposing the propositions, before-mentioned, to be true ones, (which, I think, have been proved to be true ones) it is manifest, that penitent sinners were really treated by the Deity, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, in the penal manner aforesaid.—This view of the divine treatment of penitent sinners, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, is, I think, scriptural: And it doth honour to the Deity, whom it exhibits as a righteous and just governour, who is equitable in the administration of his government, and acts, in all cases, with the utmost impartiality, and without any respect of persons; and as a being of perfect wisdom and goodness, who, in all cases, chooses and pursues those measures, in his dealings with mankind, which are the most fit and proper for promoting, upon the whole, the happiness of the *species*, and are demonstrative of the perfect and unchangeable rectitude of his own moral government: which things can be affirmed of no other account, which has been given of the divine treatment of penitent sinners, under this, or any other *form* of divine government.

§ 70. Having now finished my design, I shall conclude all with a few *observations* on the account which I have given of the nature, design, and use of those peculiar sacrifices, which were in use under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion.—The view then, which we have had of the nature, design, and use of those sacrifices, serves to clear up several difficulties, and to furnish us with many advantages, such as,

(1) It enables us, in a clear and satisfactory manner, to account for the rectitude of divine moral government, in the treatment of penitent sinners, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion; a thing which has been left in a state of great confusion, and under a cloud of thick darkness, by all those *systems* which have been erected upon other notions of the nature and design of these sacrifices.

(2) It gives us such an idea of the intention of the Deity, in the *institution* of these sacrifices, as clears him from the imputation of laying upon men's shoulders an useless and insupportable load of burthen-

burthenfome ceremony, at a time when they could not bear it, and in circumstances which did not require it; and exhibits him, in the very institution of those sacrifices, as a good, wise, and righteous governour, who did enjoin nothing but what had a natural tendency to promote the happiness of the human *species*, and to secure the end and rectitude of his own moral government: which cannot be said of any other notion of the nature and design of piacular sacrifice, which has been offered to the world.

(3) It clearly explains the reason, why *burnt-offerings* were the only *species* of piacular sacrifice, which was instituted under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion; and the reason, likewise, why particular care was taken, under the *law of Moses*, that no person should have any share of those sacrifices, which he offered for his sins, to eat, or for his own *private use*.

(4) And, *finally*, If it be the true scriptural one, (as, I think, I have proved it is) we are both warranted and enabled by it, to correct the false philosophy of all those accounts and schemes of divine moral government, which proceed upon this *supposition*, viz. That penitent finners are discharged from all punishment by the Deity, and treated as righteous persons, whose obedience has been perfect and undefective.—Such schemes of government as these can never be brought to any consistency either with the goodness, wisdom, end, and rectitude of divine moral government, as I have demonstrated in the foregoing *Essay*; or with the true scripture-idea of *piacular sacrifice*, as I have shewn, I think, in this part of the present performance; and shall shew more abundantly in the next part of it; to which I now proceed.

The End of the Second Part.

PART



P A R T III.

Concerning the rectitude of divine moral government, in the treatment of the Hebrew nation, under the Mosaic dispensation of religion.

§ 1. **T**HE *Mosaic* dispensation of religion was a *Theocracy*, set up, not over mankind in general, but over the *Hebrew* nation, and such of other nations as might choose to submit to it, or to become proselytes to the religion which it required, *that is*, to the worship of the one true God, the creator of heaven and earth.

§ 2. Idolatry had, for some ages, been introduced, and gradually gaining ground among mankind, before this dispensation of religion was set up. And, at the time of its erection, it had made such advances, that it was become the popular religion of the whole world, at least, of all those nations of whose religion we have any account in history: Insomuch that the knowledge of the *unity* of the God-head was much obscured, and in danger of being quite lost, through a general belief of a *plurality* of Gods; and the worship of the one true God was well nigh banished out of the world.

§ 3. This was the state of the world at this time, with regard to religion: A state of such degeneracy and impiety, as it became the wisdom and goodness, and greatly concerned the honour of the true God, to give a check to. And, accordingly, it seemed good to him, at this time, to set up a *Theocracy* over the *Hebrew* nation, and those of other nations who should think fit to comply with its injunctions, as a fence against idolatry, and as a mean by which, for the general good of mankind, the knowledge and belief of the *unity*

unity of his own nature, and the worship of him, might be kept from being quite lost, and preserved, at least, in one nation; from which others, who were disposed to receive instruction, might learn them.

§ 4. Under this *Theocracy*, the precepts of religion, and the laws of civil political government, were incorporated together, and enforced by the same authority. And, indeed, under a *Theocracy*, it was impossible to separate the one from the other, or to tell, which of them were, or were not, precepts of religion, or laws of civil government. For, because God was King and Lawgiver, both were his Laws; and obedience to both was obedience to him, consequently, *religion*, which formally consists in obedience to God.

§ 5. When this *Theocracy* was set up over the *Hebrew* nation, there was such a strong propension in the minds of that people towards Idolatry, that it was very difficult to restrain them from the practice of it. And, indeed, as Idolatry was, at that time, the popular religion in all the neighbouring nations, the temptation to the practice of it was very strong.

§ 6. Wherefore, it being the main end and intent of this dispensation of religion, to restrain a people from idolatry who were so prone to the practice of it, and to keep them up to the worship, and to the belief of the unity, of the one true God; it was necessary, that the most efficacious measures should be taken, and the best means used, for securing those ends; which, accordingly, we find, was done.—Idolatry, and all the vices which paved the way to it, and were the concomitants of it, (as well as contempt of authority, and the other crimes which are destructive to society) were made capital by law. (b) Affinities with the idolatrous nations of *Canaan*, and inter-marriages with idolaters, were absolutely forbidden. The oblation of sacrifice, in any place, by any private person, was prohibited

(b) Under a *Theocracy*, Idolatry, and all its concomitants, would have the nature of *High-treason*. For, in a Kingdom of which God was King and supreme Magistrate, these crimes would be rebellion against the Sovereign; and, for that reason, would be justly punishable with *Death*. And, accordingly, they were crimes of a capital nature under the *Hebrew Theocracy*. See *Levit.* xviii. 1—30. *Deut.* xiii. 1—18, xvii. 2—7.

hibited under a severe penalty; and they were ordered to bring all their sacrifices to the door of the *Tabernacle*, (or to that of the *Temple*, after it was built) there to be offered by an order of men, chosen and appointed by God for that service. Withal, the duties of obedience, or religion, were now greatly multiplied: Sacrifices, additional to those which were in use under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, were instituted; and the occasions, on which they were offered, were enlarged: Add to this, that a great number of rites and ceremonies were appointed, which, however worthless and insignificant in themselves, yet, considered as the means whereby that people were frequently, and almost constantly, kept doing something, in obedience to the will of the one true God, it had a natural tendency to preserve a constant sense of his being, unity, and supremacy in their minds, and to keep them to his worship.⁽ⁱ⁾ And, *finally*, In the case of a general apostacy from God by idolatry; they were, in a national capacity, threatened with the greatest evils that could befall a people, and those to be inflicted either by the immediate hand of God, or the particular direction and appointments of his providence. See *Levit.* xxvi. *Deut.* xxviii. 15—68.—Thus, under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, the most efficacious measures were taken, and the best means used, to restrain that people from idolatry, to keep them to the worship of the one true God, and to preserve in their minds a lively sense, and a firm belief, of the *unity* of his being, and of his supremacy over all, as the Creator and Governor of the whole universe.

§ 7. This *Theocracy*, being set up over one people, and containing new fences against Idolatry, and new expedients for keeping up a belief of the divine *unity*, and the worship of the one true God, may be considered as a dispensation of religion different from the *patriarchal*, which had obtained in the preceding ages.

§ 8. But though the *Hebrew Theocracy*, with regard to these superadded circumstances, may be considered as a dispensation of religion different from the *patriarchal*; yet, in substance, and in the
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(i) See the foregoing *Essay*, Chap. I. § 14.

main essential parts, those two dispensations of religion were the same. For the *Hebrew Theocracy* was nothing but the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, with such amendments, enlargements, and enforcements, as rendered it a better fence against idolatry in the then moral state of the world, and more accommodated to the temper of the *Hebrew* nation, and to the particular policy under which they were placed by God. The difference between these two dispensations of religion was in *circumstantials* only, and not in *essentials*: For the main lines of faith and duty, and the treatment of moral characters, were the same under both.

§ 9. 1st. The main lines of faith and duty were the same under both dispensations of religion. Belief in one God, the Creator of heaven and earth, was the faith; and the worship of this one God, and obedience to his will and commands, were the duties, which were required under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion: And the very same faith and duties were required under the *Hebrew Theocracy*; and no other faith or duties but these: Only, under the *latter*, the duties of worship and obedience were multiplied, and made much more numerous than they had been under the *former*.

§ 10. 2^{dly}. Moral characters had the same kind of treatment from the Deity under the *Law of Moses*, which they had from him under the preceding dispensation of religion. For,

§ 11. (1) As perfect and undefective obedience was not to be expected from any of the *Hebrew* nation, any more than from the rest of mankind, they remained divested of the badge of *innocency*, and were kept, in the common world, subject to *mortality* and *death*.—This had been the fate of mankind under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion. And, under the *Law of Moses*, it remained unremoved, and was the curse of the *Hebrew* nation. For, under that law, every one was denounced and declared to be *curst*, who did not confirm all the words of that Law to do them, Deut. xxvii. 26. Which is thus paraphrased by St. Paul,—As many as are of the works of the law, are under the curse: For it is written, *Curst is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the Law to do them*, Gal. iii. 10. The whole *Hebrew* nation, therefore,

therefore, by being thus subjected to *mortality* and *death*, were treated as offenders; by which means, a due difference was made and preserved between their treatment and that of creatures whose obedience was perfect and undefective; such a difference as rendered their treatment perfectly congruous to their moral character as offenders, and to the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government. (k)

§ 12 (2) As the punishments, denounced, and executed upon the impenitent, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, were all of a temporal and worldly nature, and such as were formed out of those many evils to which mortal men are obnoxious in this present life; (l) so, the punishments awarded, under the *Law of Moses*, against impenitent sinners, were all of the same nature, and formed out of the same stock of materials. In the case of a general defection from God by idolatry and impiety, the punishments threatened, were either a *life* in the land of *Canaan* miserable and wretched in proportion to the degree and continuance of the defection; or *extermination* out of it by the most grievous and calamitous captivities. Gross and enormous sins, such as, contempt of authority, idolatry, and its concomitant vices, and those crimes which had an immediate and direct tendency to the ruin of society, these were made capital by the law; and the persons who were guilty of them were to suffer *death*, whether they were penitent or impenitent. And for offences of a less atrocious nature, determinate punishments, less grievous than that of *death*, were annexed to the most part of them, by the law; and the rest were ordered to be punished in a discretionary, but equitable manner, by the judges. The punishments of this last class, were all duly proportioned to the nature and heinousness of the respective offences against which they were awarded. In all cases, a greater sinner had a greater punishment than any lesser sinner, and *vice versa*; as every one must see, who reads over the *Levitical law* with due care. And these punishments were ordered

(k) See Part II. § 27. of this *Essays* and the foregoing *Essay* Ch. I. § 28. and Ch. II. § 4, 5. and Sect. I. of the same Chapter.

(l) See this same *Essay* Part II. § 32.

to be executed with the utmost impartiality, and without any partial favour, or respect of persons: And, therefore, if the judges were not deficient in their duty, the guilty, whosoever they were, did actually suffer them, provided they were impenitent; provided, I say, they were impenitent, for those punishments, as we shall see in a proper place, were remitted to the penitent, who were graciously treated by the Law-giver, and suffered a milder one in lieu of them. 'Tis evident, therefore, that that administration of punishments to the impenitent, which was ordered and fixed by the *Law of Moses*, was, in all respects, suitable to the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government. And, therefore, I shall say no more about it.

§ 13. (3) The rewards, likewise, which were promised to the penitent and obedient under the *Law of Moses*, like those under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, were all of a *temporal* and *worldly* nature; and such as were formed out of those blessings which are proper to a *mortal state*. All the rewards promised to obedience, in the *Law of Moses*, are of this kind; (*m*) and they are reducible to, and comprehended in this general one, *viz.* A long and happy life in the land of *Canaan*. The things, which were promised to the obedient, were such as were, in some respect or other, conducive to their happiness in this present world; and the obedient are frequently encouraged with the promise of *living long, or prolonging their days, in the land which the Lord their God had given them.* And

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(*m*) The promises of the *Messiah*, and of the blessings of his kingdom, which were made under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, had been made to mankind under the preceding dispensation of religion, and were of an absolute, unconditional nature; and, therefore, were to be fulfilled in their season, whether the *Hebrew* nation were obedient or disobedient. The spiritual and eternal blessings, therefore which were contained in those promises, were not promised to the *Israelites* as a reward for their obedience to the *Law of Moses*; nor did the conveyance of those blessings to mankind depend, in any manner, on their obedience to that Law. Wherefore, since these spiritual and eternal blessings were not promised to them as rewards for their obedience, no argument can be taken from the promise of them, to prove, that any of those rewards, which were promised to obedience, under the *Law of Moses*, were of a spiritual or eternal nature.

as to those rewards, which were promised to single persons in circumstantiated cases, they were all of such a nature as had a tendency to make them easy and happy in this present world, either in their *minds* or in their *bodies*, or in their external circumstances of life, *that is*, to make their life happy in the land of *Canaan*, or in foreign countries where providence might carry them, And, *finally*, as those rewards were capable of being distributed, in just and righteous proportions, to the obedient, according to the different measures and degrees of their obedience; and as the Deity was perfectly qualified for distributing them in such a manner; so, without doubt, they were distributed among them after that manner. (n)

§ 14. 'Tis true, that such a distribution of rewards to the obedient, and such an administration of punishment in cases of general defection from God by idolatry and impiety, as have been mentioned, would require the exercise of a *particular* and *minute* providence at all times, and of an *extraordinary* one on some occasions: But, under a dispensation of religion, which furnishes us with many instances of both, this *objection* can be of no weight.

Upon the whole then, it appears, not only that moral characters had the same kind of treatment from the Deity under the *Law of Moses*, which they had from him under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion; but also, that the treatment which impenitent offenders had from him under the *Law of Moses*, and the treatment, likewise, which penitent sinners had from him under it, as far as it was of a premial nature, and regarded the good and commendable part of their moral character, were perfectly congruous to the rectitude of divine moral government; and such as had a natural and direct tendency to promote the immediate end of the *Hebrew Theocracy*, viz. The piety and happiness of the *Hebrew* nation. (o)

§ 15. The truth of the first and last of these propositions will appear in a fuller and stronger light, when we have considered the penal

(n) See this *Essay*, Part II. § 34, 35.

(o) See the foregoing *Essay* Ch. I. § 33—37. and Ch. II. Sect III. § 8—12, and Sect. IV of the same *Chapter*.

penal part of the treatment which penitent sinners had from the Deity under the *Law of Moses*; to which I now proceed,

§ 16. The penal treatment, which the rectitude of divine moral government requires to be given to penitent sinners, is fully set forth and explained in *Part II.* § 40. of this *Essay*, and in the places there referred to, in the *Margin*. And to save time and needless repetition, I must refer the reader thither for full satisfaction about that point.

§ 17. Under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, as I have shewn before, it was, by the oblation of piacular sacrifices, in obedience to divine injunction, that penitent sinners were *mulcted* for their sins, and the faulty part of their moral character. And as piacular sacrifices were instituted under the *Law of Moses*, and penitent sinners were expressly ordered to offer them for their offences; I am of opinion, that persons of this moral character were treated by the Deity in the same penal manner under this, as under the former dispensation of religion; and that it was by those sacrifices, offered, as prescribed *mulcts*, for their sins and the culpable part of their moral character, that their treatment was brought to, and preserved in, a consistency with the rectitude of divine moral government.—This is the main point which I propose to clear up, and set in a proper light, in this part of this *Essay*. And since the *Levitical Law* gives us as clear accounts, as we can wish for, not only of the *divine institution* of those piacular oblations, which were in use under it; but also of the *moral character* of the persons for whose ease and relief they were instituted, and of the various *cases* in which, and *occasions* on which, they were offered, and of the several *effects* which were produced by the oblation of them; 'tis very hopeful, that, by a careful attention to these, and a due examination of them, we may arrive at a rational satisfaction about the point in question. And, that I may cast all the light, I can, upon it, I propose,

I. To premise some general observations concerning those piacular oblations which were instituted, and in use, under the *Law of Moses*.

II. To shew, that penitent sinners were the only persons, for whose ease and relief those piacular oblations were instituted.

III. To

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III. *To consider and examine all the effects of those oblations.*

IV. *To prove, that those oblations produced all the effects, which are ascribed to them, as mulcts for sin, and for faultiness of moral character.*

V. *To shew, that the treatment, which penitent sinners had under the Law of Moses, was perfectly suitable to the rectitude of divine moral government. And,*

VI. *To exhibit the imperfection of that provision, which was made by the Law of Moses, for the treatment of mankind according to their different moral characters; and the need there was of a proper remedy for that defect, by the introduction of a new and more perfect dispensation of religion.*



CHAP. I.

Containing some general observations concerning those Piacular Oblations which were instituted, and in use, under the Law of Moses.

§ 1. **B**Y *piacular oblations*, I understand such oblations as were ordered by the Deity to be offered for sin, and for *faultiness of moral character*. This is not intended as an accurate definition of piacular oblations; for that I intend to give in its proper place, after I have duly examined the effects of them, and the way and manner in which those effects were produced: But it is only mentioned here, as a general mark by which piacular oblations may be distinguished from other oblations of a different nature.

§ 2. *Burnt-offerings* were that species of piacular sacrifice, which had been in use under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion. And, under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, the oblation of them was enjoined by a *new Law*, or rather, by a repromulgation of the ancient, original institution

institution of them, *Levit.* Ch. i. Under this *Theocracy*, the oblation of *burnt-offerings* was very frequent. A *burnt-offering* was offered, evening and morning every day, *Numb.* xxviii. 3—10. *burnt-offerings* were often a part of private sacrifices *Levit.* v. 7—10. xii. 6—8.—xiv. 10.—31.—xv. 13—20. *Numb.* vi. 9—16. And, on all solemn and public occasions, whether weekly, monthly, or annual, they were the most expensive and bulky part of those piacular oblations which they offered, *Levit.* viii. 14.—21.—xvi. 3, 5; 24.—xxiii. 15—36. *Numb.* vii.—viii. 8—12.—xv. 24—26.—xxviii. 9—31.—xxix. 1—38.

§ 3. Under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, 'tis probable, that *burnt-offerings* were wholly consumed, and reduced to ashes, by fire: And, under the *Law of Moses*, 'tis certain, that they had the same fate. Only, under the latter, the *bides* of the *burnt-offerings*, which were offered by the people, were reserved from the fire, and, by special grant, became the property of the priests, who offered them, *Levit.* i. 1—17.—vi. 9—13.—vii. 8.

§ 4. The *burnt-offerings*, which were offered under the *Law of Moses*, were sacrifices of the piacular kind: For the same effects, which are ascribed to other piacular sacrifices, are ascribed to them; such as, *making atonement*, *Lev.* i. 4.—xii. 6—8. *Numb.* vi. 11. *sanctifying the offerers*, *Exod.* xxix. 1. 15—18. *Purifying the unclean*, *Lev.* xii. 6—8.—xiv. 19, 20, 31.—xv. 15, 30. *Numb.* vi. 11.—viii. 12, 21. And *the procuring of the remission of sin*, *Levit.* v. 7—10. *Numb.* xv. 24—26.

§ 5. MEAT-OFFERINGS and *drink-offerings* were the common and usual appendages of such *burnt-offerings* as were offered as public sacrifices, *Levit.* xxiii. 12, 13, 18. *Numb.* xv. 1.—12, 24. Chapters xxviii. xxix.—The *drink-offerings* were poured out unto the Lord in the holy place: And neither the priests nor the owners had any share of them for their own private use, *Numb.* xxviii. 7.—The *meat-offering*, if the priest was the owner of it, was wholly burnt upon the Altar. *Lev.* vi. 23. And if any other person was the owner of it, a memorial of it was burnt upon the Altar; and the

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the priest and his sons had the remainder of it to eat, *Lev. ii. 2, 3, 9, 10.—vii. 9, 10.*

§ 6. To the *burnt-offerings*, which had been in use, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, it pleased God to add a new species of piacular sacrifice, under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, viz. *sin-offerings*. *Sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings* were very distinguishable. For the *burnt-offerings* (except the *hides* of them, as has been said) were wholly consumed by fire upon the Altar of burnt-offering: But for *sin-offerings*, the fat and combustible parts of them only, were thus consumed by fire upon that Altar; and the carcases of them were either burnt to ashes without the *camp* or *city*, or were assigned to the priests for a part of their maintainance.

§ 7. Many think, that the *trespass-offerings*, which obtained under the *Law of Moses*, were a distinct species of piacular sacrifice, different from the *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings*. But, for my part, I can discover no peculiar mark, or characteristic, whereby to distinguish those *trespass-offerings* from *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings*. (p) And for this reason, and the other reasons which I shall here subjoin, I am of opinion, that the *trespass-offerings* were no other than the *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings* which were offered for sin by single persons, who were not the *high-priest*, nor of the rank of *rulers*.

§ 8. 1st. The piacular sacrifices which were offered for the whole congregation, - the high-priest, and rulers, are, no where, called *trespass-offerings*. Hence it is evident, that *trespass-offerings* were those

(p) *Levit. iv. v. vi.*—In these chapters we have an account of the divine institution of *Sin-offerings* and *Trespass-offerings*. And that both were oblations of the piacular kind, is manifest. For *Sin-offerings* are ordered to be offered for sins that had been sinned, and are said to make atonement for the sin he (the offerer) hath committed, *Levit. iv. 3, 14, 26, 28, 35.*—And, in like manner, the *Trespass-offerings* are ordered to be offered for the sins which the offerers had sinned, and for their trespasses; and they are expressly said to make atonement for the ignorance wherein they erred and the sins which they had sinned, *Levit. v. 6, 10, 13, 15, 18.—vi. 6, 7.*

those piacular sacrifices which were offered for single persons, who were neither the *high-priest*, nor of the rank of *rulers*. (q)

§ 9. 2dly. In the *first* and *fourth* Chapters of *Leviticus*, *Moses* is very exact and minute in describing the way and manner in which *burnt-offerings* of all sorts, and *sin-offerings* of the bestial kind, were to be offered. But in the *fifth* and *sixth* Chapters, where he treats of *trespass-offerings*, tho' he is equally careful in setting down the way and manner in which the *turtles*, *pidgeons*, and *fine-flour* were to be offered for trespasses, as *sin-offerings*, *Levit.* v. 7—9; yet, when he comes to speak of the *rams*, *lambs*, and *kids*, which were offered for trespasses, and of the *turtles* and *pidgeons* which were offered for them as *burnt-offerings*, he leaves both priest and people in the dark, and doth not give one single direction about the way and manner in which they were to be offered, as appears from *Levit.* v. 6, 10; 15—19.—vi. 6, 7.—How then is this omission to be accounted for? And such care and accuracy in some things to be reconciled with such looseness and negligence in others? No way, as far as I can see, but by supposing the *trespass-offerings* to have been the *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings* which were offered for personal sins by such single persons, as were not *rulers*, nor the *high-priest*. If this be supposed, *Moses* had no reason, or occasion, to give any directions about the way and manner of the oblation of the *rams*, *kids*, and *lambs* that were offered as *sin* and *burnt-offerings* for trespasses; or of the *turtles* and *pidgeons* that were offered for them as *burnt-offerings*; because he had given particular directions about it, before hand, in the *first* and *fourth* Chapters. But he had good reason to be careful and particular in giving directions about the oblation of the *turtles*, *pidgeons*, and *fine-flour*, as *sin-offerings* for trespasses, of which he had said nothing before.

In this view of things, the *first* and *fourth* Chapters of *Leviticus* will treat of the divine institution of *burnt-offerings* of all sorts, and

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(q) Particular priests, of the family of the *high-priest*, offered *trespass-offerings* for their sins, as appears from *Ezr.* x. 18, 19. But those *trespass-offerings* were not offered for the sins of the *high-priest*, but for the personal sins of the particular priests of his family.

of *sin-offerings* of the bestial kind; and contain particular directions for the oblation of them. And the *fifth Chapter*, and part of the *sixth*, will contain instructions for the application of those *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings* for the expiation of the offences of single persons who were not of the rank of *high-priest*, or of *rulers*: To which instructions there is annexed an institution of some less expensive *sin-offerings* for the ease of the poor.—The taking things in this view gives an easy and natural solution of the difficulty mentioned, and makes *Moses* write like a careful and accurate *Historian*. And this satisfies me that the *trespass-offerings*, treated of in the *5th* and *6th Chapters* of *Leviticus*, were not a distinct species of sacrifice, but the *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings* which were offered for offences by single persons, who were not of the rank of *rulers*, or of the *high-priest*.

§ 10. 3dly. Under the *Law of Moses*, single persons, who were of a rank inferior to those of the *high-priest* and *rulers*, were ordered to offer, for every *sin of ignorance*, both a *sin-offering* and a *trespass-offering*, see *Levit. iv. 27—35.—v. 1—19.—vi. 1—7. Numb. xv. 27—29.*—Wherefore, upon the *supposition*, that *trespass-offerings* were a distinct species of piacular sacrifice, different from *sin-offerings*, 'tis manifest, that both a *sin-offering* and a *trespass-offering* were requisite to expiate any *sin of ignorance* that was committed by any of the persons mentioned. And yet nothing is more evident, than that this could not be the meaning of that law; because, according to the express declarations contained in it, either a *sin-offering* without a *trespass-offering*, *Levit. iv. 31, 35.* or a *trespass-offering* without a *sin-offering*, *Levit. v. 6, 11, 12, 15—18.—vi. 6, 7.* or a *sin-offering* joined with a *burnt-offering*, *Levit. v. 7—10.* was sufficient to atone for a *sin of ignorance*: and, in fact, a *sin of ignorance* was expiated by a *trespass-offering* alone, *Levit. xix. 21, 22. Ezr. x. 19.* In order, therefore, to preserve harmony betwixt these declarations of *holy scripture*, and to keep them from contradicting one another, it is necessary to suppose, that *trespass-offerings* were not a distinct species of piacular sacrifice, but the *burnt-offerings* and

and *sin-offerings* which were offered for offences by single persons, who were not rulers, nor the *high-priest*.

§ 11. *Lastly*. The *trespass-offering* is expressly called a *sin-offering*, Levit. v. 6, 11. And, in a case, which would often happen, a *sin-offering* and a *burnt-offering* did constitute a *trespass-offering*, Levit. v. 7—10. But how a *sin-offering* alone, or a *sin-offering* joined with a *burnt-offering*, should constitute a *trespass-offering*, unless *trespass-offerings* were the *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings* which were offered for offences and trespasses, is what I cannot comprehend.

§ 12. But to this notion of *trespass-offerings*, several *objections* have been made, and some others may be made, which it will be proper to mention, and answer, before I proceed.

§ 13. 1st. The *trespass-offerings* have a peculiar and appropriated name given to them by *Moses*. And from this it may be argued, that they were a distinct species of piacular sacrifice, different from *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings*.

Ans. This argument is of no manner of force, because the appellation, given by *Moses* to *trespass-offerings*, is not so appropriated and peculiar to them, as some may imagine: For it is, sometimes, given to a *sin-offering*, and, at other times, to a *sin-offering* joined with a *burnt-offering*. (r) Besides, there was a great propriety in calling those *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings*, which were offered for trespasses, by the name of *trespass-offerings*.

§ 14

(r) גִּנּוֹלָה *gnolah*, is the Hebrew word for a *burnt-offering*; חַטָּאת *chattaah*, for a *sin-offering*; and אֲשָׁם *ascham*, for a *trespass-offering*. Now *chattaah* or the *sin-offering* is called *ascham*, or the *trespass-offering*, Lev. v. 6, 11, 12. And *chattaah* joined with a *gnolah*, or a *sin-offering* and a *burnt-offering*, make the *ascham*, or the *trespass-offering*, Lev. v. 7—10. —Again, *ascham* signifies a *trespass*, as well as a *trespass-offering*; and *chattaah*, a *sin*, as well as a *sin-offering*: And yet, *ascham* sometimes denotes the sin for which a *sin-offering* was offered; Lev. iv. 3. And *chattaah*, the trespass for which a *trespass-offering* was offered. Lev. v. 6, 10, 13. —The *Radices*, likewise, of *ascham* and *chattaah* are used in the same latitude of signification, as appears from Lev. iv. 13, 22, 27. compared with Ch. v. 6, 10, 13. and Ch. vi. 4.

The like observations may be made concerning the signification of the Greek Nouns ἁμαρτία and πλημμελεία. For though the LXX usually denote the *sin-offering* by the former,

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§ 14. 2dly. It is said, *Levit. vii. 6. Every male among the priests shall eat thereof, i. e. of the trespass-offering.* From this it may, perhaps, be inferred, that *burnt-offerings*, of which the priests had no share to eat, could, in no case, be offered as *trespass-offerings*, or as a part of any *trespass-offering*.

Answ. There are few general rules but what must be understood with some limitations. And if that, under consideration, was a general rule, there is nothing more clear, than that the grant, contained in it, must be understood as limited to those *sin-offerings* which were offered for trespasses. For (1) It is most certain, that *burnt-offerings* were a part of some *trespass-offerings*, *Levit. v. 7—10.* And of these the males among the priests could have no share to eat. (2) *Rams*, in many cases, were ordered to be offered as *trespass-offerings*, *Levit. v. 15, 18.—vi. 6.* Whereas it was *lambs* of the female sex only, which were appointed to be offered as *sin-offerings*, *Levit. iv. 32.* Now as *rams* were expressly ordered to be offered as *burnt-offerings*, *Levit. i. 10.* it is hence probable, that all the *rams*, which were offered as *trespass-offerings*, were offered as *burnt-offerings*: If so; the males among the priests could have no part of them to eat. (3) It seems to be very evident from the context, that the *trespass-offerings*, of which *Moses* says, *Every male among the priests shall eat thereof*, were no other than the *sin-offerings* which were offered for *trespasses*: For, as appears from *v. 3--5*, they were sacrifices of which the *kidneys*, and the fat inward parts only (and not the whole carcase) were burnt upon the altar. And this is still further evident from *v. 8.* where *Moses*, speaking of the share, which the priests were to have of all the *burnt-offerings*, which

mer, and the *trespass-offering* by the latter, yet, sometimes, they call the *trespass-offering* *αμαρτια*, or *περι αμαρτιας*, *Levit. v. 7, 11, 12.* And concerning the persons who were to offer the *sin-offerings*, they say expressly, *πλημμελησωσι*, *they are guilty of a trespass*, *Lev. iv. 13, 22, 27.*

These observations shew, that no argument of any force can be taken from the pretended appropriated appellation of *trespass-offerings*, to prove, that they were a distinct species of sacrifice, different from *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings*.

which were offered for offences by those who were not of the sacerdotal order, saith, *And the priest that offereth any man's burnt-offering, shall have to himself the skin of the burnt-offering which he offereth.* The officiating priest was to have the *skin*, but no part of the carcass to eat.

§ 15. 3dly. There are several other objections which have been made to this notion of *trespass-offerings* by a late learned writer, (s) which it will be proper to consider and answer in this place.

§ 16. Obj. I. This writer saith, "It is certain,---that these sacrifices (viz. *sin-offerings* and *trespass-offerings*) were different. "For if a common man sinned, he was to bring a *kid of the goats*, "a *female without blemish*, or else a *female lamb*, for his *sin-offering*, "Levit. iv. 28, 32. But in the case of a *trespass-offering*, every "common man was enjoined to offer a *ram without blemish*, which "was always to be a *male*, Levit. v. 15, 18.---vi. 6. It is still a "female for a *sin-offering* for all common persons, but never a "male." (t)

Answ. This objection is of no force, because it is grounded upon a mistake: For, in many cases, a *female lamb*, or *kid*, was ordered to be offered by common persons for trespasses; animals the same, both in kind and sex, with those which persons of this rank were enjoined to offer for *sin-offerings*. Compare Levit. iv. 28, 32. with Ch. v. 6.—In the places indeed, quoted by the author, a *ram* was ordered to be offered for a *trespass-offering* in other cases. But then, since the *rams*, which were to be offered as *trespass-offerings*, were probably, as has been shewn, to be offered as *burnt-offerings*, the only inference, that can be drawn from the oblation of them as *trespass-offerings*, is, that *sin-offerings* were not, in all cases, that species of piacular sacrifice which was to be offered for trespasses by common persons: But it will not follow, that *trespass-offerings* were

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(s) The author of the *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*; published at London, ann. 1748.

(t) Page 285, 286.

were a distinct species of sacrifice, different from *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings*; or, that the *trespass-offerings* were not those *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings* which were offered for trespasses.

§ 17. *Obj. II.* The author, aforesaid, goes on thus, “The whole congregation was obliged, at times, to offer *sin-offerings*; whereas none but single persons ever offered *trespass-offerings*. The difference, therefore, between these two sorts of offerings must consist in something which might concern the whole congregation, since the whole congregation was never required to offer the one, though they were the other.” (u)

Answ. The sacrifices, which single persons offered for their trespasses, were, as has been shewn already, *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings*, either separately or jointly. See *Lev. v.* and *Ch. vi. 1—7*. And, therefore, though the congregation offered no *trespass-offerings*, it will not follow, that the *trespass-offerings*, which were offered by single persons for their offences, were not *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings*, offered either separately or jointly.—The true reason, why the congregation did not offer any *trespass-offerings*, was, because it was the congregation, or a collective body of people; and, therefore, could not offer *trespass-offerings* for such offences as were committed by single persons only, and not by the whole congregation; *that is*, could not offer those *trespass-offerings* which single individuals were to offer for their respective offences.

§ 18. *Obj. III.* Again, the author saith, “It was usual for persons, or for the congregation, to annex *sin-offerings* to their *burnt-offerings*; but never to join *trespass-offerings* to their *burnt-offerings*.” (w)

Answ. This is another mistake of the author: for it was as usual for single persons, excepting only the high-priest and rulers, to join *sin-offerings* to *burnt-offerings*, to atone for their respective trespasses, as it was for them, or for the whole congregation, to join those two sorts of sacrifice together, on other occasions. See *Levit. v. 7—10*.—I know not well what to make of the author’s expression,

(u) *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*, p. 288.

(w) *Ibidem*, p. 288.

pression, "It was never usual for them, to join *trespass-offerings* to their *burnt-offerings*." For, in cases, where a *sin-offering* and a *burnt-offering* were the constituent parts of a *trespass-offering*, and where a *burnt-offering* was the whole of a *trespass-offering*, the offerers could not be said to join a *burnt-offering* to a *trespass-offering*; because a *burnt-offering* was, in those cases, either the whole, or a part, of the *trespass-offering*. But whatever was the author's meaning, 'tis enough for my purpose, that what he saith, doth not prove, that *trespass-offerings* were not the *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings* which were offered for personal offences by such persons as were not rulers or the high-priest.

§ 19. Obj. IV. This author says further, "It is observable, that where a person was too poor to bring a lamb for his *trespass-offering*, he was to bring for his trespass, which he had sinned, two turtle-doves, or two young pigeons; and then one of them was to be offered for a *sin-offering*, and one for a *burnt-offering*. And, in this case, the *sin-offering* was to be offered first, and, afterwards, the *burnt-offering*, Levit. v. 9, 10. And supposing that a person could not attain to two turtles, or pigeons, then he was to bring the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour for a *sin-offering*. The very poorest, therefore, did not bring a *trespass-offering* for the same offences for which others brought them, but they brought a *sin-offering* in its stead. And in persons not the very poorest, a *burnt-offering* and a *sin-offering* were equal to a *trespass-offering*." (x)

Ans. The matter of fact, as it is related Levit. v. is briefly this, viz. All they who were able to do it, were to offer a female kid, or lamb, as a *sin-offering*, for any of the trespasses there mentioned, v. 6.—They who were not able to do this, were, in place of it, to offer, for any of these trespasses, two turtle-doves, or two young pigeons, the one as a *sin-offering*, and the other as a *burnt-offering*, v. 7—10.—And they who were not of ability to afford the last mentioned expiation, were to offer, for any of the said trespasses,

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(x) Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices, p. 288, 289.

trespasses, the tenth part of an *ephah* of *fine flour*, as a *sin-offering*, v. 11—13.——Hence it appears, that all those *trespass-offerings* were either *sin-offerings*, single and alone; or *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings* joined together. These facts, therefore, instead of giving us any ground to think, that *trespass-offerings* were a distinct species of sacrifice, different from *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings*, afford us good reason to conclude the contrary, viz. that *trespass-offerings* were no other than the *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings* which were offered for trespasses by single persons who were not rulers, nor the high-priest.—The author's inference, therefore, from these facts, viz. “That the very poorest did not bring a *trespass-offering* for the same offences for which others brought them, but they brought a *sin-offering* in its stead,” is neither consistent with truth nor common sense. And his other inference, viz. “That in persons not the poorest, a *sin-offering* and a *burnt-offering* were equal to a *trespass-offering*,” is equally inconsistent with truth and common sense; because, in their case; a *sin-offering* and a *burnt-offering* were the very *trespass-offering*; consequently, a *sin-offering* and *burnt-offering* cannot be said to be either equal, or unequal, to a *trespass-offering*; any more than a mite, or a mountain, or any thing else, can be said to be equal, or unequal, to itself.

§ 20. Obj. V. The author, aforesaid, proceeds thus, “When a *sin-offering* was made by the *priest that is anointed*, or by the *whole congregation*, for *sin through ignorance against any of the commandments of the Lord concerning things which ought not to be done*, i. e. by doing any thing that is prohibited, a *bullock* was to be brought; the fat of the inwards, and the kidneys, and the fat about them, and the caul above the liver, was to be burnt; but the whole *bullock* besides, was to be carried without the camp, or the city, and there to be burnt. But if a *ruler*, or any one of the *common people*, sinned in like manner, their *sin-offering* was to be burnt in part only, and the remainder was to be eaten by the priests, *Levit. vi. 25—30*. Now, in the case of the *trespass-offering*, the priests had the same parts to eat as in the *sin-offerings*. But then all the *trespass-offerings* were alike consumed
“ upon

“ upon the altar ; and no part, at any time, was carried out of the
 “ camp, or city, to be burnt. When, therefore, it is said, *As the*
 “ *sin-offering is, so is the trespass-offering; there is one law for both,*
 “ Levit. vii. 7. that relates only to the parts to be burnt, or eaten,
 “ and to what share the priest that offered it was to have ; and not
 “ to cases where the high-priest, or the whole congregation sinned,
 “ and to the rites in those cases to be used.” (y)

Answ. What the author here says is all true, but I cannot see
 any thing in it, or in any part of it, from which it can be inferred,
 that *sin-offerings* were not offered as *trespass-offerings*; or that *trespass-*
offerings were not the *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings* that were of-
 fered for trespasses by single persons who were not rulers, or high-
 priest. He says, indeed, “ That all *trespass-offerings* (that is, the
 “ parts of all *trespass-offerings* which were to be burnt) were alike
 “ consumed upon the altar, and no part, at any time, was carried
 “ out of the camp, or city, to be burnt.” This is very true. But
 then, if it proves, that *trespass-offerings* were not *sin-offerings*, it
 proves, at the same time, that all *sin-offerings* whatsoever, except-
 ing those which were offered for the priest anointed, and for the
 congregation, were not *sin-offerings*: for, according to the author’s
 own confession, all those *sin-offerings*, as well as the *trespass-offerings*,
 were alike consumed upon the altar ; and no part, at any time, was
 carried out of the camp, or city, to be burnt.—The truth is, nei-
 ther the *trespass-offerings*, nor the *sin-offerings* which were offered
 for rulers, or for common people, were the *sin-offerings* which were
 offered for the priest anointed, or for the congregation. This is all
 that follows from the facts here related by the author : but it no
 ways follows from these facts, that either the former or the latter
 were not *sin-offerings*.

§ 21. *Obj.* VI. But to prove his point, the author, aforesaid,
 adds, “ *Lastly.* There was some difference in the rites to be used
 “ on these occasions. In the *trespass-offering*, the blood was to be
 “ sprinkled round about upon the altar, just as the blood of the
 “ burnt-”

(y) *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*, p. 290, 291.

“ *burnt-offerings and peace-offerings* was sprinkled, *Lev. vii. 2.* But,
 “ in the case of a *sin-offering* for the common people, the priest
 “ was to take of the blood, and to *put it on the horns of the altar*
 “ of *burnt-offering*, and to *pour out the blood at the bottom of the al-*
 “ *tar of burnt-offering.*” (2)

Answ. It is said, *Levit. vii. 2.* *And the blood thereof* (i. e. of the trespass-offering) *shall be* (the priest) *sprinkle round about upon the altar.* And it is said, *Lev. iv. 30.* *And the priest shall take of the blood thereof* (i. e. of the sin-offering for one of the common people) *with his finger, and put it upon the horns of the altar of burnt-offering, and shall pour out all the blood at the bottom of the altar.* Now there is not so great a difference between the phraseology in those two texts, as to give any just ground for thinking, that *trespass-offerings* were a species of sacrifice different from *sin-offerings*; because the putting *blood* on the *horns* at the four corners of the altar, and the pouring out the remainder of the *blood* into the *fosse* which encompassed the altar, may, perhaps, be briefly expressed by *sprinklin the blood round about* (לְסָבִיב) upon, before, or beside the altar; for in all those significations is this *Hebrew particle* often used.—But, passing over this; the naked truth, as it appears to me, is this; It is certain fact, that both *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings* were offered as *trespass-offerings*; and there is no reason for thinking, that *trespass-offerings* were any other than those *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings* which were offered for personal offences by those who were not *rulers*, nor the *high-priest*, but good ground for a contrary way of thinking, as I have shewn before. Wherefore, this being the truth of the matter, when a *burnt-offering* was offered as a *trespass-offering*, or as a part of a *trespass-offering*, the blood of it, like that of all other *burnt-offerings*, was, without doubt, *sprinkled round about upon the altar.* Compare *Levit. i. 5.* with *Ch. v. 10.*—And, in like manner, when a *sin-offering* was either a part, or the whole, of a *trespass-offering*, the blood of it was, no doubt, *put upon the horns of the altar, and poured out at the bottom*

(2) *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices, p. 291, 292.*

bottom of it. Compare *Levit. iv. 30, 34.* with *Levit. v. 6, 9.*---
The blood of all *trespass-offerings* must have been disposed of in one or other of the two ways mentioned, excepting in cases, where the law gave particular directions for disposing of it after another manner, as it did in the purification of the *leper*, *Levit. xiv. 14, 25.*

§ 22. Thus I have taken a survey of all the arguments by which this author endeavours to prove, that *trespass-offerings* were a distinct species of piacular sacrifice, different from *sin-offerings*. And, upon the strictest scrutiny, I can find nothing in them, either to confirm the point which he endeavours to establish, or to subvert my own notion of *trespass-offerings*; as being the *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings* which private persons were ordered to offer for their offences or trespasses. In the sequel of his *book*, the author proceeds to clear his notion of *trespass-offerings* from several embarrassments, which, in my opinion, he doth very poorly. But my design, in this performance, doth not carry me to follow him any further. And, therefore, I return to make some further *observations* concerning those piacular oblations that were in use under the *law of Moses*.

§ 23. *Trespass-offerings* being, as has been proved, no other than the *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings* which were offered for offences by private persons, it is manifest, that the same rites, which were observed in the oblation of *trespass-offerings*, must have been observed, likewise, in the oblation of *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings*, and *vice versa*. Wherefore, if we have an account of any rite, observed in the oblation of *trespass-offerings*, which is not mentioned as having been observed in the oblation of *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings*, we may be sure, that that rite was observed in the oblation of the latter, as well as of the former, and *vice versa*. E. G. The offerer of a *trespass-offering* is directed to make an explicit confession of the sin for which he offered it; and, in cases of injury done to others, to make restitution of the principal, with the addition of a fifth part more, as a compensation for the damage sustained by the injured person, *Levit. v. 16.*—*vi. 5.* *Numb. v. 7, 8.* But no such directions are given to the offerers of *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings*, as appears from *Levit. i. and iv. Chapters.* In like

like manner, the offerers of *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings* are directed to lay their hands upon the heads of their *victims*, *Levit. i. 4.—iv. 4, 15, 24, 29, 33.* But no such order is given to the offerers of *trespass-offerings*, as appears from *Levit. v. and vi. 1—7.* But now, since *trespass-offerings* were the *sin-offerings* and *burnt-offerings* which were offered for offences by private persons, it is manifest, that the offerers of *trespass-offerings* laid their hands upon the heads of their *victims*; and that the offerers of *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings* did make an explicit confession of the sins for which they offered them; and, in cases of injury done, restitution of the *principal*, with the addition of a fifth part more for damages.

§ 24. Under the *law of Moses*, the things, which were offered as piacular oblations, were generally *animals*, but not always *animals*: for the tenth part of an *ephah* of *fine flour* was offered and accepted for the poor, *Levit. v. 11—13.*

§ 25. The *animals*, which were to be offered in sacrifice, were generally slain, but not always slain: for the *scape-goat*, and one of the *birds* with which the *leper's* house was cleansed, were neither of them slain. The first *was sent, alive, into the desert by the hands of a fit person*, *Levit. xvi. 21, 22.* And the other was ordered *to be let go out of the city into the open fields*, *Levit. xiv. 53.* And it is manifest from what is said of these two *animals*, that they were offered as piacular oblations; for with both *atonement* was made, *Lev. xiv. 53.—xvi. 10.* And, as to the *scape-goat* in particular, it is expressly mentioned as a part of the *sin-offering*, *v. 5.* And, as such, *Aaron laid his hands upon the head of it, and confessed over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins*, *v. 21.* And it is said, *to bear upon it all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited, or a land of separation*, *v. 22.*

§ 26. All the things, which were offered as piacular oblations, were to be good in their respective kinds. Things which were unsound, or had any natural defect, were expressly forbidden to be offered: for it was peremptorily commanded, that all the *animals* which were offered as *sin-offerings*, *burnt-offerings*, and *trespass-offerings*,

offerings, should be *without blemish*, Levit. i. 3, 10 ---iv. 3, 23, 28, 32. ---v. 15, 18. ---vi. 6. And the *flour*, which the poor offered for their trespasses, was to be *fine flour*, Levit. v. 11.

§ 27. The things, which were to be offered as piacular oblations, were such as were of some value and real worth to the offerers of them; consequently such as they could not offer without suffering some loss or damage. They were all of the useful kind, and such as the offerers could not offer without trouble as well as cost, especially, as they had them to present *alive* to the priests at the door of the tabernacle, or temple. ---The *animals* were all to be of the *clean* kind; such, therefore, as might have been useful for food, &c. if they had not been offered to expiate their sins. ---And forasmuch as these piacular oblations were all to be good in their respective kinds, the value of them, and the loss which the offerers sustained, were hereby increased. ---The expensiveness of piacular oblations, and the loss suffered by the offerers of them, are so plainly supposed, and so particularly considered, by the *Hebrew law-giver*, that abatements, in various degrees, are made for the ease of the *poor*. Levit. v. 7---13. ---xii. 8. ---xiv. 21, 22. Which is a plain indication, that the oblation of them was, in some measure, burthensome to all ranks of men.

§ 28. All the things, which were offered as piacular oblations, became, upon their being so offered, the peculiar property of God. And accordingly, they were disposed of by his special order and particular direction. Some of them were wholly consumed by fire upon the altar of *burnt-offering*. Some were ordered to be set at liberty, alive, either in the *desert*, or in the *open fields*. There were others which were burnt to ashes, partly, upon the *altar of burnt-offering*, and partly, without the *camp* or *city*. And, finally, there was a good number of them, of which the *kidneys*, *caul above the liver*, and *the fat upon the inwards*, were burnt upon the *altar*; and the remainder was assigned towards the maintenance of the priests.

§ 29. After piacular oblations had been offered in the prescribed manner, special care was taken, that the persons, for whom they

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were offered, should have no part or share of them to eat, or for their own private use. The *burnt-offerings* which were offered for the whole congregation, were wholly consumed by fire upon the altar of *burnt-offering*. The *sin-offerings* offered for it, if their blood was brought within either the *veil* or the *tabernacle*, were also wholly burnt, partly upon that altar, and partly without the *camp*, or the *city*, Levit. iv. 13—21.—vii. 30. xv. 11—15, 27. If the blood of those *sin-offerings* was not brought into the *tabernacle*, or within the *veil*, a part of them was burnt upon the altar, and the males among the priests had the whole remainder to eat, as appears from Levit. ix. 15. compared with Ch. x. 16—18. And as to those *meat-offerings* which were appendages of the *burnt-offerings* of the congregation, a memorial of them was burnt upon the altar, and the remainder was assigned towards the maintenance of the priests, Levit. ii. 1—10. Numb. xv. 9. Hence it appears, that the congregation had no part or share of any of those *piacular oblations*, which were offered for it as a collective body, to eat. Again, as to those *piacular oblations*, which were offered by single persons, whether *rulers* or *common men*; certain parts of them were burnt upon the altar of *burnt-offering*, and the priests had the whole remainder to eat. Thus were all the *piacular oblations*, offered by the persons mentioned, that were not of the *burnt-offering* kind, disposed of; their *sin-offerings*, *trespass-offerings*, and *meat-offerings*, as is clear from Levit. ii. 9, 10.—iv. 22—35.—v. 6—19.—vi. 14—18, 25—29.—vii. 1—7; 9, 10. Numb. xviii. 9, 10. Part was burnt upon the altar, the priests had the remainder, and the persons, for whom they were offered, had nothing. And as to their *burnt-offerings*, the priests, who offered them, had the skins of them, Lev. vii. 8. and all besides was burnt. Hence it appears, that the *laics* in *Israel* had no share of any of those *piacular oblations*, which they offered for particular offences, to eat, or for their own private use. And, *finally*, although the high-priest, and the males of his family, had a part of their maintenance out of those *piacular oblations* which were offered for the whole congregation, and for persons who were not of the sacerdotal order; yet (which deserves

a particular *remark*) of those piacular oblations which the high-priest offered for himself, or for himself and his house, they had no part or share to eat, or for their own private use. The *burnt-offerings*, thus offered, according to the general law relating to *burnt-offerings*, where wholly consumed by fire upon the altar of *burnt-offering*. The *meat-offerings*, by a special law provided for that purpose, had the same fate. *Levit.* vi. 22, 23. And the *sin-offerings*, whether the blood of them was, or was not, brought into the *tabernacle*, or within the *veil*, were wholly burnt, partly upon the *altar of burnt-offering*, and partly without the *camp* or *city*, as appears from *Levit.* iv. 3—12.—viii. 14—17.—ix. 8—11.—xvi. 11—14; 25, 27. Whatever benefit, therefore, the high-priest, and the males of his family, had from the expiatory oblations of the people, yet they were not permitted to have any from those which were offered for their own offences. (a)

§ 30. Under the *Law of Moses*, the occasions, on which piacular oblations were offered, were various, such as,

(1) When the *Israelites* entered into covenant with God at *Horeb*, and gave their consent to have him for their God and King, *Exod.* xxiv. 4—8. And when God, in a solemn and august manner, fixed his residence, or the symbol of his presence among them in the *tabernacle*, *Levit.* ix. 1—24.

(2) When *persons*, or *things*, were to be brought into a peculiar relation to God, and set a part for his service. Thus *Aaron* and his *sons*, *Exod.* xxix. 1—18. The *Levites*, *Numb.* viii. 8—12. The *Altar*, *Exod.* xxix. 36, 37. *Numb.* vii. And the *persons* who were under the *Nazarite's* vow, *Numb.* vi. 13—16. were all consecrated, and set a part for the service of God, by the oblation of piacular sacrifices.

C c 2

(3) When

(a) Dr. Lardner affirms, that the worshipper, as well as the priest, partook of the altar, excepting in the case of whole-burnt-offerings. [See his remarks upon Dr. Ward's *Dissertations*, page 135]—But this notion that learned and worthy Gentleman has certainly taken upon trust, from others. If he will examine for himself, he will find facts to be as represented above.

(3) When the whole congregation, or the high-priest, or any other single person, had committed a sin of *ignorance*, or *error*, Lev. iv. 3—35.—v. 1—19.—vi. 1—7. Numb. vi. 22—28.

(4) When *persons*, or *houses*, defiled by ceremonial uncleanness, were to be *cleansed*, Levit. xii. 6—8.—xiv. 1—53.—xv. 1—53. Numb. vi. 1—16.—xix. 1—22.

To these, add the *burnt-offering* that was offered, evening and morning, every day Numb. xxviii. 3—8. The costly piacular oblations which were offered *weekly*, on the sabbath day, Numb. xxviii. 9, 10. *monthly*, on the new-moons, Numb. xxviii. 11—15. And *annually*, at the three great *festivals*, and on the day of *expiation*, Levit. xvi. 1—29.—xxiii. 26—43. Numb. xxviii. 16—24.—xxix. 1—39. And the *burnt-offering* which was offered *yearly* with the *sheaf* of the *first fruits*, Levit. xxiii. 12, 13. And the *sin-offering*, and the expensive *burnt-offering*, which were offered fifty days after the last-mentioned, with the *meat-offering* of the *first fruits*, Lev. xxiii. 15—20. Numb. xxviii. 26—31.

§ 31. The last *observation*, which I shall make, is, that, under the *law of Moses*, the offerers of piacular oblations were not left at liberty to offer, or not to offer them, as they pleased; but were obliged to offer them, by express and peremptory command. This cannot escape the notice of any body who, with due care, reads over the several passages of *scripture* which are quoted in the foregoing *paragraph*.

§ 32. The foregoing are all the *observations*, which I shall have any occasion for, as a basis for my future reasonings. As to others, of a more particular and minute, or of a more nice and abstruse nature, as I shall have no occasion for them, so I shall not trouble the reader with them.



C H A P. II.

Concerning the moral character of the persons for whose ease and relief piacular sacrifices were instituted under the Law of Moses.

§ 1. **P**ENITENT sinners were the only persons, for whose ease and relief piacular sacrifices were instituted under the law of Moses. This will plainly appear from the following considerations.

§ 2. It must, I think, be allowed, that these piacular oblations were instituted for the ease and relief of those who offered them. And this concession, in my opinion, is, of itself, sufficient, to shew, that penitent sinners were the only persons for whose benefit they were instituted. - Impenitent sinners were altogether unworthy of favour: and had any been shewed to them by the Deity, it would have been productive of very bad consequences to mankind, and, of course, inconsistent with the wisdom, goodness and rectitude of divine moral government. (b)

§ 3. The remission of sin was one of those blessings, which the offerers of piacular sacrifices obtained by the oblation of them, Lev. iv. 20, 26, 31, 35.—v. 10, 13, 16, 18.—vi. 7.—xix. 22. Numb. xv. 26, 28. But this blessing was of such a nature, that the Deity could not confer it upon impenitent sinners, without introducing great disorder and misery among mankind, and acting inconsistently with the rectitude and end of his own moral government. (c)

§ 4. The

(b) See the foregoing *Essay*, ch. i. § 33—35. and ch. ii. sect. ii.

(c) *Ibidem*.

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§ 4. The oblation of piacular sacrifices for sins, was a virtual acknowledgment and confession of guilt; and, of course, a document and expression of the *penitence* of the persons who offered them, provided they were sincere in what they did.

§ 5. The *Israelites* were often admonished by the prophets, who were sent to them, that their piacular oblations would only avail them, if they were penitent and virtuous; and that the most expensive sacrifices would not procure the remission, nor avert the punishment, of their sins, if they were wicked and impenitent; but, instead of being acceptable, would be an abomination, to the Deity, 1 *Sam.* xv. 22. *Psal.* iv. 5.---1. 7---22. *Isai.* i. 10---20.---lxvi. 2---4. *Prov.* xv. 8. *Amos* iv. 1---6.---v. 12---24, &c. These passages contain plain and express declarations, that no persons, who were not penitent for their sins, could have any benefit from any sort of piacular oblations. And these declarations are perfectly conformable to what the *Israelites* were taught in the *law of Moses*. For,

§ 6. 1st. When God was about to enter into covenant with the *Hebrew* nation, at *Horeb*; he caused the condition of that covenant to be proposed to them; which was, obedience to his voice, and to the commands contained in the covenant; which condition they declared their acceptance of, and their readiness to perform, *Exod.* xix. 3---8. And agreeably to this solemn declaration, when the covenant between God and them came to be made and ratified, they gave their solemn, explicit promise to God, that they would *do all the words which he had said, and be obedient*, *Exod.* xxiv. 3.---Now this covenant between God and the *Israelites*, was made and ratified by the oblation of *burnt-offerings*, which were a species of piacular sacrifices, *Exod.* xxiv. 5---8.---From all this, therefore, it appears, that the *Israelites* were required to be of a penitent and obedient temper of mind, when they offered these sacrifices; and that both the efficacy of these expiations, and the conveyance and enjoyment of the privileges and blessings, intailed by the covenant that was made and ratified by them, did depend on their being of this good and virtuous disposition of mind.

§ 7. 2^{dly}.

§ 7. 2dly. After this covenant, between God and the Israelites, was made, the persons who occasionally offered *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings*, as trespass-offerings, for those sins which they did commit, were, each of them, required, to lay his hands on the head of his *victim*, and to make an explicit confession of the sin for which he offered it; and, moreover, if any injury was done to the property of other persons by the sin so confessed, the offerer was ordered to make restitution of the *principal*, with the addition of a fifth part more for damages: (d) *that is*, the offerers of these piacular oblations were peremptorily required, to do every thing which it became offenders, who were sincerely penitent, to do. Or, in other words, *penitence* was the condition, upon which their oblations were acceptable to the Deity, and could procure to themselves that ease and relief, of which they were instituted to be the means of conveyance.

§ 8. 3dly. On the day of *expiation*, when *atonement* was made, by the prescribed piacular oblations, for all the sins of the collective body of the nation; the Israelites were required, under a most severe penalty, to *afflict their souls*, Lev. xxiii. 27—30. And the high-priest was ordered to confess, over the *scape-goat*, *all their iniquities*,

(d) For the proof of these *facts*, see the foregoing Chapter, § 23. and Dr. Whitby on Heb. ix. 19.

“Deinde et hoc addendum est, illos ipsos doctores (scil. Judaicos) statuere, precandi
“imprecandive signum extitisse istam imponendarum manuum consuetudinem. Neque
“enim verisimile est, homines magis mutos fuisse quam bruta, cum ea coram Deo sis-
“terent. Itaque et confitebantur peccata, et poenas deprecabantur, hac concepta, ut
“Hebræi volunt, formula: * Obsecro, domine, peccavi, perverse egi, rebellavi, hoc et

* Maim in “illud commisi; sed poenitentia ductus redeo ad te. Sit igitur hæc
Maase corban. “(hostia) expiatio mea.” Joan. Hen. Maj. Hist. Brev. Animal. in sacr.
c. 3. v. loc. memorator. (edit. Francofurt. et Spira, Ann. 1685) p. 260.


Outram. p. 159.

“Quia enim dies expiationum est dies remissionis et expiationis peccatorum, ideo aiunt
(scil. Judæi) necesse esse, ut eo quisque peccatorum suorum confessionem edat, sicut in
Vet. Test. de omnibus oblationibus, quæ pro peccatorum expiatione fiebant, legitur,—
Et confitebantur peccata sua quæ fecerunt, &c.” Johan. Buxtorf, Nepot. Synagoga Judaica,
(Edit. 3tia Basilea, Ann. 1680) p. 519.

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iniquities, and all their transgressions in all their sins, Lev. xvi. 21.— By these injunctions God gave the *Israelites* to understand, that they had no ground to hope for any benefit from those piacular oblations, which they then offered, unless they were sincere penitents.

§ 9. *Lastly, The law of Moses* gave the impenitent no ground to hope for any favour, or for the least abatement of those punishments which were denounced against their sins.—In the case of *private vices*, offenders, who did not confess their sins, and repent of them, and make the appointed restitution and compensation to those whom they had injured, were without remedy, condemned to suffer the grievous *primary penalties*, which were awarded in the law against their respective offences.—And, in the case of a *general corruption of manners*, the whole nation is threatened with a series of the most grievous evils, increased in weight and number in proportion to the duration and degrees of their impenitency and obstinacy, *Lev. xxvi. 14—39. Deut. xxviii. 15—68.* From which evils they had no way left to redeem themselves, but by an unfeigned national repentance and reformation, *Lev. xxvi. 40—45. Deut. xxx. 1—5, &c.*—This hopeless state, in which impenitent sinners were left by the *law of Moses*, sheweth, that piacular oblations could avail nothing in their case; consequently, that these oblations were neither instituted nor intended for their ease and relief. I pass on to,



C H A P. III.

Concerning the effects which are ascribed to piacular oblations in the Law of Moses.

§ 1. **H**AVING already seen who the persons were for whose ease and relief piacular oblations were instituted under the *Law of Moses*, I now proceed to consider the *effects* which were produced by those oblations, or the blessings which were obtained by them.

§ 2. The

§ 2. The effect which, in the writings of *Moses*, is most frequently ascribed to piacular oblations, is that of *making atonement*. This effect is universally attributed to all piacular oblations, and in such a manner, as gives ground to think, that it was a general one, which comprehended under it all the particular effects which are, any where, ascribed to oblations of this kind. It is often mentioned when no other effect is taken notice of. And when other effects are named, it scarce ever fails of being mentioned with them; and that, in such a manner, as shews it to be of the same signification and import.—The piacular oblations, by which persons and things were *sanctified*, *the unclean purified*, and *the remission of sin procured*, are all said to *make atonement*, or are exhibited as the means by which *atonement* was made in all those different cases: From which it is natural to conclude, that *making atonement* is a phrase of the same import with the other effects mentioned, or a general term by which they are all signified and expressed. For this reason, it will be of great use, in the present inquiry, to have a clear and determinate idea of what is signified, in the writings of *Moses*, by the word *atonement*, and the phrase, *making atonement*.

§ 3. The right reverend and learned Dr. Butler, late Bishop of *Durham*, observes, that *we seem to be much in the dark concerning the manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be made by sacrifice.* (e) If, by the *ancients*, that worthy prelate means the pen-men of the *holy scriptures*, his observation is just.---But then, as the sense of the ancients may, in this case, be found out by a critical examination of the ideas which they make the word, *atonement*, and the phrase, *making atonement*, to stand for, in the many passages where they occur in their writings; the ignorance which men are in about the way and manner in which they understood *atonement to be made* by sacrifice, ought not to be any discouragement to further inquiry; but rather an incitement to seek new light in that way in which there is reasonable ground to hope for it.---The following observations may, I hope, be of use to give light into this dark affair.

D d.

§ 4. The

(e) See his *Analogy* (Edit. London, 1736) p. 208.

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§ 4. The *Hebrew* word, which is commonly used, to denote the effect produced by piacular oblations, is כפר *copher*; and wherever it is used for that purpose, our *translators* render it by the word, ATONEMENT. (f)

§ 5. The first place where this *Hebrew* word occurs in the Bible, is, *Gen.* vi. 14. And there our *translators* render it by the word, *pitch*; but the LXX by a word which signifies *bitumen*. (g) This last was a tough, adhesive substance, and very hard when it was dried; and, consequently, fit to be used as a *cement*.---With this *Noah* daubed the Ark within and without, whereby all the seams, fissures, chinks, and pores of the wood, were filled up; and all the parts of the fabrick brought into close contact with each other, and firmly cemented together; so that the ark became impenetrable by the waters of the deluge, and a proper and safe vehicle for *Noah*, and his family, and the animals that were shut up in it with him. And this pitchy or bituminous substance, with which *Noah* thus pointed the ark, I take to be the thing which the *Hebrew* word, *copher*, originally, and, at first, signified.

§ 6. From the qualities and use, aforesaid, of this pitchy or bituminous substance, as a *cement*, the *Hebrew* word, which was its name, came, afterwards, to be used in a figurative sense, to denote any medium, or mean, whereby some union, or relation, was made, restored, or preserved and supported.---In all the places of scripture where

(f) [כפר *copher*] That this *Hebrew* word denotes the effect of piacular oblations, is manifest; for the *sin-offering*, by which *atonement* was made, is called, חטאת הכפרים *chattaath hachippurim*, the *sin-offering of atonements*, *Numb.* xxix. 11. And the *ram*, which was offered to make *atonement*, is called, איל הכפרים *el hachippurim*, the *ram of atonements*, *Numb.* v. 8. And the great day of *expiation*, on which *atonement* was made for the whole nation, by the oblation of piacular sacrifices, is called, יום הכפרים *jom hachippurim*, the *day of atonements*. And which is still more, the priests are said, by all sorts of piacular oblations, לכפר *lecapper*, to make *atonement*. For the two last mentioned, see *Levit.* i. 4.—iv. 20, 26, 31, 35.—v. 6. 10, 13, 16, 18.—vi. 7.—xxiii. 27, 28.—xxv. 9.

(g) *Gen.* vi. 14. Ποιησον αυ—Κεωλον,—Και ασφαλωσεις αυτον—ασφαλω.

where *copher* occurs, and doth not denote the effect of any piacular oblation, it seems to bear the signification, just now mentioned, and to denote the *medium* by which some union or relation was either made, restored, or supported. (h) See the marginal note below.

D d 2 § 7. 'Tis

(h) The person, whose ox had, thro' the owner's culpable negligence, killed a man or a woman, was permitted, by the *Law of Moses*, to redeem his life with a sum of money. And because that the sum of money made up the breach between him and the persons by whom his life was in danger, that money is called כפר *copher*, a *satisfaction*, or the *union-money*, *Exod. xxi. 30.*—And because murder made a breach between the murderer and the civil society, and subjected him to capital punishment; and the legislator did not permit the judges, in whose hands the execution of the law was lodged to remit that punishment, or to be reconciled and reunited in friendship with the murderer, therefore it is said, ye shall take no כפר *copher*, satisfaction for the life of a murderer, *Numb. xxxv. 31.* And, v. 32. Ye shall take no כפר *copher*, satisfaction for him that is fled to the City of his refuge.—The half shekel, likewise, which every Israelite gave towards the service of the tabernacle, because of its subserviency to support and preserve a moral union or relation between God and them, is called, כפר *copher*, a *ransom*, or *moral cement*, *Exod. xxx. 12.* And the whole money, collected for that purpose, is called, כסף הכפרים *kesebh hachipurim*, the money of atonements, or the union-money, v. 16.—Riches also are said, *Prov. xlii. 8.* to be כפר *copher*, the ransom of a man's life, that is, the mean whereby dangerous differences or enmities are removed, and friendship restored between a man and his enemies.—And because the execution of justice on wicked men for their crimes, is a proper mean to avert the displeasure of the Deity from the civil society of which they are members, and to secure to that society the continuance of the divine favour and protection, therefore are the wicked said, *Prov. xxi. 18.* to be כפר *copher*, a ransom for the righteous; or a figurative cement by which their union and friendship with the Deity is preserved and supported.—Thus, likewise, those nations, made a descent upon the dominions of those princes who had invaded Judea, because they made those princes recall their armies from Judea, and thereby restored to the Jews all the effects of peace and friendship with them, therefore they are said to be כפר *copher*, a ransom for the Jews, that is, the means of putting them into the condition just now mentioned, *Isai. xlii. 3.* I gave Egypt (כפרה *cophrecha*) thy ransom, Ethiopia and sebah for thee.—In like manner, those means, by which friendship, or an union of affection, is produced between persons who are at variance with one another, or who act as if they were at variance, are called *copher*, or a figurative cement. Thus because a bribe often serves to corrupt a judge, and to make him favour those whom he ought to punish, or acts like a cement in uniting him in friendship with those who deserve punishment, it is called, כפר *copher*. See 1. Sam. xii. 3. Amos v. 12.—Again, concerning a man, who is outrageously angry against him who hath defiled his bed, it is said, *Prov. vi. 35.* He will not regard any כפר *copher*, ransom; that is, it will be in vain to propose any means of reconciliation to him.—Thus, also, the means,

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§ 7. 'Tis observable, likewise, that the several *Greek* words, by which the *LXX* translate the *Hebrew* word, *copher*, in those passages of scripture, either denote the means by which a figurative union is either made, restored, or preserved; or are determined to bear this sense, by the nature and circumstances of the case, or subject. (i)

§ 8. Again, as the *Hebrew* noun, *copher*, primarily signified *pitch*, or *bitumen*; so its root, כפר *capbar*, primarily signified the action of *pointing*, *cementing*, or *uniting* things with *pitch*, or *bitumen*. (k) And this *Hebrew* root, in the conjugation, commonly called *pihel*, has a large figurative signification, correspondent to that in which we have seen the noun *copher* to be used; and denotes, the making, restoring, or preserving any sort of union or relation between persons and persons, or between persons and things. In this sense we find it used in all those passages of scripture where it occurs, and in which it hath no relation to piacular oblations. (l) See the note below for the proof of this.

§ 9. And

means, by which an union of friendship, between God and his offending creatures, is made, are called *copher*, or a figurative cement. Of the impenitent sinner it is said, Job xxxvi. 18. A great כפר *copher*, ransom cannot redeem him; that is, no means of reconciliation can avail any thing in his case. And, to shew the wealthy sinner the vanity of his riches, it is said, Psal. xlix. 7. He cannot give to God כפר *copher*, a ransom for his brother. On the other hand, the means, by which a penitent sinner recovers union and peace with God, are called *copher*, or a figurative cement, Job xxxiii. 24. Deliver him from going down to the pit; I have found out כפר *copher*, a ransom, that is, the means of reconciliation.—From the sense in which the *Hebrew* word כפר is used in the several passages, which I have here quoted, 'tis manifest, that it denotes a figurative cement, or the means by which any figurative union, or relation, is made, restored, or preserved.

(i) The *LXX* render the *Hebrew* word כפר *copher* by λύπον, *Exod.* xxi. 30.—xxx. 12. *Numb.* xxxv. 31, 32. *Prov.* vi. 35.—xiii. 8.—By ἀλλάγμα, *Isai.* xliii. 3. *Amos* v. 12.—By ἐξισμα, *Psal.* xlix. 7.—By περιπαλασμα, *Prov.* xxi. 18. The first three in the cases in which they are used, are words proper enough to denote the mean whereby a moral union or relation was either constituted, restored, or preserved; And the last is determined to bear the last of these senses, by the nature of the case in which it is used.

(k) *Gen.* vi. 14.—Rooms shalt thou make in the Ark, וכפרת vecapharta and thou shalt pitch it (i. e. point, calk, cement, or unite it) within and without.

(l) [כפר in *pihel* כפר] This latter conjugation has the figurative signification above mentioned in all those places of scripture in which it has no relation to piacular oblations,

as

§ 9. And though the LXX in rendering the several *tenses* of this conjugation of the root כפר *capbar*, commonly, and almost always, make use of a Greek verb which signifies to *appease*, *reconcile*, or *make an offended person propitious to the offender*: (m) Yet it is mani-

fest, as appears from the following instances, viz. *prayer*, because it is a mean of restoring that union or friendship between the Deity and offenders which has been dissolved by the practice of sin, is said to *make atonement*, Exod. xxxii. 30. *peradventure* [אכפרה *acapperah*] I shall make atonement (viz. by *prayer*, v. 31. 32.) for your sins.—The execution of justice upon offenders because it makes up the breach which is made by their crimes between the Deity and the society of which they are members, is, in like manner, said to *make atonement*; thus of Phineas, who averted the wrath of God from the Israelites by putting Zimri and Cosbi to death, it is said, *He was zealous for his God*, [ויכפר *vajecapper*] and made atonement for the Children of Israel, Numb. 25. 13.—For the same reason, David, when he wanted to make up the breach which King Saul's breach of faith had made both between God and the Israelites, and between the Israelites and the Gibeonites, he saith to the latter, *Wherewith* [אכפר *acapper*] shall I make the atonement, *that ye may bless the inheritance of the Lord?* 2 Sam. xxxi. 3. This atonement, or union in friendship, as we see, was made by putting to death seven of the sons of king Saul, who had been concerned with their father in contriving and attempting the destruction of the Gibeonites, v. 4—9.—In like manner, gifts or presents, given with a design to remove differences between persons who are at variance with one another, are said to *appease*, or *make atonement*, Gen. xxxii. 20. *For he said*, [אכפרה *acappera*] I will appease him with the present that goeth before me.—The oil also, that was poured upon the head of the leper, because it was a mean of restoring an union between him and the congregation, from which he had been separated by his uncleanness, is said [לכפר *lecapper*] to make atonement for him, Levit. xiv. 18, 29.—Again, the half shekel, which every Israelite gave towards the service of the tabernacle, because it was a mean whereby a relation and union in friendship was preserved between God and that people, is called, an offering unto the Lord, [לכפר *lecapper*] to make atonement for their souls: and the money, collected for that end, is called [כסף הכפרים *cheshph hachippurim*] the atonement or union-money, Exod. xxx. 15, 16. In the same sense, the jewels, found among the spoils of the enemy, and which the officers of the Hebrew army dedicated to the same use, are said, [לכפר *lecapper*] to make atonement for their souls before the Lord, Numb. xxxi. 50.—Finally, when God is pleased to be merciful to, or united in friendship with, a sinful people, who have given him reason to be displeased with them, this is expressed by the same verb; Deut. xxi. 8. O Lord [כפר *capper*] be merciful to thy people Israel, and lay not innocent blood to their charge. Deut. xxxii. 43. He will render vengeance to his adversaries, [ויכפר *vajecapper*] and will be merciful.—to his people.

(m) In all the texts quoted in the last marginal note, except the two last of them, the LXX render the several *tenses* of the conjugation *piel* of the root כפר *capbar* by the Greek verb

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fest, that they use that *verb* in the same latitude of signification in which the conjugation *pibel* of the root כפר *capbar* is used, For they use it not only in cases where an union in friendship, between persons who had been at variance with one another, is spoken of; but in cases where it expresses an union made between certain persons and certain things or offices. For which see *Numb. viii. 12. Lev. xiv. 53.---xvi. 16---18; 33. &c.*

§ 10. Now, since the *Hebrew noun copher*, in all the places where it occurs in a *secondary* and *figurative* sense, and doth not denote the *effect* of a piacular oblation, signifies the *medium*, or mean, by which an union, of some sort or other, either between persons and persons, or between persons and things, was made, or restored, or preserved and supported; and since its root *capbar*, in the conjugation *pibel*, denotes, in like manner, in all places where it has no reference to piacular oblations, the action of constituting, or restoring, or preserving, such sorts of union as these now mentioned; And since the *Greek words* into which the *LXX* translate the *Hebrew noun* and *verb*, aforesaid, either bear the same sense which they do; or are determined, by the nature and circumstances of the *subject*, treated of in those places, to bear it; it is very natural to conceive, that the said *Hebrew noun* and *verb* may have the very same signification, and stand for the same ideas, in all those passages of scripture, where they denote the effect, or any action relating to the effect, of piacular oblations. For, if, in those passages, last mentioned, they be supposed to stand for the same ideas as in other places, they will have one uniform sense in all the places where they occur; and there will be no occasion, or necessity, for affixing unrelated and widely different significations to the same word.— And that the *Hebrew noun* and *verb*, mentioned, may, and must, have the same sense and signification in those places where they denote the effect of piacular oblations, or actions relating to that effect, which they have in other passages, is very manifest from the two following considerations.

1st. In

verb ἐξιδαναι or ἐξιδασκοναι. And, in the two excepted places, they render this *Hebrew verb* by ἰδως γενε, and ἐκκαθαριει, which either signify the same thing as that *Greek verb*, or are determined to bear the same sense by the nature of the subject treated of.

1st. In all writings, words ought always to be understood according to their common and vulgar signification, unless there be evident and good reasons for departing from it. But in the case before us, there is no evident and good reason for departing from the common acceptance or signification of the Hebrew *noun* and *verb*, aforesaid, in those places where they denote the effect, or actions relating to the effect, of piacular oblations: but there are good reasons for our adhering to it. For (1) The common sense and signification of words is the most natural and obvious one, and, therefore, ought to be preferred to any other, in all cases, where there is nothing to forbid it. (2) The Hebrew *noun* and *verb*, under consideration, may be understood, as bearing their common and ordinary signification in all those passages in which they denote the effect, or actions relating to the effect, of piacular oblations, without obscuring or hurting the sense of them; yea, thus understood, they give a rational and good sense to all these passages: For there is no piacular oblation, mentioned in the *law of Moses*, but what was a *medium*, or mean, either in making, or restoring, or preserving, some union and relation or other, either between persons and persons, or between persons and things; as will appear, when we shall have considered the particular effects of piacular oblations.

2^{dly}. If any other signification, but the common and vulgar one, be given to the Hebrew words, aforesaid, in those passages of scripture where they denote the effect, or actions about the effect, of piacular oblations, that signification will render the sense absurd in many of those passages. The modern idea, affixed to the phrase, *making atonement* (when that is affirmed of piacular oblations) is that of *rendering God propitious to the offender*. But there is nothing more evident, than that this notion of *making atonement* must be very absurd in all cases where no sin was committed to give offence, and where nothing further was intended by *making atonement*, but the making, or restoring, or preserving, an union or connection between certain persons and certain offices or things: And yet, in many such cases as these, piacular oblations were offered, by which *atonement*

is said to be made. See *Exod.* xxix. 33. *Lev.* xii. 7, 8.—xiv. 19, —xv. 15, 30. *Numb.* viii. 12. &c. To which add all the daily, weekly, monthly, and annual piacular oblations.—Another notion of *atonement*, which has been adopted by some, is that of *covering* or *hiding sin*. But it is self-evident, that *atonement*, in this sense, could not have been the effect of those piacular sacrifices which were not offered to procure *the remission of sin*, but for other purposes; which sacrifices, nevertheless, are said to *make atonement*; as is evident from the passages of scripture last quoted. Nor can this notion of *atonement* agree even to those sacrifices by which the *remission of sin* was procured: For though, by the *pardon*, which was consequent to *atonement*, sin was *covered* or *hidden*; yet by the *atonement* itself, which was made by confession of sin, prayer for pardon, and the oblation of sacrifice, sin was really *uncovered*, exposed to view, and made public. Nor doth this notion of *atonement* accord with the original and primary signification of the *Hebrew root* כפר *capbar*, which is not to *cover* or *hide*, but, as has been shewn, to *point, calk*, or fill the seams, junctures, fissures, chinks, and pores of wood, with any proper cement, such as *pitch*, or *bitumen*: Nor doth it accord with any secondary or figurative sense, in which this *Hebrew root* is found to be used in any passage of scripture: For it, no where, signifies *to cover* or *hide*. (n)

§ 11. From the whole of what has been said, in this and the preceding *Chapter*, we may venture, I think, to draw the three following *inferences*.

(1) When *atonement* is said to be made by piacular sacrifices and oblations, the meaning is, that those sacrifices and oblations were the means by which some union or relation, either between persons and persons, or between persons and things, was either constituted, or restored, or preserved. For the making *atonement* in this sense, is agreeable to the common and ordinary signification of the word in other

(n) For further satisfaction, I refer the reader to the *Criticisin upon modern Notions of Sacrifice*, Appendix I. where he will find all that has been advanced in support of this notion of *atonement* examined, and the whole affair set in a clear light.

other cases; and it is a sense which the word, without any absurdity, will bear, in all those places where it denotes the effect of piacular oblations. And, which deserves particular notice, if any other sense be affixed to *atonement*, or *making atonement*, in the places mentioned, that sense will be absurd in many of them.

(2.) Penitent sinners being the persons, for whose ease and relief piacular oblations were instituted, the *atonements*, which were made by these oblations, or the several kinds of *union* and *relation* which they produced, or restored, or preserved and supported, must have been such as were beneficial to persons of this moral character, and consistent with the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government.

(3.) Because *making atonement* was the effect of all piacular oblations, under the law of Moses, and that effect consisted either in making, or restoring, or preserving and supporting an union or relation, either between persons and persons, or between persons and things, 'tis manifest, that these piacular oblations may, with regard to their effects, be considered under a three-fold distinction, viz.

First, Such as constituted;
Secondly, Such as restored, and
Thirdly, Such as preserved and supported an union or relation between persons and persons, or between persons and things.

And if, in fact, all these piacular oblations, and all the particular effects, which are ascribed to them, shall be found to be all reducible to these three general heads, which are plainly comprehended under the term, *atonement*; this will shew us the reason why *atonement* is said to be made by all and each of these piacular oblations; and, at the same time, be a further confirmation, that the ideas, which I have annexed to the term *atonement*, are those which it stands for in Holy Scripture.

I shall, therefore, now proceed to consider the *Mosaic* piacular sacrifices and oblations, and all the particular effects which are ascribed to them, as being actually reducible, or rather, as being, in fact, in scripture, reduced to these three general heads.

E. e.

SECT.

~~CHAPTER IV. OF THE EFFECT OF PIACULAR OBLATIONS, IN MAKING AN UNION OR RELATION BETWEEN PERSONS AND THINGS, OR BETWEEN PERSONS AND PERSONS.~~

SECTION I.

Concerning the effect of piacular oblations under the law of Moses, considered as being the media, or means, by which an union or relation, of some kind or other, was made and constituted.

§ 1. **T**HE term ATONEMENT, as we have seen already, signifies a *medium*, mean, or figurative cement, by which an union or relation is made and constituted, either between persons and persons, or persons and things. This is one of the ideas which are, in scripture, denoted by that complex term. And as *atonement* is mentioned in the *Levitical Law*, as an effect of the oblation of all piacular sacrifices, I am now to consider and point out the various cases, in which those piacular oblations *made atonement*, in the sense of making and constituting an *union* or *relation* between persons and persons, or between persons and things. In order to this,

§ 2. I observe, that, under the *law of Moses*, piacular oblations are said to *hallow* or *sanctify* persons and things, or to *make them holy*. Now when they are said to do this, the meaning is, that they were the means by which persons and things were brought into an union with, or a relation to God. The truth of this is manifest from the ideas which we find annexed, in scripture, to the words *sanctify*, *hallow*, and *holy*, which I shall here exhibit.

§ 3. God is said to be *holy*; and, sometimes, he is stiled *the holy*, or *the holy one*, by way of eminence, *Lev. xi. 44, 45.--xix. 2--xx.*

26.--xxi. 8. Job vi. 10. *Isai.* vi. 3. (o) Holiness, when thus attributed to the Deity, denotes that transcendent excellence of nature and character, and that supreme power and dominion over the whole, and every part of the universe, by which he is separated and distinguished from, and exalted above, all other beings.—Agreeably to this idea of holiness, God, when he displays the transcendent excellence of his nature and character, and his supreme power and dominion over all, either in the signal deliverance of an oppressed, or in the signal punishment of a sinful nation, is said, to *sanctify his great name*, and to *magnify and sanctify himself*, *Exod.* xxvi. 23.---xxxviii. 23. And to *be sanctified*, and to *sanctify his great name*, in those who obtain such deliverances, or have such punishments inflicted on them, and that *before*, and *in the sight of* the spectators of them, *Lev.* x. 3. *Numb.* xx. 13. *Ezek.* xx. 41.---xxviii. 22, 25.---xxxvi. 23.---xxxix. 27. And, on account of these illustrious manifestations of the distinguished excellence of his nature and character, and of his supreme dominion over all, it is said, *The Lord of hosts is exalted in judgment; and God that is holy, is sanctified in righteousness*, *Isai.* v. 16. And, finally, men are said, in the same sense, to sanctify God, when their behaviour is such as has a tendency to illustrate and magnify the supereminent excellence of his nature and character, and his supreme dominion over all; as it doth when they believe in him, acknowledge and worship him as the only true God, behave towards him with great reverence, make him the object of their fear and dread, and carefully obey his commandments. See *Numb.* xx. 12.---xxvii. 14. *Isai.* viii. 13, &c.

§ 4. Holiness is, likewise, ascribed to men, but in a sense different from that in which it is attributed to the Deity. When it is ascribed to men, it has a double sense.

E. e. 2.

1st. It

(o) קדוש, or קדוש, *kodesch*, *kadosch*, or *kadusch*, are the Hebrew words which signify holy. And one or other of them is used in all the passages of scripture which are referred to in this section. The first is often used as an abstract noun, to denote holiness; but in the passages mentioned, it is used in an adjective sense, and denotes the qualities and relations of persons and things.

1st. It denotes a moral rectitude of temper and behaviour, resembling that of the divine mind and actions. But concerning holiness, in this sense, I have no occasion to say any thing in this place.

2^{dly}. Holiness very often denotes an external union with, or relation to the Deity. And, in this sense, it is attributed to *men, places, times, and things*.

(1) To *Men*: Thus the *Israelites*, because they were united with, and related to God, as his chosen and peculiar people; and the *first-born*, because they were separated from the other *Israelites* to be the Lord's, and, of course, the *Levites*, who were accepted in their stead; and *Aaron* and his *sons*; and the persons who were *prophets*, because they were separated from all others, and united with, and related to God, as his *priests* and *prophets*; and the *Nazarites*, because they voluntarily separated themselves from other men to be joined to the Lord, and employed in his service; are all said, in scripture, to be HOLY, *Exod.* xix. 6. *Levit.* xxi. 6, 7, 8. *Numb.* vi. 5, 8.—viii. 17, 18. *Deut.* vii. 6.—xiv. 2.—xxvi. 18, 19. 2 *Kings* iv. 9. *Acts* iii. 21. Not only so, but the idolatrous *Medes* also, because they were chosen by God to be the executioners of his vengeance on *Babylon*, and, on that account, stood in the relation of *servants* to him, are called his *sanctified* (or holy) *ones*, *Isai.* xiii. 3.

(2) To *places*; such as the Deity had brought into a special relation to himself, by manifesting his presence in a solemn manner in them, or residing in them in the visible symbol of his presence, or ordering his worship to be performed in them; such as, the *place* where he first appeared to *Moses*, mount *Sinai*, *Jerusalem*, the *Tabernacle*, and the *Temple*, *Exod.* iii. 5.—xxvi. 33, 34. *Levit.* xvi. 2. *Nehem.* xi. 18. *Psal.* v. 4.—xi. 4.—lxviii. 17, &c.

(3) To *times*; viz. Those which had a relation to God, and were, as it were, connected with him, as being set apart for his public worship, such as those in which the *Jewish sabbaths* and *festivals* were celebrated, *Exod.* xxxi. 14, 15. *Ezra* iii. 5. See the *original* in this last place, where what is rendered in our translation,

lation, *all the set feasts of the Lord, that were consecrated*, runs thus *all the set feasts of the Lord* [המקודשים hammekuddaschim] that were sanctified, hallowed, or made holy.

(4) To *things*: particularly, 1st. Those things which were set apart and consecrated to God, and were used as utensils, or any other way, in the tabernacle or temple-service, such as the *anointing oil*, the *priests vestments*, the *ark*, the *golden table*, the *shew-bread*; the *candlestick*, *altars*, *laver*; the *aromatic perfume* before the ark, the *trumpets* dedicated to the temple and tabernacle-service, and all the *ministring vessels*, *Exod.* xxix. 37.—xxx. 10, 25, 29, 31, 35, 36.—xxxv. 21.—xxxvii. 29.—xl. 9.—11, 13. *Levit.* viii. 9.—xvi. 4.—xxiv. 9. 2^{dly}. To all the *things*, likewise, which were offered in sacrifice, and were dedicated and voluntarily devoted to God; *Exod.* xxviii. 38.—xxix. 33. *Levit.* ii. 3, 10.—vi. 25, 29.—vii. 1, 6.—xix. 24.—xxii. 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 14, 16.—xxiii. 20.—xxvii. 1.—33, 28. *Numb.* xviii. 32. *Josh.* vi. 19. 2 *Chron.* xxix. 33.

§ 5. Agreeably to the last mentioned idea of holiness, the Hebrew *root*, which signifies to *sanctify*, or *make holy*, denotes the action of making an external union, or relation, between God and men, places and times. (p) This will appear from the following instances.

God

(p) קדש *kadasch* is the Hebrew *root* that signifies to *sanctify*. And, in all places, where it doth not denote any action relative to *holiness* in the Deity, or to moral dispositions in men, it has, I think, the signification above-mentioned.

There are, indeed, several passages of scripture, in which this Hebrew *root* may, perhaps, be thought to have a different signification; which, therefore, I shall here mention, and shew that it has the very same signification in them, which it has in other places.

The *Israelites* are required, *Levit.* xxi. 8. to *sanctify the high-priest*; q. d. that as God had separated him, and brought him into an union with, and peculiar relation to himself, they were to behave towards him, with all due respect, as a person thus *sanctified*, or separated from other men, and united to God; and hereby imitate the example which God had set them.

Again, In some places of scripture, where God declares his intention to punish a sinful nation, it is said, *He will prepare against it* (in the original, *He will sanctify*) the people,

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God is said to sanctify the *Israelites*, the *first-born*, *Aaron* and his *sons*, and *Jeremiah*; viz. by taking them into an union with, and a special relation to himself; the first, as his *peculiar people*, the second as his *property*; the third, as his *priests*; and the last, as his *prophet*. See *Exod.* xxix. 44. *Levit.* xx. 8—21. 8, 15.—xxii. 9, 16. *Numb.* viii. 17. *Jer.* i. 5. *Ezek.* xx. 12. And, in the very same sense, he is said to sanctify *things* and *times*, as the *tabernacle*, the *altar*, and the *Jewish-sabbaths*, *Exod.* xx. 11. xxix. 43, 44. *Levit.* xxi. 23.

In the same sense, men are said to sanctify,

(1) *Themselves*; when they qualify themselves to act and behave as persons who stand in the relation of servants and worshippers to God, either by forsaking idolatry and vice, or by keeping themselves free from such defilements as rendered them unfit for his worship, or by purifying themselves from those ceremonial pollutions which did disqualify them for the tabernacle-service. *Exod.* xix. 22. *Levit.* xi. 44,---xx. 7. *Numb.* xi. 18. *Josh.* iii. 5. *I Sam.*

ple, or *nation*, by which he was to punish it. The meaning is, that he would set apart that people or nation, and join them to himself, for the important work of being the executioners of his vengeance. *Jerem.* xxii. 7.—li. 28.

The prophet *Jeremiah*, likewise, prays, *Jerem.* xii. 3. That God would *prepare* (in the Hebrew, *sanctify*) *the wicked for the day of slaughter*. i. e. set them apart for the day of slaughter, or provide the means for connecting their persons and their punishment with one another.—In like manner, the people, destined by God to destroy wicked nations, are some times desired to *prepare* (in the Hebrew, *to sanctify*) *the war*; that is, to make an union or relation between it and God, by consecrating it to him, as an instrument of the just and righteous vengeance which he was to execute upon those wicked nations. *Jer.* vi. 4. *Joel* iii. 9.

Lastly. The *false prophets* are said, *Mich.* iii. 5. to *prepare* (in the Hebrew, *to sanctify*) *war against him that putteth not into their mouths*; that is, they set apart the war, which they carried on against him, for God, or to a pious and religious use, pretending, but falsely pretending, that it was sacred to God, as being intended for his service and the interest of religion.

These are the *texts* in which the Hebrew root, *קדש* *kadasch*, seems to have a different signification from that which I have assigned to it. But, we see, when they are duly considered, and compared with their *contexts*, that Hebrew root appears to have the same signification in them which it has in other places.

1 Sam. xvi. 5. 1 Chron. xv. 12, 14. 2 Chron. xxix. 5, 15, 34.---xxx. 3, 15, 17.---xxxv. 6.

(2) *Other persons*; when they bring them into an external union with, or relation to God, by doing those things, or causing them to do him, which are necessary to set them apart, and dedicate them to him. Thus the *Israelites* sanctified the *first-born* by giving or dedicating them to God, *Exod.* xiii. 2. *Deut.* xv. 19, 20. And thus *Moses* sanctified the *Congregation*, by causing them to do those things which were necessary to qualify them for meeting with God, and entering into covenant with him, *Exod.* xix. 10, 14. As he did also *Aaron* and his *sons*, by performing those rites by which they were set apart, and consecrated to God, *Exod.* xxviii. 41. *Levit.* viii. 12, 30. And thus also the men of *Kirjath-jearim* sanctified *Eleazer*, by causing him to be set apart to the sacred office of keeping, and attending on, the Ark of God, 1 Sam. vii. 1.

(3) *Times, places, and things*; when they devote them to God, or set them apart for his service, or perform the rites which are requisite to consecrate them to pious uses, or do what is necessary to prepare and fit them for such uses; *that is*, when, in any way, they constitute an union or relation between God and *times, places, or things*. See *Exod.* xix. 12, 23.---xxix. 27, 28, 36. *Levit.* viii. 10, 11, 15.---xxvii. 14.---19; 22, 26. *Numb.* vii. 1. *Deut.* v. 12. 2 Chron. xxix. 16, 17. *Neb.* iii. 1.---xii. 47.---xiii. 22.

§ 6. Upon the whole, it appears, that the Hebrew *root*, which signifies *to sanctify* or *hallow*, denotes the action of setting something or other apart for God, or, in other words, the making or constituting an union or relation between him and it.--Wherefore, when the performance of any external rite is said to *sanctify* persons or things, the meaning is, that that rite is the *medium* or mean, by which an union or relation is made or constituted between God and those persons or things.--Hence we are supplied with a clear and determinate idea of the real effect which was produced by those peculiar sacrifices which are said to *sanctify* or *hallow* persons and things, *viz.* They were the *media* or means by which those persons and

and things were separated from other persons and things, and set apart for God; or, in other words, the means by which an union or relation between God and them was made or constituted; which effect being coincident with one part of the complex idea of *making atonement*, those piacular sacrifices, by which persons and things were *sanctified*, are, with the strictest propriety, said to *make atonement*.

§ 7. Having now found out the *effect* which was produced by those piacular oblations which are said to *sanctify* or *hallow* persons and things; I shall next point out the various cases in which piacular sacrifices produced this *effect*.

§ 8. In order to this, I premise, that, in all cases, where persons or things appear to have been set apart for God, or, are said to be separated to him, or to be made *holy*, by the oblation of piacular sacrifices, these sacrifices must have *sanctified*, tho' this effect be not expressly mentioned; The reason is plain, *viz.* because to be *sanctified*, and to be separated or set apart to God, or, to be *holy*, or, made *holy*, are all equipollent terms.--This being premised, the following appear to me to have been the cases in which piacular sacrifices are either said, or may be supposed, to *sanctify* persons and things.

I. When the *Israelites* entered into covenant with God at mount *Sinai*, burnt-offerings were offered, with part of the blood of which *Moses* sprinkled the people, saying, *This is the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you, &c. Exod. xxiv. 5, 8.* And tho' the effect of these burnt-offerings is not there mentioned: yet as they were a *medium*, or mean, by which the *Hebrew* nation was joined in covenant with God, or brought into an external union with, or relation to him, it is manifest, that this people was *sanctified*, *hallowed*, or made *holy*, by the oblation of these sacrifices. To strengthen this, it may be observed, that the *Hebrew* nation, after the making of this covenant with God by sacrifice, is frequently stiled *an holy people*, and *an holy nation*; but is no where so stiled before it was made. (q)

II. A (q) Before the *Israelites* did enter into this covenant, the language of God to them runs thus, *Ye shall be unto me an holy nation, or people, Exod. xix. 6.—xxii. 31.* But after they had made this covenant, his language changes, and runs thus, *Thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God, Deut. vii. 6.—xiv. 2, 21, &c.*

II. A burnt-offering and a sin-offering were sacrificed when *Aaron* and his *sons* were consecrated to the priesthood; which piacular oblations are expressly said to *sanctify* or *hallow* them, *Exod.* xxix. 1. compared with *v.* 10.--18. Which they did no other way than as being the *means* by which they were brought into an external union or relation to God, as his priests.

III. By those piacular sacrifices, by which *Aaron* and his *sons* were consecrated to the priesthood, the *altar* is said to be *purified*, *cleansed*, and *sanctified*; that is, those sacrifices were the means whereby an external union or relation between God and the altar was constituted. See *Exod.* xxix. 36, 37. *Lev.* viii. 15.

IV. When the *Levites* were consecrated to the service of the tabernacle, a burnt-offering and a sin-offering were offered, by which they must have been sanctified: For God had sanctified the *first-born* to himself; and he took the *Levites* in exchange for the *first-born*; whence it is evident, that he sanctified the *Levites* to himself in place of the *first-born*. Now the *Levites* were sanctified to God by being separated from the Children of *Israel*, and consecrated to God; But it was by the oblation of a burnt-offering and a sin-offering, that the *Levites* were consecrated to God; and, therefore it was by the oblation of these sacrifices, that they were *sanctified*, or brought into an external union with, and relation to God, as ministers in his tabernacle. See *Numb.* viii. 5.--19.

V. A burnt-offering and a sin-offering were offered by those who took the vow of a *Nazar* upon them. Now, because these persons did, by their vow, separate themselves unto the Lord, and are said to be *holy* during the whole time of this separation; 'tis manifest, that the piacular sacrifices, which they offered, did *sanctify* them, in the sense of constituting an external relation or union between God and them. See *Numb.* vi. 2, 5, 6, 8. (r)

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There

(r) Some *Nazarites* were separated unto the Lord for life. Thus was *Samson* a *Nazarene* from the womb; and was called of God to be the guardian and deliverer of his people; in which service he spent his whole life. See *Judg.* xiii. 5, 7.—*Samuel*, in like manner,

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These then are all the cases, in which piacular oblations are either said, or may be rationally supposed, to have *sanctified* persons and things, in the sense of constituting an external union or relation between them and the Deity. I now proceed to,



SECTION II.

Concerning the effect of piacular oblations, under the Law of Moses, considered as being the media, or means, by which an union or relation, of some kind or other, was restored, after it had been interrupted.

§ 1. **I**N the complex idea of *making atonement* (which was the general effect of all piacular oblations) there are three things included; (1) The *making*, (2) The *restoring*, and (3) The *preserving* and *supporting* an union or relation, either between persons and persons, or between persons and things.

§ 2. In the foregoing *section*, I have considered piacular oblations, as having been the means by which an union or relation was constituted between persons and persons, or between persons and things: And shall now consider them as having been the means by which an union or relation between persons and persons, or between persons and things, was restored, after it had been interrupted; and point out the cases in which they were subservient to this purpose.

§ 3. Under

manner, was devoted unto God for a perpetual *Nazarite*, and, as such, was employed in his service all his life long. In his youth, he ministered unto the Lord, under *Eli* the *high-priest*; and, afterwards, he executed the office of an extraordinary *judge* and *prophet*: See 1 *Sam.* Ch. i. And forward to *Chap.* xxv.—From these Instances, I am satisfied, that the *Nazarites*, while under their vow, were *sanctified* unto God, in the sense above expressed.

§ 3. Under the *Law of Moses*, there were two general cases, in which piacular oblations restored an union or relation, after it had been interrupted, viz. (1) In the *purification of the unclean*. (2) In *procuring the remission of sin*.—These two cases will require a distinct and separate consideration: For which reason, I shall divide this *Section* into two parts.



PART I.

Concerning the effect of piacular oblations, under the Law of Moses, considered as the media, or means, by which the unclean were purified.

§ 1. **T**O set this whole affair in a clear point of light, I shall, *First*. Give a brief detail of the several cases, in which piacular oblations were used in the purification of the unclean. (s)

Secondly. Shew that these oblations purified the *unclean*, by restoring an union or relation, which had been interrupted by their uncleanness. And,

Thirdly. Compare the *effect* of those piacular oblations, by which the *unclean* were purified, with the *effect* of those, before-mentioned, by which persons and things were sanctified; and shew wherein they did agree or disagree.

1st. I am to give a brief detail of the cases, in which piacular oblations were appointed to be used in the purification of the unclean.

F f 2

§ 2. Piacular

(s) The Hebrew nouns, which signify an *unclean person*, are טָחור *tachor*, and טָמא *tame*. And the root, which signifies *to cleanse*, is טָהַר *tachar*, and, sometimes, חָטָא *chata* in the conjugation *piel*; And the noun, for the *pollution contracted*, is טִמְאָה *tumea*.—These are the Hebrew words which are used in all the texts which will be quoted in this part of this performance.

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§ 2. Piacular oblations were appointed to be used in the purification of the *unclean*, in the following cases, *viz.*

I. Women, at a certain time after *child-bearing*, were ordered to offer a burnt-offering and a sin-offering, by which they are said to be *cleansed from the issue of their uncleanness*, and to be made clean, Lev. xii. 6—8.

II. On the eight day, likewise, after the ceasing of their *menstrual issues*, they were ordered to offer a burnt-offering and a sin-offering, to make atonement for the issues of their uncleanness, Levit. xv. 29, 30.

III. Men are commanded to offer a burnt-offering and a sin-offering, to make atonement for their issues, Levit. xv. 14, 15.

IV. The *leper* is ordered to offer a burnt-offering, and a trespass-offering for his cleansing, Levit. xiv. 10--31.--Before these sacrifices were offered, the *leper* is mentioned as a person who was to be made clean, v. 11, 14, 17, 18, 19, 25, 28, 29, 31. but after they were offered, he is spoken of as a person who was made clean, v. 20.

V. The *Nazarite*, who happened to be defiled by the dead, was ordered to offer, for his purification; a burnt-offering and a sin-offering, Numb. vi. 9--11.

VI. There is a peculiar kind of *purification*, which seems to belong to this class, and which it will, therefore, be proper to mention in this place; and that is, the *purification* of those who happened to be defiled by the dead, (t) The persons so defiled, were cleansed

(t) The following observations will set this affair in a clear light.

After the *red Heifer* was killed, her blood was sprinkled by the priest, seven times before the tabernacle of the congregation. (Numb. xix. 4) in the same manner as the blood of some sin-offerings was sprinkled seven times before the vail of the sanctuary, Lev. iv. 6, 17. or before the mercy-seat within the vail, Lev. xvi. 14, 15.—Her flesh also, and her skin, dung, &c. were burnt without the camp, as the same parts of some sin-offerings were. Compare Numb. xix. 5, with Lev. iv. 11, 12, 21.—ix. 11.—xvi. 27.

Again, the *red Heifer* is called שרפת החטאת *sherephath hachattath*, the heifer of sin-offering, Numb. xix. 17. in the same manner as the bullock that was offered for a sin-offering is called פר החטאת *par hachattath*, the bullock of sin-offering, Levit. viii. 2, 14. And still to the same purpose, it is said of the water of purification, which was made with the

ed by being sprinkled, on the third and seventh day after the pollution was contracted, with a water of purification, which was made with the ashes of a red heifer, Numb. xix. 2—19. Before the defiled person was thus sprinkled, it is said, *He shall be unclean*, v. 13, 16. But after the sprinkling of the seventh day, and washing his cloths, and bathing his flesh in water, it is said, *He shall be clean at even*, v. 19.

2dly. I am to shew, that those piacular oblations, which were offered by the unclean, did purify, or cleanse them, by restoring an union, or relation, which had been interrupted by their uncleanness.

§ 3. As a proof of this proposition, I shall offer the following facts and observations to the consideration of the candid and ingenious reader.

§ 4. I. They who were clean, had the privilege of living in society with the clean, and of joining in all the rites and acts of the tabernacle and temple-worship.—The clean priests might do all the duties of their function in the tabernacle of the congregation, and eat of the hallowed things, Lev. xxii. 2, 7. Numb. xviii. 11, 13.—And the clean Israelite might eat the flesh of his peace-offerings, Lev. vii. 19. and kill and eat the passover, Numb. ix. 13. and bring his gifts and offerings to the tabernacle and temple, and join in all the rites and acts of public worship, there performed, with the congregation, as will appear by and by.

§ 5. II.

the ashes of this heifer. חַטָּאת *chattath hi*, it is a purification for sin, or a sin-offering; just as the same expression is used concerning sin-offerings, Levit. iv. 21, 24.—v. 12.

To these observations I add, that, in the case of the Nazarite, who was defiled by the dead; a burnt-offering and a sin-offering were ordered to be offered in place of this purification, which was used in all other cases of that nature: From which it is manifest, that this purification with the water which was made with the ashes of the red heifer was of a piacular nature, since it answered the same end, and produced the same effect, which piacular sacrifices did. See Numb vi. 9—11.

But, what puts this affair beyond all doubt, is that which St. Paul affirms, Heb. ix. 13. viz. That the ashes of the red heifer, sprinkled upon the unclean, had the very same effect as the blood of those bulls and goats, which were offered as piacular sacrifices, viz. They both sanctified to the purifying of the flesh.

§ 5. II. The *unclean*, on the contrary, were generally excluded from all society with the *clean*, and, in all cases from the tabernacle and temple, and from joining in any of the rites or acts of public worship which were performed there.—The *unclean* were separated from the *clean*, and remained without the camp, under their uncleanness, *Levit. xiii. 46. Numb. v. 2, 3.* And tho', in some cases, they remained within the camp, because they could not be removed out of it with safety; yet, even here, they were separated from the *clean* for their *infirmity* or *uncleanness*, *Levit. xii. 2, 5.*—The *unclean* might not come near the tabernacle or temple, nor join with the congregation in any rite or act of public worship there performed, *Levit. vii. 20, 21. Numb. ix. 6—13.* yea, if they came to the tabernacle or temple unpurified, they defiled them; and, by that offence, became obnoxious *to die in their transgression*, or *to excision from among their people.* *Levit. vii. 20, 21.—xv. 31. Numb. xix. 13, 20.* Hence it was, that *Jebojadab*, the high-priest, *set porters at the gates of the house of the Lord, that none which was unclean in any thing, should enter in,* *2 Chron. xxiii. 19.* This Law, relating to the *unclean*, was so general, that it extended to persons of all ranks. The *unclean-priest* might not enter into the tabernacle to eat of the *hallowed things*, or to perform the duties of his function, *Levit. vi. 16, 26. and vii. 6.* compared with *Ch. xxii. 2—9. 2 Chron. xxix. 34.—xxx. 3, 15.—xxxv. 6.* And the *unclean Levite* might not touch the ark, nor enter the temple on any account, even tho' it were to carry out dirt and rubbish, *1 Chron. xv. 12. 2 Chron. xxix. 5, 15.* From this law no exception was allowed of, except in the case of an *Israelite*, newly come off a journey, or defiled by a dead body, who, notwithstanding any ceremonial pollution he might have contracted, was permitted *to eat the passover*, *Numb. ix. 6—10.*

These facts shew, that the *unclean* were excluded from the congregation of God's people, from the place where he had fixed the visible symbol of his presence, and from having any concern in the rites and acts of his public worship in the tabernacle or temple: so that, during

during the time of their *uncleanness*, there was an interruption of all visible external union and intercourse with God.

§ 6. III. To the cleansing of the *unclean*, there were two things necessary. 1st. A being purified or freed from the *uncleanness* itself. 2^{dly}. A restoration to the privileges from which they were excluded by that *uncleanness*.

As to the *first*; it always preceded the *second*; for no *unclean* person might be restored to the privileges of the *clean*, before he was *clean*, or purified from his defilement.--A woman, after *child-bearing*, was prohibited to go into the *sanctuary*, or to touch any hallowed thing, till the days of her purifying were fulfilled, Levit. xii. 4.—The leper, likewise, was cleansed, and pronounced *clean*, before the priest presented him at the door of the tabernacle, to make atonement for him, Levit. xiv. i.—ii. A woman in like manner, on the eighth day, after the ceasing of her *menstrual issue*, came to the door of the tabernacle with the prescribed expiations, that the priest might make atonement for her, Levit. xv. 28.—30.—And the defiled by the dead were to be made *clean*, before they came near the tabernacle, Numb. xix. 13, 20. compared with v. 19.—The Nazarite, likewise, who was defiled by the dead, (and whose purification was different from that of other persons under the like pollution) was not permitted to come to the tabernacle to offer his piacular oblations, till such time as the seven days, in which he was to remain in his *uncleanness*, were elapsed, Numb. vi. 10, 11. compared with v. 19.

§ 7. The second thing, included in the purification of the *unclean*, was, their restoration to the privileges of the *clean*; concerning which I observe,

1st. That the *unclean*, being purified from their *uncleanness*, in the manner mentioned; and, in some cases, pronounced *clean* by the priest, came to the door of the tabernacle, and brought with them the prescribed piacular oblations, which the priests offered, and thereby made atonement for them.—Thus a woman, after *child-bearing*, and a menstruous woman, and a man that had a running issue, after they were purified from their respective *uncleannesses*, brought,

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brought, each of them, a burnt-offering and a sin-offering to the door of the tabernacle of the congregation. The *Nazarite* also, on the day after his *cleansing*, brought his burnt-offering and sin-offering to the same place. The *leper*, likewise, after he was pronounced *clean*, was, with the piacular oblations prescribed in his case, presented by the priest in the same place. And then the priest, by the oblation of their respective piacular sacrifices, made *atonement* for each of them, *Lev.* xii. 6, 7.—xiv. 11, 18, 20, 29, 31.—xv. 14, 15, 29, 30. *Numb.* vi. 9—11.—The method, in which *the defiled by the dead* were restored to the privileges of the *clean*, was different, in some measure, from that which has been mentioned; for their expiatory oblation was first offered, and they were, afterwards, purified by being sprinkled with a water which had been made with the ashes of it: but the *unclean* remaining, in this case, in a state of *uncleanness* for a certain number of days, and being purified, at last, from it, by being sprinkled with the water mentioned, and that before they were restored to the privileges of the *clean*, the difference, made by their sin offerings being, before-hand offered, is of no great moment. For that sacrifice, like those which were offered for the *unclean* in other cases, had no effect upon the state of the *defiled*, till they were freed from their *uncleanness*. See *Numb.* xix. 2—19.

2dly. When the priest had made an atonement for the *unclean*, by the oblation of the piacular sacrifices, aforesaid; they were restored or readmitted to all the privileges of the *clean*. For the cause of their exclusion being removed, the exclusion itself ceased, and the law appointing it, became of no force. They, who had been *unclean*, might now come into the camp, live in society with the *clean*, go to the tabernacle or temple, bring their gifts and offerings thither, and join in all the rites and acts of public worship there performed; *i. e.* Their union, intercourse, and fellowship with God and his people and worshippers, which had, for some time, been interrupted by their *uncleanness*, were now restored.

3dly. The piacular oblations, which were offered by the *unclean*, were the means by which their union with God and his people and worshippers was restored. For,

(1) It

(1) It was in order to bring and offer these piacular oblations, that the *unclean* were first permitted to come to the tabernacle; consequently, the offering them was the first rite or act of public worship they were suffered to perform.

(2) In fact, the *unclean*, before they brought these piacular oblations, and had them offered for them by the priest, might not come near the tabernacle, nor join in any rite or act of worship there performed, as I have shewn already: But after they brought them, and had them offered, they were actually restored to the privileges mentioned.

(3) The piacular sacrifices, which were offered for the *unclean*, are expressly said to *make atonement* for them, *that is*, to be the means whereby an union was either made, or restored, or preserved and supported; and, in the cases, under consideration, it is manifest, that an union, which had been dissolved, was actually restored. See *Levit. xii. 7, 8. — xiv. 18, 19, 20, 31. — xv. 15, 30. Numb. vi. 11.*

Wherefore, if the being the first rite and act of public worship which the *unclean* were permitted to perform; and *that*, on the oblation of which, they were restored to the privileges of the *clean*; and *that* by which *atonement* was actually made, in the sense of restoring an union which had been interrupted; If all this, I say, can be thought sufficient to prove, as I think it clearly doth, that the piacular sacrifices, which were offered by the *unclean*, were the means whereby an union between them and God and his people, which had been interrupted, was restored, then the point, which I am contending for, is clear and evident; and there is no need to say any more about it.

3dly. The last thing which I proposed to do, was, *to compare the effect of those piacular sacrifices, by which the unclean were purified, with the effect of those of the foregoing class, by which persons and things were hallowed or sanctified.*

§. 8. The effect of those piacular sacrifices, by which the *unclean* were purified, did, as I have just now shewn, consist in the restoration of an union or relation which had been interrupted; and the effect of those piacular sacrifices, by which persons and things were

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sanctified did consist in making or constituting an original union or relation, as I have shewn in the preceding *section*.—Wherefore, when the *effects* of the piacular sacrifices, of these two classes, are considered with regard to what was antecedent to them, there is a remarkable difference between them. The one of these *effects* supposes both the existence and the interruption of an antecedent union or relation: The other implies the absence or negation of any antecedent union or relation.—However, when the *effects* of the sacrifices, of both classes, are considered in their abstract or general nature, there appears no difference at all between them. Both did consist in the production of an *union or relation*; the one, in the production of an original union or relation, where there had been nothing of that kind before; and the other, in the reproduction of an union or relation, after it had been dissolved and interrupted.—And because the abstract ideas of these two *effects* are identical, therefore is it, that the terms, by which they are expressed in scripture, are often used in a promiscuous manner: *that is*, the piacular sacrifices, by which the *unclean* were purified, are frequently said to *sanctify* them, or to *make them holy*. (u) And, on the other hand, the

(u) The persons, who did not make themselves abominable by eating the flesh, or touching the carcases, of unclean things, are said to be *holy*, and to *sanctify themselves*, Lev. xi. 43, 44.—xx. 25, 26. And agreeably to this idea of *holiness*, the persons who did cleanse themselves from ceremonial pollution, are said to *sanctify themselves*. Thus Samuel desires the elders of *Bethlehem* to *sanctify themselves*, 1 Sam. xvi. 5.—And, still in the same sense, the priests and Levites are desired to *sanctify*, and accordingly, *did sanctify themselves*, to bring up the ark of the Lord God of Israel, 1 Chron. xv. 12, 14.—And the same persons did *sanctify themselves*, to *sanctify the house of the Lord*, by carrying the filthiness out of the holy place, and to fit themselves for the duties of their function, at the *passover-festival*, 2 Chron. xxix. 5, 15, 34.—And, on an other occasion, the Levites are desired to *sanctify themselves* to kill the *passover*, 2 Chron. xxxv. 6.—And, in the reign of Hezekiah, the Israelites could not keep the *passover* because the priests and Levites had not sufficiently *sanctified themselves*; who, being ashamed of their negligence, did, afterwards *sanctify themselves*, 2 Chron. xxx. 3, 15.—In like manner, and in the same sense, the persons, who were cleansed from ceremonial pollutions, are said to be *sanctified*, and they, who were not cleansed from them, are said, *not to be sanctified*. Thus the priests, who were purified from those pollutions, are said to be *sanctified*, 2 Chron. v. 11.—And Bathshebah, the wife of Uriah, when she went in to David, is said to be [Heb.

the piacular sacrifices which were offered to *sanctify* persons and things, are, sometimes, said to *cleanse* them. (w)



P A R T II.

Concerning the effect of piacular oblations, under the Law of Moses, considered as being the media, or means, by which the remission of sins was obtained.

§ 1. **T**HE remission of sin is another effect which, in the writings of Moses, is ascribed to piacular oblations; for

(1) When the whole congregation had done something, through ignorance, against any of the commandments of the Lord, they were enjoined to offer a bullock as a sin-offering; or, a young bullock for a burnt-offering, with his meat-offering and drink offering, and one kid of the goats for a sin-offering, for the sin committed, Levit. iv, 13, 14. Numb. xv. 24.

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(2) When

[Heb. מִתְקַדְּשֶׁת *mithkadescheth*, sanctified] purified from her uncleanness, 2 Sam. xi. 4.—And, of the priest, who offered the piacular sacrifices for cleansing the Nazarite, who had been defiled by the dead, it is said, *Hesball hallow*, or sanctify, his head, Numb vi. 11.—On the other hand, the Israelites, who had not purified themselves from ceremonial pollutions, are said, *not to be sanctified* 2 Chron. xxx. 17. that is, *not to be clean*, as it is explained in the same place.—And, to mention no more instances, St. Paul tells us, *That the blood of bulls and goats, and the ashes of an heifer, sprinkling the unclean sanctifieth* [Gr. *αγιαζει*] *to the purifying of the flesh*, Heb. ix. 13.

(w) With these piacular sacrifices, which were offered to consecrate and sanctify the Levites, Aaron is said, *to make atonement for them to cleanse them*, Numb. viii. 21.—And, at the consecration of the Altar, Moses took of the blood of the sin-offering, (offered on that occasion) and put it upon the horns of the altar round about, with his finger, to purify it, Levit. viii. 15.

And agreeably to this promiscuous use of the words *sanctify* and *purify*, the high-priest, on the day of expiation, in order to purge the altar from the uncleanness of the Children of Israel, was directed, to sprinkle the blood of the sin-offering seven times upon it, with his finger to cleanse it, and to [וְקִדְּשׁוּ *vekiddeshcho*, et sanctificabit id] *hallow or sanctify it*, Levit. xvi. 19.

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(2) When the high-priest sinned according to the sin of the people, he was directed to offer a bullock for his sin, Levit. iv. 3.

(3) When a ruler sinned against any of the commandments of the Lord, he was ordered to offer a male kid of the goats for his sin, Lev. iv. 22, 23.

(4) When any one of the common people sinned, through ignorance, by transgressing any of the commandments of the Lord, the person so offending, was required to offer a female kid, or lamb, for his trespass, Levit. iv. 27, 28 — v. 6. Numb. xv. 27. (x)

With these piacular oblations, the priest made atonement for the sins which had been committed; which atonement being made, it is expressly said, *it, the sin which had been sinned, done, or committed, the thing that was done in trespass, shall be forgiven him or them*, Lev. iv. 20, 26, 31, 35. — v. 10, 13, 16, 18. — vi. 7. — xix. 22. Numb. xv. 25, 26, 28. — Hence, it is manifest, that the piacular oblations, aforesaid, were the *media*, or means, by which the offenders, for whom they were offered, obtained the remission of sin.

§ 2. But, in order to cast all the light, I can, upon this dark and intricate subject, which has puzzled many learned heads, I shall consider,

First. *The extent, and*

Secondly. *The reality, of that remission of sins which was obtained by the oblation of piacular sacrifices. And then,*

Thirdly.

(x) Thus it appears, that the obligation to offer piacular oblations for sin committed, was, in no case, dispensed with. However, an extraordinary indulgence was granted to the *poor*: For the person, who was unable to be at the charge of a kid or lamb, was permitted to offer, in place thereof, *two turtle-doves, or, two young pigeons*, the one as a burnt-offering, and the other as a sin-offering. And, if a person's circumstances were so low, that he could not afford this easy oblation, he was further indulged by being allowed to offer for his trespass, *the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour*, Lev. v. 7. — 11. — But as these indulgences were solely intended for the ease and relief of the *poor*; so they appear to have been limited to certain offences, to the commission of which they might have been often led by mere accident, or by human frailty, Lev. v. 1 — 6. — In other cases, the *poor* don't appear to have had any more favour shewn to them than the *rich*. See Lev. v. 15, 18. — vi. 1 — 6. Ezra x. 17 — 44.

Thirdly. *Shew, that, by these piacular sacrifices, as being the means whereby the remission of sin was obtained, an union or relation, which had been dissolved, was restored between the Deity and the persons who offered them.*

I. I am to consider: *the extent of that remission of sins which was obtained under the Law of Moses, by the oblation of piacular sacrifices.*—The following observations may be of use to set this affair in a clear light.

§ 3. 1st. All the punishments, which were awarded against offenders, under the *Law of Moses*, were, as has been before observed, of a *temporal nature*. Wherefore, since those punishments were all of a temporal nature, it is clear, that the remission, which was obtained, under this dispensation of religion, could be no other than a remission of temporal punishments only: consequently, the eternal remission of sin, or the remission of sin, or the remission of the punishment of it in the world to come, was not obtained by the oblation of these piacular sacrifices which were instituted, and in use, under the *Law of Moses*.

§ 4. 2^{dly}. The civil government, under which the *Hebrew nation* was placed, under this dispensation of religion, was a *theocracy*, or a political government which was erected and exercised by the Deity.—Now, under a civil government which was exercised by the Deity, there would be some sins which could not, in a consistency with the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of that government, be *purged by sacrifice*: such as, all the *crimes* which had a natural and immediate tendency to the ruin and destruction of society; a cool, deliberate contempt of authority; and idolatry; and whatever had the nature of *high-treason* under a civil, theocratical government. The safety of the *subjects*, and the preservation of the *constitution*, made it absolutely necessary that crimes of this enormous nature should be severely punished. And, accordingly, they who were guilty of them were condemned to suffer capital punishment; and *repentance* and *sacrifice*, were not permitted to stop the execution, or to procure the remission, of it.

§ 5. 3^{dly}.

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§ 5. 3dly. Penitent sinners, as I have shew'n in a former chapter, were the only persons for whose ease and relief piacular oblations were instituted under this dispensation of religion; and, therefore, the remission of sin, which was obtained by these piacular oblations, was confined to persons of this moral character; and the impenitent were excluded from it.

From these three observations, 'tis manifest, that the remission of sins, which, under the *Law of Moses*, was the effect of the oblation of piacular sacrifices, did not comprehend the remission of sin in the world to come; nor the remission of the sins of the impenitent; nor the remission of any of these enormous crimes which had the nature of high-treason, or a natural and immediate tendency to the ruin and destruction of society, whether the persons, who had committed them, were penitent or impenitent. But to proceed,

§ 6. 4thly. The real and true extent of the remission of sins, aforesaid, will be clear and obvious from a view of these sins for which piacular sacrifices were appointed to be offered under this dispensation of religion. For it is self-evident, that the remission of no sins could be obtained by the oblation of these sacrifices, but only of those, for which they were ordered to be offered.—These sins, in the writings of *Moses*, are denominated SINS OF IGNORANCE, or error.—This phrase denotes,

(1) Sins of ignorance properly so called. For, of the persons who had committed them, it is said, *They wist it not*, Levit. v. 17, 18. And the sins, which they had done, are said to be done without their knowledge, and to be hidden from them, and are represented as coming to their knowledge after that they were committed, Levit. iv. 13, 14, 23, 28.—v. 2, 3, 4. Numb. xv. 24. Which things could not have been said, unless the sins committed, had been sins of ignorance, properly so called.

The *Law of Moses* was duly promulged to the *Israelites*: and the precepts and prohibitions of it were expressed in a plain and easy stile of language, such as could not but be readily understood by persons of low and ordinary capacities. For, tho' ignorance of the *Hebrew Idiom*, and of the customs in these ancient times, may, perhaps,

haps, render the sense of some few of these precepts and prohibitions obscure to us: yet, to the *Israelites*, whose mother-tongue the *Hebrew language* was, and who were well acquainted with the customs of their own times, there could arise no difficulty nor obscurity from the causes mentioned. For however difficult it might have been to many of the *Israelites*, to penetrate into the reasons of some of these precepts and prohibitions, yet the sense and meaning of them was easy and obvious.—Even at this distance of time, any person of a common and ordinary capacity, who reads the *Law of Moses* with due attention, is seldom at a loss to understand what things the *Israelites* were either required or prohibited to do.—Add to this, that the *Israelites* were strictly charged to make the *Law of Moses* the subject of daily meditation and constant study, and to instruct their children carefully in the knowledge of it, *Deut. vi. 6.—9.* And this law was ordered to be solemnly and publicly read to the whole body of this people, at the end of every seven years, when they were assembled together to keep the *feast of tabernacles*, *Deut. xxxi. 9.—13.*—Wherefore, since the *Law of Moses* was duly promulged, in words which were plain and easy to be understood; and since great pains were taken both to instruct the *Israelites* in the knowledge of it, and to make them careful to inform themselves of the contents and requirements of it, no *Israelite* could transgress this law through an *invincible ignorance* of the precepts and prohibitions of it.—If the sin, which the offender committed, was *hidden from him*; if, when he sinned, *he wist it not*; and only came to the knowledge of the sin afterwards; this was all his own fault; for he might have known better, had he been at due pains to inform himself; and might have acted better, had he been more attentive to the law, and more watchful over his own actions. And, therefore, the *ignorance*, through which he sinned, could not justify his misconduct, or be a proper excuse for it.—Had an *Israelite*, in any instance, transgressed the *Law of Moses* through an *absolute, invincible ignorance* of the contents of it, that ignorance, without either penitence or sacrifice, would have expiated, or rather annihilated, his sin: For a law that neither is, nor can be, known,

is,

is, in point of obligation, the same as no law at all. Wherefore, since the *Israelites* contracted real guilt by *sins of ignorance*, and were ordered to offer piacular sacrifices to make atonement for it, 'tis manifest, that the ignorance, from which these sins proceeded, was not *invincible*, but of a culpable and criminal kind.—To strengthen what I have here advanced further, it may be observed, that the *Hebrew* word, which denotes a *sin of ignorance*, no where denotes an irregular action, which proceeds from an *absolute invincible ignorance* of the law, or rule, to which actions ought to be conformed; tho', in many places, where it occurs, it signifies such a sin as proceeds from a *vincible and faulty ignorance* of the rule of action. (y) — And, in fact, all the instances which we have, in scripture, of *sins of ignorance*, are such as did not proceed from an *absolute and invincible ignorance* of the right of action, but from such an ignorance of it as might have been removed by due attention, consideration, and inquiry. (z)

From these observations and facts, it appears, that the *sin of ignorance*, for which the *Israelites* were ordered to offer piacular oblations,

(y) See the marginal note (c) next following.

(z) The *Jews*, who procured the death of our Lord *Jesus Christ*, are said to have acted, *Kata arrovian*, ignorantly, Acts iii. 17. — The times, in which the Gentile world was over-run with idolatry and vice, are termed, *Xpovos tns arrovias*, times of ignorance, Acts xviii. 30. — St. Paul ascribes all the idolatry and wickedness of the Heathen world to, *arrovian en autois*, the ignorance that was in them. Eph. iv. 18. And St. Paul calls their vicious desires and inclinations, *en tn arrovia επιθυμιας*, lusts in ignorance, 1 Pet. i. 14. — St. Paul describes the unbelieving *Jews*, who opposed and rejected the gospel, as, *arrovies tnv tn dea δικαιοσυνην*, ignorant of the righteousness of God, or of the gospel-method of justification, and he imputes their infidelity to that ignorance, Rom. x. 3. — And having mentioned the blasphemy, persecution, and inhumanity, of which he himself had been guilty, before he became a convert to the *christian faith*, he ascribes these to the ignorance which he was then in; for he says, *I obtained mercy, oli arvovwv ενωινσα εν απιστια*, because I did them ignorantly in unbelief, 1 Tim. i. 13. — The sins, mentioned in these several passages, were all *sins of ignorance*, but not of *absolute, invincible ignorance*; for had the person, who were guilty of them, divested themselves of their prejudices, and rectified the disorders of these passions by which they were blinded, and made a right use of their understandings by attending carefully to the evidence which was afforded to them, they might have known that what they did was *sin*. But these things they did not; and, therefore, were blame-worthy.

oblations, were such as did proceed from a *vincible ignorance*, which was the effect of culpable causes, such as, inattention, prejudice, precipitancy, and a criminal negligence of understanding.

Perhaps, it may be objected, that the *septuagint version* calls a *sin of ignorance* an *involuntary sin*; (a) and affirms, that the person, who committed such a sin, did act and sin *involuntarily*: (b) Whence some may infer, that *sins of ignorance* were the effects not of a *vincible ignorance*, but either of an *invincible ignorance*, or of external force.—ANSW. The idea of *involuntariness* is not included in the signification of the *Hebrew* words, of which those of the *septuagint version* are a translation; and, therefore, it ought not to be admitted. A translation is no more than a translation, and, therefore can be allowed no authority, but only as far as it coincides with the sense of the *original*, and exhibits it. Where it delivers a sense different from that of the original, it ought to be corrected, at least, be understood in such a sense as may agree with the other. This is a plain dictate of reason and common sense.—Whatever *involuntariness* did attend the commission of *sins of ignorance*, that *involuntariness* could not be the effect either of *invincible ignorance* or of external force, because actions, proceeding from these causes, are not sinful.—The person, indeed, who did commit a *sin of ignorance*, sinned without knowing that he sinned, and without any intention to offend, and so far he may be said to have sinned *involuntarily*. But then, his *ignorance* was the effect of culpable causes which he might have corrected, and ought to have corrected, and yet did it not; and, therefore, the sin, which proceeded from it, was, ultimately, the effect of *voluntary* inattention, and negligence of understanding; and, as such, not an involuntary sin.

(2) The sins of *ignorance* or *error*, for which piacular sacrifices were offered under the *Law of Moses*, did comprehend, not only *sins of ignorance*, properly so called; but, likewise, all other sins against that law which were the result of *human frailty*, and did not

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proceed

(a) Ἀνεσιον, Numb xv. 25, 26.

(b) Εαν δε αμαρτη και ποιηση ανεσιως, or, Εαν δε αγνοηση ανεσιως, Levit. iv. 2, 13, 22, 27. Numb. xv. 27, 28.

proceed from a cool, deliberate contempt of God, and of his authority as king of *Israel*: even such sins as offenders were excited to the commission of by *sensual appetites* and *passions*, and by the influence of *evil example* and *external temptation*; and did commit *knowingly*, and against the dictates and remonstrances of their own consciences. However, all those sins, which were threatened with *excision* or capital punishment, are here to be excepted.—The truth of what I have here affirmed will clearly appear from the following considerations.

In the writings of the *Old Testament*, the Hebrew *nouns*, which our translators render *a sin of ignorance*, denote any sin which doth not proceed from a deliberate contempt of authority, but from human frailty or infirmity only. (c)—And the *root*, from which these *nouns* are derived, is used in the same latitude of signification, and denotes the action of a moral agent in committing any sin through human

(c) שגגה *schagegah*, משוגג *meschugah*, or משגב *mischgeb*, are the Hebrew *nouns* which are rendered *a sin of ignorance* by our translators; and they have all the same signification, as being derived from different forms of the same *root*.—These three *nouns*, wherever they occur in the *old Testament*, denote such a sin as is not the effect of a deliberate contempt of authority, but of human frailty only, i. e. of *mistake*, *inconsideration*, *sensual appetite* or *passion strongly raised*, *vicious habit*, *temptation*, &c. The following instances will be sufficient vouchers of the truth of this remark.—*Jacob*, speaking of the Money which was secretly returned in his Son's sacks, saith, *perhaps it was משגב mishgeb*, an oversight, or mistake, Gen. xliii. 12.—*David* saith, *Psal. xix. 12. Who can understand, שגגותי schegijoth, his error?* that is, his many sins arising from human frailty and infirmity, as is evident from the distinction which he there makes between these sins and presumptuous sins, v. 13.—*Job* saith, *Be it indeed, that I have erred משוגגתי meschugathi*, mine error remaineth with me; that is, it is a sin of infirmity for which I myself am accountable, Job xix. 4.—In like manner *King Solomon*, speaking of rash vows, saith, *Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin; neither say thou before the angel, כי שגגה היא chisbegagah hi*, that it was an error, or a sin of infirmity which arose from precipitancy, inconsideration, or some other weakness incident to human nature, Ecc. v. 6.—And he observes also, Ecc. x. 5. *That there is an evil under the sun, כשגגה chischgagah*, as an error (or instance of human weakness) proceeding from the ruler; viz. *Folly is set in great dignity*, &c.—These passages shew us, that the Hebrew *nouns*, afore said, denote any sin whatsoever, which is the result of *human frailty* and *infirmity*, and not of a cool, deliberate contempt of authority.

human weakness or frailty. (d) And, since this Hebrew root, and the nouns, aforesaid, derived from it, have, in other places, a signification which relates to, and comprehends, other sins, besides those

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(d) The Hebrew root שגג *schagag*, or שגה *schagah*, or שגו *schug*, from which the nouns, mentioned in the foregoing note, are derived, signifies the action of committing any sin through human frailty and infirmity, either knowingly and wilfully, or not knowingly and wilfully. This is manifest from the following instances.—King Saul, when he confesseth that the jealousy, which had stirred him up to persecute David, was unreasonable, groundless, and unjustifiable, saith, *I have played the fool*, וַאֲשַׁחֲזֶה *vaeschgeh*, and have erred exceedingly, 1 Sam. xxvi. 21. He sinned through culpable infirmity, by gratifying an unreasonable passion, without duly considering the evil and wickedness of the actions to which he had been excited by it.—Job says to his mistaken friends, Job vi. 24. *Cause me to understand wherein*, שְׁגִיתִי *schagithi*, I have erred, viz. by mistake, inconsideration, impatience, or the force of sorrow and pain.—And he says, Chap. xix. 4. And be it, that, שְׁגִיתִי *schagithi*, I have erred (viz. through human infirmity) *mine error remaineth with me*.—The Psalmist also saith, אֶל תִּשְׁגֶּנִי *al tasehgeni*, O let me not wander (or err through human infirmity) *from thy commandments*, Psal. cxix. 10. that is, let me not be seduced from obedience to thy commandments through inconsideration, precipitancy, and youthful lusts, as appears from the context.—And, v. 67. he saith, *before I was afflicted*, שָׁגַגְתִּי *schogeg*, I went astray; that is, not perversely, and in contempt of God's authority, but through security and the want of serious reflection, which bad state of mind his affliction had effectually cured.—Solomon saith, Prov. xx. 1. *Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging, and whosoever*, שָׁגַגְתָּ *schogeh*, is deceived (or led into error) by it, is not wise: the meaning is, wine and strong liquors inflame men's appetites and passions, and make them rash and inconsiderate in their words and actions, and disposed to say and do things which are sinful; and, therefore, whosoever suffereth himself to be thus seduced into the commission of sin, by too liberal an use of them, is a very foolish and wicked person.—The prophet Isaiah, in like manner saith, Isai. xxviii. 7. That the Ephraimites, שָׁגַגְתִּי *schagu*, erred through wine; and that the priest and the prophet, שָׁגַגְתִּי *schagu*, erred through strong drink: that is, they were inconsiderately led into the commission of sin by those sensual appetites and passions which were excited and inflamed by drunkenness.—And as to the priests and prophets, so seduced into sin, it is there said, שָׁגַגְתִּי *schagu*, they err in wisdom; they stumble in judgement; that is, they deliver false prophecies, and give forth unjust sentences and decisions in judgement, through that stupid state of mind, into which strong drink, and the passions and sensual appetites thereby raised and inflamed, have brought them.—These passages of scripture shew us, that to sin through ignorance (or error) is, to sin through human frailty or infirmity; that is, through inconsideration and the neglect of due reflection, whether this arises from mistake and absence of thought, or from passions and appetites strongly moved, or from the influence of vicious habit, temptation, or evil example, or from any other cause which is not a symptom and indication of a base perverseness of mind, or of a cool, deliberate contempt of God's authority.

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those of *ignorance*, properly so called; I can see no reason for limiting or restricting their signification to *sins of ignorance*, and the *action* of committing them, in those passages where they denote the sins for which piacular sacrifices were ordered to be offered, or the actions of the persons who did commit those sins.—The following observations, I think, will satisfy every fair and candid mind, that their signification, in those passages, neither ought to be, nor, indeed, can be, so limited.

1st. Under the *Law of Moses*, piacular sacrifices were ordered to be offered for sins which were *knowingly* committed: *E. G.* When a man denied or kept back that which was deposited in his hands by another person; or wronged his neighbour who traded in partnership with him; or took any thing from another person either by deceit or violence; or did not restore to the proper owner the lost thing which he had found, but denied it, and swore that he had not found it; In all these cases, cases in which offenders could not be ignorant of the sins which they had committed, the guilty person was ordered to offer a *trespass-offering for the sin which he had sinned*. Levit. vi. 1—6. From which appointment, it is clear, that, under the *Law of Moses*, piacular sacrifices were offered for such sins as were *knowingly* committed, as well as for *sins of ignorance*.

2^{dly}. As sins of *ignorance*, or *error*, were the only sins for which piacular sacrifices were appointed to be offered; so the only sins, which are opposed to these in the writings of *Moses*, or in any other part of scripture, are those of *presumption*. These two species of sin

It is not to be denied, that this Hebrew *root*, sometimes, signifies the action of wicked men in the commission of sin. *E. G.* It is said, *Psal. cxix. 21. Thou hast rebuked the cursed proud*, חַשְׁבֹּגִים *haschogim*, who err from thy commandments.—And it is said, *Prov. v. 23. He (the wicked man, v. 23) shall die without instruction; and, in the greatness of his folly, יִשְׁחָגֶה, jischgeh, shall he go astray.*—But then, it deserves remark, that the most part of those sins, which wicked men commit, are sins of *infirmity*; i. e. such sins as arise from security, inconsideration, vicious habit, the violence of passion and sensual appetite, and the influence of temptation and evil example; and nor from a cool, deliberate *contempt* of God and his authority. And, for this reason, the Hebrew *root*, under consideration, may have the signification, which it has in all other places, even in those passages where it denotes the action of wicked and vicious men in committing sin.

fin are mentioned as being the reverse of each other, Numb. xv. 27, 30. *If any soul sin through ignorance, then he shall bring a she-goat of the first year for a sin-offering.—But the soul that doth ought presumptuously,—the same reproacheth the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people.* Here sins of ignorance or error and sins of presumption are represented as being of an opposite or contrary nature; for which reason, the knowledge of the nature of the latter will afford a good insight into the nature of the former.

The scripture notion of *presumptuous sin* appears to me to be this, that it was such sin as did not proceed from human frailty and weakness, but from a cool deliberate contempt of God's authority, requiring this to be done, and that not to be done. And, as such, it did not stand in opposition to *sins of ignorance* properly so called only, but also to all other sins which did not proceed from a cool, deliberate contempt of authority; and, consequently, to all sins knowingly committed, which were not the result of such contempt, but of human frailty only.—But the true nature of *presumptuous sin* will best appear from those characteristics and instances which we have of it in holy scripture.

Presumptuous sins are said to be committed, בִּיד רָמָה *bejad ramah*, with an high hand, Numb. xv. 30. And they are called *sins of pride or insolence*, Psal. xix. 13. (e) And the persons, who committed them, are said to *act proudly or arrogantly*, Exod. xviii. 11. —xxi. 14. Deut. i. 43. —xviii. 20. (f) *to despise the word of the Lord*, Numb. xv. 21. *and to reproach or blaspheme the Lord*, Numb. xv. 30. (g)—All which expressions are a lively description of the perverse

(e) Psal. xix. *Keep back thy servant also*, מִזֶּזְדִּים *mizzedim*, (*superbe factis*, vid. Buxtorf. Lexicon) *from presumptuous sins*.

(f) In those places, it is said of presumptuous sinners, זָדוּ *zadu*, (אִזְדוּ *zud*, *Superbivit*, *arroganter egit*, vid. Buxtorf. Lexicon) *they did proudly*.—And, at v. 22. of the last quoted chapter, the offender is said to speak, בְּזִדּוֹן *bezadon*, *in pride, or insolently*.

(g) *The soul that doth ought presumptuously,—the same* מְגַדֵּלֶפֶה *megadleph*, *reproacheth the Lord*. i. e. He affronteth him by a cool, deliberate contempt of his authority.—Thus because *Senacherib* did coolly and deliberately speak contemptibly of God, and put him upon the same level with Idol-Gods, the question is put to him, 2 Kings xix. 22. *Whom hast thou reproached*, וְגִידֶפֶתָ *vegiddaphtha*, *and blasphemed, or insolently affronted?*

perverse temper of such persons as did offend, not through human infirmity and frailty, but through wantonness, and a cool, deliberate contempt of God's authority.—And that this is the true scripture-notion of the nature of *presumptuous sin*, is manifest, likewise, from all those instances of it which are recorded in scripture.—Because *Pharaoh* despised the Lord, and acted coolly and deliberately in contempt of his authority, he is said to *deal proudly*, or *presumptuously*, *Exod. v. 2.* compared with *Chap. xviii. 10, 11.*—And because the person, who in cool blood, watched for an opportunity to kill his neighbour, knew that the sin of *murder* was prohibited by God, and yet would not be restrained from the commission of it by a sense of his authority, he is, therefore said, to *come upon his neighbour presumptuously*, *Exod. xxi. 14.*—In like manner, the *Israelites*, because they went up the hill, to fight against the *Amorites*, in contradiction to an express command forbidding that action, are said to *go presumptuously up the hill*, *Deut. i. 42, 43.*—The person also, who would not submit to the sentence given by the *priest*, or *judge*, because he acted insolently against that authority which God had established, is said to *do presumptuously*, *Deut. xvii. 12, 13.*—The *false prophet*, likewise, because he did deliberately, and in contempt of the authority of God, who forbade the wickedness, forge a commission for himself from God, he is said to *speak presumptuously*, *Deut. xviii. 22.*—Lastly, *Senacherib*, because he shewed a great contempt of God, and of his supreme authority and dominion, by comparing him with the Idol-Gods of the Heathen nations, and affirming that he was not able to deliver the *Jews* out of his hands, he is, therefore, said to *reproach and blaspheme*, (or, to *sin presumptuously*) and to *exalt his voice, and to lift up his eyes on high against the holy one of Israel*, *2 Kings xix. 22.* compared with *v. 10—13.*

From these scripture characteristics and of *persumptuous sin*, it appears to have been such a sin as proceeded from a cool, deliberate contempt of God, and of his authority, requiring this to be done, and that to be left undone: not a remote, consequential contempt, such as is implied in the commission of any sin whatsoever; but a deliberate and designed contempt, expressed either in words, or in
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the manner of acting.—Sins of this kind were not the result of mere frailty and infirmity, but of a perverse and incorrigible temper of mind. They were crimes of *lese majesty* or *high-treason*.

And, for sins of this atrocious nature, no piacular sacrifice was either appointed, or permitted, to be offered, under the *Law of Moses*. On the contrary, the persons, who were guilty of such sins, were ordered to be put to death, *Numb. xv. 30, 31*. And, accordingly, the writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* saith, *He that despised Moses Law died, without mercy, under two or three witnesses, Heb. x. 28*. And, as the *Law of Moses* did not provide, nor even permit, any expiation for *sins of presumption*; so the Christian dispensation of religion doth not appear to me, to afford any ground of hope to those who are guilty of them: *For if we sin wilfully* (i. e. presumptuously, *ἐν γνώσει*; in contradistinction to *ἀνεπίστωτος*, which, in the *Septuagint* version of the old Testament, is the peculiar characteristic of *presumptuous sins*, as I have shewn before) *after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin; (b) but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries. He that despised Moses law died, without mercy, under two or three witnesses: Of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the son of God, or the authority of the son of God, &c. Heb. x. 26—29*.

But for all sins, which were not of the presumptuous kind, nor threatened with *excision*, piacular sacrifices were not only appointed to be offered, but graciously accepted; not only for *sins of ignorance*, properly so called, but for all other sins also which were *knowingly* committed, and were the result of human frailty and infirmity: (i)

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(b) *καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνῃ ἀποδείξει ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι θυσία ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτίας*. Sacrifice for sin is no further, or no longer, left, viz. to the sinner. *καὶ ἐν* is here joined in construction with *ἀποδείξει*, and not with *θυσία*. And that *καὶ ἐν* signifies no further, or no longer, is evident from *Mat. xxii. 46*.—*xxvi. 65*. *John xiv. 30*. *Phil. v. 16*.

(i) Expiatory sacrifices, *Ezek. xlv. 20*. were offered for every one that erred *וְשִׁמְפֵּתִי* *umippethi*, and for the simple. For the simple; that is, for foolish and inconsiderate sinners, who did not wantonly offend in contempt of authority, but were deceived, and induced to commit sin, either through mistake and inconsideration, or by the lusts of their own hearts, and the influence of temptation and evil example: For, that this is the proper import and signification of the Hebrew word *פֶּתִי pethi*, is evident from the sense which it bears in other places. See *Psal. cxix. 130*. *Prov. i. 22*.—*vii. 7—22*.—*ix. 4, 6*. And *Buxtorf. Lexicon in voc. פֶּתִי*.

Consequently, for all sins which proceeded from inconsideration, precipitancy, prejudice, the violence of appetites and passions, and the influence of evil example and temptation, provided they were not accompanied with a cool, deliberate contempt of authority, nor among the sins which were threatened with *excision*. See *Levit.* iv. 1—35.—v. 1—19—vi. 1—7. *Numb.* xv. 22—30.

Upon the whole, it now appears, that the remission which was obtained by the oblation of piacular sacrifices, under the *Law of Moses*, was the remission of the *temporal punishment* of all sorts of sins, whether committed *knowingly*, or *through ignorance and mistake*; provided they did not proceed from a cool, deliberate contempt of authority, and were not among the other sins which were threatened with *excision* or capital punishment.

II. The next thing which I have to consider, is, *the reality of that remission of sin, which, under the Law of Moses, was obtained by the oblation of piacular sacrifices.*

§ 7. The question, which we have to consider here, relates only to the remission of those temporal punishments which were threatened against sins, or annexed to transgressions, by the *Law of Moses*: And is this, whether or not did penitent sinners obtain the real remission of those temporal punishments by the piacular sacrifices which they were ordered to offer for their sins?

§ 8. At first view, one would be apt to think, that persons, free from prejudice, and from all unreasonable attachment to any pre-conceived *hypothesis*, could not hesitate one moment to determine this question in the affirmative. For, as the *Hebrew* legislator ordered penitent sinners to offer piacular oblations for their sins of *error*, committed thro' ignorance and infirmity; so he tells them expressly, that when the priest had, by those oblations, made atonement for the sins which they had sinned, those sins should be forgiven, *Lev.* iv. 20, 26, 31, 35.—v. 10, 13, 16, 18.—vi. 7.—xix. 22. *Numb.* xv. 25, 26, 28. The language in these several texts runs thus, *The priest* (by the oblation of the prescribed sacrifices) *shall make atonement for him, or them; or, for the sin which hath been done, sinned, committed, or done in trespass; and it* (i. e. that sin) *shall be for-*
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given him or them. And I don't know of any words, more plain and significant than these, that could have been used, to intimate, that a real pardon of the sins committed, or a discharge from those temporal punishments which were annexed to them by the law, was to be obtained by the oblation of the prescribed piacular sacrifices.

§ 9. However, the reality of this remission of sins has not only been called in question, but directly and expressly denied, by men of eminent parts and learning, and, among others, by the learned Dr. Samuel Clarke, (k) who affirm, that, under the *Law of Moses*, piacular sacrifices had no efficacy, of themselves, to expiate sins, but only as they were typical of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. It will, therefore, be proper to remove this mistake, by shewing, that the piacular sacrifices, which were offered under the *Law of Moses*, had, of themselves, as real an efficacy to procure, for penitent sinners, a release from those temporal punishments that were due to their transgressions by the sanctions of that law, as the sacrifice of Christ hath to procure, for persons of the same moral character, a release from the future punishment of their sins in the world to come. And,

§ 10. *First.* That the remission of sins, which was obtained, under the *Law of Moses*, by the oblation of piacular sacrifices, was not a nominal and figurative, but a real remission of those temporal punishments which were due to them, is clear and evident from the following facts and instances.

§ 11. (1) The penalty, annexed by the *Law of Moses* to all those trespasses, whereby the property of any person was injured, or wrested from him by fraud, theft, or violence, was a *double restitution*. This penalty is expressly extended to all trespasses which related

(k) "And though the Jews, by God's own appointment, were to offer certain beasts in sacrifice, and God himself was pleased to declare that he would accept these offerings, so that the blood of the beasts should make atonement for their sins; yet neither had these sacrifices any real efficacy in themselves to expiate sin, but only as they typified that great sacrifice, which was to be offered for the sins of the whole world." Dr. Clarke's *posthumous Sermons*. No. CXXXVII.

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related to *oxen, sheep, asses, raiment, and things lost*, *Exod. xxii. 9.* Only it is to be observed, that a thief, who had sold or killed what he had stolen, was to restore *five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep, v. 1.*—And if he was so poor that he could not make this restitution, it was ordered, that he should be sold to satisfy for the theft, *v. 3.*—These were the penalties which were awarded, in the *Law of Moses*, against those who did injure any of their fellow-subjects in his property by fraud, theft, or violence.

Now the person, who had, through ignorance or human frailty, committed any of the trespasses mentioned, and was penitent for the sin, was ordered, to restore to the injured person the *principal*, with the addition of a fifth part of the said *principal*, and to offer a *ram* in sacrifice, to make atonement for his trespass; which being done, the sin was forgiven, or, in other words, he was discharged from the penalties mentioned. So we are informed, *Levit. vi. 1—7.* in the following words, *The Lord spake unto Moses saying, If a soul sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and lie unto his neighbour in that which was delivered him to keep, or in fellowship, (i. e. in partnership in stock or trade) or in a thing taken away by violence, or hath deceived his neighbour (by cheating and over-reaching him) or have found that which was lost and (to conceal it, and keep it from the person who hath lost it) lieth concerning it, and sweareth falsely (that he did not find it) In any of all these that a man doth, sinning therein; Then it shall be, because he hath sinned, and is guilty, or obnoxious to the punishment of making restitution according to the requirement of the law) that he shall restore that which he took violently away, or the thing which he hath deceitfully gotten, or that which was delivered him to keep, or the lost thing which he found, or all about which he hath sworn falsely: He shall even restore it in the principal, and shall add the fifth part more thereto, and give it unto him to whom it appertaineth, (that is, to the injured person, or, if he was not to be found, to his next kinsman, or, if there was no kinsman, to the Lord, even to the priest; *Numb. v. 7, 8.*) And he shall bring his trespass-offering to the Lord, a ram without blemish out of the flock, with thy estimation, for a trespass-offering unto the priest. And the priest shall*
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make atonement for him before the Lord: And it shall be forgiven him, concerning all that he hath done in trespassing therein; that is, the trespasser shall be discharged from the penalty or punishment which the Law of Moses had denounced against that sin which he had committed: For unless he was discharged from this punishment, he neither did, nor could, obtain the remission of his sin: and the relief, promised to him by sacrifice, was delusory only, and made his sufferings greater than, otherwise, they would have been.

Here then was a real remission of sin, obtained by the oblation of piacular sacrifices.—Nor can it be alledged, that the restitution of the *principal*, and the addition of a fifth part more, were a punishment inflicted on the offender. For the *principal* was the real property of the injured person; consequently, the restitution of it was what common justice and honesty required to be made. And for the *fifth part*, which was to be added to it, the payment of that was no more than an equitable compensation for the damage which the injured party had sustained; and a satisfaction for the profit which the offender might have reaped from the use of his property.—A restitution, therefore, so circumstanced as this, was necessary, not only in point of justice, but as a proper testimony and expression of the offender's penitence; and, therefore, it was no punishment, yea, so far was it from being intended as a punishment, that when the mentioned demands of equity were satisfied, and a *trespass-offering* was offered to make atonement for the sin which had been committed, the penalty, awarded against the offender by the law, was really and truly remitted; and he was no longer obnoxious to make a double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution; one or other of which was the punishment which he had incurred.

§ 12. (2) A second instance of a *real remission*, obtained by the oblation of piacular sacrifices, was that of the penalty which was denounced against those who offended in the *holy things* of the Lord.

The *holy* or *hallowed things* were such things as belonged to God and his priests, by particular appointment, or were voluntarily devoted and given for pious uses; such as, *tithes*; Levit. xxvii. 30—33.

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Numb. xviii. 21—30. Deut. xxvi. 12—15. *The first-fruits* of corn, wine and oil; Exod. xxii. 29.—xxiii. 19.—xxxiv. 26. Numb. xviii. 12, 13. Deut. xxvi. 12—15. *The firstlings* of all clean beasts, and the money payable for the redemption of the *first-born* of man, and of unclean beasts; Exod. xiii. 13.—xxii. 30.—xxxiv. 19, 20. Numb. iii. 46—48.—xviii. 15—18. *The first of the fleece of sheep*; Deut. xviii. 4. *The fourth year's fruit* of a tree, after it was planted; Levit. xix. 24. *The half-shekel* of redemption-money, payable by every *Israelite*, who was twenty years of age or upwards, towards the service of the tabernacle; Exod. xxx. 12—16. *The things which particular persons dedicated, or vowed to dedicate, or sacrifice to God*; Levit. xxvii. 1—29. Numb. xviii. 14. Deut. xxiii. 21, 22. *The burnt-offerings*, of which the priests had the *skins*; Levit. vii. 8. *The sin-offerings and the trespass-offerings*, which belonged to God and his priests; Levit. iv. 1—35.—vi. 25—30.—vii. 1—7. Numb. xviii. 9, 10. *The meat-offerings*, which, likewise, were the property of God and the priests; Levit. ii. 1—16.—vi. 16—vii. 9, 10. Numb. xviii. 9. And *the peace-offerings*, to the *heave* and *wave offerings* of which the priests had a right; Levit. vii. 13, 14. Numb. xviii. 11, 19. Deut. xviii. 3.

While these *holy things* remained in the hands of those from whom they were due, they were of the nature of a *depositum*. The persons, therefore, to whose care and trust they were committed, if they injured God and his priests, by keeping back the whole, or a part of any of them, or by giving a worse one for a better, were obnoxious to the penalty that was awarded in the law against breach of trust, *that is*, they were liable to restore *two-fold*, Exod. xxii. 7—9. And accordingly, the person who changed a *tithe-animal*, and gave another to the priest instead of it, was actually condemned in the loss of both, Levit. xxvii. 33—Moreover, the person who, after the *holy things* were put into the hands of the priests, took any of them, or any part of any of them, by mistake, fraud, or violence, was made liable to the very same punishment, by the statute of Exod. xxii. 7—9.

But.

But now, when the persons, who had incurred this penalty, did offend through human frailty, and were penitent for what they had done, and did restore the *principal*, with a *fifth part more*, they were directed to bring a *ram* for a trespass-offering, which being offered by the priest to make atonement for the trespass committed, they were discharged from the punishment of making a double restitution, or, in other words, the sin was forgiven, *Levit. v. 14—16.* *The Lord spake unto Moses, saying, If a soul commit a trespass, and sin through ignorance in the holy things of the Lord; then he shall bring for his trespass unto the Lord a ram without blemish out of the flocks, with thy estimation by shekels of silver, after the shekel of the sanctuary, for a trespass-offering. And he shall make amends for the harm that he hath done in the holy thing; and he shall add a fifth part thereto, and give it unto the priest: And the priest shall make an atonement for him with the ram of the trespass-offering, and it shall be forgiven him.*—'Tis manifest, therefore, that this remission was not nominal and figurative; but real, as consisting in a release from a positive and determinate punishment.

§ 13. (3) A third case, in which, I think, a real remission of sin was obtained, under the Law of Moses, by the oblation of piacular sacrifices, is recorded, *Levit. v. 2, 3, and v. 5—12.* in the following words, *If a soul touch an unclean thing, whether it be a carcase of an unclean beast, or a carcase of unclean cattle, or the carcase of unclean creeping things; and if it be hidden from him, he also shall be unclean, and guilty. Or if he touch the uncleanness of man, whatsoever uncleanness it be that a man shall be defiled withal, and it be hid from him; when he knoweth of it, then he shall be guilty.—And it shall be, when he shall be guilty in one of these things, that he shall confess that he hath sinned in that thing; and he shall bring his trespass-offering unto the Lord for his sin which he hath sinned, a female from the flock, a lamb, or a kid of the goats, for a sin-offering: And the priest shall make an atonement for him concerning his sin. If the offender was so poor that he could not bear the charge of this sacrifice, he was allowed to offer, in place of it two turtle-doves, or two young pigeons,*

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pigeons, the one as a *sin-offering* and the other as a *burnt-offering*, v. 7—10. And if his poverty was extreme, he was permitted to offer for his trespass, the *tenth part of an ephah of fine flour* as a *sin-offering*, v. 11—13.—But whichever of these the offender did offer, when the priest had made an atonement for him with it, the sin which he had sinned was forgiven him; for it is expressly said, *The sin shall be forgiven him*, v. 10, 13.

In order to shew that the remission of sin, here mentioned, was not figurative and barely nominal, but real; it will be necessary to set both the *sin* committed, and the *punishment* remitted, in a proper and clear light; for they seem to be both left in great obscurity in this passage. For this end I shall offer the following observations to the consideration of the candid and ingenious reader.

First. It seems clear to me, that the bare touching of the unclean persons and things, here mentioned, considered in itself, could not be the sin, the remission of which was obtained by the oblation of the piacular sacrifices aforesaid. For (1) The touching of unclean persons and things was not, in all cases, sinful, or the transgression of any particular, positive law given to the *Israelites*. On the contrary, it was, in many cases, a real duty, founded upon the great laws both of *necessity* and *charity*. (2) The persons, who were defiled by these pollutions, are, elsewhere, directed to purify themselves, not by the oblation of piacular sacrifices, as in the passage before us, but by such means as were of a quite different nature. They who had touched the carcases of *unclean beasts*, *fowls*, or *reptiles*, or the carcase of a *clean beast* which had died of itself, were required *to be unclean until the evening*, Levit. xi. 24, 27, 31, 39. And the person who did eat of the carcase of a *clean beast*, which had died of itself, or had carried the carcase of an *unclean beast*, was ordered *to wash his clothes*, and *to be unclean until the evening*, Levit. xi. 25, 28, 40. (1) And they who

(1) Between the two methods of *purification*, last mentioned, there seems to be a difference: For, according to the *first*, the defiled persons were only required *to be unclean*, or to remain in a state of separation from the *clean*, *until the evening*; but, according to the *latter*, the *unclean* were to *wash their clothes*, and *to be unclean until the evening*. But this,

who touched, or were touched by, a man, or woman, under their *uncleanness*, were ordered to *wash their clothes*, and to *bathe their bodies in water*, and to be *unclean until the evening*. Levit. xv. 5—11. and v. 19—27. And the persons who were defiled by the dead, (*i. e.* by touching the *dead body* of a man, or a *grave*, or the *bone* of a dead man; or by being present in the house, or tent, when a man *died*, or by coming into it while his *dead body* remained in it) were purified by having the water of purification sprinkled on them on the third and seventh days after they had been defiled, and by *washing their clothes*, and *bathing their flesh in water*, Numb. xix. 19.—The persons, likewise, that were defiled by those who were defiled by the *dead*, either by touching them, or being touched by them, or sprinkling the *water of purification* upon them, were directed to purify themselves, by *washing their clothes*, and being *unclean until the evening*, Numb. xix. 21, 22.—These were the different ways in which the persons, defiled by the *ceremonial uncleanness* under consideration, were directed and ordered to purify themselves; not by the oblation of piacular sacrifices; but by being *unclean until the evening*; or by *washing their clothes* and *bathing their flesh in water*, and being *unclean until the evening*; or by being *sprinkled with the water of purification*.—Wherefore, since the touching of unclean persons and things was, in many cases, a duty, and not a sin; and since the *uncleanness*, contracted by touching unclean persons and things, was not ordered to be purged by the oblation of sacrifice, but by other means; I conclude, that the piacular sacrifices, mentioned in the passage under consideration, were not offered to purify the *unclean* from pollutions of this kind; and that these *pollutions* were not the sins for which those sacrifices were ordered to be offered,—But to proceed a step further, I observe,

Secondly.

this, perhaps, may be only a seeming, and not a real difference. For as the being *unclean until the evening*, sometimes implies the *washing of clothes*, and the *bathing of the body*, in *water*; see Levit. xv. 5. compared with v. 10. so it may imply the same in the cases here mentioned. But be this as it will, it is certain, that the *unclean*, whether cleansed in the one, or in the other of the two methods mentioned, were not purified by the oblation of piacular sacrifice.

Secondly. That, in scripture-phraſeology, the *cause* or *occasion* of a thing is often put for the thing itſelf, and *vice verſa*. Thus *ſin* is put for the *puniſhment of ſin*; Gen. iv. 7. And, indeed, this phraſeology is ſo common and frequent in ſcripture, that it is needleſs to mention any more inſtances of it here. Wherefore, ſince the touching of unclean perſons and things, was not the ſin for which the peculiar ſacrifices, mentioned in the paſſage under conſideration, were ordered to be offered; it is natural, and agreeable to ſcripture-phraſeology, to think, that the touching of thoſe unclean perſons or things is put for the ſin of which it was the *cause* or *occasion*; and this I take to be no other than *the ſin of defiling the tabernacle*, by coming to it, and joining in the worſhip there performed, under thoſe *uncleanneſſes*: For, as the unclean were expreſſly forbidden to come near the tabernacle, and to join with the congregation in the worſhip there performed; and were told, that they would, by ſo doing, *defile the tabernacle of God*; this *defiling of the tabernacle* ſeems to be the only ſin of which their *uncleanneſſes* could be the *cause* or *occasion*. And the probability, that this was the ſin of which the offenders of this claſs were guilty, is much ſtrengthened by this circumſtance, that the ſin is ſaid *to be hidden*, and the perſons, who were guilty of it, are repreſented as being *ignorant* of the ſin at the time of the commiſſion of it, and as coming to the *knowledge* of it afterwards: For, upon the ſuppoſition, that an *Iſraelite* had contracted ſome ceremonial pollution, without knowing that he had contracted it, is it not natural to think, that he would neglect to purify himſelf from it, and, at the ſame time, continue to join with the congregation in the tabernacle-worſhip, and, by ſo doing, *defile the tabernacle of God*? Indeed, I cannot ſee, how he could avoid the commiſſion of this ſin, in the ſuppoſed circumſtance of *ignorance*, provided he had an opportunity to commit it.

Thirdly. Upon the ſuppoſition, then, that *defiling the tabernacle* through ignorance, was the ſin which I am enquiring after, 'tis eaſy to ſee, how reaſonable it was, not only to provide, and admit of, an expiation for it, but to make that expiation as eaſy as poſſible

to the offenders. The sin, tho' it was of a very heinous nature, when it was committed *knowingly* and *wilfully*; yet, when it was committed thro' *ignorance*, it was of a much less grievous nature: For tho' the ignorance, from which it proceeded, was not altogether excusable, because the guilty ought to have been more watchful; yet there were many things to extenuate the sin. Not only were the cases, in which the *Israelites* might have been defiled through *ignorance*, many, and the occasions frequent; but, in many cases, there were such incidents as were sufficient to swallow up all their thoughts, and render them inattentive to the pollution which they contracted, such as, unexpected losses, great surprise, excessive grief for the sufferings or death of near and dear relatives, and compassion for the miserable, together with a laudable care and concern to minister to their ease and relief; things which commonly and naturally divert the attention of men both from what they do themselves, and from what is done to them by others. To all which add, that as ceremonial pollution was contracted by *touching the unclean*, or by being *touched by them*, the most watchful would, sometimes, be off their guard, and in danger of being defiled; for who is it that can, at all times, advert to all his own motions, or to those of other people?—In cases, therefore, of offence, so circumstanced, it was highly reasonable, and consistent with true wisdom and goodness, to grant the indulgence aforesaid.

Wherefore, to conclude; since ceremonial uncleanness could not have been the sin for which piacular oblations were ordered to be offered in the passage under consideration; and since it is agreeable to scripture-phrasology, to conceive, that, in this passage, *ceremonial uncleanness*, unknowingly contracted, is put for the sin of which it was the *cause* or *occasion*, that is, for the sin of *defiling the tabernacle*, by coming near it, and joining in, or performing, any part of the worship there to be performed; and since, withal, it is reasonable to think, that it was perfectly consistent with the wisdom and goodness of God, to provide an expiation for this sin, when thus committed through ignorance; it is highly probable,

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that *defiling the tabernacle of God*, in the manner mentioned, under ceremonial uncleanness, unknowingly contracted, was the sin for which piacular oblations were ordered to be offered in the passage under consideration.—And if this was the sin for which these oblations were appointed to be offered, 'tis very manifest, that a *real and literal remission* of that sin was obtained by them. For,

1st. The penalty, which was awarded, in the *Law of Moses*, against the sin of *defiling the tabernacle*, was, *excision from among their people*, or, *the dying in their transgressions*, Levit. vii. 20, 21. —xv. 31. Numb. xix. 13, 20.

2^{dly}. When the priest had made atonement for the offender, by offering the prescribed piacular oblation for his sin, this penalty was remitted to him; so that he was not to be cut off from among his people, or to die in his transgression: For it is expressly said, *the sin which he hath sinned shall be forgiven him*, Levit. v. 10, 13. —To what has been said I shall only add, that if we could make no discovery either of the sin, which is mentioned in the passage under consideration, or of the punishment which was annexed to it; yet there is sufficient reason for thinking, that a *real remission* of the punishment of some real sin was obtained by the oblation of the prescribed sacrifices; because the words of *Moses*, upon any other supposition, would have no sense or meaning at all.

§ 14. (4) Another instance of a *real and literal remission*, obtained, under the *Law of Moses*, by piacular oblations, is, the remission of the sin of perjury, or false swearing, in witness-bearing. Concerning this sin, and the way and manner of the expiation of it, *Moses* thus speaks, *If a soul sin, and hear the voice of swearing, (m) and is a witness, whether he hath seen or known of it, if he do* not

(m) קול אלה *kol alah*, the voice of swearing. By this some understand *curfing*, or the imprecation of evil upon another person. But such persons do not consider that the word אלה no where bears this sense. This Hebrew noun has two significations only.—1st It signifies an oath or adjuration. Then shalt thou be free מאלתי *mealathi*, from my oath; the oath which *Abraham* made his servant swear to take a wife for his son *Isaac* from among his kindred, Gen. xxiv. 41.—And the priest shall charge her (the woman whose

not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity.—And it shall be, when he shall be guilty,—that he shall confess that he hath sinned in that thing. And he shall bring his trespass-offering unto the Lord for his sin which he hath sinned, a female from the flock, a lamb, or a kid of the goats, for a sin-offering. And the priest shall make an atonement for him concerning his sin, Levit. v. 1, 5, 6.—If the offender was poor,

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whose virtue was suspected by her husband) with האלה *haalab*, an oath of adjuration, Numb. v. 21.—The priest shall write these, האלות *haaloth*, (the form and words of adjuration, as appears from the context) curses in a book, v. 23.—That thou shouldest enter into covenant, with the Lord thy God, וּבְאֵלָתוֹ *ubealatho*, and into his oath, Deut. xxix. 12.—Neither with you only do I make this covenant, and this האלה *haalab*, oath, v. 14.—And it came to pass when he heareth the words of, האלה *haalab*, of this curse, that is, of this oath, or adjuration, in which the party swearing bound himself under a certain punishment, or curse, to fulfil the covenant which he had made with God, as appears from the context, v. 19. And, to mention no more instances, If any man trespass against his neighbour, and there be laid upon him אלה *alah*, an oath to cause him to swear, &c. 1 Kings viii. 31. 2dly. In other places, the Hebrew noun אלה signifies the evil, punishment, or curse, which a person brings upon himself by breach of oath; the event or effect being expressed by that which is the cause or occasion of it, by a common and usual figure of speech. Thus it is used in the following texts, viz. Numb. v. 21. The Lord make thee, (the married woman who had committed adultery) לאלה *lealah*, a curse and an oath among thy people, when he causeth thy thigh to rot, and thy belly to swell.—v. 27. The woman shall be לאלה *lealah*, a curse among her people; i. e. she shall be visibly and signally punished for her perjury.—Deut. xxix. 20. The Lord's jealousy shall smoke against that man, (i. e. who had broken the covenant which he had sworn to keep, v. 10—15) and all האלה *haalab*, the curse written in this book shall lie upon him.—v. 21. The Lord shall separate him unto evil, according to all, אלות *aloth*, the curses of the covenant.—Chap. xxx. 7. And the Lord thy God will put all these, האלות *haaloth*, curses (which were due to the Israelites, when they brake the covenant which they had sworn to keep) upon thine enemies.

These two are the only senses in which I find the Hebrew noun אלה any where used. And it is very manifest, that, in the passages now before us, it doth not signify the punishment or curse which is due to a person for breach of oath; because it doth not there denote punishment, but something that was audibly pronounced or uttered by the voice of a person; something that might be heard by the ear, and, upon the hearing of which, a person might sin, and act in a wrong manner. It must, therefore, bear the other sense in this passage, and signify an oath or adjuration: consequently, the voice of swearing doth there signify, The words of an oath or adjuration audibly pronounced by one person, in the hearing of another person, with a design to bind or oblige that other person to declare what he knows about some matter in dispute, or to perform some promise.

he was permitted to offer for his sin *two turtles, or two young pigeons*, v. 7—10. And if he was not of ability to be at the charge of these, he was ordered to offer for his trespass *the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour*, v. 11.—13.—But whichsoever of these he offered, when the priest had made an atonement for him with it, the punishment, due to his sin, was remitted; for it is expressly said, *the sin which he hath sinned shall be forgiven him*, v. 10, 13.

The following observations will shew us, that the remission of sin, mentioned in this passage, was real and literal, and not nominal or figurative.

When a person was required, by proper authority, to give his oath in any cause, as an evidence, or witness; if he refused to give his oath, and to discover what he knew of the matter in dispute, he was guilty of *a contempt of authority*; and for that crime he was ordered to be put to death, *Numb. xv. 30, 31. Deut. xvii. 12, 13*. In cases, therefore, of this nature, no expiation was appointed or admitted; nor, consequently, was the remission of the sin to be expected.

When any person did, as an evidence, or witness, give his oath in a *court of justice*, but prevaricated and acted dishonestly, either by saying things which he knew to be false, or by concealing what he had seen, or known, in whole or in part; penalties were ordered to be inflicted upon this sort of offenders, proportioned to the several degrees of injury occasioned by their perjury in witness-bearing. For,

1st. If the injury, which was the result of the *perjury*, did affect the persons of other people, the law of *retaliation* was appointed to take place; so that the false swearer was to suffer in his own person, those very evils which he had brought upon others by his perjury. *Life was to go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, &c.* Deut. xix. 16—21.—*No satisfaction was to be taken for the life of a murderer*, Numb. xxxv. 31. And, therefore, when the false swearer did swear away the life of a man, his life was, without remedy, to go for his life.—But, in all other cases of personal injury, arising from *perjury* in witness-bearing, if the offender

offender had sinned through *error* or human frailty only, and was penitent for what he had done, and, as a testimony of the sincerity of his penitence, confessed his sin; he was ordered, as in the passage before us, to offer a *trespass-offering* for his offence, with which the priest made atonement *for the sin which he had sinned* which being done, that sin *was forgiven him*, or he was released from the punishment which was due to him by the law of *retaliation*.

2dly. If the injury, which was the result of perjury, in witness-bearing, did affect the *property* of other persons, that injury would be of the nature of a *trespass*; consequently, the false swearer would be obnoxious to the penalties which were awarded in cases of trespass, *that is*, he would be liable to make a *double, quadruple, or quintuple* restitution. But, in this case, as in the foregoing, if the perjured person had sworn falsely through *error* or human frailty, and was penitent for his sin, and confessed it, he was ordered to offer a *trespass-offering* for his sin, which being offered by the priest, to make atonement for it, that sin *was forgiven him*, or he was discharged from the punishment of making a double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution.

In both the cases mentioned, therefore, 'tis evident, that *the remission of sin*, obtained by the oblation of the prescribed piacular sacrifices, was real and literal, and not nominal or figurative.

§ 15. (5) Another instance of a *real and literal remission of sin*, obtained, under the *Law of Moses*, by piacular oblations, is, that of *the sin of profane, heedless swearing by the name of God*. Of this sin, and of the piacular oblations which were appointed to be offered for the expiation of it, *Moses* gives us an account, in the following words, *If a soul swear, pronouncing with his lips, to do evil, or to do good; whatsoever it shall be that a man shall pronounce with an oath, and it be hid from him; when he knoweth of it, then he shall be guilty. (n)—And it shall be, when he shall be guilty,—that he shall confess*

(n). That *profane, heedless swearing* by the name of God, is the sin here described, will appear to any one who considers, (1) That the *Israelites* were prohibited to swear by any thing but the name of God. (2) That the swearing, here mentioned, is described as being *hid* from the offender, and as *coming to his knowledge* afterwards; and these are the peculiar characteristics of profane, heedless swearing, it being simply impossible, that any

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confess that he hath sinned in that thing. And he shall bring his trespass-offering unto the Lord, for his sin which he hath sinned, a female from the flock, a lamb, or a kid of the goats, for a sin-offering; and the priest shall make an atonement for him concerning the sin which he hath sinned, Levit. v. 4—6.—If the offender was poor, he was permitted to offer, in place of this expensive sacrifice, two turtle-doves, or two young pigeons, v. 7—10. And, if he was not of ability to afford this oblation, he was indulged further, and was ordered to offer the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour for his sin. v. 11—13.

Although swearing by the name of God, with becoming reverence, be, in many cases, not only a real duty, but an homage which is due to the Deity; yet swearing lightly and profanely by his name, without any reason or necessity, is a sin of a very heinous nature, as being an indication of great irreverence, and of an high contempt of him. For which reason, the persons, who were guilty of it, were threatened with severe and exemplary punishment by the *Law of Moses*. In the general, they were told, *That the Lord would not hold them guiltless, Exod. xx. 7.* And, in particular, it was enacted, that they should be stoned to death, *Levit. xxiv. 16. He that blasphemeth (Heb. mentioneth or pronounceth) the name of the Lord, (o) he shall surely be put to death; all the congregation shall certainly stone him.*

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any person should swear by the name of God, without knowing it, but by a gross inadvertency to his own words. (3) That the swearing here mentioned, *whether it was to do evil or to do good*, was sinful; which can be true of profane heedless swearing only; because, in this case, the evil quality, or sinfulness, of the action, doth not depend either on the good or evil of the things which the person swears to do; but on the irreverence for God, which he shews, by mentioning his name with so little awe and respect, that he neither knows nor minds what he saith.

(4) That *blaspheming the name of the Lord*, in the text here quoted, was the sin of swearing profanely, lightly, and without reverence, by the name of God, and, consequently, the same sin which is mentioned *Levit. v. 4.* will appear from the following observations.

The occasion of enacting the Law, *Levit. xxiv. 16.* by which it was awarded, that death should be the punishment of *blasphemy*, was, the profane behaviour of the son of an *Israelitish* woman, (who had married an *Egyptian*) who, in the heat of a quarrel with a
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As men could not be incited to the commission of this sin, by any of the common motives and temptations by which they are led into the practice of other sins, such as, the love of sensual pleasure, the man of Israel, is said to have blasphemed the name of the Lord, and to have cursed, v. 10, 11.

Of the crime of this son of the Israelitish woman there were two distinct parts, viz. cursing and blasphemy. This is evident from the distinct law which was made for the punishment of each of these crimes. The law for the punishment of cursing God, is expressed in these words, *Whoever curseth his God, shall bear his sin*, v. 15. And the law, made for the punishment of the blasphemer, is thus expressed, *He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death*, v. 16.—It is the latter of these crimes only, that I am concerned to consider here. And in order to shew, that it was the same sin with that of swearing lightly and profanely, and without due reverence, by the name of God, it will be necessary to settle the signification and sense of the Hebrew words, which are rendered, *He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord*. For this end, I observe.

That the sin of the son of the Israelitish woman is thus expressed v. 11. וַיִּקְבֹּה הַשֵּׁם *vajikkobh haschem*, he mentioned or pronounced the name. And, in the law, enacted for the punishment of that sin, it is said, v. 16. וְנִקְבַּה שֵׁם יְהוָה *vanokebh shem Jehovah*, He that mentioneth or pronounceth the name of the Lord &c. The sin, therefore, of the son of the Israelitish woman did consist in mentioning or pronouncing the name of the Lord in a sinful manner, that is, profanely, and without due reverence.

To strengthen this interpretation of these words of Moses, it may be observed, that tho' the original and primary signification of the verb נָקַב *nakabh*, is, to bore, yet, when it is used in a secondary and figurative sense, it always signifies to name, or to mention by name. Gen. xxx. 28. And he said, נָקַבְהָ *nakebha*, name thou thy wages, and I will give it thee.—Isai. lxii. 2. And thou shalt be called by a new name, which the mouth of the Lord יִקְבֶּה *jikkabhenu*, shall name.—Numb. i. 17. Moses and Aaron took these men which נִקְבִּי *nikkebhu*, are expressed by name, or named.—I am not ignorant, that Lexicographers commonly give the signification of cursing to this Hebrew verb. But it ought to be considered, that there is another Hebrew verb (viz. קָבַב *kabbabh*) which signifies to curse; and that there are some tenses of this verb which cannot be distinguished from the same tenses of the verb נָקַב *nakabh*. Wherefore, since it is in these tenses only, which cannot be distinguished from the same tenses of the verb קָבַב *kabbabh*, that the verb נָקַב *nakabh* is supposed to have the signification of cursing, it is highly probable, that these tenses, wherever they occur in the sense of cursing, belong not to the verb נָקַב *nakabh*, but to the verb קָבַב *kabbabh*. This is a thing which is acknowledged by the best and most judicious Lexicographers. See Buxtorf. Lexic. Hebr. et Chald. in Rad. נָקַב.—But, whatever becomes of this criticism, it is most certain, that the verb נָקַב *nakabh* cannot have the signification of cursing in the passage under consideration, for if it had it, there would be a tautology not only in the description of the sin of the Israelitish woman, but also in the words of the short law which was

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the desire of wordly gain or advantage; so it was in few cases, that they could commit it through human frailty, and without a cool, deliberate contempt of God's authority. And, for this reason, the persons who were guilty of it, had seldom any favour shewn to them under the *Law of Moses*.---Indeed, there was only one case, in which this sin could be committed through human frailty, and the guilty could hope for favour and indulgence; and that was, when any person did swear profanely, and without due reverence, by the name of God, without minding what he did, or adverting to the words which he uttered. *Inadvertency* was the only human frailty, through which this sin of profane and irreverent swearing by the name of God, could possibly be committed; for besides this, there was no other branch of *infirmity*, through which men could fall into the commission of it.

Accordingly, the *Law of Moses* provided an expiation for the sin of profane and irreverent swearing by the name of God, in the case of *inadvertency* only, and in no other. For if a person did swear, and the sin, at the time of the commission of it, was *bid* from him, but came to his knowledge afterwards, he was directed in this case, and in this case only, *to confess that he had sinned*, and after that, *to bring a trespass-offering* to be offered for his sin, *a lamb*, or *a kid of the goats*; or, or if he was poor, *two turtle doves* or *two young pigeons*; or, if he could not afford these, *the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour*. And we are told, that when the priest had made an atonement for him, with some one of these oblations; the sin which he was made for the punishment of that sin; which, as the words, in which laws are expressed, ought to be concise, cannot, in reason, be admitted.

To the foregoing observations I add, that the LXX. render the *Hebrew* words, which are a description of the sin of the son of the *Israelitish* woman, thus, *καὶ ἐπονομάσας—το ὄνομα καὶ πατέρα*, i. e. *having named the name, he cursed*. And, when they come to the description of the offender in the law which was made against that sin, they render the *Hebrew* thus, *Ὀνομαζὼν το ὄνομα κυρίου*, i. e. *He who nameth the name of the Lord*.

These observations give strength to each other, and prove, I think, that the sin, condemned *Levit. xxiv. 16*. was the sin of swearing profanely, wantonly, and without reverence, by the name of God; and the same with the sin mentioned *Levit. v. 4*.

he had sinned was to be forgiven him; or, in other words, he was to be discharged from the capital punishment which he had incurred by the sin of prophane and irreverent swearing by the name of God.—This, therefore, is a plain, undeniable instance of a real and literal remission of sin, obtained, under the *Law of Moses*, by piacular oblations.

To conclude, the foregoing five instances are instances of so many particular cases, mentioned in the *Law of Moses*, in which piacular oblations were directed and ordered to be offered for sin. And, under each of them, I have considered the sin therein mentioned, and shewn what the positive punishment, denounced in the *Law of Moses* against it, was: And the express words of *Moses*, or rather, of God by *Moses*, tells us, that, when atonement was made for the offender, by the oblation of the prescribed sacrifice, the sin, that is, the punishment awarded in the law against it, was to be forgiven him.—It is, therefore, evident, that, in all and each of these cases, a real and literal remission of sin was obtained by the oblation of piacular sacrifices.

§ 16. But the few cases mentioned, tho' very comprehensive, were not the only ones in which a real and literal remission of sin was obtained by the oblation of piacular sacrifices. For the real pardon of all sins of error whatsoever (*that is*, of all sins which were the result of human frailty) was obtainable by the same means, whether they were committed by the whole congregation, or by any single member of it. This is evident from the following passages, viz. *If the whole congregation of Israel sin through ignorance, and the thing be hid from the eyes of the assembly, and they have done somewhat against ANY of the commandments of the Lord, concerning things which ought not to be done.—When the sin, which they have sinned against it, is known, then they shall offer a young bullock for the sin,—and it shall be forgiven, Lev. iv. 13—20.* And still to the same purpose, *If ye have erred, and not observed ALL these commandments which the Lord hath spoken unto Moses;—then it shall be, if OUGHT be committed*
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by ignorance, without the knowledge of the congregation, (p) that all the congregation shall offer one young bullock for a burnt-offering,—and one kid of the goats for a sin-offering. And the priest shall make atonement for all the congregation of Israel, and it shall be forgiven them, Numb. xv. 22—25.—The like provision was made for the expiation of all the sins of error of single persons, whether committed through ignorance, or other infirmities of nature, as appears from the following passages,—If the priest that is anointed, do sin according to the sin of the people; then let him bring for the sin which he hath sinned, a young bullock without blemish unto the Lord for a sin-offering, &c. Levit. iv. 3.—When a ruler hath sinned, and done somewhat through ignorance (Heb. error) against ANY of the commandments of the Lord his God,—and is guilty; or, if his sin, which he hath sinned, come to his knowledge; (q) he shall bring his offering, a kid of the goats, a male without

(p) If the thing be hid from the eyes of the assembly;—If ought be committed without the knowledge of the congregation;—When the sin, which they have sinned, is known.—In these several expressions, we have a plain description of sins of ignorance, properly so called.—Sins of this sort were the only ones which the whole congregation could commit through human frailty. For it is absurd to suppose, that the whole congregation could, at any time, be under the actual influence of any one of those passions or sensual appetites, which are too often the causes of misconduct in single persons. And as these were the only sins of error or infirmity that could be committed by the whole congregation; so they were the only sins of the congregation, for the expiation of which piacular sacrifices were instituted.

(q) From the manner of the expression here used, in the description of these sins of a ruler, and of a common man, for which sin-offerings were appointed to be offered, 'tis manifest, that piacular sacrifices were instituted, and ordered to be offered, for other sins besides those of ignorance, properly so called; even for all sins committed against ANY of the commandments of the Lord, provided they proceeded from error or human frailty. For, in the description of these sins there is an *alternative* which is not found in the description of the sins of the congregation, for which piacular sacrifices were ordered to be offered, viz. *When he* (the offender) *doth any thing through ignorance*, i. e. through error or human frailty, as I have shewn before; *Or*, (the other part of the *alternative*) *if the sin, which he hath sinned*, (viz. through mistake, inattention, or inadvertency) *come to his knowledge*; he shall (in either of these two cases) *bring his offering*, &c.

From what I have said here, and in the foregoing *marginal note*, it plainly appears, that piacular oblations were appointed to be offered for all sins of error or human frailty, in

without blemish:—And the priest shall make atonement for him as concerning his sin, and it shall be forgiven him, Levit. iv. 22—26.—And if any of the common people sin through ignorance (Heb. error) while he doth somewhat against ANY of the commandments of the Lord, concerning somewhat which ought not to be done, and be guilty; or, if his sin, which he hath sinned come to his knowledge; then he shall bring his offering, a kid of the goats, a female without blemish, for his sin which he hath sinned.—And the priest shall make atonement for his sin that he hath sinned, and it shall be forgiven him. And if he bring a lamb for a sin-offering, he shall bring it a female without blemish; &c. Levit. iv. 27—35. See also, Levit. v. 17, 18. Numb. xv. 27—29.

That the remission of sin, mentioned in these several passages, was a real, and not a nominal or figurative remission, is evident, I think, from the very words of Moses, viz. *The sin shall be forgiven them or him.* For I cannot see, how Moses could, with any truth or propriety, have said so, if, indeed, no real remission of sin, no actual release from any deserved punishment, was intended to be granted.

§ 17. But, the remission of sin, being the remission of the punishment of it; and there being many sins, against which no determinate punishment was awarded in the Law of Moses; some, perhaps, may argue, that there could be no room for granting the remission of sin, in cases where no determinate punishment was awarded against sin: consequently, that a real remission of sin could not be obtained in such cases as these, by the oblation of piacular sacrifices.

Ans. To this objection I answer, that tho' there are sins, prohibited by the Law of Moses, against which no special determinate punishments

in general, whether knowingly or unknowingly committed: which is a further confirmation of what I have said before concerning this affair: only it must be remembered, that such crimes as had a direct and immediate tendency to the ruin of society, and were of the nature of high-treason under a theocratic government, are here to be excepted. For no expiation was provided or admitted for such crimes as these, unless they were committed through mistake, and without any ill intention.

punishments are denounced; yet there is good reason to think, that every act of disobedience did render offenders, even in these cases, obnoxious to a real positive punishment. This is highly probable from the very nature of laws: For, to use the words of the great Mr. *Locke* here “ Since it would be utterly in vain, to suppose a
 “ rule set to the free actions of men, without annexing to it some
 “ enforcement of good and evil to determine his will; we must,
 “ wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punish-
 “ ment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelli-
 “ gent being to set a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not
 “ in his power to reward the compliance with, and punish the de-
 “ viation from his rule, by some good and evil that is not the
 “ natural product or consequence of the action itself. For that,
 “ being a natural convenience or inconvenience, would operate of
 “ it self, without a law. This if I mistake not, is the nature of
 “ all law, properly so called.” (r)—And what this great man deduces, in this manner, from the light of nature, concerning the nature of all law in general, the writer of *the epistle to the Hebrews* expressly affirms concerning the *Law of Moses* in particular: *The word, says he, spoken by angels, was stedfast; and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompence of reward*, Heb. ii. 2.—And the truth of this affirmation is evident from the provision which, in fact, was made by the *Law of Moses*, for the punishment of those sins against which no particular, determinate punishments were awarded: For, in all cases of this kind, the judges, who were intrusted with the execution of the law, were invested with a discretionary power, to punish offenders, within a certain limited degree of punishment. *Deut. xxv. 1—3.*—Not only so, but, in all cases, wherein the judges either neglected their duty, or could not perform it, God reserved the execution of the law in his own hands.—The *Israelites* were commanded to *keep the words of the covenant, and to do them, that they might prosper in all that they did.* But, if there was any person, man or woman, who did not keep these words, and do them, but turned

(r) *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book II. Ch. xxviii. § 6.

ed aside to the practice of idolatry and vice; so that when he heard the words of the covenant, it came to pass, that he blessed himself, saying, I shall have peace though I walk in the imagination of my heart, to add drunkenness to thirst; the Israelites are told, That the Lord would not spare this person, but his anger and jealousy would smoke against him; that all the curses that are written in this book should lie upon him; that the Lord would blot out his name from under heaven, and separate him unto evil out of all the tribes of Israel, according to all the curses of this covenant that are written in this book of the law, Deut. xxix. 9—21. (s) From all which it is manifest, that, under the Law of Moses, a real positive punishment was annexed to every sin, or act of disobedience, though the quantity and degree, and perhaps the kind, of the punishment, was, in many cases, left to the determination of the judges; and the execution of it was, sometimes, reserved by God in his own hands. And since a real positive punishment was annexed to every act of disobedience by the Law of Moses, 'tis plain, that the remission of any sin, done against that law, was, in it self, a possible thing.

§ 18. Besides the objection, which I have been considering, there are others which may be made to the doctrine which I have been inculcating; and some of them have actually been made to it: And therefore, it will be proper, to state the principal of these objections, and to consider the real weight and strength of them, before I proceed any further.

§ 19. Obj. I. It may be objected; that piacular oblations were, in themselves, insignificant and worthless, and such as the Deity could receive no manner of advantage from; and, therefore, they could have no real efficacy to procure the remission of sin, or a discharge from the punishment of it.

Ans. w.

(s) The curses which are written in the book of the law, are recorded, Levit. xxvi. 14—39. Deut. xxviii. 15—68, &c. Many of them are such as are calculated for the punishment of a political body of men; and others of them are such as may be inflicted on single persons, without affecting the public.

Ans. The whole strength of this *objection* lies in this, that the remission of sin depends solely and wholly on the sinner's offering something to God that is of worth and value to him; something whereby he may be profited, as being conducive to make some new addition either to his happiness, or to his property, or to his personal perfection and excellence. But since these are naturally incapable of being enlarged, or made greater than they are, by any thing that man can do, or offer; if the remission of sins depend on this, 'tis plain, that it is absolutely unattainable by any sort of *sacrifice*, or by *repentance*, or any other mean whatsoever. They, therefore, who make this *objection*, would do well to consider its real tendency, before they urge it, or lay any stress upon it.

§ 20. *Obj.* II. The piacular oblations, which were offered under the *Law of Moses*, could not derive their efficacy to purge away sin from any thing but the *appointment* of God, ordering them to be offered for that end; and, therefore, they could not, of themselves, have any *real efficacy* to procure the remission of sin.

Ans. This *objection* has the same general tendency as the foregoing, and proves too much, if it proves any thing at all.—For, if all *real efficacy* to procure the remission of sin, be denied to the legal sacrifices, because they could have no efficacy that way, but what they derived from *divine appointment*; then, for the same reason, all efficacy, of that kind, must be denied to all sacrifices whatsoever: And so the efficacy of *Christ's* sacrifice will be on the very same foot with that of the legal sacrifices.—The Deity, in bringing about his ends, generally makes use of means, and the means which he appoints and makes use of (which is a proof and testimony of his infinite and unerring wisdom) always have a natural fitness, tendency, or efficacy, to produce the intended effects. This natural fitness, tendency, or efficacy, they have of themselves, and from their own nature, antecedently to divine appointment: Yea, the divine appointment of them to be means, in reference to such and such *ends*, plainly supposes this antecedent fitness, tendency, or efficacy, call it which you please.—And this is all the efficacy to procure the remission of sin, that I contend for, on behalf of the legal sacrifices:

sacrifices: a natural fitness, tendency, or efficacy (as *means* appointed by infinite wisdom) to accomplish the *end* which they were intended to subserve.—And, that they actually had such a natural fitness and real efficacy as this, to procure the remission of sins for penitent sinners, will appear, with sufficient evidence, when I come to consider the way and manner in which they produced their *effects*.

§ 21. *Obj.* III. The piacular oblations, which were offered under the *Law of Moses*, were only types of the sacrifice of *Christ*; and, therefore, could of themselves, have no efficacy to procure a true and real remission of sin for those who offered them.

Ans. Though this be a very common *objection*, yet it is not easy to comprehend the drift and force of it.—If the meaning of it be this, that the legal sacrifices had no real efficacy at all to procure the remission of those sins for which they were offered: and, that though the remission of sin is mentioned in the *Levitical* law as being the effect of them, yet that effect was not produced by them, but is attributed to them, in a figurative and improper sense only, as being *types* of the sacrifice of *Christ*, by which the remission of sin, ascribed to them, was really procured: I say, if this be the meaning of the *objection*, as I am apt to think it is, then I answer, 1st. That the *objection* is of no weight at all, because it contains no argument in proof of the point in dispute, nor, indeed any thing but bare assertions, which ought to be proved to be true, but are not. 2^{dly}. It is so far from being true, that the piacular sacrifices, offered under the *Law of Moses*, could not procure a true and real remission of sin, because they were *types* of the sacrifice of *Christ*; that their being *types* of that sacrifice is, in it self, a good and strong proof of the contrary.—A *type* being a figure, pattern, or copy of some *original*, one thing cannot be the *type* of another thing, unless it be a model or representation of it.—Wherefore, the legal sacrifices could not have been *types* of the sacrifice of *Christ*, unless they had produced an effect similar in kind, tho' different in degree and duration. If no real remission of sin was procured by the legal sacrifices, how could those sacrifices have been *types*, that is, *models* or *representations*, of the sacrifice of *Christ*, by which the eternal remission of all
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sin is procured for all penitent sinners?—This *objection*, therefore, destroys itself, and is a proof of the truth of that which it is intended to confute.

§ 22. *Obj. IV.* The writer of *the epistle to the Hebrews* says in express words, *It is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins.* And, to the same purpose, *The priests, under the law stood daily ministering and offering the same sacrifices which can never take away sin*, Heb. x. 4. 11.

Answ. Many, I doubt not, have been led, by those words of this inspired writer, to conclude, that the legal sacrifices did not procure any true and real remission of sin. And yet, if this writer's argument, and the connection and scope of his reasoning, be duly considered, there will appear to be little or no ground for such a conclusion.

The thing, which the inspired writer labours to prove, in the place where the objected passages occur, is this, that the legal sacrifices, which were offered to expiate sin, could not fully answer that end, forasmuch as they could not procure for the offerers, an eternal remission of sin, or the remission of the future punishment of it in the world to come, as well as the remission of those temporal punishments which were denounced against it in the *Law of Moses*: But that this defect was fully and effectually remedied by the one sacrifice which *Christ* once offered of himself: For that sacrifice doth what the legal sacrifices could not do, even *perfect forever them that are sanctified*, by procuring for them an eternal remission of their sins.

The first argument, which the writer of this *epistle* advances in proof of this point, is, that the *Law of Moses*, by which the oblation of piacular sacrifices was enjoined, *being a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image*, or an exact and perfect similitude, of them; the piacular sacrifices, which were offered under it, must, of course, have been *shadows* and imperfect similitudes of some good thing to come, (*i. e.* of the sacrifices of *Christ*) and not *exact images* or perfect resemblances of it: consequently, being only *shadows*, and imperfect resemblances of this good thing to come, the effect which they produced, though of a similar nature to that of the

the sacrifice of which they were *shadows*, must yet have been different and much inferior in degree: *i. e.* whatever remission of sin the legal sacrifices did procure, yet that remission could not be the *eternal remission* of sin, or the remission of the punishment of it in the world to come; for this was to be the effect of the sacrifice of *Christ*, of which these legal sacrifices were not the *very image*, or an exact and perfect resemblance, but only *shadows*. The law, says he, *having a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things, can never, with these sacrifices which they offered year by year, make the comers thereto* (or the worshippers) *FOREVER perfect*; *i. e.* by procuring for them an eternal remission of their sins, or a release from the punishment of them in the world to come, Heb. x. 1. (t)

The 2d argument, whereby the inspired writer proves the point aforesaid, is this, If the legal sacrifices had procured an eternal remission of sins, they would not have ceased to be offered; or there would have been no reason to abolish them, and to substitute another sacrifice in their place; because *the worshippers*, (or offerers) *being once purged*, (or forever released from the punishment of sin) *would have had no more conscience of sin*, *i. e.* no reason to fear further punishment for sin; and, consequently, no need of any other sacrifice, v. 2.—But, (so far was this from being the effect of the legal sacrifices, that) *in those sacrifices, there is a remembrance again made of sin every year*, v. 3.—For the high-priest was required

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(t) Heb. x. 1.—Καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ταῖς αὐταῖς θυσίαις αὖς προσφέρουσιν, εἰς τὸ διηνεκές ἁδεποῖε δύνασθαι τὰς προσερχομένους τελειῶσαι. Our translators place a comma after the words εἰς τὸ διηνεκές, and connect them with the words which go before; but, because the scope and drift of the apostle's argument and reasoning, in the subsequent context, requires it, I put a comma after προσφέρουσιν, and connect the words εἰς τὸ διηνεκές with those which follow them. The effect, ascribed to the sacrifice of *Christ*, v. 14. is, *τελειῶσκει εἰς τὸ διηνεκές*, *it hath perfected forever* (or procured the eternal remission of sin for) *them that are sanctified*. That, therefore, which is here denied to the legal sacrifices, must be this, that they could *τελειῶσαι τὰς προσερχομένους εἰς τὸ διηνεκές*, *perfect the worshippers forever*, by procuring for them an eternal remission of sins; so that being *once purged* from sin by them, *they should have no more conscience of sin*, or no ground to fear further punishment. See Dr. Whitby's notes on v. 1, 12, and 14, of this chapter.

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every year, *viz.* on the day of *expiation*, to confess, over the head of the *scape-goat*, *all the iniquities of the Israelites, and all their transgressions in all their sins*; to make atonement for them, that they might be clean from all their sins; and to send the *scape-goat* away into a land not inhabited, bearing upon him, emblematically, *all their iniquities*: and while these things were a doing by the high-priest, they themselves were required, to afflict their souls for these their sins, *Lev. xvi. 21, 22, 30, 31.*—This repeated, yearly oblation of piacular sacrifice for ALL their sins, even for those sins for which the same and other piacular sacrifices had been formerly offered, and their being called to afflict their souls for these their sins, on a set day, every year, was a repeated *remembrance* made of their sins, as if they had neither been forgotten nor forgiven; an intimation, therefore, that though the punishments, denounced against their sins in the *Law of Moses*, had been forgiven, yet all future punishment of them was not forgiven; and that such an ample and durable *remission of sins* was not to be obtained by the legal sacrifices: for had these sacrifices been as efficacious to procure the remission of the punishment of sin in the world to come, as they were to procure the remission of those temporal punishments, which were denounced against it in the *Law of Moses*; there would have been no reason for calling the sins, for which they had been offered, so frequently to remembrance, as sins which still needed to be expiated, by a repeated oblation of these sacrifices. But since this was appointed to be done, there must have been a reason for the appointment: and that appointment was a clear intimation, that sacrifices, thus repeated, year after year, in order to take away the same sins, or the punishment of the same sins, could not take them away forever, or procure an eternal remission of sin.—This argument the inspired writer concludes thus, *For it was not possible, that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins.* And the sense of these words must be determined by the *premises* of the argument, of which they are the *conclusion*, and the *scope* of the discourse, of which they are a part; and, therefore, must be this, *viz.* Since there was, in the legal sacrifices, a remembrance again made of sin every year, which was a plain intimation,

mation, that these sacrifices did not exempt the offerers from all future punishment of sin, it was not possible, that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins, or the punishment of sin, FOREVER. This is the only consequence, or conclusion, which follows from the *premises* of the writer's *argument*; and, consequently, the only thing which he can, in reason, be supposed to affirm. And that this was the only thing which he meant to express in this *conclusion* of his argument is further evident from his going on, in the subsequent *verses*, to prove that the legal sacrifices could not procure the remission of sin *forever*, because it was foretold, in the writings of the *old testament*, that they were to be abolished, and another sacrifice to be substituted in their place, which was to effect what they could not, even an *eternal remission of sins*.

The words of the 11th *verse* contain the other part of the *objection* which I am considering, which is, *The priests—stood daily ministring and offering the same sacrifices which can never take away sins—sacrifices which can never take away sins*: The thing, which is affirmed in these words, is the very same with that which is affirmed v. 4. viz. That the legal sacrifices could *never take away sins*: FOREVER, or procure the *eternal remission* of them. This is evident from the *antithesis* which is made between the effect of the legal sacrifices and that of the sacrifice of *Christ*, v. 12, 14. The legal sacrifices, says the inspired writer, *can never take away sins*, viz. FOREVER: But (in opposition to this) *this man*, (i. e. *Christ*) *after he had offered one sacrifice for sin forever, (u) sat down on the right hand of God:—For by that one offering he hath perfected FOREVER them that are sanctified.*—The legal sacrifices could not take away sins, in the sense of *perfecting them that are sanctified* FOREVER, or procure for them the eternal remission of their sins: But this the sacrifice of *Christ* did.

The sum of what I have said in answer to the *objection*, under consideration, is, that the inspired writer's general and indefinite *assertions*,
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(u) Our translators join the words εἰς τὸ ἀΐνεν in construction with ἐκάθισεν, which follows after them: But, because the *Apostle's* reasoning requires it, I place the *comma* after these words, and join them in construction with what goes immediately before.

ons, understood in the sense to which they are limited and restricted by the *premises* contained in his *arguments*, and by the structure and scope of his discourse, amount only to this, *viz.* That the legal sacrifices could not expiate sin FOREVER, or procure the remission of the future punishment of it in the world to come.—But tho' they could not do this, yet they might, and certainly did, procure, for the offerers of them, a real remission of those temporal punishments which were denounced against their sins by the *Law of Moses*. This is what the writer of this *epistle* doth not deny; nor, indeed, doth he at all meddle with it, because it was quite *forreign* to the purpose of his argument, or discourse.

Upon the whole, it appears, that the *remission of sin*, which was obtained, under the *Law of Moses*, by *piacular oblations*, was not a nominal or figurative, but a real and literal remission; and that the best and most plausible *objections*, which can be made to this doctrine, are of no weight. I now proceed,

III. To shew, that, by the *remission of sins*, which was obtained by *piacular oblations*, under the *Law of Moses*, an union or relation, which had been interrupted, was restored between God and penitent sinners.

§. 23. Upon this point I shall say very little, because it is almost self-evident.—Favour constitutes an union or relation, such as subsists between a *benefactor* and the *beneficiary*, or between a *friend* and the *person befriended*. On the other hand, displeasure dissolves that union or relation which *favour* constitutes, and is an obstruction to all the effects of it.—Now, because sin is the natural object of God's displeasure, the commission of it must dissolve that union and relation which, before the commission of it, had subsisted between God as a *friend*, and the offender as a person *favoured* and *befriended* by him.—Whatever, therefore, is conducive to remove the displeasure of God, thus awakened by sin, and to restore the offender to his favour, must be the mean whereby an union or relation, which had been dissolved and interrupted, is again restored.—Wherefore, because the *remission of sin*, which comprehends the *effects* mentioned, was procured by *piacular oblations* under the

Law

Law of Moses, these oblations must have been the *media*, or means, whereby an union or relation, which had been dissolved and interrupted by sin, was restored between God and penitent sinners. They were a *figurative cement*, by which the persons at variance were reunited in friendship. And, on this account, those piacular oblations, by which the *remission of sin* was obtained, are said to *make atonement*, or mentioned as the means whereby *atonement* was made. See *Levit.* iv. 20, 26, 31, 35;—v. 6, 10, 13, 16, 18.—vi. 7. *Numb.* xv. 25, 28. &c.

SECTION III.

Concerning the effect of piacular oblations, under the Law of Moses, considered as being the media, or means; whereby an union or relation was preserved and supported, after it was made or restored.

§ 1. **I**N the two foregoing *sections*, I have shewn, that the piacular oblations, which were offered under the *Law of Moses*, made atonement for penitent sinners in the sense of constituting an union or relation between them and the Deity; and, likewise, in the sense of restoring that union or relation, after it was dissolved and interrupted.—And I am now to shew, that those piacular oblations made atonement for persons of this moral character in a third sense, *viz.* in that of preserving and supporting an union or relation between the Deity and them, after it was made, or restored.

§ 2. I take all the sacrifices, which were not offered with a view either to constitute an original union or relation, or to restore an union or relation which was interrupted or dissolved, to belong to this head: such as, the sacrifices which were offered for the high-priest, and for the whole congregation, immediately after the *Hebrew* nation were joined in covenant with God at mount *Sinai*, and the *priesthood*

priesthood was constituted, and the *tabernacle* reared up, and its whole *apparatus* put in order, *Levit.* ix. 1—22. Which sacrifices may be considered as a figurative *cement* whereby the union or relation, which had been lately made between God and the persons mentioned, was supported and corroborated.—To this head also belong all those piacular oblations which were ordered to be offered, at certain stated times, every day, week, month, and year; such as, the continual *burnt-offering* which was offered morning and evening every day, and was much encreased in value every sabbath-day, *Numb.* xxviii. 3—10. The *burnt-offering* which was offered with the *sheaf of first-fruits*, *Levit.* xxiii. 12. And the costly sacrifices which were offered at the *solemn festivals*, whether monthly or annual; on the *new moons*, *Numb.* xxviii. 11—15. On each of the seven days of the *passover*, *Numb.* xxviii. 16—24. At the *feast of weeks*, *Numb.* xxviii. 26—30. At the *feast of the blowing of trumpets*, *Numb.* xxix. 1—5. On each of the seven days of the *feast of tabernacles*, and on the day following, *Levit.* xxiii. 33—36. *Numb.* xxix. 12—38. And on the day of *expiation*, *Levit.* xvi. 1—30. *Numb.* xxix. 7—11. (w)

§ 3. The sacrifices, now mentioned, were either *burnt-offerings* or *sin-offerings*, consequently, of the piacular kind. And, as such, they must have *made atonement*; for this is the general effect which is ascribed to all *burnt-offerings* and *sin-offerings*, *Levit.* i. 4.—iv. 20, 26, 31, 35. &c. And this effect is always attributed to them, wherever any effect is ascribed to them; and is frequently attributed to them, when no other effect is assigned to them.

§ 4. Now since the piacular sacrifices of this class, did *make atonement*, they must have done this, either by constituting an *original union or relation*, or by restoring an *union or relation* which had been interrupted and dissolved, or by supporting and preserving an *union or relation* which actually existed: For, as I have formerly shewn

(w) The oblation of these sacrifices, which were offered on the day of *expiation*, was intended to convey to the *Israelites* some important instruction, which I shall take notice of, in a proper place. These sacrifices are only considered here as being *means* whereby an *union or relation* was supported or preserved.

shewn, the idea of *making atonement* includes nothing in it, but one or other of these three things. But, in the cases, now under consideration, no *original* union or relation was constituted; nor was there any *dissolved* union, or interrupted relation, to be restored; and, therefore, the only sense, in which the sacrifices of this class could *make atonement*, was that of supporting and preserving an union and relation, which already existed. To illustrate and confirm this further, I shall subjoin the following observations.

§ 5. The union, which subsisted between God and the *Israelites*, was founded on a special compact or covenant. According to the tenor of this covenant, God became their God and King, on the express condition, that they would behave as dutiful, faithful, and loyal subjects, and be obedient to the law which he gave them: and, on the other hand, they actually became his people and subjects, by consenting to have him for their God and King upon the condition proposed to them; and, hereupon, became entitled to all the privileges and blessings of a *theocratic government*. The relation, therefore, in which the *Israelites* considered as a collective body of people, stood to the Deity, was that of *subjects*, or of a *chosen and peculiar people*, entitled to his special care, and to the blessings of his wise, righteous, and good government. See *Exod.* xix. 3—8.—xxiv. 3—8.

§ 6. As *obedience* was the stipulated condition of that covenant into which God entered with the collective body of the *Israelites* 'tis plain, that *penitence* for past sins was included in the condition of that covenant. For unless that people had been penitent for their past sins, and determined to forsake them, they could not have promised obedience to God for the future. Wherefore, it follows, that the union or relation between God and the *Hebrew* nation, which was grounded on the covenant mentioned, was an union or relation between the Deity and a collective body of *penitent sinners*. And this was the union or relation which the oblation of the piacular sacrifices, before-mentioned, did support and preserve.

§ 7. And

union was not dependent on the individuals, but on the collective body

§ 7. And that the oblation of those sacrifices was the mean whereby the union or relation between God and the *Israelites*, aforesaid, was supported and preserved, is very evident; (1) Because the oblation of those sacrifices was a part of the stipulated *obedience* which was the very *basis* of that union or relation. And (2) Because the collective body of the *Israelites* was allowed no intercourse with God as their God and King, nor permitted to come near the place, where he resided among them by a visible symbol of his presence, but only by and through the oblation of the said sacrifices.

The observations and facts, mentioned, are, I think, sufficient to satisfy any fair and candid mind, that the piacular sacrifices, before-mentioned, were the *media*, or means, by which an union or relation between God and the *Hebrew* nation, considered as a collective body of *penitent sinners*, was supported and preserved. And, therefore, I shall enlarge no further upon the proof of this point.

§ 8 Having thus fully considered and explained all the *effects*, which, in the writings of *Moses*, are ascribed to piacular oblations; I shall now conclude this *Chapter*, with a brief recapitulation of the principal things which have been said upon this subject.

In the general, all the piacular oblations, which were offered under the *Law of Moses*, made atonement, either by constituting an original union or relation between the Deity and penitent sinners, or by restoring such an union or relation after it had been dissolved or interrupted, or by preserving and supporting it after it was either made or restored. For, to come to particulars,

First. Those piacular oblations *sanctified* sinners of the penitent character, in the sense of constituting an original union or relation between God and them, either as his *peculiar people*, or as his more immediate and distinguished *servants*, employed by him in particular functions or services.

Secondly. When persons, of the moral character mentioned, were become unfit for the public worship of God in the tabernacle, and for society with his people, by any *ceremonial pollution*; those piacular

lar oblations served, after they became *clean*, to make atonement for them, in the sense of restoring that union between them and God and his people, which had been dissolved or interrupted by their *uncleanness*. —In like manner, when the union or relation of friendship, which subsisted between God and the whole congregation of *Israel*, or between him and any member of that community, happened to be dissolved by the actual commission of any particular sin of *error* (or human frailty) In cases of this nature, likewise, the dissolved union was again restored to the penitent, by the oblation of piacular oblations; or they obtained the remission of the sin, committed, by this mean.

Thirdly. When an union or relation between the Deity and the whole congregation, or any particular member of it, had been made, or restored, by the oblation of the prescribed piacular sacrifices, that union or relation was, afterwards supported and preserved by the frequent and repeated oblation of piacular sacrifices at stated times, prescribed by God. The frequent and repeated oblation of these sacrifices had the same efficacy, as a *cement* often renewed: they served to secure and maintain an union of friendship between the Deity and the offerers.

The piacular oblations, which produced the first of the three particular *effects*, mentioned, may be considered as *initiatary*; they, which produced the second of these *effects*, as *occasional*; and they, which produced the third, as *stated*. But, because this *distinction* is scarce adequate, and but of little use; I, therefore, rather choose to distinguish piacular sacrifices, according to their different effects, into those which did constitute an original union or relation; those which did restore an union or relation, after it was interrupted or dissolved; and those which did support and preserve an union or relation, after it had been made, or restored. This distinction of piacular sacrifices is perfectly adequate, and founded in nature, as being suitable to the three ideas which the phrase, *making atonement*, stands for; and it is a distinction which will be of great use in the future part of this work. I now proceed to,



C H A P. IV.

Concerning the way and manner in which the piacular oblations, which were offered under the Law of Moses, produced the several effects which are ascribed to them.

§ 1. **H**AVING, in the foregoing chapter, had a view of all the effects which are ascribed, in the *Law of Moses*, to piacular sacrifices and oblations; I now proceed to consider the way and manner in which piacular sacrifices and oblations produced those their effects.

§ 2. At my entry upon this subject, I cannot but observe, that, in the investigation of the nature and end of piacular sacrifices and oblations, there is nothing that can be more useful and helpful, than a true or right notion of the way and manner in which they produced the several effects which are assigned to them: For, without a true and right notion of this, it is impossible to discover whether these sacrifices and oblations had, or had not, any real tendency, fitness, or efficacy, to produce these effects; or to find out what was the use and design of them.

§ 3. But though a true and right apprehension of the way and manner in which piacular sacrifices and oblations did produce their effects, be of such consequence in inquiries of this nature; yet it clearly appears from the many different and inconsistent sentiments about it, into which men of great learning and parts have been carried, that the attainment of it is difficult. And this difficulty has been much increased by the rubbish of *hypothesis*, *system*, and *sophistical reasonings*, which has been collected and heaped together for the support of so many different and inconsistent sentiments; and under which truth is so deeply buried, as it were, that it is kept

kept out of sight. This rubbish, therefore, must be first removed, before we can get any clear and distinct sight of truth. And for this end, I observe,

§ 4. I. That there are some who are of the opinion, that the piacular sacrifices, which were ordered to be offered by the *Law of Moses*, were all of an *emblematical* or *symbolical* nature; and that they produced their effects only as being, symbols or emblems of those things which they signified or represented.—Thus far they agree in the same general opinion; but when we come to look a little further into their sentiments, we presently find them at as much variance in them from one another, as from those of other people; for they make those sacrifices to be emblems or symbols not of the same thing, but of very different things.

§ 5. An eminent writer of this class, tells us, that the piacular sacrifices, aforesaid, were *symbolical addresses to God*; that is, as he himself explains it, *symbols of penitential prayer, and of those internal desires, dispositions, and affections, which are expressed by penitential prayer*; and he affirms, that, as symbols of these, they had their whole efficacy in the production of their effects. But then, this notion of the emblematical nature of piacular sacrifice has no foundation in, nor support from, the holy scriptures; nor can it account for either the use or efficacy of those sacrifices which were not offered for sin, but for other ends; nor, indeed, for the efficacy even of those sacrifices which were offered to expiate sin: And, therefore, this notion ought to be rejected as being *unscriptural*, and insufficient for explaining the efficacy of piacular sacrifices, and giving any rational and credible account of the production of their effects.

§ 6. Another writer of this class, of no less eminency than the former, tells us a very different story. For he says, that *eating and drinking together with God*, was the *end and design* of the sacrifices, aforesaid; that this *eating and drinking together with God* was a *symbol of friendship* betwixt him and the offerers of them; and that the furnishing out this *emblem or symbol of friendship* was the ultimate end and design of those sacrifices.—But this notion of the nature, design and efficacy of piacular sacrifices, is, if possible, worse than

the former: For, as there is nothing, any where in scripture, to support it, so it is impossible to bring it to accord with the way and manner in which all piacular sacrifices were ordered to be disposed of: For, as no man was permitted to *eat* or *drink* any part of those piacular sacrifices or oblations, which he offered for himself, and on his own account; 'tis plain, that God and the offerers of those sacrifices and oblations did not *eat* and *drink* together.—This notion, therefore, of the nature, use, and efficacy of piacular sacrifices must, as well as the former, be given up, as being not only unscriptural but antiscritptural; and as serving not to explain the nature and efficacy of them, but to contradict and perplex the account which the scripture gives us of the way and manner in which they were disposed of. (x)

§ 7. Wherefore, setting aside both these notions of the emblematical nature, use, and efficacy of piacular sacrifices, as both unscriptural, and antiscritptural, I observe,

§ 8. II. That the bulk of those, who have written upon this subject, are of opinion, that piacular sacrifices were *instruments* or *engines* of divine moral government in the treatment of penitent sinners; and, as such, did produce the *effects* which are ascribed to them. But though these writers agree in this general opinion, yet, in their explications of it, they frame *hypotheses*, and rear up *systems*, which are widely different, and, indeed, inconsistent with one another. For,

1st. Some of these writers think, that the *efficacy* of piacular sacrifice arose solely and wholly from the merit of its actions and sufferings, and that, by the merit of these, it produced its whole effect.

2^{dly}.

(x) If the reader desires a fuller view of this and the foregoing notion of the emblematical nature, use, and efficacy of *Jewish* sacrifices, he may consult Dr. Taylor's *scripture-doctrine of atonement examined*; and an anonymous piece, entitled, *An Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*. And if he would see a confutation of both those notions, he may read a late piece, entitled, *A Criticism upon modern notions of sacrifice*; where he will find all that I have said concerning these notions, in this, and the foregoing paragraph, largely and fully proved.

2dly. Others of them are of opinion, that the sacrifice was the offender's substitute, and, as such, suffered, *in his stead*, the punishment which was due to him; and, by this vicarious suffering of punishment, procured for him the remission of his sin, or a discharge from the punishment of it.

3dly. There are some few, who think differently from both the former, and are of opinion, that piacular sacrifices were penal to the offerers of them, as being laid upon them as *mulcts*, or *secondary punishments*, in place of more grievous punishments, for sins repented of, and the faulty part of their moral character; and that, as being mild and moderate *mulcts*, they had all that *efficacy* whereby they produced the effects which are assigned to them.

§ 9. These are the three different opinions about the *nature* and *efficacy* of piacular sacrifices, which have been embraced by those writers, who have considered them as *instruments* or *engines* of divine moral government in the treatment of penitent sinners.—And, indeed, as it seems to be impossible, to conceive of any real benefit that penitent sinners could reap from piacular sacrifices, unless those sacrifices did either *merit* some good thing for them by their actions and sufferings; or did suffer, *in their stead*, the punishment which was due to them; or were imposed upon them, and accepted of, as mild and moderate *mulcts*, in place of greater and more grievous punishments; it seems clear to me, that one or other of the three opinions, mentioned, must be the true and right one. And, therefore, in order to discover which of them is the right one, or, in other words, which of them is, and which of them is not consonant to scripture-doctrine and common sense, I shall examine each of them separately.

SECTION



SECTION I.

Concerning the opinion of those who think, that the efficacy, whereby piacular sacrifice did produce its effects, arose from the merit either of the actions or of the sufferings of the sacrifice.

§ 1. **M**ORAL merit denotes that quality of the actions or sufferings of a moral agent which arises from their conformity to the rule of right moral behaviour, and by which the agent or sufferer becomes entitled to approbation, praise, or reward.—Demerit is the reverse of merit, and denotes that faultiness in the actions of moral agents which arises from their obliquity, or deviation from the right rule of moral behaviour, and by which the agent becomes obnoxious to displeasure and punishment.—These are the only ideas which *merit* and *demerit* stand for, when they denote these properties of moral actions which are the grounds of reward and punishment.—And from these ideas of *merit* and *demerit*, 'tis manifest, that, were there is no rule set to actions, nor any standard fixed, by which *right* and *wrong* action may be distinguished from each other; Or, were the being, to whose actions such a rule is supposed to be set, is incapable either of knowing that rule, or of conforming his actions to it; there *merit* and *demerit* can have no place.

§ 2. From these ideas of *merit* and *demerit*, it is manifest, that the *animals*, which were offered as piacular sacrifices under the *Law of Moses*, could merit nothing for themselves, nor, consequently, for the persons who offered them, either by their actions or sufferings.—The actions of brute creatures, who have no knowledge of the standard of right action, who can neither perceive the requirements of any rule that is set to their actions, nor conform their

their actions to such requirements; I say, the actions of such creatures as these, are, in a moral and religious sense, absolutely *worthless*, and void of all *merit* or *demerit* to render them worthy of reward or punishment.—And if these brute animals could merit nothing for themselves by their actions; it would, surely, be very absurd to imagine, that they could merit any thing, by them, for the persons who offered them in sacrifice.—Again, the sufferings of the brute animals, which were offered in sacrifice, were as void of moral merit as their actions. *Pain* and *death*, indeed, these animals did suffer: But these they suffered through force and compulsion only. They did not submit to them upon moral motives, or with a view to promote any good or worthy, end, which are the only things that can stamp merit upon the sufferings of any being. And for this reason, the *pain* and *death*, which the sacrificial animals suffered, were, in a moral sense, void of all *merit*, and absolutely *worthless*: and, therefore, could produce no effect, procure no favour for penitent sinners, by their merit.

§ 3. To what has been said, I add, that God ordered the *poor* to offer *the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour* for their trespasses.

This piacular oblation is expressly called a *sin-offering*; and the very same effects are assigned to it which are ascribed to piacular oblations of the animal kind; for, by it, *atonement was made*, and *the remission of sin obtained*, Levit. v. 11—13.—Wherefore, since this piacular oblation did produce the same effects which were produced by those of the animal kind, it is natural to think, that, in the production of them, it operated after the same manner, or exerted the same kind of *efficacy*, as the others did. But, surely, it was not by the merit either of its actions or sufferings that it produced these effects; for of both these it was naturally and absolutely incapable.

§ 4. The arguments, already produced, clearly prove, I think, that the piacular oblations, which were offered under the *Law of Moses*, did not produce any of those effects which are assigned to them, by the merit either of their actions or of their sufferings.
And,

And, therefore, there is no necessity for enlarging any further upon this point.—However, in order to prove, that neither these piacular oblations, nor any other piacular sacrifice, could produce their effects in the way and manner just now mentioned, I shall, *ex abundanti*, subjoin the following argument.

§ 5. The persons, who would rest the *efficacy* of any piacular sacrifice, which is offered for sin, either directly, or solely and wholly, upon the *merit* either of the actions or of the sufferings of the sacrifice, may be easily reduced to the absurdity of self-contradiction.—For, to shew, that there was reason for appointing the oblation of a sacrifice to procure the remission of sin, they must say, that it was morally fit, or that the end and rectitude of divine moral government did require, that the penitent sinner should be punished: But, after the oblation of the sacrifice, and the punishment, to which the sinner is supposed to have been obnoxious, is forgiven, they must retract the former assertion, and say, that it is not morally fit, nor doth the end and rectitude of divine moral government require, that the penitent sinner should be punished; *that is*, they must unsay what they, at first, affirmed, and hold the reverse for truth.—In order to render this self-contradiction more clear and obvious, I observe, that the moral character of a penitent sinner, after a sacrifice has been offered for his sin, is the very same which it was before that sacrifice was offered. And from this identity of moral character both *before* and *after*, the oblation of the sacrifice, I argue thus. If the moral character of a penitent sinner, and the end and rectitude of divine moral government, make it fit, that he should be punished, before a sacrifice has been offered for his sin; then it follows, that his moral character, and the end and rectitude of divine moral government, remaining the same *after*, as *before*, the oblation of the sacrifice, make it still fit, that he should be punished: And, therefore, to affirm, that a penitent sinner ought to be punished *before* but not *after*, a piacular sacrifice has been offered for his sin, is to affirm that which is a self-contradiction.—I do not see, what way the force of this argument can be evaded, unless it be by absurdly supposing, either that *moral effects* ought to
cease

cease before the *causes* of them are removed; or, that *moral fitness*, and the *rectitude* of divine moral government, are malleable and mutable things, and may be made any thing, or nothing, by fancy and imagination; Or, that *moral character* and *moral fitness* are actually changed, while, at the same time, it is acknowledged, that they remain unchanged. To say, that, before a piacular sacrifice has been offered for his sin, the moral character of a penitent sinner, and the rectitude of divine government, make it fit, that he should be punished; But that, after a sacrifice has been offered for his sin, they do not render it fit, that he should be punished, is a contradiction in terms. It is to affirm, that the same thing is morally fit to be done, and not morally fit to be done: For, in this case, the *merit* of the intervening sacrifice doth not effect or alter the *moral fitness* of punishing the penitent sinner, because his moral character which is supposed and acknowledged to be a proper ground of punishment before the oblation of the sacrifice, continues to be the very same after the oblation of the sacrifice, which it was before it was offered.—This self-contradiction, which is unavoidable by those who attempt to explain the *efficacy* of any piacular sacrifice, which is offered for sin, by the merit either of its actions or sufferings, is a demonstration, I think, that the *efficacy* of sacrifices of this kind, cannot be explained, and accounted for, in that way.

§ 6. But, as I have met with no writer who has assumed this *hypothesis*, in his explication of the efficacy of the *jewish* piacular sacrifices and oblations, I have been at more pains than was needful, in setting it aside: And, indeed, I should have spared my self this trouble, but for the sake of a *corollary* of some use and importance in disquisitions of this nature; which is as followeth,

Coroll. That *definition* of piacular sacrifices, which rests their *efficacy*, in the production of their effects, either directly, or solely and wholly, upon the *merit* either of their actions or of their sufferings, is a wrong *definition* of them.—The truth of this *corollary*, is nearly self-evident; because, if it was true, that the *efficacy* of piacular sacrifices, in the production of their effects, did arise either directly, or solely and wholly, from the *merit* of either their actions

or sufferings, then it will follow, that all the piacular sacrifices which were offered under the *Law of Moses*, must be expunged from among the number of piacular sacrifices; because both their actions and their sufferings were utterly void of *merit*. (y)



SECTION II.

Concerning the opinion, that piacular sacrifices did procure for penitent sinners the remission of sin, by having their guilt transferred upon them, and suffering, in their stead, the punishment which was due to them.

§ 1. **T**HE abettors of this opinion agree not in their sentiments in all things. Some of them think, that the *sin* and *punishment* of the sinner were both transferred to the sacrifice: but others think, that his *punishment* only was transferred to it. However, they all agree in this, that the sacrificial animal was the offender's *substitute*, and, as such, suffered, *in his stead*, the very punishment which he ought to have suffered.

§ 2. The

(y) This *corollary*, however, is not so to be understood, as if it were intended to exclude *moral merit* from having any manner of concern in the *efficacy* of any piacular sacrifice. For it only intimates, that the *efficacy* of piacular sacrifices doth not arise either directly, or solely and wholly, from the *moral merit* either of their actions or sufferings; or, that *moral merit* is not essential to the *efficacy* of such sacrifices; But there may be piacular sacrifices, which have no *moral merit* at all to produce any *effect*.—When a moral agent is the subject of such a sacrifice, the *moral merit* of his actions and sufferings may, indeed, be the means of producing that influence or efficacy by which all piacular sacrifices produce their effects; But still, that influence or efficacy may be produced by other means, and not by *moral merit*; for, otherwise, there could be no true piacular sacrifice, where such merit is not to be found in the actions and sufferings of the subject of the sacrifice. The truth is, as will hereafter appear, the *efficacy* of a piacular sacrifice did not depend on its meriting any thing from the Deity, but upon the influence which it had upon the offender; and where the *moral merit* of the sacrifice has such an influence upon the sinner, that *moral merit* is the cause of the efficacy of the sacrifice.

§ 2. The only scripture-proof, which I find alledged in support of this opinion about the *efficacy* of piacular sacrifices in producing their effects, is the rite, which was observed by all the offerers of those sacrifices, of *laying their hands* upon the head of the sacrificial animal; which rite, we are told, signified the sinner's transferring upon it the punishment which was due to himself. (z) But it is manifest, that this rite, of itself, signified no such thing: For it was observed and practiced by the *Jews* in the oblation not only of their piacular sacrifices, but of their peace-offerings, where it could not signify the sinner's transferring his punishment upon the sacrifice. See *Lev. iii. 2, 8, 13.*—The rite itself appears to me to have been nothing but a *mode*, which was observed by the offerer, in devoting his sacrifice to God, either as an expression of his piety or gratitude, or as a victim for sin.—Moreover, when the tenth part of an *ephah of fine flour* happened to be offered as a *sin-offering*, it would, upon the *hypothesis* which we are considering, be necessary, that the offerer should transfer his *guilt* and *punishment* upon it by some rite or other: But it is most certain, that he could not do this by *laying his hands upon its head*, or by any other rite whatsoever.

§ 3. Some other arguments have been advanced in support of this *hypothesis*, which are supposed, by the abettors of it, to be either true scripture-consequences, or to be grounded in the nature and reason of the thing: But, instead of mentioning them, and giving each of them a particular discussion; I shall oppose to them the following stubborn facts and arguments; from which it will clearly appear, that neither they, nor the *hypothesis*, into the service of which they are pressed, have any foundation either in scripture, or in reason and common sense.

§ 4. I. The animals, which were offered in sacrifice, under the *Law of Moses*, were naturally incapable of either *guilt* or *punishment*; and, therefore, it was impossible, that either the guilt or the punishment

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(z) We read, that under the law, the sinner laying his hand upon the sacrifice, to signify the transferring upon it the punishment due unto himself, the sacrifice was slain, and it was accepted for him, to make an atonement for him. *Dr. Clarke's Posthumous Works, Sermon CXXXVII.*

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nishment of the persons who offered them in sacrifice, should be transferred upon them. *Guilt* and *punishment* are of such a nature, that they require a fit and proper recipient: But this the animals, which were offered in sacrifice, were not.

As to *guilt*; it is the non-conformity of an action to that rule to which it ought to be conformed. Hence it is manifest, that *guilt* can, in no case, become the mode or property of the actions of any creature who has no rule set to its actions, nor power to conform, or not to conform, its actions to that rule, as it pleases. This was plainly the condition of all those brute animals which were offered in sacrifice; and, therefore, *guilt* could, at no time, nor by any means, become a mode or property of any of those actions which they performed. And because *guilt* could at no time, nor by any means, become a mode or property of any of their actions, the *guilt* of the actions of other creatures could not be transferred upon them: The reason of this is plain and evident, for *guilt* being a mode or property of the actions of moral natures only; and it being impossible, that any mode or property of actions should exist any where, or at all, but only in and with those actions of which it is a property, *that is*, in and with the moral actions of moral natures, actions of which brute animals are naturally incapable; it follows, that the *guilt* of the actions of moral natures cannot be transferred upon brute animals, unless those actions, of which that *guilt* is a mode or property, were transferred with it: but as a translation of the actions is naturally impossible, so also is a translation of the *guilt* of them.

As to *punishment*; it is, strictly speaking, natural evil inflicted on a moral nature for immoral action or behaviour. And from this idea of *punishment*, it is self-evident, that the brute animals, which were offered in sacrifice, were naturally incapable of any penal treatment. Being destitute of *understanding* to know the rule of moral action, and of *power* to act conformably or not conformably to that rule, as they pleased, they were naturally incapable of doing any immoral action. Wherefore, being naturally incapable of performing that which is the ground and reason of punishment, they were

were naturally incapable of *punishment* itself.—These animals might be put to pain, even grievous pain, as, indeed, they generally were. But between the idea of *punishment* and that of *pain*, or bare suffering, there is a wide difference: For, though *punishment* always includes the idea of *pain* or *suffering*; yet, in many cases, the idea of *pain* or *suffering* doth not include that of *punishment*. And from what has been already said, it is abundantly evident, that the pain and sufferings which animals endured, when they were offered in sacrifice, did not, could not, include the idea of punishment.—I do not deny, that the pain, which the sacrificial animals suffered, was, by divine appointment, a consequence of the sin of the offerer; nor that its suffering death was, according to the same appointment, in order to the obtaining of remission of sin for the offerer. But from these concessions, it will not follow, that the pain, which the animal suffered, was of a penal nature. The pain, which the sacrificial animal bore, was bare, simple suffering, and not punishment. For, besides what I have said already to prove this, I may observe further; if we should suppose, that the punishment of the sinner was transferred, and laid on the sacrificial animal, so that it really and properly suffered, *in his stead*, the punishment which was due to him; this supposition, instead of furnishing us with the idea of *punishment*, which always includes that of *justice*, supplies us with a very different idea, *viz.* that of *cruelty*, *oppression*, and *injustice*: which is a thing that well deserves the serious consideration of those who are attached to this *hypothesis*.

When, indeed, sufferings are brought upon sacrificial animals in consequence of the sins of moral agents; and the persons, who offer them, obtain the pardon of these their sins by the oblation of them; such animals may, in a lax, vulgar sense, be said, to suffer the punishment of those who offer them, or to be punished *in their stead*. But these are loose and unphilosophical expressions, in which the idea of *punishment* is substituted for that of *bare, simple suffering*, which is a widely different idea. But to go on,

§ 5. II. We find, in fact, a peculiar oblation, appointed to be offered for sin, which was naturally incapable both of *pain* and *punishment*: consequently,

consequently, the punishment of those who offered this piacular oblation, could not be transferred upon it. The piacular oblation, I here speak of, was that of the *tenth part of an ephab of fine flour*, which the *poor*, who could not be at the charge of a more expensive oblation, were ordered to offer as a *sin-offering* for their trespasses, to make atonement for them, and to procure the remission of them, Levit. v. 11—13. This *tenth part of an ephab of fine flour* was naturally incapable both of *pain* and *punishment*; and therefore, the punishment of those, who did offer it, could not be transferred upon it.—But, concerning this oblation of *fine flour*, I observe further, that, though it was naturally incapable both of *pain* and *punishment*, yet it was substituted in place of the more costly animal-oblations which were offered in sacrifice for sin by the *rich*, and produced the same effect which they did. This, I think, clearly shews, that neither this oblation, nor the animal sacrifices, in the place of which it was substituted, did produce their effects by suffering the punishment that was due to the offerers of them: For, if it be supposed, that the animal-oblations of the *rich* did produce their effects after this manner, 'tis self-evident, that the inanimate oblations of the *poor* could not produce the same effects, because they were naturally incapable of suffering either *pain* or *punishment*; and yet, it is clear from the writings of *Moses*, that they did produce the very same effects as the other.

§ 6. III. The *hypothesis*, now under consideration, implies, that those things, which were offered as piacular oblations for sin, did, in all cases, suffer the *same punishments* which were due to the offenders who offered them. This seems to be the very basis of this *hypothesis*; for if the punishment, which was due to the offender, was transferred upon the sacrifice, and the sacrifice suffered, in his stead, that, and no other punishment, then it is plain, that the sacrifice must have suffered the very *same punishment* that was due to the offender. Wherefore, if this, which is assumed for the basis of the whole fabric, be shewn to be a false principle, all that is built upon it must fall to the ground, and that it is a false principle, is very clear, I think, from the following plain and unquestionable facts.

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We may, in the general, observe, that when the punishments which were due, by the *Law of Moses*, to those who offered peculiar sacrifices and oblations for sin, and the treatment which those sacrifices and oblations had, are compared together, we seldom find, that there is any resemblance at all (not to mention *sameness*) between them. The truth of this general observation is confirmed, beyond all doubt, by the following facts, *viz.*

The punishment which was denounced by the *Law of Moses* against those who had injured other people in their goods or properties, was commonly a double, but, in some cases, a quadruple, or quintuple restitution, as I have shewn in the foregoing chapter. But the animals, which were offered in sacrifice to expiate trespasses of this nature, instead of making the restitutions mentioned, (*i. e.* instead of suffering the *same punishments* which were due to the persons who offered them) were *slain*, and *put to death*. Levit. vi. 7.

Again, the punishment, which, by the *Law of Moses*, was due to false witnesses for the bodily injuries which others suffered through their perjury, was, *eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot*, Deut. xix. 16—21. But the animals, which were offered in sacrifice to expiate sins of this kind, instead of losing an *eye*, a *tooth*, an *hand*, or a *foot*, (*i. e.* instead of suffering the *same punishment* which was due to the persons who offered them) were *put to death*, Levit. v. 1, 5—10.

I add, That the *tenth part of an ephah of fine flour* was naturally incapable of suffering the same punishments which were due to the offenders who offered it as a *sin-offering* for their trespasses. This *fine flour* could not have an *eye* plucked out, or a *tooth* struck out, or an *hand* or *foot* cut off; which were the punishments that were due, by the law of retaliation, to those who, by perjury in witness-bearing, had brought the like bodily evils upon other persons:—It could not be *cut off from among its people*, which was the punishment that was due to those who *defiled the tabernacle* by ceremonial uncleanness:—Nor could it *suffer death*, which was the punishment that was due to those who were guilty of *profane swearing*. And yet

yet the penitent *poor*, who had committed any of the sins, just now mentioned, through *error* or human frailty, might offer this oblation as a *sin-offering*, and that to *make atonement for their sin*, and procure *the remission of the punishment of it*, Levit. v. 1—4. 11—13.

But to insist no longer on particular facts, I observe, that the most part of those punishments, which were denounced against sins by the *Law of Moses*, were distinct from, and inferior to that of DEATH, which was only awarded against a few crimes which were of an atrocious nature and pernicious tendency. And yet the animals, which were offered to expiate those sins of *error*, or frailty, which were done against ANY of the commandments of the law of *Moses*, were all put to death. See Levit. iv. 2—23.—v. 17, 18. Numb. xv. 22—28. Hence it is manifest, that, in the many cases, in which *death* was not the punishment incurred, the sacrificial animals did not suffer the same punishments which were due to the offenders by whom they were offered,

After all, it must be acknowledged, that, in some cases, the sacrificial animal did undergo the same suffering, in which the punishment, due to the offender who offered it, did consist, E. G. *death* was the punishment that was denounced against the sin of the *profane swearer*, as I have shewn in the foregoing chapter: And *death* the animal suffered, which he offered in sacrifice for his sin, Levit. v. 4—10.—But this was what did seldom happen; and when it did, the sacrificial animal suffered death; not because there was any reason for its suffering the same punishment which the offender had incurred; but because it so happened, that the punishment, which he had incurred, was *death*; which was that sort of suffering which all animals were ordered to undergo, which were offered in sacrifice for any particular sin, whether committed by the whole congregation, or by any single member of it. The truth of this is abundantly evident from what I have already proved: and it is yet further evident, in the case under consideration, because in place of the animal sacrifice, offered by a rich offender, a poor sinner was ordered to offer the *tenth part of an ephah of fine flour* as a *sin-offering*.

ing, to make atonement for his sin, and to procure the remission of it; which effect this oblation of *fine flour* could not have produced, had it been any way needful to the production of it, that it should suffer the same punishment which the offender had incurred.

§ 7 To sum up all that has been said, and conclude; The arguments, which I have produced, prove, that the animals, which were offered in sacrifice under the *Law of Moses*, were naturally incapable either of guilt or punishment; that those animals very rarely underwent the same sort of sufferings which the offerers of them had incurred by their sins, but sufferings of a widely different nature; that in those few cases, in which the sacrificial animal did undergo the same sort of suffering which the offerer had incurred, this did not proceed from there being any reason for its suffering the same punishment which the offender had incurred; but from its so falling out, that the punishment, which the offender had incurred, was DEATH, which was the very kind of suffering which the animal, as a sacrifice, had to undergo, whether the punishment, incurred by the offender, was DEATH or not; and, *lastly*, that in these very cases, in which the sufferings of the sacrificial animals, and those incurred by the offenders who offered them, happened to be of the same kind, the sins, for which these animal sacrifices were offered, were expiated, and the remission of them obtained, in the case of the *poor*, by a *sin-offering*, in which there was neither an animal, nor the death of an animal; and, of course, neither pain nor punishment.

§ 8. These things, put together, amount, if I mistake not, to a demonstrative proof of this proposition, *viz.* That the piacular sacrifices and oblations, which were offered under the *Law of Moses* did not *make atonement*, nor procure the remission of sin, for those who offered them, by suffering, in their stead, the punishment which they had incurred. They, therefore, who inculcate such a notion of the *efficacy* of piacular sacrifices and oblations, or of the way and manner in which they produced their effects, give us such an idea of their efficacy and manner of operation, as is utterly repugnant

pugnant to revelation, contradictory to reason, and would, were it a true one, exclude all the piacular sacrifices and oblations, which were instituted and offered under the *Law of Moses*, from being of the number of piacular sacrifices and oblations.—I now pass on to,



SECTION III.

Which sheweth, that, under the Law of Moses, piacular sacrifices and oblations were instituted as mulcts for sin and faultiness of moral character; and, as such, did produce all the effects which are assigned to them.

§ 1. **T**HE truth of the proposition, contained in the title of this *section*, is rendered highly probable by what has been proved in the foregoing part of this *chapter*. For since there is no reason to think, that the piacular sacrifices and oblations, which obtained under the *Law of Moses*, were of a symbolical or emblematical nature, but good ground to think, that they were not; and since those sacrifices and oblations, considered as *instruments* or *engines* of divine moral government, could procure no ease, relief, or benefit to those by whom they were offered, either by the *merit* of their actions and sufferings, or by suffering, *in their stead*, the punishments which they had incurred by their sins; there is no other way in which they could have been useful, or have produced the beneficial effects which are assigned to them, but that which is mentioned in the *title* of this *section*, viz. by being *secondary punishments*, or *mild mulcts*, instituted for the ease and relief of those who had transgressed the law through human frailty and infirmity, and were penitent for the sins which they had committed. But to set this affair in a clear and obvious point of light, such as may give full satisfaction to any fair and unprejudiced mind, I shall prove,

First.

First. *That the piacular sacrifices and oblations, which were instituted and offered under the Law of Moses, were mulcts, or fines; and, as such, penal to the persons from whom they were exacted, and by whom they were offered,*

Secondly. *That, as mulcts for sin and faultiness of moral character, these piacular sacrifices and oblations might, and did, produce all the effects which are assigned to them.*

PROPOSITION I.

The piacular sacrifices and oblations, which were instituted and offered under the Law of Moses, were mulcts, or fines; and, as such, penal to the persons from whom they were exacted, and by whom they were offered.

§ 2. This is the principal proposition; and if the truth of it be clearly proved, the proof of the *second* will be easy.—However, it will not be proper, to have recourse to *imagination, hypothesis, or analogical reasonings*, for the proof of it: For, if we seek for the proof of it in any of these ways, we shall loose our whole labour; and only do what many have done before us, even leave every thing, relating to the nature, design, and efficacy of piacular sacrifices and oblations, in a state of darkness and uncertainty. The proof, therefore, of this point must be taken from the very nature of things themselves, and from clear, direct scripture-evidence, or it can answer no good purpose, nor give any satisfaction to a rational inquirer. And with such a proof of it, I shall now endeavour to present the *reader*.

§ 3. The following arguments, which are taken either from the nature of things, or from plain and direct scripture-evidence, clearly prove, that all those piacular sacrifices and oblations, which were offered for particular sins committed, whether by the whole congre-

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gation or by single persons, were of a penal nature, and exacted as *mulcts* for the sins which had been committed.

§ 4. I. The whole congregation, and single persons, were required and commanded by God, to bring piacular sacrifices and oblations, and to offer them for their *trespasses*, and for the sins *which they had sinned*, Levit. iv. 3, 14, 28.—v. 6, 7, 11, 15, 18.—vi. 6. And this, of it self, proves, in a clear and demonstrative manner, that those sacrifices and oblations were exacted from them by the Deity as *mulcts* for their sins, and were of the nature of punishments. Divine punishment is *natural evil* inflicted by the Deity on sinners, because they are sinners; or for sin which they have done.—Now the oblation of piacular sacrifices was an *expence*, a *loss*, and, therefore, a *natural evil*, to those who offered them: and this natural evil they suffered for their *trespasses*, and for the sins *which they had sinned*: consequently, they suffered this natural evil as a punishment: and, *finally*, to this punishment they were condemned by the order and appointment of the Deity: consequently, what they suffered was divine punishment.—If we only conceive, that the offerers of piacular sacrifices and oblations were losers by what they offered, and that they were, by divine order or appointment, condemned to suffer that loss for the sins *which they had sinned*, the idea of divine punishment will presently rise up in our minds, and obtrude itself upon us, whether we will or not; which, I think, is a demonstrative proof, that the piacular sacrifices and oblations, aforesaid, were penal to the offerers, and exacted from them as *mulcts* for their sins.—This argument is taken from the nature of things, and has the full force of a demonstration. It is the same which I have used, *part. II.* § 66. of this *Essay*, to prove, that the piacular sacrifices, which obtained under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, were exacted by the Deity from penitent offenders as *mulcts* for sin: But, because the divine institution of those sacrifices, under that dispensation of religion, and the order or injunction to offer them for sin, are not clearly and expressly set forth in scripture; the argument, in that place, must lose of its strength in proportion; whereas, here, it has all the strength that one can wish for. But
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were this argument, in any respect, defective in strength, as I think it is not, there are other arguments to prove the point. For,

§ 5. II. By comparing the treatment which the *free Israelites* had, with that which the *betrothed bond-maid* had, with whom he had committed fornication, it clearly appears, that a peculiar sacrifice did, in fact, supply the place, and answer the end, of a corporal punishment. The primary punishment, denounced by the *Law of Moses* against fornication of this kind, was that of being *stoned to death*; which punishment was ordered to be inflicted on both the man and the woman in all cases, excepting only those in which a *rape* had been committed, Deut. xxii. 23—27.—But if the *betrothed maid* was a *bond-woman*, both she, and the free Israelite who was partner in the guilt, were discharged from the aforesaid punishment. However, a more mild punishment was substituted in its place, which both of them suffered. The man, because he was *free*, and capable of enjoying property, was condemned in the oblation of a *trespass-offering*, which being offered, his sin was forgiven: But the *bond-maid*, his female partner, because she had no property, nothing, she could call her own, to offer for her *trespass*, was ordered to be punished in a way suitable to her condition, being condemned to *be scourged*. See *Levit.* xix. 20—22. Hence it is manifest, that the oblation of a *trespass-offering*, and the *being scourged* did, in fact, answer the same end, and were both of a penal nature; not only so, but that the oblation of this *trespass-offering* was substituted, as a *mulct* for sin, in the place of a more grievous punishment, viz. that of being *stoned to death*.

§ 6. III. Of the person, who was to offer a *trespass-offering* for his sin, it is said, *Levit.* v. 1, 17. *He shall bear his iniquity.* (a) This, I think, is a very clear intimation, that the *trespass-offering*, which he offered, was exacted from him as a *mulct* for his sin, which I prove thus;—The original word, which is rendered *iniquity* in the places here quoted, frequently signifies *the punishment of iniquity*, or *sin*, in the writings of the *Old Testament*. See the *original*, Gen. iv. 13. *Levit.* xxvi. 41, 43. 1 Sam. xxviii. 10. Lament. iv. 6, 22. *Ezek.* iv. 4—6, &c. And that this word has this signification,

(a) : ונשא עונו.

nification, in the places under consideration, seems to be evident; for though the phrase, *bearing iniquity*, in those places where persons are said to bear the iniquity of other people, has other significations than that of *bearing the punishment of their sin*; yet, in all these places, where a person is said to bear *his own sin* or *iniquity*, this phrase constantly denotes his suffering the punishment of his sin or iniquity. This signification it has so universally in all the places last mentioned, that it is needless to produce any particular proof of it.—Wherefore, since the phrase, *bearing iniquity*, signifies, the bearing or suffering the punishment of iniquity, in all those places where a person is said to bear *his own iniquity* or *sin*; and since it is said of the person who was ordered to offer a *trespass-offering* for his sin, *he shall bear his iniquity*; it follows, that the offerer of a *trespass-offering* was to suffer punishment for his sin. But what punishment? Not the primary penalty, surely, which was denounced against his sin in the *Law of Moses*: For that, as I have shewn in the foregoing chapter, was forgiven. What punishment then? That punishment, most certainly, to which he was condemned, and which he actually suffered, *viz.* the oblation of a *trespass-offering* as a *mult* for his sin.—This is yet further evident from the explication which *Moses* himself gives us of these words, *He shall bear his iniquity*, which occur *Lev. v. 1, 17.*—For these words he explains exactly to the purpose mentioned, in the following words, *He shall bring his trespass-offering unto the Lord for his sin which he hath sinned, a female from the flock, a lamb or a kid of the goats, for a sin-offering, v. 6. He shall bring a ram without blemish out of the flock, with thy estimation, for a trespass-offering, unto the priest, v. 18.*—Again,

§ 7. IV. The offerers of piacular sacrifices appear to have had liberty either to offer the *ipsa corpora* of these sacrifices, or to give the value of them in money to the priests, in which case, the priest or the priests were authorized to set a price upon them, *Levit. v. 15, 18.* This I collect from *2 King. xii. 16.* Where, after mention is made of bringing in the money of the *dedicated things*, and of the *free-will-offerings* to be applied towards the reparation of the temple,

temple, it is expressly said, *the trespass-money, and sin-money, was not brought into the house of the Lord*, (i. e. to be applied as the other) *it was the priests*.—This *sin-money* and *trespass-money* I take to be the money which was payed by the *Israelites* to the priests for, and in lieu of, their *sin-offerings* and *trespass-offerings*; for this money, according to the *idiom* of the *Hebrew tongue*, might very properly be called *sin-money* and *trespass-money*: But I know of no other money that could be so denominated. (b) And if this be the meaning of *trespass-money* and *sin-money* in this passage. 'tis plain, that it was customary, among the *Israelites*, to give money to the priests for, and in lieu of, those *trespass-offerings* and *sin-offerings* which they were ordered to offer for their sins.—Now, if it be supposed, that *trespass-offerings* and *sin-offerings* were exacted from the offerers of them as *mulcts* for sin, 'tis easy to assign a reason, why the *Israelites* might, in place of these piacular sacrifices, pay the value of them in money; for their loss was the very same, whether they offered the *ipsa corpora* of these sacrifices, or payed the worth of them in money. And, upon this supposition, 'tis equally easy to perceive the reason, why the money, arising out of these sacrifices, might not be applied towards the reparation of the temple: for such an application of it would have conduced to the ease of the collective body of the *Israelites*, and, of course, in a certain degree, to the ease of the offenders who payed that money; and, for that reason, would, in the same degree, have frustrated the very end of the payment of it, if it was payed as a *mulct* for sin.—But, upon the supposition, that *trespass-offerings* and *sin-offerings* did produce their effects as *emblems* either of *penitence* and *penitent-prayer*, or of *friendship*; or by the *merit* of their actions and sufferings; or by suffering the punishment which

(b) 2 King. xii. 16. The *חטאת כסף* *trespass-money*, and the *חטאת כסף* *sin-money*, they brought not into the house of the Lord: it was the priests. *חטאת* signifies a *trespass-offering* as well as a *trespass*; and *חטאת* signifies a *sin-offering* as well as a *sin*; and they ought to have been thus translated in this text, because the sense requires it. And they are so translated by the LXX. who render the former into *περι πλημμελειας*, and the latter into *περι αμαρτιας*, which are the phrases which are constantly used by them to signify a *trespass-offering* and a *sin-offering*. And when these words are thus rendered, the text, mentioned, will run thus, *The money of the Trespass-offerings, and the money of the sin-offerings, they brought not into the house of the Lord: it was the priests.*

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which the offerers of them had incurred; 'tis manifest, that money could not have been accepted in *lieu* of them. Nor will it be possible, upon any of the suppositions mentioned, to assign any reason, why the money, arising out of these sacrifices (if, indeed, they might have been converted into money) might not have been, with equal propriety, applied towards the reparation of the temple, as given to the priests.

To what has been said, I add, that, in the early ages of the world, it seems to have been a common opinion, not only among the *Israelites*, but among other nations, that atonement might be made for sin, not only by sacrifice, but by money, and other valuable things, without sacrifice. The *Israelites*, upon the basis of this persuasion, gave each of them, yearly, *half a shekel*, towards the service of the tabernacle, *to make atonement for their souls*, Exod. xxx. 12—16. And, in like manner, the *officers*, who commanded the army which conquered the *Midianites*, made a rich oblation of jewels to the Lord, out of the spoils, *to make an atonement for their souls*, Numb. xxxi. 48—50.—And, upon the basis of the very same persuasion, the *Philistines*, when they sent back the ark, sent with it *five golden emerods, and five golden mice, as a trespass-offering*, 1 Sam. vi. 3, 4, 11.—From these instances, it appears, that it was, in those times, a prevailing and general opinion, not only that atonement might be made for sin, by paying money in lieu of prescribed sacrifices; but that atonement might be made for it, by money itself, or other valuable things, without sacrifice. And from these instances, one may argue, as in the *first case*, that it was by *money* that atonement was made for sin; and, therefore, that sacrifices could make no atonement for it in any other way, but as being *money* for sin.—And, indeed, what, but such a notion as this, could possibly have made the offerers of sacrifice think, that the more painful and afflictive their sacrifices were to themselves, the more pleasing and acceptable would they be to the Deity? What, but this, could have made them labour to make their *expence* in sacrifice proportionable to their *fear of vengeance*; or have driven them on to the shocking barbarity of offering their
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own dear children in sacrifice? Certainly, nothing, but such an idea of sacrifice could have spurred them on to so great *expenditure*, and even to so much *cruelty* towards both themselves and their children. And is not this the very idea of piacular sacrifice which is conveyed to us in these words of the prophet Micah? *Wherewithal shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?* Mic. vi. 6, 7.

§ 8. V. The writer of the *epistle to the Hebrews* affirms, that the word spoken by angels (or the Law of Moses) was *stedfast*, (i. e. rigorously executed) and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompence of reward, Heb. ii. 2. From these words, it is manifest that every act of disobedience to the Law of Moses did actually subject the offender to punishment; and, consequently, that no provision was made, by that law, for exempting any offender from all punishment.—But how could this be true, but only upon the supposition, that piacular sacrifices and oblations were imposed as *mulcts* or *penalties* upon penitent sinners? Persons of this moral character, as has been shewn in the foregoing chapter, had the primary penalties, which were denounced against their sins, remitted to them: And, therefore, if the piacular sacrifices and oblations, which they offered for their sins, were not secondary penalties, substituted in place of the primary ones, from which they were discharged; it is most certain, that they must have escaped all punishment, and that by a gracious provision made by the law it self: and then it could not be true, that every transgression and disobedience received a just recompence of reward: whence I conclude, that the truth of this assertion must either be given up, or it must be allowed, that piacular sacrifices were exacted, from penitent sinners, as *mulcts* for sin.

§ 9. The foregoing five arguments prove (some of them *demonstratively*, and others of them with the highest degree of *probability*) that these piacular sacrifices and oblations, which were offered for particular sins, either by the whole congregation, or by single person.

fons, were exacted from those by whom they were offered as *mulcts* for their sins; and, consequently, that these sacrifices and oblations were, strictly speaking, *λῦρα*, in the sense of *mulctæ impositæ et solutæ pro criminibus perpetratis*, i. e. *mulcts* or *fines* laid on offenders, and payed by them, for the sins which they had committed. (c)

§ 10. And that piacular sacrifices and oblations were exacted from penitent sinners, as *mulcts* for their sins, even in those cases in which no particular sin or sins had been committed by them, will appear to be highly probable from the following considerations.

§ 11. I. Piacular sacrifices and oblations, as I have shewn before, were instituted for the ease and relief of penitent sinners. And it is certain, as I have likewise shewn before, that those sacrifices and oblations could procure no ease or relief for persons of this moral character, either as symbols of *penitence* and *friendship*, or by the *merit* of their actions and sufferings, or by suffering, *in their stead*, those punishments which were due to them; nor, indeed, in any other way that we can form an idea of, excepting the one which I have mentioned; *that is*, as being *mulcts*, or *penalties*, levied upon them, from time to time, and on all proper occasions, on account of the faulty part of their moral character. If we consider these sacrifices in this view, the repeated oblation of them, from time to time, instead of suffering the more grievous punishments to which the impenitent were subjected by the law, would be a very considerable ease and relief to the penitent; and besides, would be a fit and proper mean for preserving the rectitude and promoting the end of divine moral government, by keeping up, from time to time, a due difference between the moral treatment of penitent sinners and that of unoffending creatures on the one hand, and that of the impenitent on the other; and withal, as contributing, with those other sacrifices, which were levied upon penitent

(c) As a confirmation of what I have here advanced, it may be observed, that the LXX often render the Hebrew noun כֹּפֶר *copher* (which denotes the *effect* of a piacular sacrifice) by the Greek noun *λῦρον*, in the sense here specified. See *Exod.* xx. 30.—xxx. 12. *Numb.* xxxv. 31, 32. &c.

nitent sinners, for every particular sin which they did commit, to remove all encouragement, from every thinking creature, to venture upon the practice of any sin, or to persevere in a course of disobedience and impenitency; and that by leaving them no ground to hope for *absolute impunity*, through any subsequent repentance. (d)

§ 12. II. We have no hint in the *Law of Moses*, or any where else, that some piacular sacrifices operated in one way, and other piacular sacrifices in a different way, in the production of their *effects*. This silence of the scriptures doth not encourage us to entertain such a notion as this; but gives us ground to think, that all piacular sacrifices operated in one uniform manner in the production of their *effects*, both those which were, and those which were not, offered for particular sins which had been committed; and consequently, that they were all, the one as much as the other, imposed and exacted as *mulcts*.

§ 13. III. There is another thing, which inclines me very much to the opinion, that the piacular sacrifices which were ordered to be offered daily, weekly, monthly, and annually, even though no particular sin, or sins, had been committed, were of a penal nature: and, *that is*, That the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government did require, that penitent sinners should, from time to time, be kept under such a penal treatment, as long as their moral character did remain unchanged, as I have shewn in the former essay. (e) But now, unless the sacrifices, aforesaid, had been, from time to time, exacted as *mulcts* for sin, or for the faulty part of the moral character of penitent sinners; 'tis plain, that proper provision would not have been made, under the *Law of Moses*, for such a continual and uninterrupted penal treatment of persons of this character; nor, consequently, for securing the goodness, wisdom and rectitude, and for promoting the end, of divine moral government, under that dispensation of religion.

§ 14. *Obj.* Perhaps, it may be objected here, That to punish where there was no fault, would have been wrong; and that nothing

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(d) See the former *Essay*, Chap. II. Sect. III. §. 3—6.

(e) See the former *Essay*, Chap. II. Sect. III. §. 2.

ing could have been more unjust and unreasonable than to inflict punishment where nothing worthy of punishment was done. And, therefore, it is absurd and shocking to think, that those piacular sacrifices, which were offered under the *Law of Moses*, in cases where no particular sin or sins had been committed, were exacted from the offerers of them as *mulcts* or *penalties*.—ANSW. This objection appears, at first view, to be a very formidable one: But really there is nothing in it. For though the offerers of these sacrifices did not offer them for any particular sin or sins which they had committed; yet they were such persons as did not deserve the highest marks of favour, or to be treated as well as unoffending and perfectly righteous creatures. Their moral character, though, in one respect, commendable and worthy of favour, was yet, in another respect, blameable and worthy of penal animadversion. And this mixed moral character might make some marks of displeasure, as well as some marks of favour, reasonable and equitable. It might render a certain degree of continued penal evil neither unfit, nor inexpedient, even then when they gave no new ground of offence; yea, even after they had ceased to do evil, and had thoroughly reformed their life. Yea, a proper degree of continued penal treatment was necessary to preserve a due difference between their treatment and that of unoffending righteous creatures, and to secure both the end and rectitude of divine moral government. And, therefore, if they had such a penal treatment, they were not punished without reason, nor without any fault on their part, as the objection insinuates; but their treatment was perfectly conformable to the faulty part of their moral character, and to the goodness, wisdom and rectitude of divine moral government. This, I think, is a full and sufficient answer to the objection before us.

§ 15. The foregoing arguments, which prove that all piacular sacrifices and oblations, whether offered, or not offered, for particular sins, were imposed and exacted as *mulcts* for sin and faultiness of moral character, I shall conclude with an observation which has a tendency to give an additional weight to those arguments: And it is this, That there are a number of *rites* and *usages*, (some of which

which were in use before the *Law of Moses* was given, and others which were practised under it) for the institution of which we may perceive a good reason, upon the supposition, that piacular sacrifices and oblations were imposed and demanded as *mults* for sin and faultiness of moral character: but, upon any other supposition, the institution of those rites and usages will appear to be absurd and irrational. A consideration of this nature cannot but have weight with those who are not disposed to swallow down absurdities, and would form a rational judgment of things: for which reason, I shall illustrate the truth of this observation by several facts.

§ 16. 1st. Upon the supposition, that piacular sacrifices and oblations were *mults* for sin and faultiness of moral character, it will be easy to assign a reason why the *tenth part of an ephab of fine flour* might be accepted as a *sin-offering* from a poor person. For, it is manifest, that a poor person would suffer as much by the loss of the tenth part of an *ephab of fine flour*, as a rich man would suffer by the loss of a *lamb* or a *kid*.

§ 17. 2^{dly}. The same supposition will shew us a reason why the *scape-goat*, which was not killed and offered in sacrifice, but was sent away, alive, into the *desert*, bearing upon it (emblematically) *all the iniquities of the children of Israel*, was nevertheless *presented alive before the Lord*, to make atonement for the *sins* of that people, *Levit. xvi. 10, 21, 22*. The reason was, the loss and suffering, by this goat's being sent into the desert, was the same as if it had been killed, and offered in sacrifice.

§ 18. 3^{dly}. Nor will it be difficult, upon that supposition, to perceive the reason and propriety of making *meat-offerings* and *drink-offerings* appendages of piacular sacrifices, *Lev. ix. 15—17.—xxiii. 12, 13, 18. Numb. vi. 14, 15, &c.* For, by these appendages, both the trouble and expence were increased; and the loss, sustained by the offerers, aggravated in proportion.

§ 19. 4^{thly}. Upon the same supposition, likewise, we may account for *oil's* being joined with piacular sacrifices in the purification of the *leper*, *Levit. xiv. 10—18, and v. 26—29*. And for its being

ing said, *that atonement was made for him with that oil*: For, the furnishing that *oil* was an expence to the *leper*; and, for that reason, the use of it, in his purification, might be enjoined as a *mulct*.

§ 20. 5thly. After the same manner, we may, in a rational manner, account for those *lustrations* which were joined with piacular sacrifices in the purification of the *leper*, of the *defiled by the dead*, and of the *man who had a running issue*; and for the *double shaving* of the head, beard, and eye-brows of the *leper*, and for the two *living birds*, *cedar-wood*, *scarlet*, and *byssop* that were used in his purification; and for the two *birds* that were used in the cleansing of the *leper's* house; and for the shaving of the *Nazarite's* head on the seventh day after he had been defiled by the dead. See *Levit.* xiv. 4—53.—xv. 13. *Numb.* vi. 9.—xix. 19. These things were all such as contributed either to the shame, or trouble, or loss of the *unclean*; and, therefore, might concur, with the expence of the animal sacrifices, to operate as *mulcts* or *penalties*.

§ 21. 6thly. In the same manner, may we, likewise, account for those *lustrations*, which were not appendages of piacular sacrifices, and for all the other *rites* which were used in the purification of the *unclean*. See *Lev.* xi, 25, 28, 32—35, 40.—xiii. 47—58.—xv. 5—12; 16—18; 21—27.—xvii. 15, 16.—xxii. 4—6. *Numb.* xix. 7, 8, 10, 19—22. All these *rites* were, in all cases, troublesome and, in some cases and circumstances, painful, and even hurtful to the *unclean*; and, therefore, were very fit for answering the end of *mulcts* or *penalties*. (f)

§ 22.

(f) The *unclean* were excluded from the tabernacle and temple-worship, and from all society with the *clean*, as far as was consistent with their safety; consequently, from all external, visible intercourse with God and his worshippers. Now, in order to restore the *unclean* to those forfeited, or rather lost, privileges, piacular sacrifices, either alone, or in conjunction with some other *rites*, were, in some cases, ordered to be offered. In other cases, *lustrations*, without sacrifice, were prescribed for this end, and that either with, or without, other *rites*. Now, since these *lustrations*, either by themselves, or in conjunction with other *rites*, produced the very same effect which was produced by piacular sacrifices, in the affair of *purifying the unclean*, it is natural to think, that, in the production of this effect, both of them operated, or exerted their efficacy, after the same manner, viz.

§ 22. 7thly. If the supposition, aforesaid, be admitted, it will be easy to assign the reason why it was peremptorily required, that all the things, which were offered for piacular oblations, should be good and perfect in their respective kinds: for, upon the supposition mentioned, this was done to secure the value of the oblation, and to ascertain the loss and damage of the offerer.—Had penitent sinners been at liberty, to offer, for their sins; animals that were lame, defective, monstrous, mutilated, or diseased; or any other thing that was unsound and bad in its kind; they might have made atonement for them, with things of little, or no value, and the loss of which could have given them no sensible pain or uneasiness: but, it being specially provided, that the animals, which they offered in sacrifice, should be *without blemish*, Levit. i. 3, 10.—ii. 1, 4, 5, 7.—iv. 3, 23, 28, 32.—v. 15, 18.—vi. 6.—xxii. 18, 24.—Deut. xvii. 1. and that the *flour*, which the *poor* offered for their sins, should be *fine flour*; (g) effectual care was hereby taken to secure the value of these oblations, and to ascertain the loss and damage of the offerers; which precaution was very proper and necessary, provided these oblations were exacted as *mulcts* for sin and faultiness of moral character.

§ 23. 8thly. It deserves remark here, that no person whatsoever, no, not any *priest*, was permitted to eat any part of those piacular oblations which he offered for his own sins, or of those *meat-offerings* and *drink-offerings* which were appendages of those oblations; or to receive any manner of benefit from them. The law, relating to this affair, extended to all sorts of persons, and was so universal, that the *priests*, though they had a considerable part of their maintenance from the piacular oblations of the people, yet none of them had

viz. as *penalties*.—The trouble, also, which the *Israelites* were put to, in cleansing some *unclean things*, and the loss which they suffered by *breaking others*, may be considered as having been appointed with a penal view.—According, therefore, to this view of things, a rational account may be given of all the legal *lustrations* and of the other *rites*, which were used in the purification of persons and things; which, in any other view, will appear to have been useless and absurd.

(g) Levit. v. 11.

had any share of those, which he offered for his own sins, for his own private use, or was suffered to receive any manner of benefit from them. (*b*)—Now, if all piacular oblations were imposed and demanded as *mults* for sin and faultiness of moral character, the reason of this general law is plain and obvious: for, had penitent sinners been permitted to receive any benefit from those piacular oblations which they offered for their sins, or from their appendages, their loss and damage had, in proportion to that benefit, been lessened; and, consequently, the effect of these oblations (supposing it to have been *punishment*) would, in the same proportion, have been frustrated. Wherefore, if this supposition be admitted, we have a plain and obvious reason why no person might *eat* any share of those piacular oblations, which he offered for his own sins, or of their appendages; and, likewise, why the *priests*, who had a part of their maintenance from the piacular oblations of the people, were not permitted to have any manner of benefit from those piacular oblations which they offered for themselves and families, or to have any share of them to eat. But, setting aside the supposition, aforesaid, no rational account can be given of those appointments.

§ 24. 9thly. The supposition, aforesaid, if allowed of, shews us the reason why *burnt-offerings* were the only *species* of piacular oblations that was instituted, and in use, through that long period of time which intervened betwixt the *lapse of Adam* and the settlement or erection of the *Hebrew theocracy*; and, likewise, why, under the *Hebrew theocracy*, sin-offerings and trespass-offerings were instituted, and added, as a new *species* of piacular oblations, to the burnt-offerings which had obtained in the foregoing ages.—In the ages, before the *Law of Moses*, all piacular sacrifices were offered either by the offenders themselves, or by the heads of those families to which they belonged. This made it expedient and necessary, that all the piacular oblations, which were then offered, should be wholly reduced to ashes by fire. For had those oblations been saved from the fire, and the offerers been permitted the use and benefit of them, the end and design of them (supposing that to have been *punishment*)

(*b*) See this same *Essay*, Part III. Chap. I. § 29.

punishment) must have been entirely, or almost entirely, frustrated : for, in that case, the loss and damage, which the offerers sustained, would either have been nothing, or next to nothing.—But then, upon the supposition, that a numerous priesthood was constituted, (as there actually was, under the *Law of Moses*) and that priesthood to have had no connection with the other families of *Israel*, with regard to *maintenance* : those two suppositions will suggest to us a good reason for a new face and regulation of things. For it was expedient and reasonable, that this numerous priesthood should have a *maintenance* out of those things which belonged to God, whose priests they were ; and it would not obstruct the efficacy and design of those piacular sacrifices which were offered by the people, (provided those sacrifices were demanded of them as *mulets* for sin and faultiness of moral character) if the priests had a part of their *maintenance* from them. Wherefore, as those piacular sacrifices, which were offered by the people, belonged to God, and he had the sole disposal of them ; he now made a *donation* of a certain determinate part of them to his priests, towards their *maintenance* : which *donation* made it necessary, that the priest's share of these sacrifices should be saved from the fire ; or, in other words, that a new *species* of piacular sacrifices, different from that of *burnt-offerings*, should be instituted.—But, though the priests might have, and actually had, a part of their *maintenance* from the piacular oblations which were offered by the people ; yet, for the same reason which, in the ages before the *Law of Moses*, made it fit and expedient, to consume all piacular oblations with fire, they neither had, nor could have, any part of their *maintenance* from those piacular oblations which they offered for themselves and their families, as has been observed before.—In this view of things, there appears to have been great wisdom and propriety in instituting, under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion, no *species* of piacular sacrifice, but that of *burnt-offering* ; and, likewise, in adding, under the *Law of Moses*, a new species of piacular sacrifice to the old one, which had obtained in former ages.

§ 25. To conclude; as the arguments, which I have produced, clearly and directly prove that the piacular oblations, which obtained under the *Law of Moses*, were instituted as *mults* for sin and faultiness of moral character; so the easy, natural, and rational account, which this notion of the nature and design of piacular oblations gives us of the various appointments and institutions of the Deity, which have been just now mentioned, renders the truth of it highly probable.

§ 26. But though the foregoing doctrine, concerning the penal nature and design of the piacular oblations which were instituted and in use under the *Law of Moses*, appears to have a firm support both from scripture evidence, and the nature of things; yet there are some specious objections which may be made to it, and others which have actually been made to it by the author of the *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*.—Those objections, therefore, it will be proper to state and answer, before I proceed any further, that they may not lie as a dead weight upon the doctrine which I have been endeavouring to establish.—The chief of those objections which may be made to this doctrine, as they occur to me, are the following three.

§ 27. *Obj. I.* The piacular oblations, which obtained under the *Law of Moses*, were, in themselves, of such a small and trifling value, that it cannot rationally be thought, that they were instituted with any penal view.

Answ. The piacular oblations, which obtained under the *Law of Moses*, were instituted for the ease and relief of penitent sinners, who, by better behaviour, were entitled to better treatment than impenitent offenders; and were intended as *marks of favour*, as well as *tokens of displeasure*: And, therefore, the very end and design of the institution of these oblations, made it requisite, that they should not be severe and rigid, but only gentle and mild, *penalties*.—But now, the mildness of a punishment doth not alter its nature, or make it cease to be punishment: And though the damage, which penitent sinners sustained by the oblation of piacular sacrifices for their sins and the faultiness of their moral character, was but small; yet

yet that damage, small as it was, might be sufficient to make and preserve a proper difference between their treatment and that of other persons, who had behaved either better or worse than they had done. And this was all that was needful to render their treatment suitable to their moral character, and congruous to the rectitude of divine moral government.

But because punishment, which is not felt, is the same as no punishment, it may be still urged, that the damage, occasioned by the oblation of piacular sacrifices, could give no pain, and, consequently, could be no punishment, to the *rich*.—To this I answer,

1st. That the *Law of Moses* supposes the contrary: For, in that law it is specially provided, that less costly piacular oblations should be accepted for, and from, the *poor*, than for, and from, the *rich*; which provision, made for the ease of the *poor*, is plainly grounded upon this supposition, that the piacular oblations, which were required from the *rich*, were so expensive and burthenfome, that the *poor* were not able to be at the charge of them; consequently, that the expence of piacular oblations was burthenfome to the *rich* themselves. [See *Lev. v. 7—13.—xii. 8.—xiv. 21—23*].—And as this supposition is very plainly made by the *Law of Moses*, so in itself, it is not an unreasonable one: For,

2^{dly}. Although the revenues of the *rich* be large, yet their way of living is commonly expensive in proportion. By the time that sufficient provision is made for the dress, equipage, and splendor of genteel and high life, and for the gratification of the pride, vanity, and luxury, which are commonly connected with large estates and high stations in life, the vast incomes of the *rich* are, generally speaking, exhausted; yea, in many cases, more than exhausted. And the support of this pomp and luxury of life, is what makes the loss of small things not only felt by them, but even painful and afflictive to them.

3^{dly}. Experience, and a proper attention to the means by which, and to the way and manner in which, the passion of pain is produced and excited in human minds, will, I think, convince any considerate person, that the expence which the *rich Jew* was at, in

furnishing out his piacular oblations, would give him some sensible pain and uneasiness. It is very obvious to observe, that the *rich* themselves are, oftentimes, made as uneasy as the *poor*, yea, sometimes, much more uneasy, by the loss even of small things; and that the *inward pain*, which is occasioned by the loss of such things, is seldom regulated by the affluence or narrowness of men's external circumstances of life. To me, there appears to be, in the breasts of all men, even of the most virtuous and self-denied, such a degree of affection to sensible objects, which are conducive either to the support, convenience, or brilliancy of human life, as renders the loss of any thing of this kind, even though it be but a small loss, painful and afflictive to them.—There is no man living, I think, who, were it in his choice, would not prefer an exemption from any small loss to the suffering of it, even though he were well able to bear it. This I take to be *human nature*. Whence then doth it proceed, that all men, the *rich* as well as the *poor*, should so constantly, and so universally, choose, rather to escape any small loss, than to suffer it? Surely, from nothing but this, that the suffering even of a small loss gives to every man some degree of pain and uneasiness: For if men did not feel some degree of pain, on such emergencies, the suffering, and the not suffering, such small losses, would be equally eligible to all those who are able to bear them without any inconveniency; and yet we don't find, that they are equally eligible to any man whatsoever.

These few observations make it evident, that the piacular oblations, which obtained under the *Law of Moses*, might, as *mulets* for sin and faultiness of moral character, have had a due penal influence upon the minds of all penitent sinners, whether they were *rich* or *poor*.

§ 28. *Obj. II.* The *Mosaic* piacular oblations are, no where, said to have been either instituted, or demanded from the offerers, as *mulets* for sin or faultiness of moral character.

Ans. To this objection this general answer may be made, *viz.* That the arguments which I have advanced, to prove that those piacular

acular oblations were really *mulcts* for sin and faultiness of moral character, abundantly shew, that there is no weight or strength in it.—But, as a more particular answer, I observe, that it is said of the offerers of piacular sacrifices, *they shall bear their iniquity*, Levit. v. 1, 17. which in signification, is *tantamount* to this *they shall bear the punishment of their iniquity*: And how they were to bear, and did bear, their iniquity, or the punishment of their iniquity, is explained by Moses himself, in these words, *He shall bring his trespass-offering unto the Lord for his sin which he hath sinned, a female from the flock, a lamb, or a kid of the goats, for a sin-offering*, v. 6. *He shall bring a ram without blemish—for a trespass-offering, unto the priest*, v. 18. So that the sacrifice, which he offered, was the very *mulct* in which he was condemned, or, in other words, he *bear his iniquity*, or the punishment of his iniquity, by bearing the loss which he suffered by and through the oblation of the sacrifice. (i) Withal, the offerers of piacular oblations were expressly and peremptorily required, to *bring* those oblations, and to *offer* them unto the Lord, *for the sins which they had sinned*, Lev. iv. 3, 14, 28.—v. 6, 15, &c. which requisition implies, that those oblations were demanded from them as *mulcts* for the sins for which they were offered, as I have shewed before. (k)

§ 29. Obj. III. Piacular sacrifices and oblations were *media*, or means, whereby penitent sinners obtained the remission of the sins, for which they offered them, or a release from the punishment of them; and, therefore, it is absurd to think, that they were exacted or demanded from them as *mulcts* for those sins: for to suppose, that they were demanded, as such, from them, is to suppose, that the offerers of them were, at the same time, released from the punishment of those their sins, and punished for them.

Ans. This objection appears, at first sight, to be a very formidable one. But the weakness of it will presently appear, if we distinguish between the *primary* and *secondary* penalties, which were awarded

(i) See this same Section, § 6.

(k) Ibidem, § 4.

awarded, in the *Law of Moses*, against offenders.—The *primary penalties* were those punishments, which were annexed to the several offences committed against that law, and were denounced against all persons who were guilty of those offences, without any regard to their future behaviour. The *secondary penalties* were those *mild mulcts* or punishments which were provided, and substituted in the place of the *primary* and more *grievous punishments*, for the ease and relief of those who, though they had transgressed the law, were, by penitent behaviour, become proper objects of grace and mercy. The *primary penalties* were the portion of all impenitent offenders, while they remained impenitent. The *secondary penalties* were the portion of penitent sinners, who, by better behaviour, had become entitled to better treatment than the former. Now, since the *secondary penalties* were substituted by the legislator, in place of the *primary ones*, for the ease and relief of the persons mentioned, it is evident, that the effect and consequence of the suffering of those *secondary penalties*, would be, the release of the sufferers from those *grievous primary penalties*, in the place of which those *secondary penalties* had been substituted; or, which comes to the same thing, the remission or pardon of those *primary penalties*.—Hence it is manifest, that, upon the supposition, that *piacular sacrifices* and *oblations* were *mulcts*, or *mild secondary penalties*, substituted in place of the more *grievous primary penalties* of the law, for the ease and relief of penitent sinners, as they certainly were; there is nothing unnatural, yea, nothing but what is perfectly rational, in the opinion, that those sacrifices and oblations, as *mulcts* for sin, might be the means of obtaining for penitent sinners the remission of those *grievous primary penalties* to which they had been obnoxious formerly, while they remained impenitent. Nor is there any absurdity in affirming, that penitent sinners might have their sins, or the *primary penalties* which were due to them by law, forgiven; while, nevertheless, they were punished in a more mild manner, and in a way perfectly suitable to their moral character, and to the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government. What has been already said, is a sufficient answer to the present objection: but

but to shew the propriety of it, I shall illustrate the whole of it by a plain scripture-instance of a *secondary penalty*, which was substituted in the place of a *primary penalty*, upon which the remission of the *primary penalty* was granted to the penitent offender.—When the prophet *Nathan* was sent to rebuke king *David* for the murder and adultery which he had committed, *David* shewed himself to be very penitent for those his sins: whereupon the prophet told him, that the *Lord* had put away his sin, and he should not die for it, though death, without benefit of clergy, was the *primary penalty* which was denounced against the sins of *murder* and *adultery* by the *Law of Moses*. However, the prophet acquaints the king, that, though this *primary penalty* was forgiven, yet all punishment was not forgiven; for, in place of the punishment forgiven, he was to suffer other penal evils. In particular, he tells him, that the child, which he had begotten in adultery, should die; that, because he had defiled the bed of *Uriah*, and procured his murder in order to conceal his own wickedness, he should be chastised for these enormous crimes by the unnatural wickedness of his own son, who would rise in rebellion against him, seek his life, and defile his bed openly and publicly before the sun; and withal, that, because he had procured an innocent man to be cut off in battle, he should be plagued with wars as long as he lived, 2 Sam. xii. 10—14. All which evils fell upon *David*, afterwards, as a just and righteous punishment for the adultery and murder which he had committed.—Here then, a *secondary punishment* was, in fact, substituted in the place of a *primary penalty*. And though *David* did suffer the former, yet, because he was released from the latter, the prophet tells him, *The Lord hath put away thy sin; thou shalt not die*, i. e. thy sin is forgiven, thou shalt not suffer the punishment which the law has denounced against it.

§ 30. Besides the three objections which have been considered, there are some others which have been made by the author of the *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*, which I shall here state in that author's own words, and subjoin a proper answer under each of them.

§ 31. *Obj. I.* “It is very observable, says that author, that sacrifices are never called by that name (i. e. *mulcts*) nor are they in scripture represented as *mulcts*. The Jews had their words, by which they were wont to express *amercements* or *mulcts*; but yet they never are applied in scripture to sacrifices, either in general, or to any particular species of them; neither to *burnt-offerings*, nor *sin-offerings*, nor *trespass-offerings*. If a man was guilty of slandering his wife in any extraordinary manner, the elders of the city were to take the man, and to amerce him in an hundred shekels of silver. The same word is used, when Pharaoh-necho took Jehoahaz, and turned him out of his kingdom, and put the land to a tribute, or set a *mulct* upon the land, of a hundred talents of silver, 2 Kings xxiii. 33. Had sacrifices, therefore, all, or any species, of them, been deemed as *mulcts* set for sin, it must seem very strange, that the proper term should never be given them; nor should they once be represented as such, when they are so often spoken of.” (1)

Answ. It is very strange, that this author did not see, that the setting a *mulct* upon a person for sin, might have been expressed, without making use of the term which he mentions, or of any other appropriated term: Might not this have been very properly and significantly expressed, by enjoining or ordering the offender to give a sum of money, or goods of such a value, for his offence? And was not this the very thing which penitent offenders were ordered to do, under the Law of Moses? Were they not enjoined to bring an animal without blemish, or something, in lieu of an animal, and offer it to the Lord for the trespass which they had done, or the sin which they had sinned? And, pray, what imaginable sense can be put upon this injunction but only this, that they were fined or amerced, for the sins which they had done, to the value of those oblations which they offered for them? This would be the sense of such an injunction as this, in any other cases of a like nature: and what reason can be shewn, that it should not be the sense of it in the cases under consideration?—But not to insist any further on this, the

(1) *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*, p. 324, 325.

the Hebrew noun כֹּפֶר *copher* pretty frequently signifies a *mulct* for sin, Exod. xxi. 30. *If there be laid on him [כֹּפֶר copher] a sum of money, or a mulct, Numb. xxxv. 31. Ye shall take no [כֹּפֶר copher] satisfaction, or mulct in money or goods, for the life of a murderer. v. 32. Ye shall take no [כֹּפֶר copher] satisfaction, or mulct, for him that is fled, &c. Job. xxxvi. 18.—Then a great [כֹּפֶר copher] ransom, or mulct, cannot deliver thee, &c.* And this very noun, and the conjugates of its root, are constantly applied, in scripture, to piacular sacrifices, in order to point out their nature, design, and effect. Wherefore, what the author affirms, with such an air of positiveness, is a downright falsehood, viz. “That the words, by which the Jews were wont to express *amercements* or *mulcts*, are never applied to sacrifices, either in general, or to any particular species of them; neither to burnt-offerings, nor sin-offerings, nor to trespass-offerings.”

§ 32. Obj. II. “Had they (*i.e.* sacrifices) been designed as *mulcts*, it is probable, that they would have been levied in some other manner. For where a *crime* is estimated at a certain price, if the price be paid, the man is acquitted; and as soon as the penalty is paid, the offender is cleared. But in the case of sacrifice, there was a great deal of *solemnity* used; and that not only by the person that brought the sacrifice, but by the *priests*. The *lamb*, or *goat*, or *bullock*, or whatever it was that was offered, was not only a lessening of the *goods* of the sinner, (on which account, if that were all, it might have been considered as a *mulct*) but there were certain *solemn rites* to be performed; some by those who brought the offering; some by the *priests*; and others that might have been performed by any person that was *clean*. He that offered the sacrifice, was to bring it to the *altar*; he was to *put his hand upon the head of it*, and to *make confession of his sin*. All this, it may be said, was the *form* of paying the *mulct*, and made thus solemn to deter men from sin. But supposing it to be a *peace-offering* which was offered, the solemnity was *prayer* and *thanksgiving*, and *no confession of sin*: and, consequently, though here was a diminution of a man's *goods*, yet there was nothing

“ done that had relation to paying a *mult*, or that could be taken
 “ for paying an equivalent, or a compensation for the offence.—
 “ But should it be insisted on, that God might require those or
 “ such-like solemn *rites* to be used in paying *mults* to him; that
 “ we are not to enquire into the reason of what he commands;
 “ that the sinner being a *debtor* to him, he may impose upon him
 “ not only the payment, but the manner of the payment; that the
 “ confession of sin was only an acknowledgment that the *mult* was
 “ just and due: Should any one assert this, then I say, &c.” (m)
 What follows here, is the author’s next or third *objection*.

Ans. To this objection, as far as it relates to piacular sacrifices and oblations, the author himself has made an answer, with which he appears to be set fast, and to which, I think, no reply can be made. To which I add, that it seems to be very probable, from what is said in some passages of scripture, that the *mults*, under consideration, were levied in another way than by the actual oblation of the animal sacrifices, even in that very way which the author mentions. It is certain, from *Levit.* v. 15, 18.—vi. 6. That the priests were to value, or set a price upon those animals which were offered as *trespass-offerings*. But for what end was this to be done? Not, surely, to secure the value of the sacrifice: for if the animal was of the kind and sex required, and *without blemish*, or natural imperfection, it was, without any more ado, to be accepted by the priest. For what end then? for none, that I can think of, but that the offerer might be at liberty either to offer the animal itself in sacrifice, or to pay the value of it in money, or the price that was set upon it by the priest. And this notion, that offenders not only might, but actually did, on some occasions, pay, in *lien* of the prescribed sacrifices, the value of them in money, is confirmed by what we read, 2 *Kings* xii. 16. where we are told, *That they brought not the trespass-money and sin-money into the house of the Lord, because it was the priests.* And what this *sin-money* and *trespass-money* was, I cannot conceive, unless it was the money which
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(m) *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*, p. 325—327.

was paid by the *Israelites* as the price of those *trespass-offerings* and *sin-offerings* which they were enjoined to offer for their sins. (n)—And then as to the *rites*, which were observed in the oblation of piacular sacrifices, and about which the author makes such a bustle, as if they made much for his purpose; thus much may, I think, be said, that the priests, as they had those sacrifices to offer to God, were under a necessity to make use of some *rites* or other in the oblation of them, whether they were *mulcts* for sin or not; and the *rites*, appointed to be used, were as proper as any other. And for those *rites*, which were performed by the offerers of those sacrifices, they were no other than what the circumstances of the case rendered proper and needful, even upon the supposition, that those sacrifices were offered as *mulcts* for their sins; such as, the bringing the sacrifice to the *altar*, the devoting and setting it apart to God by the imposition of hands, the making a public confession of the sin for which it was offered, which *last* was a natural expression of their penitence for that sin, without which the priest could offer no sacrifice, except of no *mulct* of this kind, for it.—And to say all in a few words; as the offerers, by express injunction, brought those sacrifices, and delivered them up to God, or to the priests his *ministers*, for the sins which they had sinned, and had no share of them afterwards for their own private use, there was nothing in all this that was inconsistent with their being *mulcts* for sin; yea, nothing but what was perfectly consistent with their being such.—As to the *peace-offerings*; they were not offered for sin; and, therefore, could not have been exacted as *mulcts* for sin: and I know of no person that has ever affirmed, or even thought, that they were. And, therefore, the author's mentioning them here, as not being *mulcts* for sin, is quite foreign to the purpose: at least, it is a thing which I have no concern with.

§ 33 Obj. III. "The supposition of a *mulct*, or *fine*, supposes some *crime* or *fault* for which it is laid upon a man. Supposing, therefore, sacrifices are required in cases where there was no fault, " but

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(n) See § 7. of this same section.

“ but only mere accidental misfortunes, and these such as could not
 “ be avoided, it would then be unjust to demand a *mult*, or what
 “ may come under the denomination of any sort of punishment.
 “ Now in the case of a *Nazarite*, as well as many other cases, it
 “ was impossible for the most cautious or prudent person, to avoid
 “ such accidents as would oblige him to bring a *sin*, or a *trespass-*
 “ *offering*. Suppose a *Nazarite* obliged (*Numb. vi.*) not to make
 “ himself unclean for any his nearest relations when they die; yet
 “ if a man die very suddenly by him, he was polluted; and he was
 “ to bring both a *sin-offering* and a *burnt-offering*, and the priest
 “ was to make atonement for him, for that he sinned by the dead.
 “ The meaning is, he failed in going through what he had vowed,
 “ by being defiled by the dead. But why should he be obliged to
 “ bring a *sin-offering*, if that is to be considered as a *mult*, since no
 “ crime, no fault, could be laid to his charge? Why is he con-
 “ demned, and forced to suffer in the loss or deprivation of his goods,
 “ for what was not in his power to prevent or avoid?—So, in ano-
 “ ther case, every *woman* that brought forth either a *son* or a *daugh-*
 “ *ter*, was obliged to bring both a *burnt-offering* and a *sin-offering*
 “ to the door of the *tabernacle*, and the *priest* was to make an *atone-*
 “ *ment* for her. Were these sacrifices *mults* or *fin*es set on her?
 “ For what crime? Or under what denomination of fault, could
 “ this be imposed? To make either mere unavoidable accidents,
 “ or the natural course of things, the *subjects* (*I fancy he means, the*
 “ *grounds or reasons*) of *mults*, is a rigour not to be imputed to a
 “ good and merciful being. Whereas, if *uncleanness* be considered
 “ only, as what may make a person unfit to appear in the presence
 “ of a sovereign, before purification, the many such persons be com-
 “ manded to purify themselves before they approach the *table* of
 “ their king. Accordingly, the *uncleannesses*, here mentioned,
 “ were considered as *indecenties*, or *improprieties*; and, therefore,
 “ were to be removed, when persons laboured under them, before
 “ they could be admitted as into the presence of their king.” (o)

Ans.

(o) *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*, p. 327—329.

Ans. Piacular sacrifices were either such as were offered for particular sins which had been committed, or such as were offered when no particular sin had been committed. In the objection before us, there is nothing said to prove that those piacular sacrifices which were offered for particular sins, which had been committed, were not *mults* for sin: But all that is attempted, is, to prove that some of those piacular sacrifices which were offered when no particular sin had been committed, were not *mults* for sin; particularly those sacrifices which were offered by the *unclean* when their *uncleanness* was the result of unavoidable accident, or the necessary effect of natural causes. And to what the author has objected to those piacular sacrifices as being *mults* for sin, I answer,

1st. That the difficulties, which the author has mentioned, bear as hard upon his own notion of these sacrifices, as they do upon that against which he urges them. For may it not be asked, in his accurate way of querying, Were unavoidable accidents, and the necessary effects of natural causes, indecencies and improprieties? What was it that did, or could, make them such? To make either of the two indecent and improper, would be to impeach the wisdom and goodness of God who had made the one unavoidable, and the other necessary. Why then should people be obliged to bring sacrifices to purify themselves from those things which were the consequences of unavoidable accident, and the natural effects of necessary causes; and to suffer in the loss and deprivation of their goods for what was not in their power to prevent; especially, when it is considered, that these sacrifices had no manner of fitness, as *natural means*, to purify them from their *uncleannesses*, and were not, according to the scripture-accounts of these affairs, offered till after they were clear of these *uncleannesses*?

2^{dly}. This objection, though exhibited in a very formidable view, may yet be easily answered upon a principle adopted by the author himself. He says, "That the burnt-offering was appointed for sins in general, for all such as might any way be an obstacle to the favour of God." And the only proof which he produces of this assertion, is this, "that Job offered burnt-offerings according

" to

“to the number of his sons: For Job said, *It may be that my sons have sinned, and cursed God in their heart, Job i. 5.*” And to apply this to his purpose, he subjoins, “It was not for any particular sin, that he knew his sons to have been guilty of, but for fear they should have been some how or other guilty.” (p) To this instance the author might have added the most part of those *burnt-offerings*, of which we have any account under the *patriarchal* dispensation of religion; and all those which were offered at the *Jewish festivals*, and some others; for it doth not appear, that any of those *burnt-offerings* were offered for any *particular sin* which had been committed. But though he had done this, neither the instance which he has produced, nor all those others added to it, would have been a sufficient ground for his inference, *viz.* “That the *burnt-offering* was appointed for sins in general, and not for particular sins.” For it is most certain, that *burnt-offerings* were offered, and ordered to be offered, on many occasions, for *particular sins*. Thus Job’s three friends, by particular direction from God, offered a *burnt-offering* for the *particular sin*, of not speaking of God the thing which was right, Job xlii. 7—9. And in cases, which would often occur, a *burnt-offering*, in conjunction with a *sin-offering*, was offered for particular trespasses, Lev. v. 1—4. compared with v. 7—10. Wherefore, the only inference that can, with any shew of reason, be drawn from the different occasions on which *burnt-offerings* were offered, is, that, in some cases, they were appointed to be offered for sins in general, and, in other cases, to be offered for *particular sins*. And the very same inference, concerning *sin-offerings*, may be drawn from the different occasions on which they were offered, and ordered to be offered, though this last inference will not comport with the author’s notions. He says, “that *sin-offerings* were appointed for *particular sins* :” and nobody can think otherwise, who reads over the fourth chapter of Leviticus. But is it not equally evident, that *sin-offerings* were offered, and appointed to be offered, in cases where no *particular sin* had been committed,

(p) *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*, p. 280—281.

committed, such as, at the dedication of the altar, on all the public festivals, and even in all those private cases which are mentioned in his objection? See Numb. vii. xxviii. and xxix. chapters.—But to come to the point in hand, since the author acknowledgeth that burnt-offerings were appointed for sins in general; and since it appears, from what has been said, that sin-offerings, likewise, were appointed, and, in many cases, offered, for sins in general; why might not the sin-offerings, which are mentioned in this objection, have been exacted and demanded as *mults* for sins in general, though no particular sin had been committed? This, surely, is what must be allowed upon the author's own principles. And it overthrows the whole force of his objection. However, I add, *ex abundanti*.

3dly. That the truth of the matter appears to me to have been this, viz. That, in the cases mentioned by the author, the *unclean*, who offered the sin-offerings, had, by divine appointment, and on account of their uncleanness, whether accidental or natural, been cut off from all communion and intercourse with God and his people, in any acts of public worship: That the piacular sacrifices, which they were required to offer, were the means which were appointed for the restoring of this communion and intercourse which had been broken off and interrupted: And that they affected this end as *mild mults* for their sins in general, or for the faulty part of their moral character as penitent sinners, it being by them, as such, that, in this new restoration to favour, a due difference was preserved between their treatment as penitent sinners and the treatment of all those who were of a different moral character, whether they were impenitent, or unoffending creatures. And against this notion of the penal use and end of those piacular oblations, I know not of any one objection of weight that can be made, notwithstanding all that our author has, without due consideration, said against

§ 34. Obj. IV. " Sometimes the law appointed certain fixed penalties, and did not add any sacrifice, but only ordered satisfaction to be made to the injured party. E. G. If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it, he shall restore five oxen " for

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“for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep, *Exod. xxii. 1.* No sacrifice
 “is here appointed for those crimes, but the person, from whom the
 “cattle were stolen, was thus to be made amends for his losses.”
 (*an exorbitant amends indeed, if that was all that was intended!*)—
 “Sometimes again, when a man had defrauded or cheated his neigh-
 “bour (*suppose he did this, by stealing an ox or a sheep from him*) or
 “had taken away a thing by violence, or had sworn falsely; he was to
 “to restore the principal, and to add a fifth part more thereto, and to
 “give it to him to whom it appertained; and he was to bring his tres-
 “pass-offering, in order that his sin should be forgiven him. It is
 “plain, that the fifth part was to make the owner amends for the
 “time and use of his property, of which he had been deprived;
 “and, likewise, to prevent and discourage such injurious treatment
 “for the future. Now if the trespass-offering were a *mulct*, why
 “was it not, in both cases, equally (*equally what?*) Or why was
 “not the stealing an ox or a sheep to be fined by sacrifice as much as
 “any other act of injustice or violence done to a neighbour?” (*q*)

Answ. It is said, *Exod. xxii. 9.* For all manner of trespass, whe-
 ther it be for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment, or for any manner of
 lost thing, which another challengeth to be his, the cause of both parties
 shall come before the judges; and whom the judges shall condemn, he shall
 pay double to his neighbour. In this place, no sacrifice is enjoined
 to be offered for any of these crimes; and for this reason, our au-
 thor infers, that no sacrifice was appointed, or admitted, for these
 crimes; but the offender who was guilty of any of them, was,
 without remedy, to make a double restitution. But this reasoning of
 his is in direct contradiction to what is said in *Levit. vi. 1—7.*
 where we find a *trespass-offering* expressly ordered to be offered for
 any of these offences.—The truth is, the *restitutions* which are en-
 joined, *Exod. xxii.* were the *primary penalties* which were denounced
 against the offences there mentioned, and which impenitent finners,
 who did not make a voluntary confession of the sins which they had
 sinned, nor the prescribed compensation, which penitent finners
 were

(*q*) *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices, p. 329—330.*

were ordered to make for these sins, to the persons whom they had wronged, nor bring the appointed sacrifices to be offered for them, were compelled, by the law, and the authority of the *judges*, to suffer, as is evident from v. 9.—But they who were guilty of the very same offences, and were penitent for them, and disposed to make a public confession of them, had a much milder treatment; for, upon making the confession mentioned, and a restitution of the *principal*, with the addition of a *fifth part* more, as a compensation for damages, a *trespass-offering* was accepted in lieu of the more grievous punishments of making a *double* or a *quadruple*, or *quintuple* restitution; which last-mentioned punishments were forgiven them. Thus, and thus only, can what is said in *Exod. xxii.* be brought to a consistency with the appointments which are mentioned, *Levit. vi. 1—7.*—The impenitent offender was subjected to a severe and heavy penalty, to that of making a *double*, or *quadruple*, and, in some cases, a *quintuple* restitution: But, in lieu of this, the penitent sinner was only *mulcted* in a *trespass-offering*. As their moral characters were different, the like difference was shewn in the treatment which they had. Both of them were *guilty*, and, therefore, both of them were *punished*; but punished in such a manner and degree, as was suitable to the greater and lesser tendency which their respective moral tempers and dispositions had to promote the hurt of society, and to counteract the end of divine moral government.—Had our author considered these things aright, he would have spared his questions, “Why was not the *mulct* in both cases equally?” And, “Why was not the stealing of an *ox*, or a *sheep* to be fined by sacrifice as much as any other act of injustice or violence done to a neighbour?” For the stealing of an *ox* or a *sheep* was fined by sacrifice, as we have seen. And there was a very good reason, why the *mulcts* laid on impenitent offenders, and those levied upon penitent sinners, should not be equal; and yet both were *mulcts*. Wherefore, this argument or objection of our author, has nothing in it, but mere shew and ostentation.—But he goes on thus, “If it be replied, that this was owing to the arbitrary will

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“ of the legislator (*no body says so*) who might appoint what *mults*
 “ he thought fit, then I must add,” &c.

§ 35. *Obj. V.* “ Many of the sacrifices, offered by the *Jews*,
 “ were *vows* and *voluntary offerings*; and, therefore, could not
 “ come under the name of *mults*. Their *eucharistic* sacrifices were
 “ given to God as the fountain of all good, as the giver of all things.
 “ And whether the offerer begged of God to grant him what he
 “ wanted and desired, or thanked him for what he had received,
 “ the sacrifice he offered proceeded from his own choice and free
 “ gift. Any man could make a *voluntary* sacrifice. He could
 “ make a *vow* either to give an *holocaust* (for *holocaust* might be of-
 “ fered both to ask favours, and to commemorate favours received,
 “ as well as for other reasons in which cases, they were considered
 “ as instances of the greatest humility and submission) or offer o-
 “ ther kinds of sacrifices, as the offerer thought fit. Those, there-
 “ fore, that proceed from *free-will*, and were properly *free-will of-*
 “ *ferings*, could not possibly come under the notion of *mults* or
 “ *finēs*,” (r)

Answ. If, by *eucharistic sacrifices*, and *free-will offerings*, the au-
 thor means such sacrifices and oblations as were not of a *piacular*
 nature, and which the offerers might offer, or not offer, as they
 pleased, without acting contrary to any divine injunction; what he
 says here is very true. But then it is nothing to the purpose, be-
 cause *piacular* sacrifices and oblations might have been instituted and
 offered as *mults* for sin, though *eucharistic sacrifices* and *free-will of-*
ferings were not. However, I cannot fall in with the author's sen-
 timents, that *holocausts* or *burnt-offerings* might be offered as *eucharis-*
tic sacrifices, or what he calls *free-will offerings*. For the only pur-
 pose and design of the institution of *burnt-offerings*, mentioned in
 scripture was that of *making atonement*, Levit. i. 4. And we fre-
 quently find the oblation of them enjoined for this very purpose,
 particularly Levit. v. 7—10.—ix. 7.—xii. 6—8.—xiv. 20, 31.—
 xv. 18, 30.—xvi. 24. And though we find, that *burnt-offerings*
 were

were frequently offered when no particular sin or sins had been committed, yet this doth not prove, that those *burnt-offerings* were offered as *eucharistic sacrifices*, any more than it proves that the *sin-offerings*, which were often offered on the same occasions, were *eucharistic sacrifices*. I, therefore, wish that the author had produced some proof of the truth of this notion; for I can find nothing in scripture to support it; and I am not disposed to take it upon his *ipse dixit*.

§ 36. *Obj. VI.* "Some sacrifices that were expressly enjoined, cannot possibly be considered as *mulcts*. The *passover* was as properly a sacrifice as any other; and it was not a *free-will offering*, but commanded to be observed as *an ordinance to thee, and to thy sons forever*, *Exod. xii. 24*. It was designed to be commemorative of the Lord's *passover*, who *passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when he smote the Egyptians, but delivered the Israelites and their houses*. Now this could not be required as a *mulct*, since it was the commemoration of a general deliverance, and instituted to keep up the remembrance of a *mercy bestowed upon, or shewed to the nation of the Jews.*" (s)

Ans. All this I grant to the author: But add, that the *passover* was not a particular sacrifice; for it was not offered either for sins in general, or for any particular sin or sins. And, therefore, the author's mentioning it as a sacrifice which was not a *mulct* for sin, is nothing to the purpose. And this may suffice as an answer to this objection.

§ 37. *Obj. VII.* "As some sacrifices were expressly appointed for a certain end, as the *passover*; and others were *free-will offerings*; so others still were brought, where there was not so much as *error*, nor accidental misfortune; much less was there any fault or crime in the offerers. The *firstling of a cow*, or the *firstling of a sheep*, or the *firstling of a goat*, was not to be redeemed, but was to be sacrificed, and *its blood to be sprinkled upon the altar*; and *the fat was to be burnt as an offering made by fire*;

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Numb.

(s) *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*, p. 331, 332.

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“ Numb. xviii. 17.—The *first-fruits*, likewise, were to be brought,
 “ and offered to the Lord. Not that any of these were forfeited
 “ unto God: But that, *on the day that God smote all the first-born*
 “ *of the land of Egypt, he hallowed to himself all the first-born of Israel,*
 “ *both man and beast, Numb. iii. 13.*” (t)

Ans^w. All that the author says here, is true, but it is nothing to
 the purpose: For though the *first-born of man and of clean beasts*,
 and the *first-fruits* of the earth, were offered to the Lord, yet they
 were not offered to him as sacrifices and oblations for sin and faulti-
 ness of moral character: And, therefore, from their not being
mulcts for sin, it cannot be inferred, that those sacrifices and obla-
 tions, which were offered for sin and faultiness of moral character,
 were not *mulcts* for sin.

§ 38. The author concludes all the foregoing arguments or ob-
 jections thus, “ Supposing now that it may be imagined, that
 “ the *sin* and *trespass-offering* may possibly be considered as *mulcts* or
 “ *amercements* for certain sins, yet it is impossible to argue in gene-
 “ ral, that all sacrifices were designed as *mulcts*. For there are
 “ more sacrifices that are purely *free-will offerings*, than what can
 “ be deemed in any view as *mulcts*. And if possibly these two may
 “ be considered in that manner, yet there will remain *seven or eight*
 “ sorts of sacrifices that cannot be treated as penalties: And, fore-
 “ ly, the nature and design of any general practice is to be deduced,
 “ from what the *major part* agree in, and not, contrary-wise, from
 “ what may be the possible intent of *one or two instances*. The
 “ *eucharistic sacrifices* were of several sorts; *the votive; the free-*
 “ *will offering; the Nazarite's lamb*, when the days of his separation
 “ were fulfilled; *the chagigah; the peace-offerings; the first-born;*
 “ and *the first-fruits*. These eight could never be deemed or con-
 “ sidered as *mulcts*, because there was no crime, or fault, or mis-
 “ behaviour, for which a *mulct* could be imposed. And as to the
 “ other two, *viz. the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings*, though they
 “ may possibly be considered in themselves as *finēs*, yet if any ac-
 “ count

(t) *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices, p. 332.*

"count of them can be assigned, consistent with the nature of sacrifices in general, it cannot be right, to frame an *hypothesis* only to solve the *reason* for their injunction." (u)

Answ. These words contain some new matter of objection; but before I proceed to answer it, it will be necessary to rectify a mistake of the author, or rather a misrepresentation which he gives us of the fact, upon which is reasoning depends. He says, that there were *seven* or *eight* sorts of *eucharistic sacrifices*. About this I shall not contend with him, as I have no concern with it. But I cannot but observe, that his enumeration of the several species's of *piacular sacrifices*, such as, according to himself, may be deemed *mulets*, is defective. He only mentions *sin-offerings* and *trespass-offerings* as being of this kind, and speaks diminutively of them, as being only *one* or *two instances* of sacrifice, or sorts of sacrifice. But, surely, *burnt-offerings*, if we may give any credit to the scriptures, or even to the author himself, were of this class. The *former* frequently inculcate this, as I have shewn before; and the *latter* says expressly, "The *burnt-offering* was for sins in general, for all such as might any way be an obstacle to the favour of God." p. 280. And still to the same purpose, "When the *burnt-offering* was annexed, (*viz. to the sin-offering, which was offered for any particular offence*) that was on account of all others which a man might have committed." p. 281. And accordingly, he tells us, "That when a *burnt-offering* was brought, the person that offered it, looked upon himself as in a state of *offence*;—and (*for that reason*) did not partake of that offering." p. 277.—Having thus made the author himself rectify the wrong representation of fact, which he here gives us; I now proceed to consider the truth and strength of his reasoning.

This author speaks in such a manner, here, as shews a great diffidence in the strength of all the foregoing arguments, which he had advanced, to prove that *piacular sacrifices* were not instituted and designed as *mulets*, or *finés*. For, after he has produced and urged

(u) *Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*, p. 333, 334.

urged all these arguments, he says, "Supposing it may be imagined, (*as allowing that there was still room for imagining*) that the *sin* and *trespass-offerings* may possibly be considered as *mulets* or *amercements* for certain sins, yet it is impossible to argue in general, that all sacrifices were designed as *mulets*." Now all this I could very readily grant to the author, provided he was as free to grant to me, what he supposes not very difficult or unreasonable to be imagined; and what, I think, (if we may judge of it by the success of his attempts) is very hard, if not impossible, to be confuted, *viz.* that *piacular* sacrifices and oblations may be considered as *mulets* or *amercements* for sin and faultiness of moral character. But this is what he neither will, nor can, in any consistency with his own favourite *hypothesis*, grant. For although he has not, even in his own apprehension of things, advanced any one clear and cogent argument to prove the contrary; yet he says here, "There are more sacrifices that are purely *free-will offerings*, than what can be deemed, in any view, as *mulets*. And if possibly these *two* (*viz. sin* and *trespass-offerings*) may be considered in that manner, yet there will remain *seven* or *eight* sorts of sacrifices that cannot be treated as penalties: and, surely, the nature and design of any general practice is to be deduced from what the *major part* agree in, and not, contrarywise, from what may be the possible intent of *one* or *two instances*." And to the same purpose, after he has enumerated these *seven* or *eight* sorts of sacrifices, he subjoins, "Though they (*i.e. the sin* and *trespass-offerings*) may possibly be considered in themselves as *fines*, yet if any account of them can be assigned, consistent with the nature of sacrifices in general, it cannot be right to frame an *hypothesis* only to solve the *reason* of their injunction." To which I answer, *1st*. That however this author flurs it over with the diminutive mention of *one* or *two instances* only, yet if the *major* and *minor* part of the practice of sacrificing among the *Jews*, be to be deduced, as, I think, it ought to be, from the *greater* or *lesser* number of the sacrifices which were offered; the *piacular* sacrifices, if I mistake not, will be found to be the *major part* of all their sacrifices, and

to have been much more frequently and abundantly offered, than all or any of their other species's of sacrifices. Wherefore, if the nature and design of any general practice be to be taken from what the *major part* of that practice agrees in, and not, contrarywise, from what may be the intent of a *lesser part* of it, the nature and design of the practice of sacrificing among the *Jews*, ought rather to be taken from the nature and design of *piacular*, than from those of other sacrifices. This may suffice as an answer to the author's reasoning here. But though it is sufficient to confute his argument, yet, I must confess, it can give no satisfaction to a rational enquirer after truth; for it is only answering a bad argument, with reasoning of a similar nature, and equally bad. And, therefore, I add, 2dly. That though the general design of all religious *rites* must be the same with that of *religion* itself, viz. to promote piety, virtue, and happiness; yet the particular design of *this* or *that* rite, or of *this* and *that* species of the same *rite*, may be different: and, therefore, though all religious *rites* agree in the general design mentioned, yet this agreement can be no reason, for making the particular design of all religious *rites* to be the same, or the particular intention of *this* *rite* to be the same with the particular intention of *that* *rite*. *Piacular sacrifices*, according to the scripture-account of things, were instituted to promote one set of ends; and *eucharistic sacrifices*, to promote a different set of ends; and, therefore, the intention of these two species of sacrifice was different, and ought not to be confounded: and for this reason, no general design ought to be assigned to them both, unless it be that of promoting piety, virtue, and happiness; which, without doubt, they all did, in the then circumstances of mankind, though in different ways.—To frame any *hypothesis*, that is unsupported by, or contrary to, scripture, or common sense, to solve the *reason* of the injunction of any sacrifice, or even to explain the general design of all sacrifices, is certainly wrong. But, pray, is not the *hypothesis*, which the author himself has assumed, in order to explain the general intent and design of all sacrifices, of this kind? An *hypothesis* not only unscriptural, but antiscritptural; not only antiscritptural, but shocking
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ing to common sense? Is it not so, even according to the author's own account of things? He tells us, that "sacrifices were the visible external *signs* (or *symbols*) of *friendship* with God;" p. 120. "The *dapes*, or *epulae*, which the offerer partook of when he was deemed worthy to be admitted to a state of *friendship*," p. 301. And, accordingly, he says, "that the nature and intent of sacrifice was to *eat* and *drink* with God, as it were at his *table*, and in consequence of that, to be in a state of *friendship* with him by repentance and confession of sins." p. 120.—But how was it possible for the author, in any consistency with himself, to make this the general design and intention of piacular sacrifices; since he acknowledges, that the offerers of them were not permitted to *eat* any part of them; and assigns this extraordinary reason for it, "God was justly conceived, to be *displeased*, or, at least, to have a *right* to shew *displeasure*?—The party had been guilty;—and whilst he continued in sin, he was unworthy the common marks of *friendship* with God; and, therefore, he could have no ground to hope for blessings from him. He could not then, presume to *eat* as a *friend* with God, till he had made confession, and declared himself a sincere penitent." p. 277, 281—284. To which I add, that he might not presume to *eat* as a *friend* with God, after he had made confession, and declared himself a sincere penitent; for, after he had done both, he was not even then permitted to *eat* any part of his sacrifice.—If then, as the author says, *eating* and *drinking* with God were *signs* and *symbols* of *friendship*; it is most certain, that the being actually excluded from *eating* and *drinking* with him, and that in consequence of *guilt* and *displeasure*, was a sign and symbol of the contrary, *that is*, of *anger* and *enmity*. How then could the author make piacular sacrifices (of which the offerers had no share to *eat*) *signs* and *symbols* of *friendship*, in any consistency with himself. (w)

§ 39. Having thus exhibited the scripture-evidence, whereby the piacular sacrifices and oblations, which were instituted and offered

(w) Whoever would see this affair thoroughly considered, may consult the *second appendix* in the *Criticisms upon modern notions of sacrifice*.

ered under the *Law of Moses*, are proved to have been *mulcts* or *penes*, and, as such, penal to the persons from whom they were exacted, and by whom they were offered; and having, likewise, made particular and full *answers* to all the *objections* which either have been made, or, as far as I conceive, can be made, to this notion of the *nature* and *design* of those sacrifices and oblations; I now proceed to

PROPOSITION II. viz.

To shew, that, as *mulcts* for *sin* and *faultiness* of *moral character*, be *piacular sacrifices* and *oblations*, which were instituted and offered under the *Law of Moses*, might, and did, produce all the effects which are assigned to them.

§ 40. This proposition might be dispatched with a very short proof, taken from what has been proved under the former. For the *piacular sacrifices* and *oblations*, which obtained under the *Law of Moses*, were instituted, and exacted from the offerers, as *mulcts* for *sin* and *faultiness* of *moral character* (as it has been proved, they were) it clearly follows, that they did produce all the effects which are assigned to them, as such. But, that I may give all satisfaction to rational inquirers, I shall bestow a particular illustration upon this point. In order to which I shall make the following preliminary observations.

§ 41. *Obs.* I. *Piacular sacrifices* and *oblations* were instituted and enjoined for the ease, relief, and benefit of penitent sinners only. This has been proved in the *second chapter* of this *part*, to which I refer the reader.

§ 42. *Obs.* II. Any person who compares the primary penalties, which were denounced, in the *Law of Moses*, against the transgressors of it, with the damage sustained by the oblation of those sacrifices and oblations which were appointed to be offered for the transgressions of it; will presently perceive, that the damage, sustained by the oblation of the latter, was much lighter than that which

which was sustained by those who suffered the former. (x) And if he considers further, that penitent sinners, before they became penitent, were really obnoxious to those grievous primary penalties or punishments which were denounced by the law against those sins of which they were guilty; but that, upon their becoming penitent for them, they had those grievous primary penalties remitted to them; whilst, at the same time, they were condemned in the loss of certain piacular sacrifices and oblations, which were exacted from them as *mults* for the sins which they had committed, and for the faultiness of their moral character, he will find reason to think, that these piacular sacrifices and oblations were instituted as *secondary penalties*, which, in the case of all penitent sinners, were to succeed in the place of those *primary ones* which were remitted to them.

§ 43. *Obj. III.* Moral characters, which are essentially different, are *three* in number, *viz.* That of the *perfectly righteous*; That of *impenitent offenders*; and That of *penitent sinners*. The first is the best of all characters; The second is the worst; and the third is of a middle sort, being neither so good as the first, nor so bad as the second. Now, supposing the treatment proper to the first of these moral characters, in consequence of the end and rectitude of divine moral government, to be *reward*, *reward only*, and that proportioned to the several measures of piety, virtue, and obedience, found among those who are of this character; and supposing the treatment proper to the second of them, to be *punishment*, *punishment only*, and that proportioned to the several measures and degrees of

(x) If any person wants further satisfaction about this affair, he may turn back to the foregoing chapter, and compare the *primary penalties* there mentioned, with the value of those piacular sacrifices and oblations which were offered to obtain the remission of them. He may, likewise, consider the great disproportion which there was between the weight of that *penal treatment* to which the collective body of penitent sinners, among the *Israelites*, were subjected, through the oblation of those sacrifices which they offered daily, weekly, monthly, and annually, on account of the faulty part of their moral character, and that of the more rigid and severe treatment to which impenitent offenders were obnoxious as long as they remained impenitent; of which he will find an account, *Levit. xxvi. 14—39.* and *Deut. xxviii. 15—68.*

vice, disobedience, and obstinacy, which are found among the impenitent; then it will follow, that the treatment proper to penitent sinners, in consequence of the end and rectitude of divine moral government, must be the mean betwixt these two, viz. reward proportioned to the several measures and degrees of their obedience, accompanied with a mild *penal treatment* on account of the faulty part of their moral character, and both these continued as long as their moral character remains unchanged; by which means a due difference would be made and preserved between their treatment and that of the perfectly righteous on the one hand, and that of impenitent offenders on the other: a difference which has a direct tendency and proper fitness to encourage obedience and discourage disobedience, and to promote the end and secure the rectitude of divine moral government. (y) And if the penal part of this treatment was, for the reasons mentioned, such as was proper and requisite in the case of penitent sinners, it is very manifest, that *piacular sacrifices*, as *mulcts* for sin and faultiness of moral character, and offered on the *occasions*, and, at the *times*, appointed by the *Law of Moses*, would constitute such a penal treatment, and fully answer the ends aforesaid, by producing the several effects which are assigned to them in the *Levitical Law*. For,

§ 44. 1st. When the collective body of penitent *Israelites* were taken into covenant with God, and brought into the relation of a *peculiar people* to him, let us suppose, that the goodness, wisdom, end, and rectitude of divine moral government made in requisite and necessary, that, in the conveyance of this grace or favour, something should be done, some mean appointed and made use of, whereby it might be made to appear, that this penitent people was not put upon the same footing with perfectly righteous creatures, though they were treated much better than impenitent offenders: Upon this supposition, it is manifest, that the exacting from this penitent people some *piacular sacrifice* or sacrifices as *mulct* or secondary penalty, in lieu of the more grievous punishment to which they had

(y) See the former *Essay*, Chap. II. Sect. III. and IV.

had been formerly obnoxious as impenitent offenders, might, and would, be a proper mean for making the distinction of treatment mentioned; and, consequently, for *hallowing* or *sanctifying* that people, in the sense of constituting a covenant-union or relation between God and them, in a perfect consistency with the rectitude of divine moral government.

Again; When some particular individuals of this collective body of penitent sinners, came, at any time, to have higher degrees of favour conferred on them by the Deity than their fellow penitents; E. G. suppose some of them to have had the dignity and emoluments of the *priesthood* conferred, in various degrees, upon them; and others of them to have been admitted, for a shorter or longer time, to the honour and employments of *Nazarites*: When any thing, I say, of this kind happened, let us suppose, that the wisdom and rectitude of divine moral government made it fit and requisite, that the persons mentioned, when admitted to these superior degrees of favour, should be treated according to their real moral character, and in such a manner as would make a proper *balance* betwixt their treatment and that of other penitent sinners who were not so highly favoured: Upon this supposition, 'tis manifest, that the exaction of some peculiar sacrifice or sacrifices from the persons so favoured, in the way of *mulct* for the faulty part of their moral character, would answer the ends mentioned. By such a *mulct*, the persons, exalted, by superior favour, above their fellow-penitents, would be treated as penitent sinners ought to be, even at the time when superior favour was shewn them. The loss and damage, occasioned by the payment of this *mulct*, would be a diminution of the superior favour conferred on them; a certain draw-back that would preserve a sensible and just difference betwixt their treatment and that of their fellow penitents, whose moral character was the same with, and as good as their's; and who, nevertheless, were not so highly favoured: consequently, the oblation of the peculiar sacrifices aforesaid, as a *mulct* for the faulty part of their moral character, might, and would, be a very fit and proper mean for *hallowing* or *sanctifying* the *Priests, Levites, and Nazarites*, in the sense

sense of constituting the respective relations to the Deity, into which they were received, in a perfect consistency with the wisdom and rectitude of divine moral government.—Upon the whole, it appears, that piacular sacrifices and oblations, offered as *mults* for sin and faultiness of moral character, not only might, but actually would, *hallow* or *sanctify* persons in all the cases in which the *Levitical Law* assigns this effect to them.

§ 45. 2dly. A second effect, ascribed to piacular sacrifices and oblations, is, the restoration of an union with, or relation to the Deity, after it had been interrupted or dissolved by some cause or other. This effect, I have before shewn, was produced by all those sacrifices which were offered either to restore the *unclean* to the privileges of the *clean*, or to obtain the *remission of such sins* as had been committed, confessed, and repented of. And I am now to enquire, whether this effect might, and would, in both the cases mentioned, be produced by piacular sacrifices and oblations, provided they were offered as *mults* for sin and faultiness of moral character.

To begin with the first case mentioned; let us suppose the union, or relation, which had been subsisting between the Deity and some penitent sinner, to have been interrupted or dissolved by some innocent cause, and without any fault, or variation of moral character, in this penitent sinner; or, in other words, by some *ceremonial uncleanness* or other, whether avoidable or unavoidable. Here, it is evident, that, when the union and relation, which had been interrupted, came again to be restored between the Deity and this *unclean person*, both his own moral character, and the wisdom and rectitude of divine moral government, would render it fit and requisite, that he should be treated by the Deity, neither as a perfectly righteous person, nor as an impenitent offender, but as a penitent sinner; *that is*, that a just and proper difference should, on this occasion, be made between his treatment and that of the other two moral characters mentioned. A due and proper difference would be made between the treatment of this person and that which is due to the impenitent, by his exemption from the *primary penalties* denounced against sins by the law, and by his admission to the enjoyment

joyment of *reward*, suitable or proportionable to the measure and degree of his sincere obedience to the law. And would not a like difference be made, on this occasion, between his treatment and that of perfectly righteous creatures, provided he offered some *piacular* sacrifice or sacrifices, in obedience to divine injunction, as a *mulct* for the faulty part of his moral character? Certainly there would. If so; there is nothing more evident, than that *piacular* sacrifices, as *mulcts* for sin and faultiness of moral character, might, and would, *purify the unclean*, in the sense of restoring that union and free intercourse with the Deity and his worshippers, which had been interrupted and obstructed by their *uncleannesses*, in a perfect consistency with the wisdom and rectitude of divine moral government.

As to the second case mentioned; when an union or relation of friendship between the Deity and any person had been destroyed by the actual commission of some act of disobedience, and the offender had become penitent; here the end and rectitude of divine moral government would require, that this person should be treated neither as an impenitent offender, nor as a blameless righteous person, but in a way suitable to his moral character, *that is*, better than the former, but worse than the latter. Now, if this person had the *primary penalty*, which the law denounced against the sin which he had committed, forgiven to him, and was admitted to the enjoyment of *reward* proportionable to the measure of his subsequent obedience, it is plain, that he would be better treated than an impenitent offender who had the *primary penalty* of the law to suffer; and that such a difference would be made between the treatment of those two moral characters as would have a direct and proper tendency to promote the end and secure the rectitude of divine moral government: and it is equally evident, that the exacting, from this penitent sinner, a *piacular* sacrifice or oblation, as a *mulct* or *amercement* for the sin which he had committed; and the accepting of it in lieu of the *primary penalty* from which he was discharged, would have as direct a tendency to make such a difference between his treatment and that of a blameless, righteous person, as the end and rectitude

rectitude of divine moral government rendered requisite. And if such a *mulct* was exacted from every person, as often as he committed any particular sin, this would serve to secure the rectitude of divine moral government not only in the way mentioned, but, likewise, by making a just balance and righteous proportion between the treatment which any one penitent sinner received, and that which was received by any other individual of the same moral character. Hence it appears, that the oblation of piacular sacrifices or oblations, as *mulcts* for sin, was a fit and proper mean for being made use of in the grant or conveyance of the *remission of sins* to the penitent, in a way that was suitable to the end and rectitude of divine moral government; and that, if it was instituted for that end, it would really convey that *blessing* to them in the way mentioned. I shall illustrate this affair by a very familiar example. When a person commits any *crime*, for which the *civil law* of the country, in which he lives, condemns him to be *put to death*; and the *supreme civil magistrate*, for wise reasons, changes the *sentence of death*, which the law denounces against him, into that of *exile*, or that of a *pecuniary mulct*, or, in other words, substitutes a milder secondary punishment in place of the more grievous one demerited; it is manifest, that the punishment of *death* is remitted to this offender, and that he obtains this remission through the suffering of *exile*, or the paying of the *pecuniary mulct*, which was substituted in place of that punishment by the *supreme magistrate*. In like manner, when God required penitent sinners to offer a *bullock*, a *lamb*, a *kid*, &c. for their trespasses; and condemned them in those oblations as secondary penalties, substituted in place of the more grievous primary penalties which were denounced against their sins by the *Law of Moses*; it is evident, that they obtained the remission of those primary penalties by the loss of a *bullock*, or a *lamb*, or a *kid*, &c. that is, by suffering the secondary punishments which had been substituted, by the *legislator*, in lieu of the more grievous primary penalties which that law had denounced against the sins of which they were guilty.—And that the *remission of sin* was, in fact, obtained for penitent sinners, by the oblation of piacular sacrifices and oblations

oblations as *mulcts* for sin, or secondary penalties, is very evident from two *propositions*, which have been already proved. The *first* is, That the primary penalties, which were denounced against particular sins by the *Law of Moses*, were really forgiven, or remitted, to those who were penitent for their offences, and offered the prescribed piacular sacrifices or oblations for them: and the *second* is, That the piacular sacrifices and oblations, which penitent sinners were enjoined to offer for their offences, in order to obtain that remission of them, were exacted from them as *mulcts* for sin, or *secondary penalties*. For since these piacular sacrifices and oblations were exacted as secondary penalties, and the oblation of them was, strictly speaking, *solutio mulctæ pro crimine perpetrato*; and since the offenders, who offered these sacrifices and oblations as *mulcts* which they were ordered to pay for their sins, did, hereupon, obtain the remission of those more grievous primary penalties which the law denounced against those their sins; it is very manifest, that those piacular sacrifices and oblations did, as secondary penalties, substituted in the place of the more grievous primary penalties denounced in the *Law of Moses*, obtain for penitent sinners the remission of those grievous primary penalties, or, in other words, the remission of the sins for which they were offered.—Upon the whole, it appears, that the oblation of piacular sacrifices, as *mulcts* for sin, was a proper mean for conveying the remission of sin to the penitent in a consistency with the rectitude of divine moral government; and that, as such, piacular sacrifices and oblations actually did obtain the remission of sin for persons of this moral character.

§ 46. *3dly*. The third and last effect, that is assigned to piacular sacrifices and oblations in the *Levitical Law*, is, that of preserving, or keeping up, an union or relation of friendship between the Deity and penitent sinners, after such an union had been made, or restored: And it is not difficult to conceive, how this *effect* might, and would, be produced by those sacrifices and oblations, repeatedly offered, from time to time, as *mulcts* for faultiness of moral character. For supposing the truth of that which I have, elsewhere, proved to be real fact, *viz.* that the wisdom, goodness, end, and rectitude

rectitude of divine moral government, make it fit and requisite, that a permanent difference should be preserved and kept up between the treatment of perfectly righteous creatures, and that of penitent sinners, by keeping the latter, from time to time, under a certain degree of mild *penal treatment*, on account of the faulty part of their moral character; it is clear and manifest, that the daily, weekly, monthly, and annual oblation of piacular sacrifices, in obedience to divine injunction, as *mulets* for faultiness of moral character, would fully and effectually answer this end, by constituting such a treatment for penitent sinners, as would preserve a proper and permanent difference between their treatment and that of perfectly righteous creatures; and be the means of conveying to them all the grace and favour, which was shewn to them by the Deity, and of keeping up an union of friendship and relationship betwixt him and them, in a perfect consistency with the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government. There is, therefore, no need to say any more upon this head.

§ 47. I have now finished the design of this *Chapter*. I have proved, that, under the *Law of Moses*, piacular sacrifices and oblations were instituted as *mulets* for sin and faultiness of moral character; and have made particular *answers* to all the objections which have been made, or, as I think, can be made, to this notion of the nature and design of piacular sacrifices and oblations. I have proved, likewise, that piacular sacrifices and oblations, as *mulets* for sin and faultiness of moral character, and offered on the *occasions*, and in the *way* and *manner*, directed by the *Levitical Law*, not only might and would, but actually did, produce all the various *effects* which are, any where, assigned to them. In the proof of the *first proposition*, I have assumed no *hypothesis*, but have proceeded upon scripture-evidence only, and have made use of no arguments but what are clearly grounded upon the *facts*, and *the nature of the things*, which are related in scripture. In the proof of the *second*, I have made use of no arguments, but what are clearly grounded upon the supposition of the truth of the first proposition (which, I think, may be well assumed for a true one, after it has been clearly

proved to be such) the wisdom and rectitude of divine moral government, and the account which *Moses* himself gives us of *facts*. How the proof of these *two propositions*, which I have produced, may appear to others, I cannot determine. To me, it appears to be clear, full, strong, and almost demonstrative; for which reason, I shall venture to conclude this *chapter* with two or three *corollaries*, which must either stand or fall, as these two propositions are found to be true or false.

Coroll. 1st. The true definition of a piacular sacrifice, or oblation, is, that it was a *mulct* for sin and faultiness of moral character, or, a mild secondary penalty, imposed by the Deity on a penitent sinner, or on a collective body of penitent sinners, to the end that such a difference should be either made, or kept up, between his, or their treatment, and the treatment of perfectly righteous creatures, as the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government required to be made and kept up between them; and to the end, also, that a due and righteous proportion, such as the wisdom and rectitude of government demanded, should be made and constituted between the treatment of one penitent sinner and that of another penitent sinner, according to what difference there might be betwixt their respective behaviours.—The *mulcts* or secondary penalties, which, under the *Law of Moses*, were imposed by the Deity on penitent sinners, to answer the ends mentioned, were oblations of *sound animals* of the clean and useful kind, or of something else that was good in its kind and might have been useful to the owner.—Whatever was thus offered to God for sin and faultiness of moral character, was God's property; and because it was a *mulct*, the offerer was allowed no share of it for his own private use.—If the thing offered to God was an animal, and was killed when it was offered to him, the oblation is called, זבח *zebach*, a sacrifice: if it was not an animal, but something of the inanimate kind, it is called, מינחה *minchah*, an oblation. But whatever it was that was offered by penitent sinners for sin and faultiness of moral character, it was, strictly speaking, a *mulct*, or secondary penalty, or what, in *Greek*, is called αἵματιον: and the oblation of it was *solutio mulctæ impositæ*, or the payment

payment of a *mulct* which was laid on them for sin and faultiness of moral character.

Coroll. 2d. Under the *Law of Moses*, penitent offenders were not exempted from all punishment. For though they were discharged from the grievous primary penalties which were the portion of the impenitent, yet they obtained the remission of those penalties upon no other terms, than the suffering of a milder sort of penal treatment. They were actually condemned to pay a certain *mulct* for every offence; yea, and to undergo a constant, mild penal treatment, suitable to the faulty part of their moral character, and such as kept up a permanent difference between their treatment and that of perfectly righteous creatures, even at the time they were favoured with reward proportionable to the various and different measures of their obedience.

Coroll. 3d. PIACULAR SACRIFICES and OBLATIONS, being the *mulcts* which, by the *Law of Moses*, were exacted from penitent sinners for their sins, and the faulty part of their moral character, the oblation of them was a proper satisfaction to the *public justice* of God, as king and supreme governour of the *Hebrew nation*. This was no other than the paying down those *mulcts* which the law imposed upon them as a species of offenders, distinct from the impenitent; and the accepting of, and bearing, all the punishment which the *legislator* had appointed to be suffered by persons of their moral character: and, therefore, they who offered those piacular sacrifices and oblations in obedience to, and according to the appointments of the law, did as truly satisfy the demands of the law, and of *public justice*, as any criminal doth, when he suffers the punishment which is due to his offence.



C H A P. V.

Concerning the rectitude of divine moral government in the treatment of penitent sinners, under the Hebrew Theocracy.

§ 1. **A**LTHOUGH many material hints have been given, in the latter part of the last *Section* of the foregoing *Chapter*, concerning the rectitude of divine moral government, in the treatment of penitent sinners, under the *Hebrew Theocracy*; yet it may be proper, to collect those hints together, and to add some other things to them, and to exhibit the whole in such a manner, as may give an uniform, unbroken view of the rectitude of divine moral government in the whole, and in every part, of this affair.

§ 2. The following observations, if duly attended to, will set this affair in a clear and obvious point of light.

§ 3. The *Hebrew Theocracy* made no provision for the treatment of those who lived under it, according to their different moral characters, in *the world to come*. All the rewards which it promised to the obedient, and all the punishments it denounced against the disobedient, were of a *temporal nature* only. The rewards, which it promised, are all reducible to a *life* in the land of *Canaan*, happy to the community, in proportion to the degree and measure of national piety and virtue; and to every individual, in proportion to the measure of his obedience. And the punishments, which it denounced, are all reducible to a *life*, either in the land of *Canaan*, or out of it, miserable to the community, in proportion to the measure and quantity of national impiety and vice; and to individuals, in proportion to the measure of their sin and disobedience. (z) If there

(z) See this *Essay*, Part. III. § 12, 13.

there was any reward promised to the obedient, or any punishment that was denounced against the disobedient, that is not comprehended under one or other of these two general heads, yet it will still be found to be, like the rest, of a *temporal nature*.

§ 4. The treatment proper to penitent sinners, under divine moral government, is partly *premiat*, and partly *penal*; *premiat* to such a degree as may render it duly different from the grievous treatment of impenitent offenders, and an efficacious motive and encouragement to repentance, and to perseverance and steadiness in a course of obedience to the Deity; and *penal* to such a degree as may make it duly different from the treatment which is proper to perfectly righteous creatures, and a proper motive to deter the perfectly righteous from the commission of sin, and the impenitent from persevering in a course of disobedience, and the penitent themselves from relapsing into sin and disobedience, through a delusive hope of obtaining absolute impunity upon a future repentance, to be performed at some time or other. More particularly,

§ 5. 1st. The reward conferred on the penitent, under divine government, ought to be such as bears a due and righteous proportion to the measures of obedience performed by each of them, or by any collective body of them, this being absolutely necessary to answer the ends mentioned; and, of course, the demands of the wisdom and rectitude of divine moral government. (a)

§ 6. 2^{dly}. The punishment, to which the penitent were obnoxious before they became penitent, cannot, in a consistency with the wisdom and rectitude of divine moral government be inflicted on them. If they were laid under this punishment, their treatment would be the same with that of impenitent offenders whose character and behaviour is much worse than theirs, be an effectual obstacle to their enjoyment of reward suitable to the measures of their obedience, and destroy the grand motive to repentance and amendment of life. And, in all these respects, their treatment would be absolutely inconsistent with the goodness, wisdom, and rectitude

(a) See the former *Essay*, Chap. II. Sect. III. § 8—11.

rectitude of divine moral government. The punishment aforesaid ought, therefore, to be forgiven, upon their becoming penitent. *(b)*

§ 7. *3dly*. Although the rectitude of divine moral government makes it fit and requisite, that the grievous punishment, to which the penitent had been obnoxious before they became penitent, should be remitted; yet the same rectitude makes it equally fit and requisite, that persons of this moral character should not escape all punishment, yea requires, that they should have an inferior penal treatment given them. For if they suffered no punishment, and, at the same time, had reward conferred upon them, proportionable to the measures of their obedience, they would be treated as well, and, considering the faulty part of their moral character, even better, than any perfectly righteous creature. And this partial treatment would create *murmuring* and *discontent*, and destroy the force of the grand motive to repentance and amendment of life, and to steadiness in a course of obedience, arising from the being cut off from all hope of obtaining absolute impunity by repentance, at any time performed; and would, in both these respects, be inconsistent with the goodness, wisdom, and rectitude of divine moral government. This penal treatment, however, ought to be of a gentle and mild nature, different from, and inferior to, the grievous penal treatment which is the portion of the impenitent; and, withal, such as will not obstruct the enjoyment of reward, suitable to the measure of the obedience performed by each penitent sinner. *(c)*

§ 8. *4thly*. The rectitude of divine moral government makes it likewise fit and requisite, that both the premial and penal part of the treatment of penitent sinners should remain *unvaried*, as long as their moral character remains *unvaried*. *(d)*

§ 9. *5thly*. But if a penitent sinner, after repentance, did again change his moral character by a relapse into some offence, or act of disobedience, the rectitude of divine government, would, in that case, require, that he should be treated as an impenitent offender

(b) *Ibidem*, Chap. II. Sect. III. § 6.

(c) See the *first Essay*, Chap. II. Sect. III. § 3—6.

(d) *Ibidem*, Chap. II. Sect. IV. § 2.

fender as long as he remained impenitent, and did not apply for pardon in the prescribed manner.—And if the same person, after such a relapse into sin and disobedience, did again change his moral character by becoming a penitent, the same rectitude of government would, in this case, require, that he should be treated according to his newly acquired character; *that is*, that the punishment, which had been due to him in his impenitent state, should be forgiven; and that he should have reward according to the measure of his subsequent obedience; but, withal, that such a *mark* of displeasure should be put upon him, as would make a due difference between his treatment, and the treatment, both of righteous creatures, who needed no repentance; and of other penitent sinners who had not, like him, departed from their duty and character. (e)

§ 10. *Lastly*, When more favour happened, at any time, to be shewn by the Deity to one penitent sinner, than to others of the same moral character, and whose piety and obedience were not inferior; here, the wisdom and rectitude of divine government would require, that this *surplus* of favour should be balanced by some proper draw-back. And here, it is evident, that the preponderating scale of favour may be reduced to an *equilibrium*, by throwing into it a proper weight of penal treatment; because that would be the same thing as to withdraw a certain quantity of the favour shewn.

§ 11. The foregoing *six articles* contain a full and particular account of such a treatment of penitent sinners as is congruous to the goodness, wisdom, and rectitude of divine moral government. And I shall now shew, that persons of this moral character had this very treatment from the Deity under the *Hebrew Theocracy*.

§ 12. As to the premial part of the treatment of penitent sinners, under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, I have said enough about it already; to which I must refer the reader. (f)

§ 13. And as to the penal part of the treatment, which persons of that moral character had from the Deity under this dispensation

(e) See the former *Essay*, Chap. II. Sect. IV. § 3—7.

(f) See this same *Essay*, Part III. § 13, 14.

of religion, I shall here exhibit it in all its parts, and shew that it was, in all respects, congruous to the rectitude of divine moral government, as above explained. And, in doing this, I shall proceed upon the *supposition*, that piacular sacrifices and oblations were those *mulets* which were exacted, by the Deity, from penitent offenders for their sins and the faulty part of their moral character. The truth of this *proposition* has been largely proved in the foregoing *Chapter*: And, therefore, I now assume it as a true one, and proceed upon the supposition of the truth of it.

C A S E I.

§ 14. When the *Israelites* entered in a covenant with God at *Horeb*, they appear to have been a penitent people. For, at that time, they declared their willingness, and gave their consent, to have God for their king; and promised, in the most solemn manner, to behave towards him as faithful, loyal, and obedient *subjects*, saying, with one voice, *All the words, which the Lord hath said, we will do, and be obedient*, *Exod. xxiv. 3, 7.*

Here then was a sinful people brought to repentance, and a resolution to amend their lives by a careful, future obedience.—Wherefore, it was morally fit, and congruous to the rectitude of divine moral government, that more favour should be shewn to this collective body of penitents than to impenitent nations, and that they should be put into a condition for enjoying reward suitable to the degrees and measures of their future obedience.—And, accordingly, God was pleased to discharge them from the grievous punishment to which they had been obnoxious in their former impenitent state, to receive them as his *peculiar people*, to take upon himself the government of them, to deliver to them an excellent *system of laws*; and, withal, he promised, that he would settle them in the fine land of *Canaan*, where he would dwell amongst them, rule over them, protect them, bless them, and make them a happy and flourishing people; and where they should all enjoy a reward of worldly felicity

ity proportionable to the measure of their good and obedient behaviour. (g) All this, surely, was perfectly congruous to the goodness, wisdom, rectitude, and end of divine moral government, as having a direct and strong tendency to promote repentance, obedience, and happiness.

But because the *Israelites* had been offenders, it would have been morally wrong, and inconsistent with the rectitude of divine moral government, to have shewed them the favour, aforesaid, without making any notice of their sins, or putting some proper mark of displeasure upon them for the faulty part of their moral character. To

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(g) Before this time, the *Israelites* had been a very perverse, obstinate, and disobedient people, and as prone to the practice of idolatry as any nation whatsoever. And it was by very extraordinary means and motives, that they had been brought to their present penitent and obedient temper, even by a long series of miraculous deliverances, judgments, visible manifestations of the presence and power of God, and the vigilant and laborious ministry of *Moses*, immediately directed, and visibly assisted, by God in every part of it. These extraordinary means and motives were the effects of the *free grace* of God, who, without any regard to merit, or antecedent moral character, in rational creatures, bestows his original gifts, and the external means of spiritual improvements, upon them, in different measures and degrees, as he pleaseth. Now, the present penitent and obedient temper of the *Israelites*, being produced by extraordinary means and motives, which were the effects of the *free grace* of God; the privileges, immunities, and happiness, which they now received, on account of that penitent and obedient temper, must have, likewise, been the effects of *free grace* and favour. For, from what source soever their penitent and obedient temper did derive itself, the privileges, immunities, and happiness, for the enjoyment of which they became fit and qualified by that temper, must have ultimately derived themselves from the very same source. But though the grant of the privileges, immunities, and happiness, mentioned, may be thus resolved into the *free grace* of God, and be accounted a *reward of grace*, and not of debt; yet, because it was by the *Israelites* own voluntary improvement of the extraordinary means and motives, which were afforded them, that they were brought to repentance; and because it was by repentance (which was their own voluntary, virtuous act) that they became qualified for enjoying the privileges, immunities and happiness, aforesaid, in a perfect consistency with the rectitude of moral government; it is plain, that the last mentioned blessings were conferred on them according to, and on account of, their own good behaviour.—These observations are equally applicable, under the *gospel-state*, to the conveyance of the blessings which are antecedent and consequent to repentance. The former are bestowed, out of pure grace, without any regard to moral character. The latter also are bestowed, in the way of *free grace*, but with a strict regard to moral character. And hence we may see, that blessings may be conveyed to sinners in the way of *free grace*, and, at the same time, in a perfect consistency with their moral character.

have dealt thus with them, would have been to treat them as if they had not been offenders, but perfectly righteous creatures; consequently, in a way that would have had a direct tendency to obstruct the end of divine moral government, and would have been inconsistent with the wisdom and rectitude of it.—Wherefore, in order to preserve a due difference of treatment, and thereby to secure the end and rectitude of divine government, while the penitent sinners are received to so much favour by the Deity, they make a covenant with him by *sacrifice*. *Moses sent young men*, on this occasion, *to offer burnt-offerings*, *Exod. xxiv. 5.*—The great favour, that was shewn to the *Israelites*, constituted a due difference between their treatment, and that of impenitent, idolatrous nations: and the way and manner, in which it was shewn, *viz.* through the intervention of the oblation of *burnt-offerings*, as *mults* for the faulty part of their moral character, made a fit difference, likewise, between their treatment and that of perfectly righteous creatures. Their treatment, therefore, was, in all respects, suitable to their own mixed moral character, and perfectly consistent with the rectitude of divine moral government.

C A S E II.

§ 15. The moral character of this collective body of penitent sinners, as long as it remained unchanged, would be essentially different from the moral characters both of perfectly righteous creatures and of impenitent offenders. And, for this reason, as I have shewn before, the rectitude of divine moral government would require, that they should be treated, according to this difference of moral character, as long as their moral character remained unchanged; *that is*, that they should, all along, be rewarded in proportion to the measure and degrees of their obedience; and, at the same time, be kept under a proper penal treatment on account of the faulty and vicious part of their moral character; and that in such a manner, as that they might, at all times, be better treated than impenitent offenders, and worse than perfectly righteous creatures.

ures.—And, in fact, we find, that this collective body of penitent *Israelites* was treated in this very way by the Deity. For while, by constant enjoyment of worldly felicity in the land of *Canaan*, proportionable to the measures of their obedience, an unvaried difference was preserved between their treatment and that of impenitent offenders; to keep up a like difference between their treatment and that of perfectly righteous creatures, this temporal felicity, which they enjoyed, was accompanied with a certain degree of mild penal treatment.—By the oblation of a daily *burnt-offering*, every morning and evening, and of those costly sacrifices which were offered weekly on the *sabbath days*, monthly on the *new moons*, and annually at the three great festivals, and on the day of expiation, &c. I say, by the daily, weekly, monthly, and annual oblation of those costly piacular sacrifices, in obedience to divine injunction, a permanent difference was kept up between the treatment of the collective body of the penitent *Israelites* and that of perfectly righteous creatures. For those sacrifices, being exacted from them as *penalties* for the faultiness of their moral character, and operating upon them, as such, from day to day, from week to week, from month to month, and from year to year, they would, and actually did, preserve the difference of treatment, mentioned, from time to time.—By the means aforesaid, therefore, the collective body of penitent *Israelites* were treated by the Deity, as long as their moral character remained unchanged, in an exact conformity to their mixed moral character, and a perfect consistency with the wisdom and rectitude of divine moral government. Because they had been offenders, they continued under a mild penal treatment. And because they were become penitent and obedient, they enjoyed, from time to time, just and equitable proportions of worldly felicity, such as were suitable to the measures and degrees of their obedience. And this treatment was just what the wisdom and rectitude of divine government required it should be, as I have shewn before.

C A S E III.

§ 16. The Deity did choose *Aaron* and his sons from amongst their fellow subjects, and appointed them to be his *ministers of state*; to instruct his subjects in the knowledge of his laws; to attend the place of his royal presence, and to act there, in all affairs of state and religion, as agents for him and mediators for his subjects; to judge in matters of controversy between man and man; and to see the laws duly executed: and he assigned to them their bretheren, the *Levites*, for their servants and assistants. These were places of great power and dignity, as well as trust, to which *Aaron* and his sons and the *Levites* were promoted; and they were places of profit too; for an ample provision was made for the support of the state and dignity to which they were raised.

But although *Aaron*, his sons, and the *Levites*, were thus promoted, by the great king of *Israel*, to places of power, dignity, and profit, above their *Fellow-Israelites*, yet they were of the same moral character with those who were not so distinguished. Both were penitent sinners: and the moral character of the *priests* was no better than that of the *laity*.—Here then, as has been before shewn, the rectitude of divine moral government would require, that a reduction of the disproportionate favour, which was shewn to the *Priests* and *Levites*, should be made by a suitable degree of penal treatment; so far, at least, as might render it evident, that they were not lifted up above their fellow-penitents on account of a better moral character or behaviour. And how could the Deity do this in a more proper and expressive manner, than by ordering them to be set apart to their honourable and lucrative offices by the oblation of piacular sacrifices, as *mulcts* for the faulty part of their moral character? For would not those exacted mulcts be a real reduction of the favour shewn them; and make it manifest, that they were still treated as penitent sinners?—Agreeably, therefore, to this requirement of the rectitude of divine moral government, God order-
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ed Aaron, his sons, and the Levites to be *sanctified*, or consecrated to their respective offices, by the oblation of piacular sacrifices, *Exod.* xxix. 1, 10—25. *Numb.* viii. 8—12.

C A S E IV.

§ 17. Another case, much resembling the foregoing, was that of the persons who took the vow of a *Nazar* upon them. The persons who were under this vow, did *separate* themselves to God, and were *holy*; and, as persons thus *separated* and *holy*, they were, sometimes employed by him in very honourable and important services, as I have shewed before.—This nearness, therefore, to the king of *Israel*, to which these *Nazars* were admitted; the honourable relation in which they stood to the Deity as *separated* and *holy* persons; and their being sometimes, employed, by him in honourable and important services, were such instances of a distinguished favour as were not conferred on their fellow-penitents. The rectitude, therefore, of divine moral government would, in this case, require, that such a reduction should be made of this surplus of favour, as would make it manifest, that these *Nazars* were still treated as penitent sinners, and that they were not lifted up above their fellow-penitents because their moral character or behaviour had been different from, or better than theirs. And, in exact conformity to this requirement of the rectitude of his government, was the conduct of the Deity; for he ordered the persons, who took the *Nazarite-vow* upon them, to be admitted to the favour, and to enter upon the honourable employments, which they enjoyed above their fellow-penitents, by the oblation of costly piacular sacrifices, *Numb.* vi. 13, 14. Which piacular sacrifices, being exacted from them as *mulcts* for the faulty part of their moral character, were very fit and proper means for answering the end, aforesaid.

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C A S E V.

§ 18. The persons who were defiled with corporal pollutions, particularly, women in *child-bed*, and under their *menstrual issues*; men labouring under *running issues*; and persons infected with the *leprosy*, or defiled by the *dead*; all persons, I say, thus defiled, were, by the special appointment of God, excluded from the congregation of *Israel*, from the sacred place where God, the King of *Israel*, dwelt in the symbol of his special presence, and from the public worship there performed unto him: and so were deprived of all visible communion and intercourse with the Deity, and with his peculiar people, during the time of their *uncleannesses*.—Wherefore, since the rectitude of divine moral government made it *originally*, and at the beginning, fit, that the collective body of penitent *Israelites* should be received as *subjects* and a *peculiar people* by God, and be admitted to the enjoyment of the blessings of a temporal theocracy, by the oblation of *piacular sacrifices* as *mulcts* for the faulty part of their moral character; the same rectitude of government would still make it requisite, that such of them as were reduced to that first and primitive state, by being cut off from all visible communion and intercourse with God and his peculiar people, should, when restored to that interrupted favour, be readmitted to it in the same way and manner which was observed in the first and original admission. And, accordingly, we find, that it was specially provided, that their readmission to that favour should be transacted by the oblation of *piacular sacrifices*. By their readmission to the union and communion, mentioned, a proper difference was made between their treatment and that of impenitent offenders: And by the *piacular sacrifices*, which they offered, on that occasion, as *mulcts* for the faulty part of their moral character, a proper difference was, likewise, made between their treatment and that of perfectly righteous creatures. The treatment, therefore, which they had, was perfectly congruous to their own mixed moral character,
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if there was any truth in their profession, or propriety and consistency in their behaviour; and exactly suitable to the rectitude of divine moral government.

C A S E VI.

§ 19. The penitent *Israelites*, after they were received by the Deity as his *peculiar people*, and admitted to the enjoyment of all the advantages and blessings of a temporal theocracy, might change their moral behaviour and character. They might return to folly and the practice of idolatry and vice by transgressing the *Law of Moses*.—When this happened to be done, the offenders would either remain impenitent, or be penitent.—If they remained impenitent, the rectitude of divine moral government would require, that the grievous primary penalties, which the law had denounced against the offence or offences which they were guilty of, should be inflicted on them. And, accordingly, those penalties were, in fact, ordered to be inflicted on them.—But if they were penitent, the wisdom and rectitude of divine government would make it requisite, that a quite different sort of treatment should be given them. They would make it fit and requisite, (1) That they should be better treated than impenitent offenders, by having the primary penalties, which they had incurred by their offences, remitted to them; and by having reward, proportionable to the measure of their subsequent obedience, conferred on them. And those *favours* were, in fact, granted to them. (2) That, while the grace and favour, mentioned, was shewn them, a proper difference should be made between their treatment and that of righteous creatures who needed no repentance, on the one hand; and that of penitent sinners who had not committed those offences which they had done, on the other hand. And what possibly could more properly or effectually answer both those ends, than the exacting from penitent sinners, in lieu of the grievous primary penalties which were remitted to them, a certain mild *mulct* for every sin which they did commit, and repent of? If this measure was taken, a proper difference would be made

made between the treatment of penitent sinners and that of righteous persons who needed no repentance; because the former would be subjected to a certain degree of penal treatment, from which the latter were free: and a like difference would be made and kept up between the treatment of one penitent sinner and that of another penitent sinner, because every person of this moral character would have the appointed *mult* to pay for each sin which he himself did commit, but for no sin that was committed by any other penitent sinner; and so every person of the penitent character would have his own proper burthen, and his own proper burthen only, to bear. Wherefore, because this was a fit and proper expedient for securing the rectitude of divine moral government by answering the ends, mentioned, the Deity was pleased to make use of it: for he condemned all penitent sinners, the whole collective body of them, and every individual, in the penalty of being at the charge of certain piacular sacrifices or oblations for every particular sin which they, or any of them, did commit. See *Levit.* iv. v. and *ch.* vi. 1—7.

§ 20. In the foregoing *six cases* (which were all the cases in which piacular sacrifices and oblations were ordered to be offered under the *Law of Moses*) I have exhibited a clear, distinct, and full view of the treatment which penitent sinners had from the Deity under the *Hebrew Theocracy*; and have shewn, that that treatment was, in all its parts, and in every respect, perfectly consistent with, and conformable to, the rectitude of divine moral government.—I shall now conclude all that I have said upon this subject, with a few *corollaries*.

§ 21. *Coroll. I.* Under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, there was, in the treatment of penitent sinners, a wonderful and wise mixture of *punishment* and *reward*; a mixture of punishment and reward exactly suited to their mixed moral character; correspondent to every change that could happen in their behaviour; calculated to make, and keep up, a due and proper difference between their treatment and the treatment of all others who were not of the same moral character; yea, between the treatment of one penitent sinner and
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that of all other penitent sinners; and admirably adapted to the wisdom, goodness, end, and rectitude of a *theocratic* government: punishment and reward concurring, in perfect harmony, and without any unnatural repugnancy, in the treatment of one and the same moral character. For so far were the piacular *mults*, which were exacted from penitent sinners under this dispensation of religion, from being any obstruction to the enjoyment of a reward suitable to the measure and degrees of their obedience, that they were the very means whereby that reward was rendered congruous to their mixed moral character, and reduced to such a righteous proportion as made it suitable to the measure and degree of obedience performed by each of them. The more sins any person did commit, the more loss, and diminution, would he suffer in his worldly circumstances (even though he was penitent for them) by being at the charge of those piacular sacrifices and oblations, which he was ordered to offer for them: consequently, his external prosperity (*that is*, the reward of his obedience) would diminish in exact proportion to the number of his sins, and become, from time to time, suitable to the nature and right of his case. In this view of things, the institution and oblation of piacular sacrifices have a sense, a meaning, an end, which (though it is not duly adverted to, yet) is rational in itself, worthy of the Deity, and expressive of the consummate wisdom of the glorious king of *Israel*, who, by one simple sort of *mean*, duly applied in different cases, and properly repeated on various occasions, could produce so many noble effects, and promote a variety of important ends, in an amiable consistency with the perfect rectitude of his own moral government.

§ 22. *Coroll. II.* The *Law of Moses* not only confirms all those notices which *the light of nature* gives us concerning the divine treatment of penitent sinners, as being partly premial and partly penal; but, likewise, supplies us with that light and information, which *the light of nature* doth not afford; by shewing us, how punishment and reward not only may, but actually do, meet together, in perfect harmony, and without any repugnancy, in the divine treatment

treatment of penitent sinners. This appears to me, to be a presumptive evidence, that the *Law of Moses* was given by God, and has the characteristic of a *divine revelation*.

§ 23. *Coroll. III.* Having got a clear and distinct idea of the treatment, which penitent sinners had from the Deity, under the *Hebrew Theocracy*; we may hence form a general idea of the treatment, which persons of this moral character will have from him under all other dispensations of religion: For, the rectitude of divine moral government, being invariably the same under all dispensations of religion, will render the same kind of treatment, which is fit for penitent sinners under any one dispensation of religion, fit for persons of this moral character under all dispensations of religion; though, perhaps, different *media* or means may be made use of in the conveyance of it.—We may, therefore, in the general, be certain, that, under all dispensations of religion, the treatment of penitent sinners will be worse than that of perfectly righteous creatures, and much better than that of impenitent offenders. We may, likewise, rest assured, that, though penitent sinners, under all dispensations of religion, will have the grievous punishment, or punishments, to which they were obnoxious while they remained impenitent, remitted to them, and reward suitable to the various measures and degrees of their obedience, conferred on them; yet, they will be put, and kept, under such a degree of mild penal treatment, as may be sufficient to make, and keep up, a due difference between their treatment and that of perfectly righteous creatures, and between the treatment of one penitent sinner and that of another penitent sinner.

§ 24. *Coroll. IV.* As a plain and genuine consequence of the last *Corollary*, I add, That as the treatment, which penitent sinners had from the Deity under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, must, for the reason already mentioned, have been, in some measure, *representative* of the treatment which persons of that moral character were to have from him, under the *Christian* dispensation of religion; so the legal piacular sacrifices, which did constitute a considerable part of the treatment of penitent sinners, under that *Theocracy*,
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ought to be considered as *types* or *shadows*, that is, as obscure and imperfect resemblances, of the sacrifice of *Jesus Christ*, by which a very material and important part of the treatment of persons of this character, is formed under the *gospel-kingdom* of God, both in its preparatory state here on earth, and in its perfect state, in heaven. And, accordingly, we really find the writer of *the epistle to the Hebrews* considering them, oftner than once, in this very light. For he says, that *the law* (as appointing piacular sacrifices to be offered by, and for, penitent sinners) *had a shadow of good things to come*, Heb. x. 1. And, that *the priests* (who offered these sacrifices) *served unto the shadow and example of heavenly things*, Heb. viii. 4, 5. And he calls *the purging with shed blood* (that is, the way of obtaining the remission of sins by the shed blood of the legal sacrifices) *a pattern of things in the Heavens*, Heb. ix. 22, 23.—And whereas they, who were high priests under the *Law of Moses*, were *ordained of God, to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins* (that is, for the sins of penitent offenders, who had sinned through error or human frailty) a like treatment of persons of this moral character was observed under the gospel; for, God *glorified Christ to be an high priest*; who being ordained of God to this office of priesthood, *there was a necessity, that he should have something* (some piacular sacrifice for the sins of penitent offenders) *to offer*, Heb. v. 1—5. compared with ch. viii. 3.

§ 25. With these *lights* in our hand, and carrying along with us a right idea of piacular sacrifice, as being a *mult* for sin, and for faultiness of moral character; we may now, with great advantage, and upon sure and clear *data*, proceed to exhibit the rectitude of divine moral government, in the treatment of moral characters, and, particularly, in the treatment of penitent sinners, under the *Christian* dispensation of religion. But, before I enter upon this subject, it will be proper to spend a little time, in considering the reasons which the Deity had for setting aside the *Hebrew Theocracy*, and erecting a new dispensation of religion in its place. I, therefore, proceed to



C H A P. VI.

Concerning the imperfection of the provision which was made for the treatment of moral characters, particularly, of penitent sinners under the Hebrew Theocracy; and the need, which there was of a remedy for that imperfection, by the introduction of a new and more perfect dispensation of religion.

§ 1. **W**HEN the *Hebrew Theocracy* is considered as a temporal one, calculated only for regulating the worldly state of the people of *Israel*, and of such of other nations as might submit to it, in all things relating to *religion* and *civil policy*; the treatment, which moral characters, of all kinds, had under it, was so perfectly conformable to the rectitude of divine moral government, that enough cannot be said in its praise, nor can we sufficiently admire the wisdom, goodness, and equity of it.

§ 2. Under this *Theocracy*, the nature of offences was well weighed, and duly considered. And the primary penalties, which were annexed to them, were heightened, or lowered in severity, in exact proportion to the greater or lesser heinousness of their nature, and according to their greater or lesser tendency to the hurt and ruin of society. They who were guilty of *high treason*, such as *idolaters*, and *contemners* of supreme authority; and they whose crimes had a direct and immediate tendency to promote the ruin of the society, were ordered to *be put to death*. But they, whose offences were of a less heinous nature, were ordered to be chastised with punishments of a milder nature, and those diversified in weight and measure, in exact proportion to the aggravating and alleviating circumstances of the particular crimes of which they were guilty.

§ 3. A just regard was, likewise shewn to the *different dispositions* of offenders both at, and after, the time of offending.—They who
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had sinned *presumptuously*, from a wilful, deliberate, and wanton contempt of authority, were capitally punished. But they, whose offences were the mere result of *human frailty*, were punished in a milder manner: if they were impenitent, they were condemned to suffer the primary penalties which were annexed to the crimes of which they had been guilty: but if they were penitent, they were treated conformably to their mixed moral character; the punishment, which had been due to them in their impenitent state, was remitted; and reward, suitable to the measure of their renewed obedience, was conferred on them; but, in order to preserve a proper difference between their treatment and that of perfectly righteous creatures, they were condemned to offer certain piacular sacrifices, as *mulets* for the sins which they had committed: and, in the appointment of those *mulets*, gracious allowances were made for the ease of the *poor*; for less costly oblations were accepted from them than from the *rich*.

§ 4. Again, when a penitent sinner relapsed into disobedience and impenitency, he was treated according to this change of moral character, and was ordered to suffer the primary penalty, or penalties, which the law had denounced against the sin, or sins, which he had committed. But if this same person became penitent for what he had done amiss, he was, in that case, received again to the state of favour from which he had fallen; only he was condemned in the oblation of a piacular sacrifice, as a *mulet*, or secondary penalty for his: by which *mulet*, a proper difference was made between his treatment and that of other penitent sinners, who had not offended as he had done; and his worldly felicity (*that is*, the reward of his obedience) became, by this diminution of it, suitable to the nature and right of his case.

§ 5. Moreover, when more favour was, on any occasion, shewn to any penitent sinner than to other persons of the same moral character, care was taken to reduce this *surplus* of favour, by a proper degree of penal treatment, so far as to make it evident, that the person received this superior degree of favour as a penitent sinner only, and

and not as having a better moral character than other penitent sinners: For, at the time he had such a *surplus* of favour conferred on him, he was ordered to offer certain piacular oblations, as a *multa* for the faulty part of his moral character.

§ 6. Finally; the treatment, which all persons had from the Deity under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, was not only conformable, but, at all times, conformable, to their respective moral characters, and to the rectitude of divine moral government. Impenitent sinners were, at no time, treated as perfectly righteous creatures, or as penitent offenders, but in a way worse than either of the two. And penitent sinners were never treated either as perfectly righteous creatures, or as impenitent offenders; but had, at all times, a middle sort of treatment given them, suitable to their own mixed moral character, and to the rectitude of divine moral government, as being *worse* than that of perfectly righteous creatures, but much *better* than that of impenitent sinners.

§ 7. From this short view, therefore, which I have here given, of the treatment which all sorts of moral characters had from the Deity, under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, 'tis manifest, that the treatment was, in all respects, congruous to the rectitude of divine moral government; and that that *Theocracy* had not, in respect of *rectitude*, any defect or imperfection at all.

§ 8. But although the *Hebrew Theocracy*, considered as a form of divine government, which had, for its object, the regulation of the civil and religious state of those who lived under it, while they continued in this world, and no longer, was, in respect of *rectitude*, a most perfect and unexceptionable dispensation of religion; yet, when it is considered with regard to the *present* and *future state* of the bulk of mankind, who did not live under it, and even with regard to the *future state* of those who did live under it, it appears to have been a very defective and imperfect dispensation of religion, as not providing for any part of mankind such a treatment, through all the successive periods, and the whole duration, of their existence, as was congruous to their different moral characters, and the rectitude of divine moral government. For,

§ 9. I. Although the *Israelites*, and *profelytes of justice*, were treated, under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, suitably to their respective moral characters, and the rectitude of divine moral government; yet, that *Theocracy* made no provision for a like treatment of the bulk of mankind, who either knew nothing of it, or were not willing to be subject to it.—Under this *Theocracy*, indeed, they who were *Israelites* by birth, or by *profelytism*, had a most equitable moral treatment, a treatment duly diversified according to the differences and variations of their respective moral characters.—The daring, presumptuous sinner was treated after one way; and the weak, frail sinner after another way.—The penitent and impenitent were used with such just and righteous distinctions as rendered their treatment suitable to their respective moral characters.—And between the treatment of one penitent sinner, and that of another penitent sinner, such differences were made, as rendered the treatment of every person of this character suitable to his particular behaviour.—But then, the *Hebrew Theocracy* made no provision at all for such an equitable treatment of men in the *Gentile world*. For here, without any thing being done by that *Theocracy* to prevent it, the moral characters of the frail and of the presumptuous sinner, of the penitent and of the impenitent, were confounded and jumbled together, and not distinguished from each other by any suitable difference of treatment, provided by that dispensation of religion.—The *Hebrew Theocracy*, therefore, though it was calculated to afford such a treatment to those who lived under it, as was perfectly suitable to their respective characters, and to the rectitude of divine moral government; yet, it made no provision at all for such a just and righteous treatment of the rest of mankind; and, for that reason, it was very defective, and, in no respect, calculated to answer the case and exigencies of all mankind. And, indeed, it was never intended, that it should do this.

§ 10. II. When the provision, which was made by the *Hebrew Theocracy*, for a different treatment of moral agents, according to their different moral characters, and the variations of those characters, is considered with regard to the *future life* of men (whether

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Jews or Gentiles) in the world to come, it appears to be very defective. The rewards which were promised to the obedient, and the punishments which were denounced against the disobedient, were all of a worldly nature; and, of course, could make no difference, in the world to come, between the treatment of one moral agent and that of another, according to the difference between their respective moral characters.—The *Hebrew Theocracy* was calculated for the present, and not for the future state of those who lived under it. It was a *temporal*, not an *eternal*, *Theocracy*. It makes no mention of *rewards* and *punishments* in a world to come; nor of any manner of provision, in such a world, for a different treatment of men (no, not even of those who lived under it) according to their different moral characters.—Considered, indeed, as a *temporal Theocracy*, calculated for the *Israelites* in this present life, it was, to that people, a dispensation of religion which was consummately perfect; as making full and ample provision for a different treatment of persons according to their different moral characters, whatever they were: but, considered with regard to their *future life* in the world to come, it was utterly defective, even with respect to them, as well as to the rest of mankind.—Though it promised, to the obedient, a *happy life* in the land of *Canaan*, yet it could not give them (eternal life) Gal. iii. 21. It did not bring in a better hope, i. e. the hope of a future and better life in the world to come. It promised no such life to the obedient; nor did it make any manner of provision for a different treatment of men, in the world to come, according to the *merit* and *demerit* of their behaviour in the present world: And, for these reasons, we are told, that the *Law made nothing perfect*, Heb. vii. 19.—More particularly, means were provided, under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, for making, and keeping up a proper difference between the treatment of penitent sinners and that of all other moral characters. On the one hand; a due difference was made between the treatment of penitent sinners and that of impenitent offenders, by the *former* having those punishments, which the *latter* suffered, remitted to them, and temporal felicity in the land of *Canaan*, proportionable to the measure of their

their obedience, conferred on them. But then, the punishments remitted to the penitent, and the rewards conferred on them, being of a temporal and worldly nature, could not be means for making, and keeping up, such a difference, or, indeed, any difference at all, between the treatment of the penitent and that of the impenitent in the world to come. On the other hand; under this *Theocracy*, a due difference was made and preserved between the treatment of penitent sinners and that of perfectly righteous creatures, by piacular oblations, offered as *mulcts* for sin, and for faultiness of moral character. But, it is very manifest, that such a difference could not be made and preserved between the treatment of these two moral characters, in the world to come, by the means mentioned. For,

§ 11. 1st. The priests, who were ordained to offer the piacular sacrifices and oblations of penitent sinners, were, for a very good reason, taken from among frail men who were subject to infirmities, Heb. v. 1, 2.—vii. 28. But, in the world to come, the penitent *Israelite* would find no priest of this sort, to offer his piacular sacrifices and oblations.

§ 12. 2^{dly}. Although the *Aaronical priesthood* had been continued to the end of this world, by a regular uninterrupted succession of persons to that office; yet, because every person, in this succession, was subject to death, and because his office, as a priest, ceased at his death, it was impossible, that that *priesthood* should remain in force in the world to come. And, therefore, in this future world, the penitent *Israelites* could find no priest of the family of *Aaron*, to offer those piacular sacrifices which the *Law of Moses* required to be offered for him by such a priest, Heb. vii. 23.

§ 13. 3^{dly}. But though it had been possible for the penitent *Israelites*, to have found, in heaven, priests of the family of *Aaron*, to offer their piacular sacrifices for them; yet they could not, there, find the sacrifices themselves: for we have no reason to think, that heaven is stocked with *sheep, goats, bullocks, pigeons, &c.* Or, if it be thus stocked, that its inhabitants have any distinct property in them. Wherefore, in heaven, a due difference, between the treatment

ment of the penitent part of the *Israelites* and that of perfectly righteous creatures, cannot be made and preserved, by the former's offering such things as those in sacrifice, as *mulcts* for the faulty part of their moral character.

§ 14. 4^{thly}, Had one single oblation of those piacular sacrifices, which obtained under the *Hebrew Theocracy*, been sufficient to make an uninterrupted, permanent, and everlasting difference between the treatment of penitent sinners and that of perfectly righteous creatures, there would have been no reason for providing, or appointing, any other expedient, or means, for perpetuating that difference in the world to come: but when a daily, weekly, monthly, and annual repetition of those piacular sacrifices was necessary to preserve that difference of treatment, even in this world; it is plain, that the difference, between the treatment of penitent sinners and that of perfectly righteous creatures, would cease, whenever the repeated oblation of those sacrifices became impracticable; and, consequently, that penitent sinners, if admitted to the happiness of the heavenly state, without any further provision made by the Deity to prevent it, would be treated in the same way with perfectly righteous creatures; and, therefore, in a way absolutely repugnant to the faulty part of their own moral character, and to the rectitude of divine moral government. (b) This argument is, several times, urged by the writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, in order to shew the *weakness* and *unprofitableness* of them, and their utter insufficiency to answer the need of those, who offered them, in the world to come. See *Heb.* vii. 26, 27.—ix. 24—26.—x. 1—4; 11—14.—In the *verses*, referred to in the last of those *chapters*, it is expressly affirmed, that *the law could never, with those sacrifices, which they offered year by year, make the comers thereto* (i. e. the worshippers) *FOREVER perfect*; (i) because those sacrifices, if they could have produced this effect, *would not have ceased to be offered*; or there would have been no need to make any further provision.

(b) See the former *Essay*, Chap. II. Sect. III. § 3—6.

(i) See this same *Essay*, Chap. III. Sect. II. Part II. at the marginal note (w)

vision for the treatment of penitent sinners, by the introduction of a new and more perfect dispensation of religion.—And, in opposition to the *one offering*, by which Christ *both perfected FOREVER them that are sanctified*, it is said, That the legal sacrifices, *which were often offered, can never take away sins*, viz. FOREVER, as appears from the *antithesis*.

§ 15. 5thly, The annual oblation of those piacular sacrifices, which were offered on the *day of expiation*, was, to the *Israelites*, a plain intimation not only of the weakness of those very sacrifices, but of the utter insufficiency of all the other legal sacrifices, to procure such a full and durable remission of sins, as the case of penitent sinners required.—Those piacular sacrifices were of two sorts. The one was *ordinary*, being such as were frequently offered on other occasions: but the other were *extraordinary*, being such as were offered *on the day of expiation* only. I shall confine my present observations to the latter sort; because the annual oblation of them, on a certain day, and with the extensive view of *cleansing the Israelites from ALL their iniquities, and from ALL their transgressions in ALL their sins*, furnishes us with a clear and demonstrative proof of the weakness and insufficiency both of those sacrifices, and of all the other legal sacrifices, to procure the remission of sin FOREVER, or, which is the same thing, in the world to come.

§ 16. On the day of *expiation*, then, the high-priest, by offering a *bullock* as a *sin-offering* for himself and his family, and a *kid of the goats* as a *sin-offering* for the people, *made an atonement for himself and his family, and for the congregation*; that is, for the whole collective body of the penitent *Israelites*: and all this he did, *to cleanse them, that they might be clean from ALL their sins, before the Lord*, Levit. xvi. 30.—On this memorable day, likewise, the high-priest was ordered, *to confess, over the head of the scape-goat, ALL the iniquities of the children of Israel*; not only the *legal uncleannesses* by which they had defiled the *tabernacle*, but *ALL their iniquities, and ALL their transgressions in ALL their sins*, Levit. xvi. 21.—And when this was done, the *scape-goat* was ordered *to be sent into the desert, bearing (emblematically) upon him ALL their iniquities, unto a land*

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not inhabited, v. 22.—And while all these things were doing, the *Israelites* were required, under a most severe penalty, *to afflict their souls, Levit. xxiii. 29.*—These things were done not for one time only, but once every year, on a stated day.

§ 17. Now what could the *Israelites*, in reason, think of all those piacular sacrifices which they had formerly offered for their sins, when they thus saw, that all the sins, for which they had been offered, were *called again to remembrance*; and that a *sin-offering* was to be offered for them every year, just as if no piacular sacrifices had been formerly offered for them? The first and most natural thought, I think, that their own reflections would have suggested to them, is, that all the piacular sacrifices, which they had formerly offered to procure the remission of those their sins, had not fully answered that end; and that a more ample and durable remission of sins, than what could be obtained by the oblation of those sacrifices, was still wanting.—Without such an *inference* as this, I do not see, what sense the *Israelites* could have made of a yearly repetition of a new piacular sacrifice, *to cleanse them from ALL their sins*, even from those very sins, for the obtaining of the remission of which, they had, before-hand, offered many piacular sacrifices; or, of being themselves required to have their sins *confessed*, and *to afflict their souls for them*, every year, on a stated day, just as if those sins had not been, heretofore, pardoned. Had the *Israelites* been fully satisfied, that the sacrifices, which they had formerly offered for their sins, were sufficient to obtain for them a full and durable remission of those sins, they could not but have looked upon all the pompous transactions of *the day of expiation* as superfluous and ridiculous.

§ 18. Again; what hope could any *Israelite* conceive of obtaining a durable pardon of his sins, through the efficacy even of that sin-offering which was annually offered, *on the day of expiation, to cleanse him*, and the other *Israelites*, *that they might be clean from ALL their sins, before the Lord*? Had that sin-offering been only once offered, the *Israelites* would have had some ground to hope, that it might prove sufficient to procure a permanent and durable remission of

of all their sins. But when it was ordered, every year, to be repeated on a certain day, and still to cleanse them, that they might be clean from ALL THEIR SINS, from those very sins for which a like sin-offering had been offered in every one of the foregoing years; this was a plain proof of the weakness and insufficiency of its efficacy; a clear and incontestable intimation, that a more full and durable remission of sins was wanting, than what was attainable by a sin-offering which needed to be so often repeated.—The *sin-offering*, which was offered for the *present year*, would be a proof and document of the weakness and insufficiency of all the *sin-offerings* which had been offered, *on the day of expiation*, in the *preceding years*. And the repetition of the same *sin-offering*, the next year following, would be as clear a proof and document of the weakness and insufficiency of that which was now offered, as it would be of the weakness and insufficiency of all those which had gone before it.—And so on, from year to year, *in infinitum*, the *sin-offering*, which was offered on the *last day of expiation*, would shew the weakness and insufficiency of all those which had gone before it.—Wherefore, it is manifest, that the annual oblation of a *sin-offering*, on the day of *expiation*, to cleanse the Israelites, that they might be clean from ALL their sins, was a proof and document of the weakness and insufficiency not only of all the other legal, piacular sacrifices, but of that annual *sin-offering* itself.

§ 19. From the foregoing observations, put together, it clearly appears, that the *Hebrew Theocracy* was, in some respects, a very imperfect and defective dispensation of religion. It made no provision for a different treatment even of those who lived under it, according to their different moral characters, in the world to come. And for the rest of mankind, it made no provision for their being treated in that manner, either in *that* or in the *present world*.—And from this great and obvious imperfection of the *Hebrew Theocracy*, 'tis manifest, that there was both room and need for a new dispensation of religion; a dispensation of religion more extensive and durable than the other was, and calculated to remedy the imperfection and defects of it, by making suitable provision for the treatment

treatment of the whole human race, according to their different moral characters, and the rectitude of divine government, both in the *present* and the *future* state of their existence.

§ 20. And, as there was both room and need for such an extensive, universal, and durable dispensation of religion; so there was ground, and good reason, to hope for it. For since the Deity is the God of the *Gentiles*, as well as the God of the *Jews*; the supreme governour and judge of the whole human race; and such a righteous governour and judge as will, at all times, and in all cases, *do that which is right*; it is most certain, that he will treat all men, equitably, and according to their moral behaviour, whether they have been perfectly righteous, or offenders either *penitent* or *impenitent*: and, consequently, that he will find out, and constitute means, for making and preserving all such differences in his treatment of different moral characters, as will render the treatment of every individual suitable to his particular moral character, and congruous to the rectitude of divine moral government.—Wherefore, since the *Hebrew Theocracy* made no provision for such a treatment of all mankind, through all the periods of their existence, it was reasonable, agreeable to the differences which are observable between the moral characters of men, to the attributes of Deity, and to the wisdom and rectitude of his moral government, to expect the erection of a new dispensation of religion; more *universal, durable, and perfect*; and by which all the defects of the *former* were to be remedied, and effectual provision made for the everlasting treatment of the whole human race, with such just and righteous distinctions, as should tally with all the differences of moral character found among them, and be demonstrative of the wisdom, goodness, and perfect rectitude of divine moral government.—The erection of such a new and glorious dispensation of religion as this, the whole human race had reason and ground to hope for; and they could not but hope for it, if they did attend, in a due manner, to the nature and reasons of things.

§ 21. But the *Israelites*, who were a part of mankind, had special and peculiar reasons, resulting from the nature and appointments of that

that theocracy, under which they lived, to hope for such a perfect and durable constitution of things.—Their *tabernacle* was a worldly sanctuary, Heb. ix. 1. But such a worldly sanctuary as was a figure or emblem of the heavenly sanctuary, v. 9. and a *pattern of things in the heavens*, v. 23. with which compare *Exod.* xxv. 8, 9, 40. *Acts* vii. 44. *Heb.* viii. 5.—This mundane, emblematic tabernacle had two courts, the outer and the inner. The outer court was the place where the priests, at all times, performed the duties of their function. But the inner court was the presence-chamber, as it were, of God, the glorious king of *Israel*, where he was enthroned in state, and dwelt between the *cherubim* in the *Shechinah*, which was the visible symbol of his presence: and, on this account, the inner court of the tabernacle was a proper and significant emblem of *heaven*, where God has fixed his everlasting throne.—Into this inner court (which was called *the Holy of Holies*, and *the most Holy Place*) no person was, at any time, or on any account, permitted to enter, except the high-priest only. Nor was this permission granted, at any time, even to the high-priest, but on *the day of expiation* only, which happened but once in the space of a whole year.—At other times, even on the most solemn occasions, all the peculiar sacrifices were offered, and the other business, belonging to the priesthood, transacted, either in the outer court, or at the door of it: but, on *the day of expiation*, the high-priest entered alone into the *Holy of Holies*, carrying with him the *blood* of his own; and of the people's *sin-offering*, which he sprinkled seven times upon the *mercy-seat eastward*, and before the *mercy-seat*, to make an atonement for them and himself, that they might be clean from all their sins, before the Lord, *Levit.* xvi. 14, 15, 30.—Now, since *the Holy of Holies* was a figure or emblem of *Heaven*, the high-priest's thus entering into it, on one day only, in the space of a whole year, with the *blood* of a *sin-offering* for himself, and of another for the people, signified (or intimated) that the way into the holiest of all (i. e. *Heaven*) was not yet made manifest, while as the first tabernacle was yet standing, *Heb.* ix. 7, 8.—Although the high-priest was permitted to go into *the Holy of Holies*, with the blood of a sin-offering for himself, and of another

another for the people, yet it was but very seldom that he was permitted to enter into it; and for the people, they might, at no time, enter into it.—This rare access which the high-priest himself had to the *Holy of Holies*, which was an emblem of heaven, and the total exclusion of the people from it, supplied the thinking and judicious with this lesson, *that the way into heaven was not made manifest, or laid open, by those, or by any other piacular sacrifices which were offered under the Law of Moses; and so afforded them a clear intimation of the inefficacy and unprofitableness of all those sacrifices, with regard to a future state of life and existence: concerning which I have said enough already.*

§ 22. But although the *Israelites* were, by the means mentioned, given to know, *that the way into Heaven was not laid open under the first tabernacle; yet, by the very same means, they were instructed and taught, that the way into Heaven would, in due time, be laid open by the blood of a sacrifice of greater excellence and efficacy, provided by the Deity for that very end.* For the high-priest's entering, once in the space of a year, into the *Holy of Holies*, with the blood of one sin-offering, to make atonement with it for the whole congregation of *Israel*, *that they might be clean from ALL their sins*, did emblematically signify, that one sin-offering would, in its proper season, be exhibited and offered, that would fully answer the need of all penitent sinners, as being available to lay open the way into heaven, by obtaining for them a durable and eternal remission of their sins: but that the blood of this sin-offering would not be brought into the worldly sanctuary, but be carried by the high-priest, who was to offer it, into the highest heavens, (of which the *Holy of Holies*, in the earthly tabernacle, was a figure or emblem) there to make an everlasting atonement for ALL the sins of all true and sincere penitents.

§ 23. This sin-offering, therefore, which was offered, on the day of expiation, for the whole congregation of *Israel*, was a figure, or emblem, of the one, all-sufficient sacrifice of *Jesus Christ*, who did not enter into the holy places made with hands, which are the figures of the true, but into heaven itself, to appear in the presence of God for us,

us, Heb. ix. 24.—who did not enter into the (mundane) *holy place*, with the blood of bulls and goats, (as the Jewish high-priests did) but into a greater and more perfect tabernacle (i. e. Heaven) with his own blood, having (thereby) obtained that ETERNAL REDEMPTION for us, which the legal sacrifices could not effect, Heb. ix. 11, 12. —Here we may make a *pause*, and admire the great wisdom of God in the institution of this *sin-offering*, which was offered *on the day of expiation*, and ordering the oblation of it to be made in such a manner, as might at once discover its own insufficiency, and the insufficiency of all the other legal, piacular sacrifices, to procure an eternal remission of sins; and be, at the same time, an instructive figure and emblem of the one all-perfect *sacrifice of Christ*, by which the imperfection of the efficacy of all the legal sacrifices was to be fully remedied, and eternal remission and redemption effectually secured for all true and sincere penitents.—Thus it appears, that the legal dispensation of religion is closely connected with the *Christian*. And, indeed, the *former* slides so easily and naturally into the *latter*, that St. Paul, with great propriety and truth, tells us, that *the Law of Moses was a school-master* (a teacher, or instructor) *to bring men to Christ*, Gal. iii. 24.

§ 24. To conclude: Both *Jews* and *Gentiles* had sufficient ground to expect a new dispensation of religion; a dispensation more universal, durable, and perfect than that under which the *former* lived; and by which provision would be made for an eternal treatment of the whole human race, and of penitent sinners in particular, according to their different moral characters, and in a perfect congruity with the wisdom, goodness, and rectitude of divine moral government.—And whether the dispensation of religion, which has been erected by *Jesus Christ*, be such an one, is a thing which deserves a serious, careful, and thorough examination.

The END of the FIRST VOLUME.



